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ABSTRACT 
 
Ned Richardson-Little: Between Dictatorship and Dissent: Ideology, Legitimacy, and Human 
Rights in East Germany, 1945-1990 
(Under the supervision of: Konrad Jarausch) 
 
The project examines how the idea of human rights developed in East Germany, first as a 
tool of legitimization of the socialist state, and eventually by East Germans themselves, in 
citizen-based social movement, to radically alter the Cold War status quo in 1989.   
In response to West German attacks against their control over East Germany after the 
Second World War, the ruling East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) adopted the language of 
human rights in order to undermine its opponents and legitimize its rule. The deployment of the 
language of human rights by the East German state went well beyond simple sloganeering: in 
1959, the SED created the Eastern Bloc’s only state-sponsored human rights organization – two 
years before the founding of Amnesty International. East German intellectuals loyal to the state 
developed a unique ideological conception of “socialist human rights,” that reimagined the SED 
dictatorship as a champion of a superior human rights to those of the imperialist West. These 
ideas were internalized by the SED leadership, disseminated to the population, and became 
central to diplomatic efforts to secure support from the developing world.  
The SED’s appropriation of the discourse of human rights works to explain why a 
dissident movement that was practically non-existent in 1985 could so rapidly grow as to provide 
the discursive underpinning of a revolution by 1989. East German human rights activists were 
not working in an ideological vacuum, but were fighting against an entrenched hegemonic 
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discourse of human rights to legitimize state socialism and the status quo. Only in the late 1980s 
did activists re-appropriate the language of human rights for the cause of democratization 
drawing on inspiration from Western activists, Eastern dissidents, and South American human 
rights activists, to claim that they – and not the state – were the true champions of socialism and 
of socialist human rights. The rise of a citizen-based human rights movement in 1980s East 
Germany was thus not simply the result of Western diplomatic pressure, but of a transnational 
process that began with the SED appropriation of the mantle of human rights, and ended in the 
streets of Berlin in 1989 when East Germans finally took it back. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Unjust differences in wealth will still persist, but the exploitation of man by man will have 
become impossible because it will be impossible to seize the means of production…and 
make them private property. 
-Vladimir Lenin1 
 
The Exploitation of Man by Man Has Been Abolished. 
-Article 2, East German Constitution, 19682 
 
Capitalism is the exploitation of man by man. Yes? Well socialism is exactly the reverse.  
-Anonymous3 
 
 As the East German political system was about to collapse in the face of mass protests in 
September 1989, the GDR-Committee for Human Rights celebrated its fortieth anniversary under 
a cloud of uncertainty. The state-sponsored socialist human rights advocacy group was treated to 
a speech by Prof. Dr. Frank Berg, a member of the group’s Presidium, who lauded the fine work 
of the East German state and its intellectuals in furthering the cause of socialist human rights, but 
cautioned that work still had to be done to come to terms with the mistakes of the past. The 
crimes of Stalinism needed to be examined and laid bare, but he warned the audience of going 
too far: “The history of socialism would, however, be turned upside down if it was represented 
as a history of human rights violations.”4 At that time, Berg could not have known that in less 
than two months the Berlin Wall would be opened, or that exactly four months later, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Vladimir Lenin, “The Economic Basis of the Withering Away of the State,” The State and Revolution (1917), 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/ch05.htm. 
2 Verfassung der DDR (6 Apr 1968), www.documentarchiv.de/ddr/verfddr1968.html. 
 
3 Paraphrased from an old Czechoslovak joke by spy novelist Len Deighton in Funeral in Berlin (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2009), 145. 
4 Frank Berg. “Socialist Conception of Human Rights under Discussion,” Bulletin – GDR Committee for Human 
Rights, 15:2 (1989), 17. 
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headquarters of the once feared secret police, the Stasi, would be taken over by protestors or that 
a year later, a treaty for the reunification of Germany would be under consideration in both Bonn 
and East Berlin. In that short span of time, however, he was proved quite correct about one thing 
– once East Germans began to view state socialism as the violator of their human rights rather 
than the architect of their fulfillment, everything would indeed be turned upside down. 
 More than twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is difficult to see how Prof. 
Berg could have viewed a regime that denied the rights of its citizens to free speech, free 
assembly, unrestricted travel, and of course the right to vote in competitive elections, as not only 
compliant with human rights norms, but as an international leader in the field. The tens of 
thousands of East Germans who took to the streets in fall 1989 with banners demanding “Human 
Rights and Freedom,” seemed to conclusively demonstrate that these claims were no more than 
cynical and hypocritical propaganda.5 Yet only a few years earlier there had not been a single 
independent human rights organization in the GDR. While the USSR and other Eastern Bloc 
states were faced with active resistance from human rights dissidents beginning in the 1960s and 
even more so in the 1970s, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (the Socialist Unity Party, 
SED) forestalled the emergence of an independent human rights organization in the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) until 1986, when Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte (Initiative 
for Peace and Human Rights, IFM) emerged from the peace movement. In the final years of the 
GDR, human rights transformed from a discourse used only by those applying to emigrate to the 
West and small pockets of radical thought within the church to the unifying discourse of a 
revolution. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Michael Richter, Die Friedliche Revolution: Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen 1989/90 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 279.
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 The triumph of the human rights movement in the GDR is usually attributed to the 
signing of the Helsinki Accords, an international treaty signed by thirty-five countries from both 
sides of the Iron Curtain in 1975.6 According to this narrative, the SED’s decision to affirm the 
principles of human rights in a binding treaty created an unstoppable combination of diplomatic 
pressure from abroad and a dissent from within that eventually brought down the Berlin Wall on 
November 9, 1989 and eventually state socialism altogether.7 The obvious brutality and perfidy 
of the East German state was thus brought down by the hubris and hypocrisy of its short-sighted 
leaders who cynically gambled on agreeing to human rights provisions that clearly contradicted 
the elemental structures of East German society. Helsinki simply unmasked the true feelings of 
the populace, tamped down through threats of force, coercion, and the fearsome retribution of the 
secret police, the Stasi. The narrative of western victory in the Cold War is thus integrated into 
broader historical accounts of the history of human rights as the inevitable march towards 
egalitarian liberal democracy, based on the “bulldozer logic” of human rights that relentless 
pressed forward towards progress.  
 Upon closer inspection, however, this narrative raises several questions: How could the 
SED, and indeed the rest of the Eastern Bloc, been so careless as to have signed on to human 
rights commitments that would fatally undermined its legitimacy? If such agreements were so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Daniel Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). For a journalistic account of this narrative, see Ulrich Schwarz, “Die 
Sprengkraft der Menschenrechte,” Der Spiegel (2008), 106–109. 
7 For the main work asserting the discontinuous effect of Helsinki Accords for the Eastern Bloc, see Daniel Thomas, 
The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001) as well as Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 19, which argues that the Eastern Bloc denied the validity of political and civil human 
rights prior to Helsinki. Works arguing that human rights were irrelevant to East German politics prior to 1975 
include Christian Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989: Social Movement in a Leninist 
Regime (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 116; Jürgen Wüst, Menschenrechtsarbeit im Zwielicht: 
zwischen Staatssicherheit und Antifaschismus (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 32; Steven Pfaff, “The Politics Of Peace in the 
GDR: The Independent Peace Movement, The Church, And The Origins Of The East German Opposition,” Peace & 
Change 26:3 (July 2001), 287.  
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damaging to the regime, why did it then take until 1989 for the system to collapse? In the case of 
the GDR, why was there not a single independent human rights organization until 1986? Why 
did East Germans only take to the streets in the thousands in the name of human rights almost a 
decade and a half after the Helsinki Accords were signed? The idea that the human rights 
promises of the Helsinki Accords naturally aroused popular rebellion is complicated by the fact 
that the SED had first claimed fidelity to human rights in 1946. The East German state did not 
hide from the language of human rights in the early post-war period, but rather embrace the 
concept as an element of socialist ideology and an element of the legitimizing discourse of SED 
rule. In 1959, it created the state-directed Committee for the Protection of Human Rights that 
mobilized parts of the East German population in the name of human rights against West 
German anti-communism and remilitarization. In the case of treaties, the Helsinki Accords were 
preceded by the SED’s commitment in 1968 to sign on to the United Nations Human Rights 
Covenants of 1966 as soon as the GDR became a member of that international organization. 
These commitments when beyond simple slogans and propaganda and the regime created a 
whole philosophy of “socialist human rights” and spearheaded an initiative to create an 
international “Socialist Declaration of Human Rights” in the 1980s. 
While the SED was exceptional in its early adoption of human rights as a discourse of 
legitimization and propaganda against the West, the East German people were noteworthy for 
their late adoption of human rights as a tool of dissent. When East Germans did revolt against the 
SED in June 1953, there was no talk of human rights in the demonstrations and protests that 
ensued. In 1968, while the Prague Spring rocked neighbouring Czechoslovakia, the SED held a 
plebiscite on the adoption of a new “Socialist Constitution,” which was touted as a step forward 
for human rights in the GDR and there was practically no backlash from the population. In the 
1970s, as a human rights became a global movement, East Germany remained an outlier in the 
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socialist world as one of the few without an organized human rights movement demanding 
reform. Those who sought to leave the GDR invoked international treaties, but those who 
remained did not challenge socialist rule based on the idea of human rights. The prominent 
dissidents in that decade avoided the language of human rights and some even attacked the 
human rights movements as reactionary.  
In contrast to the “Helsinki Effect” narrative, this dissertation instead argues the eventual 
arrival of a dissident human rights movement was not a linear process of western ideas inspiring 
revolution, but a complex social and political process of reimagining human rights through the 
existing discourses and norms of state socialism. The SED’s commitment to human rights was 
not just a cynical ploy, but rather it represented a genuine belief on the part of leading party 
members and loyal intellectuals that state socialism was the true champion of human rights 
against the forces of rapacious capitalism, imperialism and racism in the west. The concept of 
human rights was not seen by SED leaders and functionaries as alien to state socialism, but 
rather an integral aspect of rule. Adopting human rights as part of state ideology provided the 
SED an important means of legitimizing its rule and attacking opponents both at home and 
abroad. 
Human rights functioned to stabilize and legitimize SED rule until the 1980s, when the 
decades of propaganda was finally turned against the state by an organized human rights 
movement. When this dissident human rights movement arose, it did not import its ideas from 
western activists, but created a unique, syncretic, definition that borrowed elements from both 
sides of the Cold War as well as the non-aligned world and expressed itself in a local idiom. 
Many human rights activists in the GDR were initially committed to a socialist vision of a just 
society founded on the principles of human equality and public good, but argued that this could 
be achieved only through legally guaranteed political and civil rights. These dissidents claimed 
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to represent the highest ideals of socialism rather than the repudiation thereof. In 1989, human 
rights became a ubiquitous rallying cry for the mass opposition to the SED, but this obscured the 
diversity of the civic movement and the motivations for protests, which ranged from socialist 
utopianism and reform communism to those seeking immediate reunification with the West and 
the establishment of a social market economy. As SED officials and the socialist intelligentsia 
lost faith in their own conception of human rights and conviction in their own legitimacy, most 
chose to acknowledge the individual rights of their citizens and make a peaceful transition to 
democracy rather than support extreme violence to maintain control. Protest and opposition in 
the name of human rights only became self-evident once it had succeeded and in the beginning 
human rights was a marginal discourse in East German repertoires of dissent and resistance. The 
emergence of an organized movement for human rights came about only through the re-
imagination of human rights by dissidents in a way that brought together the diverse social and 
political concerns of the population and undermine the legitimizing human rights discourses 
crafted by the SED.  
The East German Dictatorship  
 At first glance, the history of human rights in the GDR is simply a story of their absence. 
Popular views of East Germany characterize it in terms of violent repression and the ever present 
threat of the secret police, the Stasi.8 Without the rule of law, open democracy or free movement, 
how could there be any doubt that the GDR was an inherently unjust state – an Unrechtsstaat. 
One historian of Amnesty International’s activism in the GDR argued that, in spite of 
international commitments,  “in practice the regime violated human rights every day.”9 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Some examples include Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-56 (New York: 
Allen Lane, 2012); Anna Funder, Stasiland: Stories From Behind The Berlin Wall (London: Granta Books, 2011). 
9 Anja Mihr, “Menschenrechtssituation im Alltag der Diktatur,” in Eckart Conze, Die demokratische Revolution 
1989 in der DDR (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), 56. 
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British scholar Anthony Glees has argued that beyond endorsing human rights for diplomatic 
gain, the embrace of such terminology and other democratic discourses, points solely to the 
interest of the state in cynically manipulating the population to cement its own power:  
To have laws guaranteeing dissent, criticism and free emigration, and to persecute those who 
sought to make use of these laws, was plainly intended to make to their subjects a very basic point 
about the will and nature of the regime, and its total determination to exercise power.10  
 
Glees has further attacked other historians who fail to explicitly denounce SED rule as a mass 
violation of human rights and the GDR “as a state in which human rights abuses were 
institutionalized and were a defining feature of the regime.”11 The failure to condemn in SED 
with the language of human rights was in itself taken to be a form of apology for the crimes of 
state socialism. 
Such interpretations work within the ‘totalitarianism’ frame that defined the GDR and 
other communist state as systems of rule rationalized by an all-encompassing ideology, based on 
the total politicization of society, and control through terroristic subjugation of all opposition. 
East Germany was, in the words of political scientist Klaus Schroeder, “a late-totalitarian 
paternalistic-surveillance state,” which was ruled through “coercion and force.”12 Daily life was 
dominated by a social-political dynamic dominated by violence, or the threat thereof, with all 
decisions imposed from the top down. According to this logic, society and culture ceased to truly 
exist for four decades and in their place existed only a regime-produced facsimile. From such a 
perspective, the only story worth telling in regards to human rights is their violation by the SED 
and the secret police, the Stasi, and their eventual realization through the end of state socialism. 
Since any true resistance would contradict the notion of presumption of an all-powerful state and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Anthony Glees, “Social Transformation Studies and Human Rights Abuses in East Germany after 1945,” in 
Christopher Flockton and Eva Kolinsky (eds.), Recasting East Germany (New York: Frank Kass, 1999), 175. 
11 Anthony Glees and David Childs, “Debate,” German Politics, Vol. 9, N. 2 (Aug 2000), 244. 
12 Klaus Schroeder, Der SED-Staat: Geschichte und Strukturen der DDR 1949-1990 (Köln: Böhlau, 2013), 648. 
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the overwhelming reach of the Stasi, the people of the GDR were no more than passive victims 
living authentically only in the smallest of private niches.   
 Such an interpretation provides a simple explanation to the paradox of stability and 
sudden collapse. Human rights were endorsed by the state as a means of taunting the populace; 
the people did not speak out due to fear or indoctrination. Yet, this version of events fails to 
account for both the elaborate system of human rights activism and intellectual production by the 
SED and the mass movement for human rights that emerged in the 1980s. It also fixates on the 
structures of the state and their differences, albeit crucial, from those of a liberal democracy. But 
this approach omits the subjectivity of East Germans who truly did believe that socialism was 
emancipatory in the wake of fascist dictatorship. As Eric Weitz has argued, “however repressive 
the practices of SED-state, however many personal tragedies traverse its history, the GDR 
remained linked ideologically to the Enlightenment humanism of the Marxism.”13 The 
totalitarian approach ignores the broad scope of everyday experiences for East Germans that 
were not defined by terror and violence. It certainly denigrates the popular protest, resistance, 
and opposition that existed from the beginning of the GDR but also the implicit and explicit 
loyalty to the system shown by many right until the end. Reducing more than forty years to the 
continuous violation of human rights does not correspond with the lived experiences of all East 
Germans, even those who were victims of the worst abuses of the Stasi. Without denying the 
ubiquity of an undemocratic state, this conception obfuscates the agency of the individual, their 
role in society, and his subjective experience through an excessive focus on rule from above. 
 The evolution of the idea of human rights in East Germany illuminates two complicating 
factors in the totalitarian narrative: the “paradox of care and coercion,” and the necessity of mass 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Eric Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 393. 
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participation within a system of dictatorship. As Konrad Jarausch has suggested, one should 
examine East Germany as a “welfare dictatorship” – a classification that “recalls the ideological 
goals of socialism, and the vision of an egalitarian social reform that it hoped to achieve for the 
benefit of the lower classes,” while still underscoring “the forced nature of the GDR’s socialist 
utopia and coercive methods used to achieve its goals.”14 The social and economic benefits of the 
system were tied to the SED’s legitimacy and underscored its right to rule. Although it is often 
argued that socialist states touted economic rights while downplaying political and civil rights, 
the SED proclaimed a commitment to all forms of human rights.15 In contrast to traditional forms 
of despotism grounded in overt state violence and oppression by a small group, the GDR was 
based on “the mobilisation of the masses […] and frequently voluntary mass participation in and 
support for [the regime].16 While functioning as a dictatorship, the SED claimed that East 
Germany held a higher form of democratic engagement that allowed for participation by the 
people from the factory floor to the highest levels of power. Although political engagement had 
to occur through carefully prescribed social forms and discursive repertoires, it was nonetheless 
an important element in the everyday life of East German for both the state and the population. 
 Turning from structures to processes, recent scholarship has examined the everyday 
relationship between state and society and non-coercive methods of rule that were employed in 
order to minimize the necessity of repression. SED propaganda did not simply brainwash the 
population but rather integrated Marxist-Leninist ideology into local discourses of antifascism, 
patriotism, and progress. Party officials and police began with the premise that they were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Konrad Jarausch, Dictatorship As Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 1999), 60. 
15 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 19. 
16 Jie-Hyun Lim. “Historiographical Perspectives on ‘Mass Dictatorship’” in Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions, 6:3 (December 2005), 325. 
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working towards a state of “workers and farmers,” and that once properly educated, the populace 
would rally to their side. The use of human rights language by the SED was not meant to 
intimidate the people of the GDR, but was rather part of the larger broader hegemonic “discourse 
of rule” employed by the state to convince citizens that they were an integral and valued part of 
the socialist community and that their material prosperity was intimately tied to the continuing 
success of the socialist project.17  
From the perspective of the population, the division of society between oppressors and 
oppressed and the possible responses to the state as loyalty or resistance obscures a wide range of 
roles and practices that existed between these poles. East Germans did not all easily fit into clean 
categories of perpetrators and victims and contestation of state policies was endemic even if open 
dissent was rare. Supporting these broader conceptions of the GDR is Alf Lüdtke’s notion of the 
“thoroughly-ruled society” (durchherrschte Gesellschaft), which he argues accommodates the 
reach of the state without obliterating society in the process: “For the GDR, it is not the success 
of authority strategies that are conspicuous, but rather the extent to which they served as a 
reference point.”18 In comparison to liberal democratic societies, the state was a far greater 
presence in the everyday, but was nonetheless not wholly dominant. Given the different nature of 
the state in a socialist country, it follows that the examination of socialist societies would require 
different standards in understanding similar relationships. 
 In a series of micro-histories and localized case studies, historians and sociologists have 
shown how the political dynamic of the GDR can be better understood through detailed 
examination. In contrast to arguments of a passive or infantilized populace standing by as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Martin Sabrow, Geschichte als Herrschaftsdiskurs: der Umgang mit der Vergangenheit in der DDR (Köln: 
Böhlau, 2000). 
18 Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2002), 49. 
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state imploded of its own accord, Stephen Pfaff’s study of “exit-voice” dynamics in the lead up 
to the 1989 revolution showed the extensive unofficial networks that had developed, especially 
over the course of 1980s.19 Studies of local communities or distinct social groups by historians –
such as Andrew Port, Corey Ross, and Jeannette Madarasz’s – focus in on the complicated and 
negotiated social interaction of state structures and the people.20 The image that emerges is one 
of a regime consistently forced to compromise in order to gain obedience from the “grumbling 
society” (Grumble Gesellschaft), instead of a seething population ready to rebel as soon as the 
state ceased to be backed by force.21 These studies likewise complicate the notion of oppression 
and resistance: People regularly defied the state without challenging SED rule through what Ross 
calls “creative accommodation” in a “culture of disrespect.”22 What appears in the broad 
perspective as purely coercive or undifferentiated becomes interactive and diverse upon closer 
inspection. Opposition to SED rule existed from the beginning of the GDR but as multiple 
histories of these groups and individuals show, such dissent was not unified around a singular 
vision of human rights but rather multiple competing conceptions of how to contest state actions 
and often conflicting understandings of what alternatives should be.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Steven Pfaff, Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and the Revolution 
of 1989 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 
20 Andrew Port, Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007); Jeannette Z. Madarász, Conflict and Compromise in East Germany, 1971-1989: A Precarious Stability 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Corey Ross, Constructing Socialism At the Grass-Roots: The 
Transformation of East Germany, 1945-65 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). 
21 Port, Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic, 115.  
22 Corey Ross, Constructing Socialism at the Grass-Roots. 8. 
23 Ehrhart Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR: 1949-1989 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1998); Wolfgang 
Rüddenklau, ed., Störenfried: DDR-Opposition 1986-1989 (Berlin: BasisDruck, 1992); Thomas Klein, “Frieden 
und Gerechtigkeit!”: die Politisierung der Unabhängigen Friedensbewegung in Ost-Berlin während der 80er Jahre 
(Köln: Böhlau, 2007). 
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Moving beyond this conceptualization of society is the realm of Alltagsgeschichte – 
everyday history – that pulls together “both structures of power and domination and social 
practice and experience.”24 By adopting a more bottom-up approach which takes into 
consideration both objective structures and their subjective appropriation as well as a pluralistic 
conception of reality, historians can take into account both the power and reach of the state 
without denying the people agency. This method relies on the anthropologically based theories of 
Alf Lüdtke: namely “Herrschaft als Sozial Praxis” (domination as social practice) and Eigen-
Sinn (self-will). According to this practice, society in the GDR should be viewed as an 
“ensemble of social relations” rather than a civil society in the traditional sense of the term. East 
German society differed from that of a liberal democracy as 
The individual spheres of the living world, the Lebenswelten, and the societal order in its entirety 
were not mediated by a differentiated set of societal sub-systems. Rather, this mediation was 
performed by a tightly organized, unitary set of political principles, represented and put into 
practice by the SED on all levels of social interaction, including the sphere of living worlds.25 
 
Through this conception Lindenberger rejects the “niche society” interpretation of totalitarianism 
as well as the micro-historical emphasis on a continued social vitality, and in the process, blurs 
the lines between state and society entirely. The pervasiveness of the political sphere meant that 
the most mundane aspects of society were linked together with high politics.  
In creating a legitimizing discourse of human rights, the SED was challenged not just by 
active dissent but also by citizens who had a “sense of reality, which was different from, though 
not necessarily contrary to, the intentions and blueprints of the SED’s projects.”26 In the case of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Thomas Lindenberger. “Everyday History: New Approaches to the History of the Post-War Germanies.” 
Christoph Klessmann, ed., The Divided Past: Rewriting Post-War German History (New York: Berg Publishers, 
2002), 45. 
25 Ibid. 54. 
26 Thomas Lindenberger, Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur: Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR 
(Köln: Böhlau, 1999), 51. 
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human rights, the SED leadership often had to contend with varying subjective interpretations of 
its own discourse of human rights and faced problems even from state officials who conceived of 
SED human rights policy in a manner not intended by the party leadership. Similarly, the 
seemingly united sections of the East German population campaigning together in the name of 
human rights often had widely different understanding of what those rights would mean in 
practice. 
Human Rights in History and Historiography 
 While human rights was an almost completely neglected topic until the end of the 1990s, 
since then it has exploded as a subject of inquiry.27 But where does the story of human rights 
begin? Some scholars have approached human rights as timeless concept stretching back to 
philosophical principles of justice and equality as found in antiquity. In this reading, the 
universal morality of the Stoic philosophers of Ancient Greece, the Babylonian legal system in 
the Code of Hammurabi, and the Persian guarantees of religious freedom for conquered peoples 
in the Cyrus Cylinder represent the beginnings of a quest to realize human rights, even if the 
terms itself was not yet in use.28 Others have disputed this lineage as anachronistic and instead 
traced the idea of human rights to the development of Natural Law theory and the Enlightenment 
in Europe. For Jonathan Israel, the concept of human rights is the end product of the rational 
materialist thinking of Spinoza and others in the Radical Enlightenment.29 According to Lynn 
Hunt, the origins of human rights can instead be traced to a moral awakening caused by a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Samuel Moyn, “The First Historian of Human Rights,” The American Historical Review 116:1 (Feb 2011), 58. On 
recent human rights historiography, see Devin Pendas, “Toward a New Politics? On the Recent Historiography of 
Human Rights,” Contemporary European History 21:1 (Feb 2012). 
28 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008); Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions 
Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 
29 Jonathan Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 12. 
	  	   14	  
revolution in sensibilities brought about by the mass reading of accounts of torture and epistolary 
novels. These experiences created “brain changes” that aroused new forms of empathy leading to 
demands for universal rights.30 Although both the intellectual and empathetic theories of 
Enlightenment origins are sharply disputed, most scholars agree that the terminology of human 
rights can be traced back to this era. 
 While human rights language began with the French and American Revolutions, the 
connection between these rights and human rights politics of today remains problematic. Dan 
Edelstein has pointedly argued that rights language functioned to legitimize the Terror and the 
brutal destruction of the counterrevolution in the Vendée not just freedom, democracy and 
equality.31 Laurent DuBois, among others, has demonstrated the reluctance of the French to 
apply the concepts of universal equality to its colonial subjects.32 Empathy for the suffering of 
others did not necessarily lead to a belief in universal equality and democracy but it could also 
spur on imperialism and interventionism in the name of spreading the ideals of civilization. In 
the Nineteenth Century, human rights language was applied to the cause of abolitionism, but 
even this movement rejected the idea of civic equality of Europeans and blacks.33 In spite of 
proclamations of human equality, women remained disenfranchised throughout the enlightened 
world. Although there were some rudimentary international legal structures in connection to anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: Norton, 2008), 19. 
31 Dan Edelstein, The Terror of Natural Right: Republicanism, the Cult of Nature, and the French Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
32 Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution & Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804 
(Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 2004). 
33 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ‘Genealogies of Human Rights,’ in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., Human Rights in 
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slavery, human rights was a concept that was tied to nationalism and sovereignty rather than 
supra-national universal morality.34  
 Turning from the eighteenth century to the twentieth, many scholars have sought the 
origins of modern human rights with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Passed by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1948, the place of the Declaration represented the first 
near-global agreement on a list of specific rights held by all human beings. The meaning of the 
Declaration, like that of the Enlightenment, is hotly contested: Elizabeth Borgwardt has touted it 
as a internationalized version of the American New Deal, while Mary Ann Glendon portrays its 
creation as the expression of a pan-global moral awakening following the horrors of the Second 
World War.35 It is tempting to cite 1948 as the point of moral breakthrough but this point too is 
undercut by the Realpolitik and contradictions between high rhetoric and low practice. As Mark 
Mazower has effectively argued, both the United State and the Soviet Union ensured that the 
Declaration would not have the enforcement mechanism and that it would not threaten their 
power. The Universal Declaration was simply an arrangement between superpowers to secure a 
new international status quo at minimum cost to either side.36   
 In recent years, some historians have changed the question from a focus on origins and 
discoveries towards a history of political conflict and social construction that seeks to understand 
what human rights meant to historical figures themselves. In recent years, however, “critical 
human rights” scholarship has rejected the concept of human rights as a single unified ideal, and 	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maintained that historians should instead look at the historical contingency of human rights and 
the diversity of conceptions and practices from a non-teleological, polycentric, and transnational 
perspective.37 As Jean Quataert argued, “rights are not self-evident, self-policing, or ethically 
monolithic; they are historical constructs rooted in struggle and are even at odds with one 
another.”38 One of the main examples of this kind of history is Samuel Moyn’s the Last Utopia 
that traces the creation of present day conceptions of human rights to the late 1970s while 
acknowledging the long genealogical past of its elements and vocabulary.  
Instead of searching for the moment when human rights were invented, this historical 
approach focuses on how differing groups chose to employ the idea of human rights, how it was 
implemented, and how it was contested over time. Per Upendra Baxi, “the originary narratives 
that trace the birth of human rights in the Declarations of the Rights of Man need replacement by 
a history of human rights struggles for human rights futures.”39 This focuses on what problems, 
ideas, and topics were specifically connected with human rights and what social, political and 
cultural function human rights ideas played within the history of the GDR.  
The GDR did not invent human rights, but its history illuminates how human rights 
function as a legitimizing discourse for both state and popular movements. In the broader 
evolution of human rights, the discourse of the SED is akin to the duckbilled platypus: a 
seemingly impossible amalgamation of intellectual and political traditions that should not have 	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existed even though it did. Official East German human rights doctrine was formed from 
elements of German liberalism, Marxism-Leninism, Hegelianism and the rhetoric of anti-
imperial protest. The Church spoke not only a language of Christian morality but also that of 
international politics and even the appropriated, and were itself at times co-opted by – the 
hegemonic discourse of socialist human rights. Dissidents ranged from those single-mindedly 
seeking to emigrate to eco-utopians to revolutionary Marxists.  
While a specifically East German discourse and politics of human rights existed for more 
than forty years, it was almost wholly extinguished with reunification. The collapse of this 
separate world of ideas was so complete that until now it has been written off as little more than 
mere propaganda by a cynical state and the diversity of dissident thought subsumed into grand 
historical narratives of Western human rights sweeping through the Eastern Bloc. The history of 
the GDR, however, connects together within a single country the four main areas of post-WWII 
human rights politics: Cold War contestations, the problem of decolonization and human rights, 
global campaigns against pariah states and the end of communism.40 The East German state and 
its citizens engaged with the rise of international human rights as a primary site of East-West 
diplomatic conflict, as part of intellectual milieu of the Eastern Bloc and as part of the global 
socialist world in dialogue with the emerging post-colonial states.  
Methodology and Theory 
In approaching the problem of how to define human rights in the case of the GDR, this 
project will trace the specific usage of the phrase human rights and international treaties and 
agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights 
Covenants of 1966. In doing so, I make no claims as to an objective definition of human rights 
but rather seek to examining how the East German state and East Germans understood human 	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rights and how they employed the language of human rights in practice. This methodology 
narrows the scope of the project based on the vocabulary employed by historical sources and 
subjects and includes all human rights claims by these sources regardless of whether these claims 
hold up to historical, moral or logical scrutiny. While this approach, as used elsewhere, has been 
criticized by some as indicative of a “search engine,” mentality that focuses too much on words 
alone, in the case of the GDR, to begin from a broad definition of human rights rooted in present 
norms eliminates almost wholly the discourse and practices of the SED, distorts the ideals and 
ideas of the Church and the dissidents and obscures the important differences between modern 
human rights usage in liberal democracies and in a socialist dictatorship.41 What is important in 
the case of the GDR is that the idea of human rights was ascribed to systems today seen as 
inherently incompatible – namely state socialism and dictatorship – while at the same time, it 
was disconnected in popular and even dissident discourse from seemingly self-evident concepts 
of political democratization and liberalization for a remarkably long period of time.  
This approach rejects the idea that human rights are intimately connected to a positive 
agenda of emancipation and progress but are rather an ambiguous discourse of morality capable 
of supporting both dissent and dictatorship. The example of the GDR helps to elucidate Costas 
Douzinas’s argument that “human rights are Janus-like, they carry the dual ability to emancipate 
and dominate, to protect and discipline.”42 The idea of human rights as a discourse of 
legitimization can act to challenge power but it can also sustain it by appeal to higher moral 
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authority. This dynamic is captured through the examining the conflict between hegemonic state 
discourses and insurgent claims made by individuals and social movements from below.43  
In tracing the evolution of how the international discourse of human rights was integrated 
into local ideology, discourse and culture of the GDR, I borrow from the work of the legal 
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry whose work analyzes the “middle level” between the global 
and the local. Instead of a process of direct transfers of knowledge, she looks at how “translators” 
link together human rights norms to local vernaculars, pulling them out of the abstract and them 
with meaning in the every day.44 As such, the dissertation focuses on the process and forms 
through which SED officials, intellectuals, the GDR-Committee for Human Rights and dissident 
made human rights meaningful in the every day including through cultural and narrative forms.45  
The development of human rights in discourse and practice occurred as a four-part 
process within the context of the Herrschaft (rule) of the SED.46 The first segment of the process 
was the development of the official state doctrine and discourse of human rights; the second was 
the implementation of this doctrine and its experience as part of the political, legal and social 
systems of the GDR; the third was the challenge of the idea of human rights by the citizens of the 
GDR and from outside; the fourth, concerned the reaction and adaptation of the state to these 
challenges. This perspective acknowledges the dictatorial nature of the regime without denying 
agency to the people and brings in the top-down emphasis of the human rights discourse in East 
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Germany while allowing for contestations from below within a restricted social and ideological 
space. 
State doctrine on the problem of human rights was created through a reciprocal 
relationship between the leadership of the SED and the intelligentsia who acted as “translators,” 
to use the terminology Sally Engle Merry.47 In response to threats to the political power and 
legitimacy of the SED, intellectuals in the East German academy and members of the GDR-
Committee for Human Rights developed ideological responses that were then approved at the top. 
Once party leadership approved new doctrine, the intelligentsia and various organs of the party 
then further disseminated it to the population. Scholarship on intellectuals under socialist 
dictatorships has often portrayed them as either wholly willing collaborators or as simple cogs in 
a larger machine that lack individual character. As Peter C. Caldwell points out, it is necessary to 
take into account the inherent contradictions of intellectual work in a socialist system: 
“Marxism-Leninism emphasized the creative, revolutionary power of materialist political 
thought yet also systematically repressed creativity with the aim of forming a uniform worldview 
that served the party.”48 The demand for doctrine came from party leaders but the system still 
allowed for some creative thinking, within definite boundaries, when it came to fleshing out 
these ideas in ideological and practical terms. This created tension within the SED elites, when 
political imperatives could not be rationalized by appeals to ideology, and when intellectuals 
found their own socialist beliefs came into conflict with the goals of the SED. 
The ideological conceptions of human rights employed in rhetoric by top state officials 
was published in the national SED newspaper Neues Deutschland as well as other local media 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Merry, “Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism.” 
48 Peter Caldwell. Dictatorship, State Planning, and Social Theory in the German Democratic Republic. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), viii. 
	  	   21	  
institutions, in statements at international meetings and summits as well as through internal 
deliberations over laws, constitutions and treaties. In spite of the discrepancies between the 
claims and realities of legal instruments, the legal texts provide a rich insight into the self-
conception of the SED as a ruling political organization. Below the level of the SED leadership, 
the extensive propaganda of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights along with the internal 
correspondence and meetings of the organization provides a wealth of official sources. On the 
side of the intelligentsia, East Germany was home to an extensive, though highly controlled, 
academic publishing industry including many journals such as Einheit (Unity, on Marxist-
Leninist theory), Neue Justiz (New Justice on legal affairs), and Deutsche Aussenpolitik (German 
Foreign Policy). Here official policy in its full detail was proposed, clarified, and approved. 
Through the decisions on what was published and what was subsequently cited, one can trace the 
journey from new idea to officially sanctioned doctrine. 
In examining the implementation of these state theories of human rights, one needs to 
shift from discourses to everyday practices. What were the freedoms that were allowed to 
citizens, how were they expected to exercise those freedoms and under what circumstances 
would they be punished for doing so? Although some have argued that the absence of the rule of 
law under socialism in the GDR meant that it was a system lacking a legal system, this is a gross 
exaggeration.49 The political rituals of the GDR from elections to plebiscites provide a window 
into the lived realities of rights within the SED dictatorship. The courts in the GDR were not 
bound to the text of the law as under western legal systems, but the principles of “socialist 
legality” aimed for a standard of reliability tempered by a consciousness of state goals.50 The law 
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was still influential and the implementation of specific human rights, in particular civil rights that 
could be claimed against other citizens, still made a difference in everyday life. While rare, when 
rights pertained to the actions of the defendant, human rights could be invoked by judges and 
prosecutors.51 Even though the law could be altered when convenient for the state and citizens 
could not directly demand rights denied to them by the state, the courts still provided an 
important forum for the implementation of human rights doctrine in the GDR. Finally, there was 
the Eingaben system – the officially sanctioned complaints system that allowed for East 
Germans to constructively criticize state policies so long as their contribution was from a place 
of loyalty. In all of these cases, East Germans did not have legally justiciable rights (rights that 
they could invoke against the state), but they had a degree of certainty about actions that were 
permitted and allowed with SED rule. Sources on implementation are accessible through the 
archives of the Ministry for State Security, popularly knows as the Stasi Archive (Stasi Archive 
(Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes (Stasi) der ehemaligen 
DDR, BStU) as well through the official documentation of the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Justice and Eingaben sent to various state offices all of which are held at the German 
Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv) and most party records are primarily held in the Stiftung Archiv 
der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO) im Bundesarchiv). 
 The contestation of state human rights discourse occurred both horizontally - between 
East Germany and Western human rights activists and the Federal Republic of Germany – and 
vertically  - between the state and the population of the GDR. The challenges to the SED from 
the West are available through the campaign material of West German political parties, the 	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published material of organized human rights activists, and declarations from the government of 
the Federal Republic. The use of human rights discourse from below is more theoretically 
complex: East German engagements with human rights ran the gamut from loyal affirmation, to 
Eigen-Sinn type reinterpretation, to “consentful contestation,” to outright dissent and 
opposition.52 In the early decades of the GDR, East Germans made their opinions on human 
rights known through sources such as petitions and complaint letters, applications to exit the 
country, meetings with officials who were surveying public opinion and certain exceptional 
events like the Volksaussprache – a massive series of public events and consultations on the 
creation of a new constitution in 1968. Collections of the petitions and opinion surveys are 
scattered throughout the SED archives at the German Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde. In 
the case of the Volksaussprache, the extraordinary quantity of written material produced by East 
German citizens is housed at archives across the former GDR included a collection of more than 
12,000 letters to the constitutional commission in Berlin and records of town-hall meetings and 
other events held in regional archives in Schwerin, Rudolstadt, Leipzig and Dresden.   
In later years, organizations within the church extensively discussed and debated human 
rights issues creating internal newsletters and public statements. The dissident movement of the 
1980s not only produced homemade newspapers but groups also publicly released statements 
through western media and held their own protests where banners and posters formed part of the 
public discourse. While the materials of official church engagement with human rights politics 
are held in Berlin at the Central Evangelical Archiv (Zentral Evangelisches Archiv), smaller 
peace and human rights groups that operated out of the church are held privately. In recent years, 
the Robert Havemann Archive in Berlin has collected numerous private collections detailing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Lindenberger, Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur; Jeremy Straughn, “‘Taking the State at Its Word’: The 
Arts of Consentful Contention in the German Democratic Republic,” American Journal of Sociology 110:6 (May 
2005). 
	  	   24	  
private correspondence of dissidents, deliberations by opposition organizations and collections of 
public statements and publications. While slightly smaller than the Havemann collections, the 
Archive of the Civic Movement in Leipzig (Archiv Bürgerbewegung-Leipzig) also contains a 
wealth of documentation on the movement in that city and Saxony in general.  
 Finally, there is the problem of how SED doctrine and practice changed in response to 
challenges from within and without? Here we return to the source based of the first level, namely 
high-level party documents, intellectual journals and the activities and internal deliberations of 
the GDR-Committee for Human Rights but from a different perspective. When did the state view 
human rights as either a threat or an opportunity and when did it launch new initiatives to deal 
with challenges to its credibility on human rights? Deliberations and debates between 
government agencies and ministries held at the German Federal Archives and the archival 
records of the Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
MfAA) provide insight into who was responsible for deciding how the SED state reacted to 
human rights problems. State media also provides a useful source through the examination of the 
increases and decreases in frequency of human rights as a subject of domestic propaganda. In 
addition to public pronouncements and propaganda, internal initiatives to shore up ideological 
consistency within the state apparatus or within the communist bloc, such as Stasi training 
manuals and diplomatic coordination, are also important sources.  
Chapter Organization 
 In examining the evolution of the idea of human rights in East Germany, this project is 
divided into two main chronological sections, the first from 1945-1975 and the second from 
1968-1990.  The first section explores the appropriation of the idea of human rights by the SED 
from its inception to the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the highpoint of East German 
human rights diplomacy. The second section shows the rise of human rights as a tool of exit, 
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voice, and revolution by the East German people beginning in 1968 and concluding with the first 
free elections in East Germany in March 1990.  
 The first section of the dissertation demonstrates how the SED initially adopted the 
vocabulary of human rights in response to competition for political legitimacy with the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party, SPD). Chapter 1 looks at 
the fallout to the 1946 citywide elections in Berlin where its rivals, the SPD, which ran on the 
slogan “No Socialist without Human Rights,” soundly beat the SED. In response, the SED 
sought to appropriate the language of the SPD – the new party slogan was “No Human Rights 
without Socialism!” – while at the same time moving away from liberal democratic principles 
towards the creation of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This rhetorical acquisition deepened in 
the late 1950s when the SED needed ammunition for its propaganda campaign against the 
outlawing of the West German Communist Party in 1956.  
Chapter 2 examines the creation of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights, the Eastern 
Bloc’s only state-directed human rights organization, which was founded to coordinate the mass 
mobilization of GDR citizens in protest against mass arrests in West Germany. Founded in 1959, 
two years before the creation of Amnesty International, the Committee organized protest letter 
writing campaigns to apply pressure on West Germany officials and raised money for the family 
members of those affected by the state clamp-down on communist organizations and left-wing 
activists protesting increased militarization. By directly mobilizing East Germans along state-
approved lines and by tightly controlling public discourse, the SED was able to mobilize GDR 
citizens to fight for human rights on behalf of the state without sparking backlash against the 
state in the name of these same principles. 
 In the 1960s, the GDR became more concerned with its lack of widespread recognition 
and legitimacy in the post-colonial world rather than simply amongst Germans and shifted to a 
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new strategy of engaging the emerging Afro-Asian Bloc. Chapter 3 examines how East German 
intellectuals created an ideological conception of “socialist human rights” drawing from Marxist 
ideology but also from the human rights claims of the anti-imperialist activists and political 
leaders from the developing world. In order to gain diplomatic recognition and membership in 
the United Nations as definitive means of entrenching GDR sovereignty against West German 
claims to represent all German people, the SED used the language of human rights to 
demonstrate that it was a state fit for membership in the international community and one that 
would support the struggle of the post-colonial states against western domination. The SED used 
the UN’s International Year for Human Rights in 1968 to promote itself and the GDR to the 
world as a champion of self-determination. The SED used the adoption of the new “socialist 
constitution” of 1968 following a nation-wide plebiscite as the primary evidence of the SED’s 
popular support from the people and official embrace of human rights. While this campaign did 
little to convince the world community that the GDR was a leader in the field of human rights, it 
led the SED and loyal East German intellectuals to internalize the notion that they represented 
the highest ideals of human rights in comparison to the hypocrisy and self-delusion of the 
capitalist west.  
 The SED’s internalization of its own propaganda would have drastic consequences in the 
1970s with the signing of the Helsinki Accords. The leadership of the GDR had developed its 
conception of human rights at a time when notions of state-sovereignty, self-determination, and 
non-interference were paramount due to the new power of the post-colonial bloc in shaping the 
discourse of international affairs at the United Nations in the 1960s. In negotiating first the Basic 
Treaty with West Germany and then the Helsinki Accords, the SED worked from the assumption 
that the norms of the United Nations human rights system were inherently favourable to state-
socialism and, interpreted correctly, would further their claims to sovereignty in the face of 
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Western efforts to interfere in internal affairs. Just as the international human rights discourse 
was shifting to a focus on individual rights over state sovereignty and anti-communism, the SED 
saw no threat from committing the GDR to human rights provisions. 
 The re-appropriation of the idea of human rights by East German citizens is the focus of 
the second section beginning with the constitutional plebiscite of 1968. As Chapter 4 shows, the 
SED invited East Germans to comment and make suggestions as to improvement to the new 
document that would serve as the ideological basis for the GDR. Thousands of East Germans 
took the opportunity to demand greater rights for free expression, free movement and the right to 
strike. In particular, East German Christians demanded that the SED restore a number of 
constitutional protections for religious freedom that were to be eliminated. In adopting the 
language of human rights, GDR citizens worked within the dominant SED discourse and argued 
that the inclusion of greater commitments to human rights would provide greater legitimacy on 
the world stage and allow for the better participation of those citizens who supported socialism 
as a political and economic system but held different worldviews from those of the atheistic state.  
While citizens were willing to use the language of human rights for “voice” within the 
East German dictatorship when provided a safe opportunity by the state, unlike in other Eastern 
Bloc countries, the GDR failed to develop a domestic dissident human rights movement. Chapter 
5 examines how those who sought to establish the right to travel outside the GDR in the 1960s, 
turned to demand immediate emigration in the name of human rights when their conciliatory 
requests failed to produce results. Although Christians were amongst the loudest voices calling 
for the entrenchment of human rights during the adoption of the new constitution, in the wake of 
the Helsinki Accords the Protestant church leadership decided to endorse the SED’s position that 
the GDR was fully compliant with international human rights treaties in order to gain leverage in 
privately protesting abuses against congregants. Soon the church hierarchy itself, not the Stasi, 
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took on the task of disciplining clergy who used the language of human rights to demand 
political and legal reforms. Since so many GDR dissidents still believed in the ideals of socialism 
even if they had soured on SED rule, supporting US President Jimmy Carter’s new human rights 
stance against the Eastern Bloc was deemed ideologically untenable. East German dissidents 
who gained international prominence at this time thus neglected to employ the language of 
human rights, as they believed the concept to be corrupted by its use in anti-communist rhetoric. 
In the 1980s, however, human rights in the name of reform returned by way of the peace 
movement. As Chapter 6 shows, in the 1980s increasingly disillusioned East Germans dropped 
out of the official social system and created a parallel civil society within the confines of the 
church. The emergence of an independent peace movement marked the beginnings of an 
important anti-political mass movement striving towards disarmament, demilitarization, and 
environmentalism. While these activists sought to eschew politics, the SED’s refusal to allow for 
a social sphere outside of party-approved organizations and the ensuing repression by the police 
demonstrated to many that political reform was needed even to achieve purely moral goals such 
as peace. In 1986, a small group of activists created the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights 
and the idea of human rights rapidly became a rallying point for the disparate groups of dissident 
and disaffected East German people. These activists invoked human rights not as the antithesis 
of socialism but as its true core values that had been forgotten and abused by the SED.  
At this same time, the ideological bulwark created by the SED was crumbling. As peace 
activists were coming together under the banner of human rights, Ideology Minister Kurt Hager 
attempted to create a socialist version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that could 
unify the communist world in the face of western pressure. Despite initial enthusiasm from 
socialist allies, one country after another pulled out of participating in the Socialist Declaration, 
scared off by various human rights guarantees contained within. In 1988, when human rights was 
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becoming the rallying cry for change across the Eastern Bloc, solidarity amongst communist 
elites on the matter collapsed and the joint effort to combat the growing movement from within 
and pressure from without was abandoned. 
In 1989, the intersection of those demanding human rights for voice – extensive 
democratic reform – and for exit – to freely depart the GDR – combined to create an 
interminable crisis for the SED. Chapter 7 shows how the party elites and loyal intellectuals who 
had once bought into the concept of socialist human rights that legitimized the SED dictatorship 
turned to the human rights ideals of the dissidents in the hopes of renewing the cause of 
socialism through the embrace of political and civil rights and the rule of law. Human rights 
served not just to rally a heterogeneous coalition of dissidents, but also provided an ideological 
justification for SED officials who dismantled their own power structure and abolished the 
party’s monopoly on power in the face of mass demonstrations and emigration. In planning for a 
new East Germany, former SED officials worked with dissidents to draft a constitution that 
would secure liberal democratic rights and freedoms alongside rights that would preserve the 
ideals of the socialist project including substantive gender equality, strong social and economic 
rights protections and greater provisions for direct democracy. In 1990, however, these joint 
hopes of dissident activists and reform communists to reform the GDR through this democratic 
socialist vision of human rights were dashed as the realities of East German economic collapse 
turned the population away from new utopian ideas towards realizing human rights through 
reunification with the Federal Republic. The idealistic anti-capitalism of the dissident elite 
alienated a population that wanted both democracy and prosperity through human rights. While 
the dissidents were successful in ending state-socialist dictatorship through their campaign for 
human rights, they ultimately failed to expand upon what they viewed as the narrow and 
unsatisfactory human rights system of the capitalist west. 
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CHAPTER 1:   
Establishing a Dictatorship of Human Rights, 1945-1958 
 
 In the Soviet Occupied Zone in the immediate postwar period, the German Communist 
Party (KPD) was caught between several contradictory political currents. While the Soviet 
military had brought the KPD to a defeated Germany and handed them power, the endemic rape 
and pillage of the Red Army made the occupying forces a liability to power as much as a 
safeguard.1 The population over which they were to rule was sharply divided between a radical 
minority, determined to remake society in order to prevent a resurgence of Nazism, and a passive 
majority that was still ambivalent in their attachment to the Third Reich.2 Finally, KPD leaders 
were limited in their range of possibilities by the ever-shifting imperatives of their Soviet 
sponsors who sought to keep their options open rather than charging ahead with a program of 
unadulterated revolutionary socialism.3 Adding to these complications, the communists lacked 
the classical characteristics of legitimacy: communism sought to overthrow rather than embrace 
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traditional authority; Walter Ulbricht and other senior figures were not charismatic; and a 
significant party apparatus – let alone a bureaucracy – did not exist yet.4  
While the coercive power of the occupying Soviet forces was always available, in the 
day-to-day, the KPD could not afford constant, intractable conflict with a population that had so 
recently embraced their ideological opponents if they were to rebuild their shattered nation. The 
threat of violence could secure a superficial loyalty grounded in fear, but the KPD initially 
sought to gain the actual approval of people in order to truly fortify their position. Instead of 
proclaiming the defeat of Hitler as a triumph for communism, they aimed to build their 
legitimacy on a platform of broad-based antifascism. Just as a coalition of bourgeois and socialist 
political forces had joined together to defeat the Nazi war machine, so too would they work 
together in peacetime. The creation of a united socialist party through the merger of the KPD and 
its SPD rivals, thus creating the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 
SED) in April 1946 was an essential element in a strategy to claim the mantle of moderation and 
antifascism rather than revolution. The merger struck a conciliatory pose while at the same time 
it implemented a radical agenda of expropriation and the centralization of political power under 
the old KPD leadership alongside reliably pliant allies from the old SPD.5  
As Eric Weitz has observed, the rhetoric of the KPD and then of the SED was marked by 
“the uneasy coexistence of two political languages – of gradualism and intransigence;” and in the 
immediate postwar period the language of gradualism dominated official statements.6 In those 
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years, the vocabulary of basic rights (Grundrechte) and later human rights (Menschenrechte) 
became crucial for those who advocated intransigence and radical revolution while maintaining a 
public veneer of gradualism and moderation. While some senior members of the KPD and the 
SED honestly supported a “German path to socialism” and the creation of a “people’s democracy” 
rather than a dictatorship of the proletariat, in practice, the democratic facade of SED goals 
covered for rampant coercion, abuse of power, and eventually the establishment of a second 
German dictatorship.7 As Walter Ulbricht, the future leader of the GDR from 1949-1971 said to 
a colleague in 1945, “It is quite obvious. It has to look democratic, but we must have everything 
firmly in our hands.”8  
In 1949, when the Soviet Zone officially became the German Democratic Republic, its 
founding constitution and the rights it contained ultimately served to cement the power of the 
SED rather than to limit it in a system that did not allow citizens to make claims against the state 
through the courts. As threats to uncontested SED rule evolved, so too did the SED’s discursive 
response. When criticism came from dissent within the Soviet Zone of Occupation, electoral 
competition from Western Social Democrats or from the newly formed West German state, the 
SED adapted its rhetoric to neutralize these attacks as much as possible without actually 
changing policy or tactics. Over this time, the SED’s use of the language of rights did, in no way, 
reflect a shift towards moderation or liberalization. As historian Dirk Spilker has noted, the 
party’s “commitment to bourgeois democratic principles ended where bourgeois democracy is 
commonly understood to begin – in the face of dissent.”9 The language of rights did not reflect 	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the reality of SED policy, but it lent the party historical authenticity, created a discursive space to 
bring together the KPD and SPD factions of the party, and provided opportunities to promote the 
legitimacy of the GDR on an international scale. From the collapse of the Third Reich into the 
late 1950s, the SED moved forward with its agenda of revolutionary socialism, while steadily 
appropriating and co-opting the discourses of rights and democracy from its opponents.  
Establishing a Socialist Discourse of Rights, 1945-1946 
The KPD arrived in the Soviet Zone of Occupation (Sowjetische Besatzungszone, SBZ) 
in 1945 speaking not of revolution and ideology but of moderation and a broad-based anti-fascist 
coalition. The leading members of the KPD sought to convince the German people that they 
were no longer the ideological firebrands of their Weimar Republic days, but responsible, 
democratic Germans seeking to undo the damage of the Nazi regime and rebuild their shattered 
nation. In the “Appeal to the German People from the Communist Party,” issued in June 1945, 
the language of Marxist revolution and class warfare had disappeared, replaced by a rhetoric of 
unity, antifascism, and democracy. The KPD claimed that it was uninterested in imposing a 
Soviet-style system on a nation having so recently been ruled by fascists, and was as such clearly 
not at the correct stage of historical development for a transition to socialism. As such, it would 
seek to bring about the bourgeois revolution that had failed to occur in 1848 through the creation 
of an “antifascist, democratic regime [;] a parliamentary-democratic republic with all democratic 
rights and freedoms for the people.”10 From the very outset of the communist project in postwar 
Germany, the leadership of the KPD had begun to appropriate the language of rights to its cause. 
In April 1946, the merger of the KPD and the SPD within the SBZ creating the SED was 
meant to serve this agenda of unity and progress, but the combined party did not inspire the 	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loyalty of all the members of the old parties with many Social Democrats refusing to take part. 
While the SED was the largest political party in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, and with the 
support of the Soviet military administration the most influential, what it had in tangible power it 
lacked in democratic legitimacy. SED leaders saw provincial (Länder) elections planned for 
October 1946 as a possible turning point for the new party, the moment when their legitimate 
place as the leaders of Germany’s antifascist coalition would be confirmed by the people through 
democratic means. As Otto Grotewohl, the former Eastern Zone SPD leader and one of the 
founders of the SED, told the rest of the leadership in June 1946,  
This first election is a highly political event of great significance not only for the eastern and other 
zones of Germany, but throughout the world where the campaign and the election results will be 
closely followed and politically evaluated. The results in the SBZ will be of the greatest 
importance for the assessment of political life in Germany and particularly the possibilities for the 
development of the German labour movement and the SED.11 
 
Most importantly, the election in Berlin – the first and only one to include the Eastern and 
Western zones of occupation until 1990 – would put the SED in direct competition with the still 
independent Western Social Democrats. SED leaders thought that the election would provide an 
opportunity to demonstrate that the united front presented by the newly merged parties was the 
choice of the German people. 
 At the center of the SED’s electoral campaign was a new manifesto, “The Basic Rights of 
the German People: The Path to German Unity.” Drafted by the legal scholar Karl Polak in 
cooperation with Soviet authorities and SED co-founder Otto Grotewohl, the manifesto 
presented the SED as natural heir to the progressive German historical tradition.12 Opening with 	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the declaration, “The German people cannot live without the restoration of German unity,” the 
document promised to “eliminate the remaining vestiges of Nazism” through the expropriation of 
militaristic great land-holders and war criminals.” It further claimed that the SED would bring 
about a system of parliamentary supremacy, equality before the law, and rights to free expression, 
religion, and property.  
On the surface, the “Basic Rights” manifesto appeared to endorse a liberal democratic 
conception of rights and citizenship. It provided for equal rights regardless of sex, religion or 
race and it made no distinction in benefits between citizens and “toilers” as found in Soviet 
constitutions.13 Although it did not explicitly promise a pluralistic democracy, it pledged that, in 
light of the current dangers to peace and the democracy in Germany, the SED would welcome an 
open exchange of views with all “antifascist and democratic parties and organizations.” Chief 
drafter of the Manifesto Karl Polak claimed, rather immodestly, that it was “to date the most 
progressive document that has ever been printed in the German language on the basic question of 
our existence as a state.” and that it was so democratic that Germans from all the political parties 
could accept it.14  
The contents of the manifesto resembled those of contemporary and historical liberal 
nationalist appeals, but within the language of moderation there were indications of the SED’s 
more radical intentions. Although the text avoided the language of revolution, some explicitly 
revolutionary ideas were present such as Section 13, which promised the breakup of “private 
corporations, major banks, cartels, and syndicates,” and the legal philosophy “The Will of the 
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People is the Highest Law!”15  The terms of the manifesto, did however, lay the groundwork for 
a system of socialist dictatorship. The emphasis on economic reform addressed the key criticism 
that Karl Marx himself had levelled at the revolutionary rights regimes of the 18th and 19th 
century, namely that they acted to reinforce the power of capitalists at the expense of the worker 
while dressing up the interests of the bourgeoisie in the name of humanity.16 With the break up 
of major capitalist interests through expropriation as a first step towards the elimination of 
economic exploitation, the SED could claim to have resolved Marx’s concern. In keeping with 
earlier documents, “Basic Rights” emphasized the need to deal with crimes of the Nazis and the 
continuing guilt of Germans instead of celebrating antifascist resistance to Hitler. The German 
people were implicitly seen as possible threats to democracy due to their recent proclivities 
towards fascism rather than as a captive population that had been freed. As Jeffery Herf has 
argued, these documents “conveyed an appeal for an antifascist democracy but also presented a 
rationale for imposing a nondemocratic government over the Germans.”17 Although “Basic 
Rights” lacked the overt “neo-corporate” rights structure of Soviet constitutions, it implied a 
radically different set of rights for those deemed to be antifascist, compared to those deemed to 
enemies of decmocracy.18 
 In adopting some of the language of German liberalism, the SED was not endorsing the 
political program of individual liberties, but instead the revolutionary and nationalistic ethos with 
which they were historically bound. Although the drafters of the 1848 Frankfurt Constitution had 	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preferred the term “Basic Rights” to the French Revolution’s more radically universalistic 
“Rights of Man,” the philosophical principles of the declaration of 1848 were also more 
adaptable to the principles of a Marxist-Leninist revolution than it would first appear.19 As 
human rights historian Samuel Moyn has argued, “revolutionary-era rights were revolutionary: 
the justification for the creation or renovation of a citizenship space, not the protection of 
‘humanity.’”20 In the case of the Frankfurt Constitution, even more so than with other 
declarations from the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the demand for rights came from a 
movement dedicated to their realization through the incorporation of the German people into a 
nation-state. These rights were to be secured and created via the state; they did not exist outside 
of it and they definitely were not above it.21 While the liberal-nationalist revolutionaries of 1848 
sought the creation of a constitutional monarchy under the rule of law, their discourse of 
revolution could be put to other uses. The nineteenth Century revolutionaries saw the formation 
of the nation-state as the key act to realize the rights of the German people, while the SED 
sought a socialist revolution that would end class exploitation.  
Far from any kind of turn towards actual liberalization, the invocation of basic rights and 
nationalist unity promoted by the SED was a calculated political manoeuvre encouraged by the 
Soviet authorities.22 As SED co-founder Otto Grotewohl said in June 1946 at a meeting of the 
party’s Central Secretariat, if “we stick firmly and unequivocally to our position that the political 
unity of Germany is inviolable, all patriotic [and] progressive people in Germany will be pinning 
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their hopes on us.”23 Many in the senior ranks of the party recognized the rhetoric of open class 
warfare or Sovietisation would alienate voters. The SED sought to portray its program as the 
realization of a centuries long process of German national self-realization, rather than that of a 
small cadre of communists recently brought to power by an occupying foreign army. 
This message became the centerpiece of the SED’s campaign in the 1946 elections. The 
main slogan of the SED in the election was “Unity, Peace and Socialism,” and the party sought 
to make the “Basic Rights” manifesto ubiquitous throughout the Eastern Zone.24 As SED co-
founder and future GDR President Wilhelm Pieck later said, the manifesto was  
In the center of our work during the election campaign to show the masses the way out of the 
terrible dilemma in which the German people have come to: the risk of ripping apart Germany by 
the formation of independent national states. As such, we have placed in the foreground that the 
SED sees the realization of basic rights as the foundation on the path to the respect and 
safeguarding of German Unity. The fundamental rights have been expressed in articles, posters 
and leaflets, and especially in the speeches of our comrades.”25  
In addition to SED members, the officially nonpartisan, but SED-aligned intelligentsia 
organization, the Kulturbund, worked to support “Basic Rights” as a visionary founding 
document of the new democratic antifascist Germany through group meetings around the Soviet 
Zone.26 In spite of a widespread shortage of paper, the SED’s newspaper Neues Deutschland 
spent weeks promoting the elections of October 1946 with numerous extra editions.27 With the 	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full support of the Soviet military authority, which provided resources and also harassed 
opposing candidates and intimidated voters, the SED leadership was confident that the party 
would gain a democratically elected majority control of the political bodies across the SBZ. 
In Berlin, the SPD reacted to this propaganda with an electoral slogan that directly 
targeted the SED and its “Basic Rights” manifesto: “No Socialism without Human Rights!”28 
Beginning with the creation of the SED in the Eastern Zone, the SPD had adopted the language 
of human rights to denounce the forced merger of the parties and to respond to a growing threat 
that Germany was exchanging one dictatorship for another. As one pamphlet urging SPD 
members to vote against the creation of the SED argued, “dictatorships know no tolerance: 
human rights and cultural humanity perish […] homogenized state parties are a plague of our 
social era.”29 In the speeches of national SPD leader Kurt Schumacher, human rights were 
primarily a matter of politics. While economic power and the interests of capitalism were 
essential to the problem for Schumacher, the issue was one of universal equality by means of 
democracy. He argued that human rights were not simply the rights of citizens in a bourgeois 
society or the special rights of workers but the universal rights shared by all as inspired by the 
French Revolution.30 His vision of human rights implicitly accepted Karl Marx’s dismissal of the 
Rights of Man in a liberal society as the mere rights of the bourgeois citizen. In order to correct 
this historical failure, Schumacher demanded a system of human rights that would truly honour 
the principles of “freedom, equality, fraternity and humanity.”31 Although social and economic 
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rights were essential to Schumacher’s conception of human rights, he also held political 
freedoms to be of greater importance declaring, “while we will fight with great passion and 
dedication for social benefits, one is only prepared to die for the great idea of freedom.”32 All of 
the economic and social rights that social democracy stood for would flow from the first position 
of a genuinely democratic society. 
While Germany had made progress towards this goal during the Weimar Era, 
Schumacher argued that the German people had not fought hard enough to preserve this system 
and the Nazis were able to destroy it. This failure meant that a democratic system had to be 
reborn stronger than before with a greater commitment by the German people to a parliamentary 
democracy based on human rights. According to Schumacher’s analysis of contemporary politics, 
the great danger facing Germany was a dictatorship, not in the fashion of the ancient Romans, 
but through the extreme concentration of power in the executive of the state. Such a dictatorship, 
as he presumed was being constructed in the Eastern Zone, would result in a failure to 
“recognize the human rights of the individual,” by denying their participation in political 
decision-making and, de facto, stripping them of their citizenship.33 Such a system of 
dictatorship would betray not only the principles of democracy, but also those of socialism. 
Schumacher rejected entirely the idea that a dictatorship could truly represent the will of the 
people because “there could be no dictatorship of the proletariat, only a dictatorship over the 
proletariat.”34 Postwar Germany needed to become a pluralistic democracy that accepted 
opposing viewpoints and political ideas to avoid such a fate. Schumacher defended the existence 
of the far right-wing German Party saying “yet, we are in the position of any democracy: even 	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“Neanderthals” can enjoy human rights.”35 In order to ensure the realization of human rights, 
ideological enemies needed to be defeated through democratic means just as social democratic 
policies need to be advanced through parliamentary tactics. 
The SPD discourse of human rights represented a broad demand for pluralism and liberal 
democracy, but it also spoke to Germans as victims of Nazism rather than co-perpetrators. While 
Germans had committed extraordinary atrocities during the Second World War, in the postwar 
period, most saw themselves as victims who had been subjected to unspeakable horrors, first 
through the mass bombings of the Allies and then through the hardship of the military 
occupation.36 The appeal to human rights by the SPD also directly supported the common 
sentiment amongst Germans that their treatment by the Allies, particularly the Soviets, was 
fundamentally unjust. Throughout the campaign in 1946, the SPD connected human rights to 
promises of relief for the suffering civilian population while playing to the population’s fears of 
Soviet totalitarianism and the general resentment of the occupation. As one campaign leaflet read, 
“We make no promises on which we cannot deliver. We support nothing that cannot be realized. 
If the future of Berlin is to be secured, two major tasks of the present must be solved: ensuring 
the material needs of the population of Berlin and securing human rights for all.”37 
In the competition for votes in Berlin and the Eastern Zone, the close association of the 
SED with the Soviet Union and its occupying forces represented a double-edged sword. The 
Soviets provided material and logistical support, including intimidation and coercion, in order to 
support the SED’s campaign. The public perception that the SED was a political tool of the 	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Soviet forces not only opened up the party for criticism from the SPD and others that it would 
seek to create a Stalinist dictatorship, but also held the party accountable for the actions of the 
occupation authorities. While the Soviets were associated with antifascism and the end of 
Nazism, voters also harshly resented the hardships imposed by Soviet industrial reparations 
policy in addition to the epidemic of rape perpetrated by occupation soldiers and as a result, 
many potential voters turned against the SED.38  
On 20 October 1946, the SED was blindsided by a humiliating defeat. In spite of the 
intense propaganda campaign and the coercion of the Soviet authorities, the SED failed to gain 
an absolute majority in any province. Worst of all, in Berlin it was routed by the SPD, which 
won decisive plurality with 48.7 percent in the city as a whole. The SED finished third behind 
the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU) with a paltry 20 
percent.39 Even in the Eastern Zone of the city where Soviet influence was greatest, the SPD still 
won 43.6 percent of the vote with the SED trailing behind at less than 30 percent.40 While the 
continued control by Soviet military authority meant that this would change little in practical 
terms in the Eastern Zone, the event that was supposed to have cemented the party’s democratic 
legitimacy had become a fiasco. Neues Deutschland covered for the embarrassment as best it 
could by focusing on the results from the provinces rather than the capital – the main headline 
boasted of the “Great Electoral Victory of the SED in the Zone” – but the weak showing in 
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Berlin was a major blow.41 Instead of supporting the legitimacy of the SED and left-wing unity, 
the election had actually revealed how shallow the party’s support really was.  
 At a meeting of the SED leadership in the wake of the elections, members were split on 
the explanation for the loss and how to address it. On one side, Walter Ulbricht and other hard 
liners blamed their defeat on the slander of the SPD, which suppressed support from the party’s 
natural working class constituency. One Ulbricht ally, Hermann Matern, conversely attributed 
the superior results for their rivals to the high turnout of  “former members of the NSDAP and 
the degenerate bourgeoisie of the Kürfurstendamm,” –the prosperous West Berlin boulevard. 
Essentially, the problem was the electorate, rather than the policies or the message of the SED.  
Another group of senior SED officials, primarily former members of the SPD but also 
including some KPD veterans such as Anton Ackermann, saw the defeat as the result of genuine 
worker concerns over the problem of dictatorship and human rights. As Ackermann said “It was 
no coincidence that one of the strongest argument of the Social Democrats in Berlin against us 
and the fundamental rights promoted by our party was this: why do you not go back to the 
original source, to the civil liberties of Britain or the Constitution of France? […] The freedom of 
personality and the basic rights of man [Grundrechte der Menschen] rather than the basic rights 
of the people [Grundrechte des Volkes].42 Richard Weimann, one of the original founders of the 
SPD in the eastern zone, added that the problem was the continued radicalism of some SED 
members who were undermining the overall message of moderation. He argued that in spite of 
public proclamations that the SED would hew a more moderate line, hardliner rhetoric had 
opened up the party to Western SPD’s attacks on human rights that had killed the SED’s chances 
at electoral success. “The Social Democrats won the masses because they had the general 	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postulates of humanity, human rights and democracy in the foreground and placed them in 
opposition to dictatorship.”43  
On the issue of human rights, the SED was under attack from two fronts. The SPD in the 
Western Zones was effectively employing the discourse of human rights to undermine the 
legitimacy of the SED. While the 1946 elections were to presage the creation of a united left 
across all of Germany, the disastrous results left this plan in shambles. From within the ranks of 
the SED itself, the electoral defeat also provided leverage to former SPD members who were 
becoming quickly disillusioned by the realities of the new united left that was increasingly 
dominated by former KPD members. In the name of human rights, high-ranking party members 
demanded even greater movement away from revolutionary socialism. It was only a few months 
into the existence of the SED and human rights already threatened its grip on power and its 
existence as a unified party. 
The Turn towards The Language of Human Rights, 1948-1958 
In response to the electoral defeat of 1946, the SED changed its tactics rather than its 
policies. Without certainty of victory in advance, the party leadership resolved that it would no 
longer call for elections as a means of gaining legitimacy. This resulted in a general shift towards 
a reliance on violence and outright coercion to maintain control within the party and the SBZ in 
general.44 In spite of this, the top leadership still sought to reduce inner-party conflict to a 
minimum by continuing to use a language of moderation and caution while pursuing an 
increasingly hardline policy on economic expropriation and the consolidation of political power. 
In order to paper over the internal conflicts brewing even at the highest levels of the SED, 
hardliners shifted from the earlier invocations of “The Basic Rights of the German People” to 	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embracing the language of human rights. While initially it was the discourse of liberal 
nationalism that the SED sought to co-opt, with opponents striking at the legitimacy of the SED 
in the language of human rights, the SED turned to appropriate this discourse as well rather than 
run from it. 
 Adopting the language of human rights in order to promote revolutionary socialism was a 
plan without precedent. While the more liberal-nationalist discourse of “Basic Rights” as 
borrowed from he Frankfurt Constitution had proven to be a passable, if not widely popular 
vehicle for the SED, the party did not have a model from German or Soviet history to draw upon 
for an appropriately socialist conception of human rights. Marxists and Communists had always 
treated the idea of human rights as a side issue of marginal importance. Karl Marx himself never 
theorized on the nature of human rights under socialism and his only writings on the subject 
focus on condemning liberal enthusiasm for the “Rights of Man” as a rhetorical trick of the 
bourgeoisie to portray their class interests as the rights of all humanity.45 Vladimir Lenin was 
similarly unhelpful, as his writings contained not a single mention of human rights.46 Before her 
assassination in 1919, Rosa Luxemburg, the founder of the German KPD, had endorsed the idea 
of “bourgeois” democratic rights as an integral part of socialist democracy. However, her attacks 
on Lenin and the Russian Revolution meant that she was now ideologically unacceptable. 
Communist activists had fought for democratic rights and freedoms during the Weimar period 
but human rights were regarded as tools to advance the revolution only within the context of 
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overthrowing the bourgeois political system.47 The closest the SED could find to an ideologically 
acceptable endorsement of human rights was in the lyrics to the late nineteenth century socialist 
anthem The Internationale that promised to “win the human right” (erkämpft das 
Menschenrecht) – a line unique to the German version likely included only because it rhymed 
with the preceding verse.48 
 In spite of this paucity of precedent, as the SED rolled out a draft constitution for a 
German Democratic Republic in November 1946 the legal scholar Karl Polak sought to reconcile 
the popularity of the idea of human rights with the necessity of centralized party control and 
socialist revolution. Polak’s influence on the development of the law in East Germany can hardly 
be overstated – his work in the 1940s and 1950s formed the basis for the theory and practice of 
law in the GDR until 1989. Polak was a devoted Marxist who saw the idea of the “dictatorship of 
the proletariat” as the crucial historical insight of modernity – a sentiment that was only 
strengthened by his time spent in exile in the USSR after he was dismissed from the German 
civil service in 1933 due to his Jewish ancestry.49 While Polak was an ideologue, he was also a 
skilled propagandist and political operator who could present hard-line communist policy in the 
language of moderation. 
 In developing a new system of constitutional rights and freedoms, Polak argued that there 
were no positive examples or traditions from history that could be followed in order to undue the 
crimes of Nazi Germany and prevent the recurrence of fascism. The rights enshrined in the 
Weimar Constitution had already been exploited by fascists to seize control of the German state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 On conceptions of basic rights and human rights in the Weimar Era, see Alexander Schwitanski, Die Freiheit des 
Volksstaats: die Entwicklung der Grund- und Menschenrechte und die deutsche Sozialdemokratie bis zum Ende der 
Weimarer Republik (Essen: Klartext, 2008). 
48 Leszek Kolakowski, “Marxism and Human Rights,” Daedalus 112, no. 4 (1 Oct 1983): 81. 
49 Peter Caldwell, Dictatorship, State Planning, and Social Theory in the German Democratic Republic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 93–95. 
	  	   47	  
and there was no reason to think it would not happen again. He similarly rejected earlier 
revolutionary systems and ideologies such as those produced by the 1789 Revolution in France, 
and the 1848 Revolution in Germany. While the SED supported the revolutionary character of 
these events, Polak ruled out a return to the French Revolution’s “Rights of Man and Citizen” or 
the “Basic Rights” of 1848 as anachronistic and antidemocratic. He argued, “What gave ‘human 
rights’ the powerful aura that it today still retains, is not their content but their proclamation and 
implementation. They were revolutionary slogans and therein lies their meaning, not the idea that 
they were final, eternal truths announced independently of their historical situation.”50 A 
declaration of rights appropriate to 1946 needed to be rooted in the present conditions of 
historical development not in hazy nostalgia for the past. Accordingly, since socialism was the 
revolutionary ideology of the modern era, “the struggle for the realization of socialism is the 
struggle for human rights; the path to human rights is the path to socialism; the content of human 
rights is the liberation from the chains and the prejudices of the capitalist social order.”51  
Polak preserved Marx’s critique that the Rights of Man was a rhetorical ploy by the 
bourgeoisie to proclaim their class interests in the name of all humanity, but he expanded on this 
logic by claiming human rights as part of the superstructure that would be altered through a 
revolution to the economic base. Human rights did not and could not exist outside of their 
relationship to the stage of historical development achieved by a society. According to Polak, 
“socialism is by definition the realization of human rights; and human rights are, if they are not 
to remain an empty principle, only realized insofar as socialism has been made a reality.”52 Just 
as all democratic systems of government from the bourgeois period of history would pale in 	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comparison to the truly democratic society that would exist following the revolutionary cessation 
of class conflict, so too would the sham human rights of bourgeois society be made real under a 
socialist order.  
Moving to problems of contemporary politics and directly addressing the slogan of the 
SPD – “No Socialism without Human Rights” - Polak simply declared the exact opposite: there 
could be “No Human Rights without Socialism!” He denounced efforts to scare the German 
public with the “boogeyman” of “socialism without human rights” and wrote off such attacks as 
part of a campaign of “wilful defamation against the Soviet Union.”53 Furthermore, he argued 
that SPD propaganda was inherently dishonest and sought to hide that its calls for human rights 
actually meant the failed “bourgeois human rights” of the inferior bourgeois revolutions of the 
past. Whereas the SPD sought to return to the French Revolution, the SED was moving towards 
the socialist revolution of the future. For Polak, this meant bringing about, “the expropriation of 
the expropriators, the overthrow of the capitalist social order and its system of the exploitation of 
man by man and the overcoming of capitalist oppression and rule through the free association of 
people.”54 Human rights were vital, but they were a second-order problem that would be solved 
through socialism, not something that could exist prior to the revolution or outside of it. 
Polak’s conceptions of human rights provided a discursive bridge between the policies of 
the SED and the faltering idealism of its membership – both SPD members who now feared that 
they would be suppressed and KPD radicals who thought that the new party was not sufficiently 
aggressive in pursuing the cause of revolution. The new discourse also defused, albeit to a 
limited extent, the criticism of the Western SPD, and changed the focus of the rights discourse 
from the realization of the bourgeois revolution to the necessity of socialism. Instead of 	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acknowledging internal dissent and the fears of the people and accommodating these concerns, 
the SED sought to press ahead and try and solve the problem through rhetorical means. If the 
people feared revolutionary socialism, they would call it anti-fascist democracy and if they were 
accused of violating human rights, they would declare themselves champions for the cause. 
From 1946 to the founding of the German Democratic Republic in 1949, human rights 
continued to serve as a site of conflict over legitimacy. When, in 1947, the Western SPD 
launched a campaign to document the persecution of former Social Democrats in the SBZ called 
“In Defense of the Basic Rights and Human Rights in the East,” the SED responded by jailing 
former SPD members who leaked information on internal party activities to their Western 
counterparts.55 Coercive measures stemmed the flow of information to those in the west who 
could make it publicly available and served as a warning to others who would challenge the party 
line. While coercion was the primary response, the party also sought to counter these attacks by 
increasingly framing their positions in the language of human rights and the slogans of Karl 
Polak. Speaking at an SED party congress in 1947, Käthe Kern, a leading figure of the SED’s 
women’s organization, the Democratic Women's League of Germany (DFD), argued that there 
could be “no true human rights without equal rights for women,” – a key element of the SED’s 
rights rhetoric since the Appeal to the German People in 1945.56 That same year, Erich Gniffke, 
a former SPD member turned senior member of the SED’s Central Secretariat, took to the pages 
of the West German magazine Der Spiegel in order to explain his support for a unified political 
left and the establishment of a socialist system in the East. Staying on message and following the 
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ideological line set by Karl Polak, he wrote, “Only in a socialist state are there true human rights. 
Thus, the goal of my struggle can only be: Socialism.”57 
The most active proponent of the new human rights language was future GDR Prime 
Minister Otto Grotewohl, the former leader of the Eastern Zone SPD and co-founder of the SED 
alongside Wilhelm Pieck. At party events he often repeated the slogan “No Human Rights 
without Socialism,” as a refutation to the critics of the SED in the West.58 In promoting the 
proposed constitution for the soon to be founded German Democratic Republic, Grotewohl 
particularly latched onto the idea of human rights as a means of legitimizing the new state. In a 
short booklet of essays on the constitutional draft that the SED widely circulated, Grotewohl 
denounced the western SPD for its claim that human rights could even be possible without the 
triumph of socialism.59 He vowed that rights enshrined in the new East German constitution 
would be “so much more than mere “individual rights” or judicial claims which the individual 
has against the state.” Indeed “they are the fundamental principles of the future of German state 
politics.”60 
The SED and International Human Rights, 1948-1958 
While the SED had found a response to the human rights criticism levelled by the SPD, 
the United Nations was changing the nature of international human rights discourse. After years 
of deliberation, debate, and revision, on 10 December 1948, the UN General Assembly approved 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While the Soviet Union had played a crucial role in 
the deliberations demanding the inclusion of anticolonial provisions on self-determination and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Erich W. Gniffke, “Gedanken Eines Deutschen,” Der Spiegel no. 44 (1 Nov 1947), 15. 
58 Otto Grotewohl, Im Kampf um Deutschland. Rede auf dem 2. Parteitag der SED, 1947, 33. 
59 Otto Grotewohl, Deutsche Verfassungspläne (Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz, 1947), 68. 
60 Ibid. 
	  	   51	  
state sovereignty, the entire Eastern Bloc ultimately abstained on the vote. Officially, this 
abstention was to protest the supposedly individualistic bias of the final draft and its potential for 
legitimizing imperialistic interventions by the west.61 While the SED was growing increasingly 
comfortable in deploying the language of human rights in the late 1940s, Soviet action at the UN 
made it difficult for the SED to claim that its stance was supported on the international stage by 
ideological allies. 
Since Germany was an occupied state without sovereignty, it was not a member of the 
UN and thus could not participate in the vote on the Declaration, but the SED was forced to 
account for the Soviet Bloc’s decision to abstain in the press. While the UN voted on 10 
December, the SED’s national newspaper Neues Deutschland did not cover the matter until the 
12th when it ran a small article on the cover proclaiming, “The Struggle for Human Rights is the 
Struggle against Old and New Fascism.”62 The article focused on Soviet delegate Andrei 
Vyshinski’s proposal to include a passage on combating fascism that was voted down by the 
colonial powers and quickly moved onto the subject of American imperialism in regards to 
emerging Cold War tensions over the status of Berlin. The actual contents of the Declaration 
were omitted and only the broader struggle between East and West with human rights serving as 
yet another ideological battleground.  
Over the course of the next few years, through the founding of the German Democratic 
Republic (East) and the Federal Republic of Germany (West) in 1949, the language of human 
rights drifted to the margins of East German political discourse, but it continued to develop in 	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Western Europe. In the immediate postwar period, the human rights discourse of Western 
Europe was primarily associated with a program of liberal democratic political rights alongside 
strong provisions for social rights and economic equality.63 As the English Social Democrat 
George Orwell had written shortly before the conclusion of the war, “the idea underlying 
Fascism is irreconcilably different from that which underlies Socialism. Socialism aims, 
ultimately, at a world-state of free and equal human beings. It takes the equality of human rights 
for granted.”64 In response to this trend, Western European conservatives sought to push back 
against the association of social democracy and human rights by promoting human rights as 
Christian revivalism and the institutionalization of “traditional” human rights (political and civil 
rights), to the exclusion of broader conceptions including economic, social and cultural rights.65  
By the 1950s, however, human rights as a discourse was becoming an important element 
of anti-communism shared by left and right alike. In West Germany, earlier Social Democratic 
emphasis on rebuilding democratic systems to achieve human rights shifted to campaigning 
against the abuses of communism, particularly in East Germany.66 Conservatives moved away 
from explicitly Christian revivalism to focus on broader issues of religious freedom in the 	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atheistic East. While neither East nor West Germany was a member of the United Nations, the 
Federal Republic began commemorating the UN’s proclaimed International Human Rights Day 
(10 December), held every year on the anniversary of the vote on the Universal Declaration.67 In 
addition to this state activity, nongovernmental organizations such as the reconstituted League 
for Human Rights, focused on assisting refugees from the East and opposing communism rather 
than seeking to democratize at home.68 Nonpartisan civil society organizations with broad 
support across the political spectrum, such as the Curatorium for an Indivisible Germany 
(Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland), which was devoted to the reunification of Germany, 
began to submit complaints over human rights abuses in the East to United Nations human rights 
organs, even though they did not accept such petitions, even from member nations.69 While these 
petitions did not produce any official consequences, the mere fact that they were sent to the UN 
prompted West German media to publicize the accusations of human rights abuses against the 
GDR. By the late 1950s, any petition sent to the human rights commission led to a flurry of press 
activity that served to embarrass SED and undermine its claims to legitimacy.70  
Once again, in the face of outside propaganda, the SED sought to match the tactics and 
rhetoric rather than reform. In this case, the party amplified its rhetorical commitment to the 
ideals of human rights and also sought to use the UN as a means of symbolically besting its West 
German rivals on the international stage. While in 1948, the Soviet Bloc had abstained on the 	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matter of adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the 1950s, the Soviet Union 
increasingly made use of the declaration to attack human rights violations in the West and sought 
to play a role in the creation of the legally binding Human Rights Covenants under discussion at 
the UN.71 The socialist bloc in general was discovering that human rights could be a useful 
weapon, not because UN institutions were effective, but because they were not. As Jan Eckel has 
argued, “In the 1950s and 1960s, the organization primarily constituted an arena for symbolic 
politics.”72 But in the competition for legitimacy between East and West Germany, symbolism 
was of the utmost political importance.73 
 One of the venues for symbolic human rights politics at the United Nations was the 
annually published Yearbook on Human Rights that collected information on the passage of laws 
relating to the Universal Declaration. In 1952, the UN sent a letter to the Soviet Control 
Commission, still officially operating in the newly founded GDR, requesting information on East 
German policy.74 The Soviet’s political counsellor, Vladimir Semyonov, enthusiastically passed 
along the request to Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl. Semyonov believed that the FRG could 
submit a contribution and, if they did so, it was important that the SED do the same. He 
suggested that they highlight the achievements of the economic five-year-plan and 
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constitutionally guaranteed rights such as the right to work, to education and health care.75 
Semyonov was not only correct that the Federal Republic would also contribute, but the West 
Germans also sought to prevent the GDR entry from being published as part of its larger strategy 
to deny East Germany any diplomatic recognition.76 
The GDR bureaucracy went much further than Semyonov’s suggestion and in the end the 
report included information on almost ninety laws that had been passed since the creation of an 
independent East Germany. In soliciting submissions from various state agencies, the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs simply asked for any material relating to any of the human right contained in 
the Universal Declaration of 1948 and as a result, the final product contained reports on 
improvements in fields ranging from daycare spaces to workplace gender equality to coal 
production.77 Anything that could be tied to the improvement of human welfare was deemed to 
be a triumph of human rights for the GDR. The report reflected Polak’s argument that human 
rights were the product of socialism – in this case, human rights were deemed to be the literal 
results of socialist rule in all aspects of the society and economy. 
 While statistics on coal production were a far cry from the expected milestones of success 
in the field of human rights anticipated by the drafters of the Universal Declaration, there were 
no negative consequences for the GDR in submitting such a self-serving and propagandistic 
account to the United Nations human rights division. At this time, the human rights bureaucracy 
of the UN was so divided by Cold War tensions that there existed no internationally accepted let 
alone legal definitions of what specific rights meant in practice. Although the Yearbook on 	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Human Rights was meant to chart the progress of the international human rights project, it 
actually served as an uncritical conduit for national propaganda. When numerous GDR state 
bureaucracies submitted reams of paperwork to demonstrate the SED’s fidelity to human rights 
principles, on the other end there was no evaluation of their response and all submissions were 
printed without question – though the GDR submission was significantly edited down for the 
sake of space.78 While the UN system could provide little for those seeking an accurate portrayal 
of the state of human rights in various nations, it did serve as a valuable function for states 
seeking to demonstrate their international legitimacy.  
The symbolic value of the UN’s human rights system meant that even seemingly 
innocuous acts could become points of international contention. A case in point, in 1956, the 
GDR took part in an international effort to honour in the 10th anniversary of the founding of the 
UN through commemorative postage stamps. The GDR League for the United Nations 
commissioned the East German Post Office to create a set representing the idea of self-
determination and racial equality.79 The result was series of three stamps, each showing a picture 
of one of the “the white, black and yellow races.”80  League members begrudgingly accepted the 
design in spite of qualms that its human rights message only made sense when all three stamps 
were together as a group and that even then, its political message was weak.81 No one involved 
appears to have noticed the unfortunate symbolism that the stamp portraying the “white race” 
had the highest value of the series.  
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While the series was released in the GDR to little fanfare – there was an article in the 
SED’s youth journal in the section devoted to stamp collecting – in West Berlin, a group of anti-
communist activists took notice.82 In order to undermine the original message, an anonymous 
group altered the 5 Pfennig stamp from the 1956 human rights series: Rather than the original 
message, “Human Rights Day – German Democratic Republic” it now read, “Day of Humans 
without Rights – Germans Are Slaves of the Soviets.”83 Even in the realm of commemorative 
stamps, the discourse and symbolism of human rights was fiercely contested across the new 
German-German border. 
The SED press initially ignored International Human Rights Day, following the Eastern 
Bloc abstention in 1948. Rather than acknowledge the international event, in 1953 they even held 
a conference on peace in Germany to rival it. By the 10th anniversary of Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1958, however, Vyshinski’s objections at the United Nations were long 
forgotten and it too was incorporated into SED propaganda. In the USSR, reticence about the 
concept of human rights had also faded and Soviet officials were now employing the language 
domestically as well as in foreign propaganda.84 Once again, the GDR post office released a 
commemorative stamp series showing the equality of the races to mark the occasion and on 10 
December 1958 Neues Deutschland covered the anniversary on the front page as a major 
international event that self-evidently legitimized the SED and the rest of the socialist bloc.85 The 
East German foreign ministry sent a message to the General Assembly commending the 
Universal Declaration and its contents as a “highpoint in the fight of the nations for democratic 	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rights and freedoms,” and “an achievement of the antifascist and anti-colonialist struggle.”86 Not 
letting an opportunity to attack West Germany go to waste, the message also pledged that the 
GDR only sought the peaceful and democratic reunification of Germany in contrast to the 
“Hitlerite” policy of rearmament pursued by the Federal Republic.87 Nearly a decade into the 
existence of the GDR, the SED identification with of human rights as a legitimizing discourse 
both at home and abroad was complete.  
Rights in Practice in the SBZ/GDR, 1945-1958 
The GDR was formally founded on a system of rights, but one that allowed the SED 
alone to determine who could exercise their rights and how. In practice, the constitution served 
as a means of restricting free speech, public dissent, and democratic participation instead of 
protecting it. As the SED moved towards a more and more dictatorial system of government, the 
usage of the language of human rights intensified. In the face of human rights based criticism, 
the SED had not moved to increase individual liberty or place restrictions on state power but had 
instead co-opted the very language of its critics and used it in turn to justify its existing plans for 
the creation of a dictatorship of the proletariat. 
In practice, the application of rights in the GDR actually resembled the systems 
advocated by some constitutional theorists of the mid-nineteenth century who sought to use the 
law to support an “organic popular state” (organischer Volksstaat). In such a system rights did 
not belong to the individual but were rather “norms for state power, which the state gives to 
itself; they form limits for administrative authority, they secure for the individual his natural 
freedom of action within a certain parameter, but they do not establish subjective rights of the 
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citizens.”88 The SED replaced the “organic popular state” with the “people’s democracy” but the 
function of rights remained very similar. Rights did not empower individuals but rather set out 
goals and general principles of rule that the state, as the representative of the people, could 
override when deemed necessary since the rights had been created by the state itself. Rights 
could not exist outside of state power and judicial oversight and review was not considered 
necessary or wise. 
While Otto Grotewohl and others promoted the human rights of socialism as more than 
mere “individual rights” it was clear from the SED’s constitutional deliberations that legally 
guaranteed individual autonomy would play a very minor role in the new political order. In 
appearance, the new GDR Constitution resembled its Weimar Era predecessor, but in practice it 
would function very differently with the result that the state, and not the individual was always 
given greater power. Rights in this new order would not be guaranteed by judicial oversight but 
instead fulfilled through state and party action. On the subject of the right to free speech, the 
educator Dr. Heinrich Deiters, representative of the intelligentsia association the Kulturbund, 
claimed that the first duty of the state was to protect from the “misuse or suppression” of this 
basic right, but also to “provide the means to allow citizens to exercise these rights effectively.” 
His solution was to place control of all major media and forms of communication in the hands of 
the state.89  
In the SBZ and then the GDR, rights thus served to legitimize state power and to create a 
system of contingent benefits. In spite of the numerous guarantees of basic rights proclaimed by 
the KPD and then the SED, there existed no system of legally guaranteed rights for individuals in 
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the GDR. This is not to say that East Germany operated wholly to the whim of party officials. 
State regulations and laws normalized and systematized rule in the GDR to a certain extent: if 
citizens followed the rules as set out by the state, they could count on the state apparatus to 
provide basic necessities and respond to limited criticism of poor living or working conditions.90 
At the same time, the SED wholly rejected the idea that the law could bind the party when 
circumstances demanded the law to be overridden or ignored. For citizens in this system, rights 
functioned as designations of benefits that would be accrued in exchange for the fulfillment of 
duties. For the state, they were a broad statement of ideals that would be implemented according 
to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and democratic centralism. In practice, this meant that 
rights served more as tools and mechanisms of rule than as protections, immunities, or 
guarantees for the individual. Those that sought to challenge the state in the language of rights or 
to undermine the SED’s official discourse of rights were severely punished. 
Although the 1949 Constitution enshrined participation in the community and national 
affairs of the GDR not only a right, but also a duty, it was made clear from the arrival of the 
KPD onwards that this was no open invitation to those who would promote Nazism or other 
ideologies deemed fascistic.91 The policy of preventing Nazis from once again taking power, 
however, was used extensively to justify the suppression of dissent. While the public supported 
the reinstatement of the rights they once had under the Weimar Republic, many were genuinely 
concerned that elements of the NSDAP could use these rights to once again seize power. While 
all citizens were technically equal according to SED propaganda, they did explicitly make 
exceptions for committed Nazis. At the debates over the GDR Constitution, one member of the 	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Society for the Victims of Nazi Persecution (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes) 
elaborated on the quote of the French revolutionary St. Just,  “No freedom for the enemies of 
freedom!” to declare, “No democratic rights for the enemies of democracy!”92  
Such concerns that democratic rights would once again be abused by antidemocratic 
forces were widespread in West Germany as well, but when more details of this policy were 
discussed, it revealed a much broader category of citizens who were not deemed unfit to have 
rights.93 Again speaking about the new constitution, Otto Grotewohl elaborated that there would 
be “No basic rights for those who seek to destroy basic rights themselves, who pursue a policy of 
undermining the political, social, and governmental foundations of the state.”94 Not only enemies 
of democracy, but anyone who threatened the fundamentals of social and political relations as 
determined by the SED would be ineligible for full rights-bearing citizenship. Protection against 
abuse by antidemocratic forces was subtly transformed into a ban on opponents of socialism and 
SED rule. 
While the SED did have a firm grip on power, supported by the Soviet occupation 
authorities, a small number of political parties were permitted to continue their existence as part 
of a National Front but they were effectively neutered of real power. Rather than facilitate the 
expression of alternative viewpoints, the “block parties” served to bring otherwise reluctant 
groups into the fold through state patronage without threatening the actual monopoly of the 
SED.95 Each was geared to a specific demographic that was not positively inclined towards 	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Communism: the Christian Democrats (CDU) for conservative Christians, the Liberal Democrats 
(LDPD) for small business owners, the Democratic Farmer’s for rural communities and the 
National Democrats (NDPD) for former Nazis. When leaders of these parties, such as the CDU’s 
Jakob Kaiser, bucked the SED line they were replaced until an appropriately docile candidate 
was found.96 Elections to the East German parliament, the Volkskammer, were neither free nor 
secret but the formal trappings of democracy helped to sustain the sense that the SED respected 
the political rights of the citizenry.97 
Although the SED specifically emphasized the social and economic rights of the 
constitution during its promulgation and in everyday propaganda in the GDR, these rights were 
always dependent on a quid pro quo.98 Access to food rationing, housing, and day-care was 
conditioned on participation in the labour market rather than citizenship. Unlike the Stalin 
Constitution of 1936, which explicitly listed duties alongside rights, the duties required to gain 
social benefits in East Germany were determined ad hoc and on a local basis.99 For those too 
young for full time employment, the “right to recreation, the right to education and the right to 
joy and happiness [Freude und Frohsinn]” were to be realized through participation in the state-
run youth organization the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth, FDJ).100 
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 In the case of women’s rights, the implicit reciprocity was made even clearer, particularly 
in relation to problems of reproduction. In 1946, the Soviet Occupation authority issued Order Nr. 
253 that prohibited wage discrimination on the basis of age or sex and in 1947, Order Nr. 234 
required factories to provide laundry, sewing, medical, and child care services to allow for the 
full integration of women into the workforce.101 Although these measures to create gender 
equality and promises of economic benefits were popular with women, the main battle for rights 
fought by women in the early postwar period hinged on efforts by the KPD and then the SED to 
restrict access to abortion. Many women’s rights activists were shocked when the new leadership 
sought a total ban on access to abortions in order to promote population growth. SED leaders 
now denounced suggestions that the party return to its Weimar Era rallying cry, “Your Body 
Belongs to You!” as “vulgar” “anarchistic and individualistic.”102  
While some elements of both the KPD and SPD sought to maintain the pro-abortion 
access policies of both parties from the Weimar-era, especially in the case of victims of rape, 
Walter Ulbricht rejected this outright and without explanation. He issued an order stating “We 
would like to make it clear that examinations of women are necessary in cases of sexual diseases, 
but otherwise we are against abortions; after a while we will state our reasons openly.”103 This 
policy of total prohibition resulted in a widespread rise in medically unsafe abortions and, in turn, 
a skyrocketing number of deaths from unsanitary or botched procedures. Following a huge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 45. 
102 On the Weimar Era KPD’s efforts to attract female voters including this slogan, see Julia Sneeringer, Winning 
Women’s Votes: Propaganda and Politics in Weimar Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2002), 
149. Quotes from SED officials rejecting a return to Weimar Era policy from Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic, 145; 
Atina Grossmann, “Pronatalism, Nationalism and Socialism,” in Between Reform and Revolution: German 
Socialism and Communism from 1840 to 1990, ed. David Barclay and Eric Weitz (New York: Berghahn Books, 
1998), 451. 
103 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 123.  
	  	   64	  
number of deaths in 1946 (more than 6,000 alone in Berlin), the SED began to allow for medical 
abortion in certain cases involving social and medical conditions as well as in cases of rape.104 
 This easing of access, did not however, imply any acknowledgement that women had a 
right to bodily autonomy. Maxim Zetkin, the SED’s chief medical officer, explained that under 
socialism there could be no such thing as a right to an abortion. “We do not believe in natural 
rights: the law is a social category. And we recognize the right of society to determine the fate of 
mother and child, but under one condition: that society guarantees them at least the minimum 
tolerable conditions of existence.”105 Although Zetkin’s explanation appears to be a cynical 
retreat from the promises of the past in the face of contemporary pressure to increase the East 
German population, he was correct that the KPD had always justified abortion rights in terms of 
the exploitation of the capitalist system where a working woman could not “combine her 
economic role as producer with her biological function as reproducer.”106 The triumph of 
socialism meant that this contradiction was gone and women no longer had need of abortions. By 
solving the problem of production, the new socialist system could demand that women devote 
themselves wholly to reproduction. 
In keeping with other systems of rights on the national level, the SED’s vigorous support 
for the minority rights of the Sorbs, a Slavic group living predominantly in Saxony, was also 
about gaining loyal socialist citizens rather than empowering the disadvantaged. Beginning in the 
late 1940s, the SED advanced a program for the “rights of the Sorbian national minority,” 
including the promotion of cultural production through the creation of a Sorbian-language theatre 
in the city of Bautzen and Sorbian radio programming on Radio Dresden as well as the 	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establishment of bilingual schools and workplaces in regions with a large minority population.107 
Following the lead of Soviet policy on minority nations, the SED viewed Sorbian culture as 
backwards and pre-modern and thus vulnerable to reactionary ideologies.108 In order to gain the 
loyalty of the Sorbs, the SED would grant them special rights so that they could be fully included 
in the larger project of socialist modernization. Expressions of minority culture could exhibit 
differences with the German majority so long as the ideological contents were firmly socialist in 
nature. Some of these programs spurred on grumbling from ethnic Germans about special rights 
and treatment, but SED officials held to programs as an imperative in creating a socialist East 
Germany. One report from a Dresden union representative in charge of implementing a bilingual 
Sorbian language program at a factory argued that such efforts were necessary in spite of the 
negative reactions since “the realization of equal rights is above all a political-ideological 
task.”109 Promoting the minority culture of the Sorbs served to further the political aims of the 
state so that they became part of the larger socialist community, not so they could exist 
separately from German society. 
Overall, the language of rights was far more common as a discourse of punishment and 
state coercion, rather than state benefits or democratic participation in this period. In the 
immediate postwar era, dissenting voices were suppressed using to Article 3 of Control Council 	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Directive 38, which prohibited behaviour that “endangered or possibly endangered the peace of 
the German people or the peace of the world through propaganda for National Socialism or 
militarism or by the invention or diffusion of tendentious rumours.”110 Following the passage of 
the GDR Constitution, the legal instrument of choice in stifling criticism became Article 6 of the 
Constitution, which prohibited “incitement to warfare and boycott” of democratic institutions.111 
This provision was used by the SED to legally prosecute supposed enemies such as the dissident 
intellectual Walter Janka whose show trial in 1957 attracted international attention and by local 
police forces to justify the disciplining of those who spoke poorly of the Soviets or publicly 
criticized state policy.112 
Those who did use the language of rights to challenge or criticize the SED were severely 
punished and within the SED party apparatus as well as amongst loyal intellectuals, the usage of 
the idea of rights was carefully policed. Even high-level members were not immune to harsh 
retribution when they undermined the party line. While in 1947, Erich Gniffke had been 
promoting his belief that socialism and the SED would bring about a state based on human rights, 
he quickly fell from grace by following through on such rhetoric in ways that challenged the 
party’s privileged position. In October 1948, while speaking on behalf of the SED, Gniffke 
publicly promised British occupation authorities that no party would hold a monopoly on power 
in the new Germany and that all citizens would be guaranteed their rights to vote, assemble, and 
associate. In response, Walter Ulbricht and other hardliners in the SED leadership expelled him 
from the SED and pushed him to leave the Eastern Zone. Shortly before immigrating to West 
Germany that same year, the disillusioned Gniffke denounced Ulbricht and his former party 	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colleagues and backed the establishment of a "bourgeois democracy" and German 
reunification.113 
 A similar fate befell Max Fechner, the SED’s Minister of Justice, when he improperly 
responded to the worker’s uprising that took place in Berlin and other cities across the GDR in 
June 1953. When asked by a reporter from the SED’s own national newspaper, Neues 
Deutschland, on how rebelling workers would be dealt with, Fechner said that violations of the 
law would be punished but he added that “the right to strike is guaranteed by the constitution. 
The leaders of the strikes will not be punished for being members of a strike leadership 
committee.”114 In response, the SED Politburo denounced Fechner as an enemy of the state and 
he too was stripped of his party membership. Within two weeks of the publication of his 
comments, he was jailed and eventually sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Although he was 
actually released from prison in 1956 and had his party membership reinstated in 1958, the 
message sent by the Ulbricht was clear: even top ministers could be expelled and jailed for 
undermining the position of the SED.115 
 In addition to high-level SED members, academics and intellectuals were also at risk of 
major punishment if they advocated even the theoretical possibility of legally binding individual 
rights under socialism. The most dramatic instance of party backlash against loyal but 
troublesome intellectuals came at the Legal Academy in Babelsberg, just outside Berlin in 1958. 
While the legal profession was dominated by the work of Karl Polak, a new generation of 
scholars worked through the 1950s to rationalize the meaning of the law in a system where 
political necessity reigned supreme. When some of the academics in Babelsberg began to claim 	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that the law could exist as something more than a tool of political power and that the party could 
be bound and restricted by the law, this was deemed to be beyond the pale. At the urging of Karl 
Polak himself, Ulbricht demanded that the rector of the law school organize a conference that 
would deal with the matter. Most of the proceedings of the Babelsberg Conference were devoted 
to the public denunciation of supposed “revisionism” as a means of simultaneously cementing a 
new orthodoxy and making it clear what would occur if intellectuals strayed from the appropriate 
line. Walter Ulbricht personally took the lead in denouncing Hermann Klenner, a young legal 
theorist whose later works would form the core of East German human rights ideology and 
eventually represent the GDR at the UN Human Rights Commission. In order to teach Klenner 
and the other “revisionists” about the realities of politics, the party stripped several of their 
academic positions and sent them to act as administrators in small villages in the countryside.116 
Although not as harsh as the punishment meted out to Gniffke or Fechner, this act also had 
longstanding consequences as East German intellectuals learned never to challenge the political 
supremacy of the SED, even in theory. To suggest that the power of the SED was limited by 
universal human rights, constitutional rights or even the law was unacceptable. 
 The Soviet authorities and the SED also ensured that independent human rights 
organizations would not be formed in the SBZ and the GDR. While members of the Weimar Era 
League for Human Rights sought to reconstitute the organization in the occupied zones, they 
posed little threat to the political domination of the SED. Several of the former members had 
even joined the SED as a sign of their commitment to antifascist unity and the desire for 
opposing political parties to work together to rebuild Germany. Many claimed to be apolitical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Ibid., 90–93.  
	  	   69	  
with their only interest the material well-being of refugees and displaced people who had 
streamed into the occupied zones from the East.117  
In spite of these seemingly harmless goals, the SED still had no interest in allowing for 
independent civil society organizations to take root in the East, particularly if they involved 
human rights activism. In keeping with its broader strategy of supporting human rights 
rhetorically while building dictatorship, the SED played a double game of publicly supporting 
such groups but preventing the establishment of any such independent organizations in the 
Eastern Zone. Immediately after the war, the KPD leadership took note of the initial re-
establishment of the League for Human Rights in the Western Zone at a meeting in June 1945 
and in that same year a branch of the organization was founded in Dresden.118 In October 1945, 
only a few months after its creation, the Soviets forcibly dissolved the group.119 According to 
Dresden League’s founder, Wolfram von Hanstein, Col. Sergei Tiul’panov of the Soviet military 
authority offered that he would go unpunished so long as he ceased all public activities.120 This 
offer was accepted and the organization disappeared. 
Although the initial efforts of the League had been foiled in the Eastern Zone, in 
February of the following year, a Western branch of the League based in Dortmund wrote to 
future SED leader Wilhelm Pieck requesting permission to set up shop in the SBZ. The 
Dortmund group claimed to represent no political party and “to follow no party-political aims” 
but only sought the peaceful reunification of Germany and to assist with the terrible social crises 
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of mass homelessness and dislocation.121  When the matter came before the Central Secretariat of 
the SED in June 1946, it determined that the League required no permission from the Party to 
begin their work.122 By claiming it lacked the authority to regulate such matters, the SED was 
able to appear sympathetic to the League without providing it any protection from the Soviet 
authorities that had already demonstrated a readiness to suppress any activities within the SBZ.  
In the Western Zones of Occupation and later the Federal Republic, the SED also pursued 
a two-pronged strategy of encouraging like-minded civil society organizations and sabotaging 
groups that would criticize SED rule. On the one hand, the SED supported antifascist and peace 
organizations that would criticize democratic failings of Adenauer’s CDU government. Through 
groups such as the Central Council for the Protection of Democratic Rights and the Defense of 
German Patriots and the Congress for German Understanding and a Just Peace Treaty.123 These 
groups publicized manifestos from arrested left-wing activists and held meetings dedicated to 
propagating propaganda on the threat to peace posed by the FRG.124  
The other half of the strategy in the 1950s lay in the hands of the newly formed State 
Security service, the Stasi. In order to subvert organizations that were not sympathetic to the 
SED and the Soviet Union, the Stasi infiltrated and undermined the efforts of the League for 
Human Rights. The main agent for these activities was none other than Wolfram von Hanstein, 
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who had earlier founded the Dresden branch of the League. Having been arrested by the Soviet 
authorities in 1951 and sentenced to death for espionage the following year, von Hanstein had 
been released in 1955 and was recruited by the Stasi.125 After immigrating to West Berlin, he 
rose quickly through the ranks of the local branch of the League for Human Rights as well as 
several other anti-communist organizations, and he used his positions to funnel information to 
his Stasi handlers on incoming refugees and planned escapes from the GDR.126 He even appears 
to have founded the Research Institution for Questions of Human Rights in 1957.127 After years 
of suspicions, in 1959, he was exposed as a spy and imprisoned for espionage once more, this 
time by West German authorities.128 
 The language of rights formed an important discourse of control in the Eastern Zone and 
then later in the GDR and the SED went to great lengths to maintain its discursive power. The 
idea of rights was used to both legitimize state power and to co-opt key elements of the 
population. Those that challenged this discourse, be they SED ministers such as Max Fechner, 
legal scholars like Hermann Klenner, or human rights activists such as those who formed the 
League of Human Rights, were all silenced. In practice, the use of the language of rights 
furthered the SED’s grip on power. Rather than provide a means for the population to protest the 
centralized control of the party, it facilitated and justified the expansion of SED control. 
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Conclusion 
From 1945 to 1958, as the SED consolidated power and created a dictatorship of the 
proletariat – a system of SED dominated “democratic centralism” – the party also increasingly 
adopted the language of human rights to legitimize its rule at home and abroad. Initially, party 
propaganda sought to portray the SED as the successors to the liberal-nationalist revolutionaries 
of 1848 but when this failed to bring them mass support, they moved to appropriate the language 
of human rights. As opponents within the SBZ and the west took up the language of human 
rights to denounce SED rule, the party hardliners only amplified their rhetorical commitment to 
the idea that there could be “No Human Rights without Socialism!” Although initially ignoring 
the United Nation’s human rights system, in the mid-1950s the SED moved to incorporate 
international human rights norms into its propaganda and began to use UN events and 
organizations as sites for symbolic political conflict with West Germany. 
The celebration of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the GDR still 
referenced basic rights and reunification, but it justified these goals in the vocabulary of the 
international human rights discourse with its emphasis on universalism, racial equality, and 
peace. Over the course of more than a decade of political conflict, the leadership of the SED had 
steadily adapted its language of rights, first by appropriating the historical language of German 
liberal nationalism and then by co-opting SPD criticism and later even emerging international 
discourse of human rights. This rhetorical shift did not, by any means, coincide with a 
liberalization of policy and ideology. Quite the opposite, the language of rights was used over 
this same period to stamp out dissent and consolidate the power of the hardliners within the SED 
leadership.  
 Although the SED embraced the language of human rights due to external pressure, many 
in the SED appear to have genuinely internalized the idea that they represented the ideals of 
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international human rights. Karl Polak’s work rationalized the seeming contradictions between 
rhetoric and practice so that the SED could first respond to attacks from the SPD and then, later 
on, elaborate on these initial propaganda efforts at the international level. Far from preventing 
the establishment of dictatorship in East Germany, the discourse of human rights actually 
smoothed the path of the SED in taking power and consolidating control of the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation and later even legitimizing their rule to the United Nations. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
Creating an Antifascist Discourse of Human Rights, 1959-1966   
 
 By 1958, the SED had succeeded in eliminating internal dissenters and consolidated its 
political control over East Germany. This did not, however, mean that the Party’s position was 
wholly secure. The 1953 workers’ uprising showed that the party was still vulnerable to internal 
opposition and the renewal of tensions in 1958, including the beginning of the Second Berlin 
Crisis, demonstrated the precarious situation of the GDR in international affairs.1 Although SED 
Chairman Walter Ulbricht had vowed in 1958 that the GDR would overtake the economic output 
of West Germany, it was soon clear that the East German economy was in no position to do so 
and its ability to provide enough basic foodstuffs – let alone consumer goods – was deteriorating 
rapidly in comparison to the Federal Republic.2 As more and more East Germans chose to 
emigrate in reaction to economic hardship and political repression, West German anti-
communists began to step up their efforts to delegitimize the “Pankow Regime”3 of the “Soviet 
Occupied Zone” both within the two Germanies and at the United Nations.  
While the SED had established its power in East Germany, it continued to suffer from a 
deficit of legitimacy that was only exacerbated by the failure to match the economic growth of 
the Federal Republic. Faced with domestic unrest, the SED leadership could not provide greater 	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economic benefits, but they were also unwilling to relinquish any of the political control they had 
spent so long to establish. Rejecting the possibilities of either political liberalization or economic 
bribery, the SED leadership turned instead to propaganda. It decided to launch a major campaign 
highlighting the continued presence of Nazis in high-ranking West German government offices 
and portraying East Germany as the bulwark of antifascism standing against the rising tide of 
militarism in the FRG. One showpiece in the build-up of the SED’s propaganda machine in 1959 
was the creation of first human rights group in the socialist world: the Committee for the 
Protection of Human Rights against Militaristic Arbitrariness and Class Justice in West 
Germany – soon after, shortened to the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights.4 
Founded two years before Amnesty International, the Committee was the first, and until 
the late 1980s the only, effort of any communist country to institutionalize human rights activism 
under state direction. Originating out of the ad-hoc prisoner support groups that sprung up after 
the banning of the West German KPD in 1956, it moved beyond this narrow mission to become 
an important source of human rights propaganda for the GDR and an organizational tool to 
mobilize East German workers against the West German Republic in the name of antifascism 
and human rights.5 The Committee did not offer a coherent theoretical conception of human 
rights as an alternative to the liberal democratic human rights discourse of the west, but it did 
begin the process of translating the concepts of human rights into a more elaborate and locally 
rooted conception of East German antifascism. 
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The Founding of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights 
 Although part of a broader propaganda campaign, the Committee’s immediate origins 
were sparked by the banning of the Communist Party in West Germany. Following the legal ban 
on the far-right Socialist Reich Party in 1952, the West German government next put the 
Communist Party (KPD) on trial.6 The courts found that a party based on the tenets of Marxism-
Leninism, even one that officially renounced revolution, was incompatible with the “free 
democratic basic order,” of the Federal Republic.7 Not only KPD members but also the leaders 
of more than eighty other groups – including the women’s auxiliary, the DFD, the Free German 
Youth (FDJ) and even the Central Council for the Protection of Democratic Rights – were 
arrested as enemies of the constitutional order.  
The ban on the KPD provoked alarm amongst left-wing West Germans and even the 
Western Allies, concerned that this drastic action threatened the very principles of liberal 
democracy it was meant to protect. As Patrick Major has argued, this period of judicial anti-
communism did not compare to the political oppression meted out by the Nazis or the mass 
surveillance conducted in East Germany, but it did represent a violation of the principles the 
West German state claimed to represent.8 He writes, “there were so many judges of Nazi vintage 
still passing sentence in the FRG that it is very difficult to talk of an unprejudiced judiciary in the 
1950s and 1960s,” and it took a bout of liberal reform in 1968 to end “a period of political justice 
which did not reflect credit on the Federal Republic’s legal system.”9 The SED exploited this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 On the interconnections between the ban on the RSP and the KPD see Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the 
Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Dominik Rigoll 
goes even farther and connects these events to bans on radicals from the Imperial Period to the 1970s, in Rigoll, 
Staatsschutz in Westdeutschland: Von der Entnazifizierung zur Extremistenabwehr (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013). 
7 Major, The Death of the KPD, 292. 
8 Ibid., 277–78.  
9 Ibid., 281–82. 
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genuine concern on the ground to attack the democratic claims of the West German state and 
attempt to take the moral high ground. 
After years of publicly demanding reunification and national unity on socialist terms, the 
SED shifted to a program of separation and demarcation from the West (Abgrenzung). The 
Berlin Crisis of 1958 had heightened tensions with West Germany and stamped out the hope that 
Germany could still peacefully reunite. The door had also closed on the possibility of bringing 
about a merger with the Social Democrats in the West. In 1959, the SPD passed the Godesberg 
Program, which renounced Marxism and the goal of ending capitalism. In their move towards the 
political center, the SPD made it clear that they were a different kind of socialist party than the 
SED, accusing them of “radically suppressing freedom” and “raping [vergewaltigen] human 
rights.”10 Without the economic means to placate the demands of East Germans and unwilling to 
liberalize politically after a decade of struggle to achieve a monopoly on power, the SED turned 
to an ideological solution.11 In 1959, they launched a major propaganda campaign with the goal 
of delegitimizing the West German state as a continuation of the Third Reich in a democratic 
disguise, while promoting the GDR as the true champion of antifascism and the paramount 
representative of the values of the anti-Hitler coalition. The campaign focussed on former Nazis 
who now held prominent positions in the Adenauer government, such as the Chancellor’s 
notorious right-hand man Hans Globke who had worked on the development of anti-Semitic 
legal codes during the Third Reich. 12 Although such figures were the main thrust of East 
German propaganda, human rights activism was integrated into its larger ideological structures. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “Godesberger Programm, November 1959,” www.hdg.de/lemo/html/dokumente/DieZuspitzungDesKalten 
Krieges_programmGodesbergerProgramm/. 
11 Michael Lemke, “Kampagnen gegen Bonn: Die Systemkrise der DDR und die West-Propaganda der SED 1960-
1963,” Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte 41:2 (Apr 1993), 2. 
12 A memorable product of this campaign was a detailed documentation on former Nazis working for the West 
German government, National Council of the National Front, Brown Book: War and Nazi Criminals in West 
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 In May 1959, the SED institutionalized the mobilization of East Germans on behalf of 
imprisoned activists in the west and the production of human rights propaganda through the 
creation of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights.13 At the opening meeting, a 
founding member, legal scholar Dr. Gerhard Kühlig spoke of the need for an organization to 
combat the rising tide of militarism in the west and its associated violations of human rights: 
Militarism and the policy of aggressive war must inevitably encounter the resistance of all peace-
loving forces and necessarily extinguish human rights, because these people have rights under the 
principles of the anti-Hitler coalition in the fight of all peace-loving people have a intrinsic 
democratic content – they include such vital human rights as the right to advocacy for peace and the 
right to advocacy for the most basic vital interests of all working people. The breach of human 
rights is therefore an essential part of the militarist system.14  
 
The goals of the organization clearly served the propaganda and foreign policy priorities of the 
state. In a speech outlining the plans of the organization, Chairwoman Friedel Malter (1902-
2001), a veteran KPD functionary who had survived the concentration camps, declared the 
priorities were to support the ratification of a just peace treaty that would “include human rights, 
democratic freedoms of the population in West Germany,” to combat the West German judges 
who “trample upon human rights” (die Menschenrechte mit Füßen treten)15, to practice solidarity 
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15  This phrase originates from Ludwig van Beethoven denouncing Napoleon Bonaparte, “Nun wird er auch alle 
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Tyrann werden!” in Franz Gerhard Wegeler and Ferdinand Ries, Biographische Notizen über Ludwig van Beethoven 
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with the families of the victims of class justice, and to expose the West German system of 
“judicial terror” in all areas of civil life.16 
 While the twenty initial members of the Committee were almost exclusively intellectuals 
and academics, the organization quickly broadened its membership base. Chairwoman Friedel 
Malter and Secretary Siegfried Forberger actively recruited prominent East Germans to serve as 
members.17 Some of their early recruits in the 1960s included such socialist luminaries as author 
Stefan Heym, actor Erwin Geschonneck, and Rosa Thälmann, the widow of the much-
mythologised Weimar Era KPD leader Ernst Thälmann whose death in a concentration camp 
made him an antifascist martyr.18 The bulk of official members were representatives from GDR 
factory and union groups who could connect the Committee to the grassroots. Whereas the 
intelligentsia served to create the Committee’s material, factory and union representatives were 
to concentrate on dissemination and mobilization. 
The founders of the Committee saw it as the heir to both the Weimar-era German League 
for Human Rights (Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte) and the proletariat-communist mutual aid 
society Red Aid (Rote Hilfe).19 Following in the footsteps of the League for Human Rights, the 
Committee was to act as a nonpartisan antifascist social organization that could bring together 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Malter would serve as Chairwoman of the organization from its founding until her retirement in 1989 shortly 
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"Komitees zum Schutze der Menschenrechte gegen "militaristische Willkür und Kassenjustiz in Westdeutschland, 
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18 BArch-Lichterfelde DZ 7/ 67. Mitglieder des Komitees. On the memory of Ernst Thälmann, see Russel Lemmons, 
Hitler’s Rival: Ernst Thälmann in Myth and Memory (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012). 
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political, legal and cultural figures in the name of peace.20 Accordingly the Committee spoke not 
as an organ of the state but with the voice of a concerned assembly of citizens. In its direct action, 
however, the Committee more closely resembled the partisan-minded Red Aid, which raised 
funds for imprisoned activists, helped the children of communists when parents were ill or too 
busy working to raise them, and demanded an end to the use of the justice system as a tool of 
class warfare. The Committee actually adopted many of Red Aid’s slogans such as its attacks on 
“class justice” (Klassenjustiz) and its calls to members to “Practice Solidarity!” (Übt 
Solidarität!)21  
While the organization portrayed itself as a collection of concerned citizens, it was 
clearly working according to the directives and towards the priorities of the SED. The Committee 
reported to Albert Norden of the Western Department (Westabteilung) of the Central Secretariat 
of the SED and regularly received requests for specific propaganda material from the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs (Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten - MfAA).22 Yet, according to 
Siegfried Forberger (1925-), the Committee’s Secretary who had been recruited immediately 
after his graduation from the “Walter Ulbricht Academy for Legal and Political Science” in 
Potsdam, the Committee was granted a great deal of leeway from the official state apparatus and 
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party records do show that it received minimal supervision.23 The only substantial feedback from 
SED officials after the first six months was that their propaganda needed to use the term “human 
rights” more often in order to appeal more to West Germans.24 The support of Gotthard Feist, a 
key figure at the state-directed Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB), and father-in-law 
of future SED chairman Erich Honecker, granted the Committee secure funding and a minimum 
of micromanagement from above.25 While the Committee initially recruited members of the non-
SED block parties and non-affiliated notables from the cultural community, the key members 
who defined the agenda and practices of the organization were invariably reliable party veterans 
such as Malter or individuals who were educated in the new GDR and could be counted on 
ideologically. As such, the SED had nothing to fear from an organization that saw the 
furtherance of state goals and the realization of human rights as one and the same.  
 
The Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Action 
In many ways, the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights functioned similarly to 
Western human rights organizations: Senior members of the Committee set about building a 
membership and donor base as well as standardized methods for choosing subjects of campaigns. 
Staff chose specific victims of human rights abuses, publicized these cases and organized mass 
responses to assist those affected through donations or to level pressure on authorities through 
letter writing campaigns. Beyond the organizational parallels, however, they also served a role in 
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the propagation of the human rights discourse by translating the language of international human 
rights into everyday terms that would resonate with the local population.26  
While anthropologists of human rights tend to examine this process of “vernacularization” 
in terms of how established power is challenged through the adoption of the language of human 
rights, in the case of East Germany, this process was used to solidify the political power of the 
SED and further legitimize its rule.27 Instead of linking together local claims and concerns with 
international norms to change the system, the Committee grafted the language of human rights 
onto the ideology and propaganda of the SED. This process preserved the vocabulary of 
international human rights while imbuing the discourse with meaning entirely composed of East 
German political and cultural norms. In coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Western Section of the Central Secretariat, the Committee developed a new language of 
human rights that could be effective for campaigning, propagandizing, and mobilizing against 
the West.  
 As Friedel Malter had already proposed in 1959, the primary efforts of the Committee 
would center on campaigns for the release of political prisoners in West Germany. When 
members of East German organizations such as the SED’s youth movement, the FDJ, or the 
GDR’s central trade union, the FDGB, were arrested in the Federal Republic on the pretext of 
being threats to the West German constitutional order, the Committee, primarily Secretary 
Siegfried Forberger, would swing into action. The Committee would draft press releases for the 
national newspaper Neues Deutschland as well as the East German news wire service (ADN) 	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27 On the uses of human rights to sustain rather than challenge power see, Neil Stammers, “Social Movements, 
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that would in turn carry the message to various regional newspapers, which would pick up the 
story if the victim were local. Committee members associated with various factories and 
worker’s organizations would spread the word. In some cases they would coordinate the writing 
of letters of protest from friends and colleagues of the imprisoned as well as other workers 
seeking to demonstrate solidarity. The Committee would then act as a liaison between the family 
members of the prisoner and the lawyers defending them in the West, as well as coordinating 
financial assistance to the families from the state apparatus. When prisoners were released, the 
Committee would coordinate the press coverage of their triumphant return to East Germany.  
 The campaign for the release of Adolf Metzner illustrates the Committee’s methods. On 5 
February 1961, Metzner, a “worker functionary” at a fish processing plant in the town of 
Sassnitz on the Baltic Sea island of Rügen, was arrested by West German authorities on charges 
of having “anti-constitutional intentions” (verfassungsfeindliche Absichten) while meeting with 
representatives of the postal workers union in Frankfurt.28 In order to assist, Committee member 
Friedrich Karl Kaul, a famed East German lawyer and part of the defense team during the 
original court case resulting in the banning of the KPD, was sent to represent Metzner in court.29 
The Committee then coordinated communication between Metzner and his family in the GDR.  
 In publicizing the case, the Committee sought to shock East Germans with the terms of 
Metzner’s imprisonment and demonstrate the discriminatory treatment towards a “peace-loving 
German patriot.” According to the Committee’s press releases, Metzner was purposely placed in 
a cell with dangerous criminals who were contagious with tuberculosis. Adding in lurid detail: 
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29 On the role of Kaul in East German legal propaganda, see Annette Rosskopf, “Anwalt antifaschistischer 
Offensiven: der DDR-Nebenklagevertreter Friedrich Karl Kaul,” in Irmtrud Wojak, Gerichtstag halten wir über uns 
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The height of discrimination and vulgarity against the upright antifascist fighter for peace Adolf 
Metzner must be that he was sentenced to share a cell with the sex killer Zigli, serving a life-
sentence for molesting and killing an 8-year-old boy. Only with difficulty could he keep at bay 
this homosexual at night. Only after vigorous protests was he transferred to another cell.30  
 
The report went on to ask if the West German doctors who certified Metzner as medically fit for 
prison work had conspired to destroy his health on orders from the state: “Was this treatment of 
Adolf Metzner on the orders of Adenauer Bonn Gestapo? Such methods are known to us.”31 
 Shortly before Metzner’s trial in January 1962, the Committee coordinated with his 
fellow workers in Sassnitz where a local committee organized a concert to raise awareness of his 
arrest and collect funds to support his family in his absence. The Committee encouraged the 
writing of protest letters to the prosecutor’s office in Frankfurt (am Main) while East German 
protestors in turn read letters from Metzner procured – and possibly written by – the Committee 
that had been published in the press. From prison, Metzner told his supporters, “I can assure you 
that I have the strength to get through all of this […] Not for a moment will I betray the interests 
of the working class and all peace-loving forces.”32 The Committee quoted a report form the 
American news wire service Associated Press stating that the Frankfurt court had received over 
4,000 letters of protest, prior to the trial. 
 While there is no evidence to suggest that these letters had any impact on the conduct of 
the trial, the eventual release of Metzner was attributed to the assistance of his fellow East 
German workers. Sentenced to time already served, Metzner was released and sent back to the 
GDR in February 1962. One headline read “Solidarity Opens the Dungeons” and the article now 	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claimed that the efforts of the Committee had resulted in more than 30,000 letters of protest 
being sent to the prosecutor’s office in Frankfurt.33 At a homecoming event in the neighbouring 
town of Stralsund near Rügen, Committee member Rudi Spektin announced to the crowd “this 
disgraceful trial against Adolf Metzner is also a trial against the interests of the German working 
class.” Metzner himself was given an opportunity to thank the crowd for its support and call 
upon them to continue the fight to free others still imprisoned in the West.34 As much as the 
horrors of the West were a focal point for the propaganda, the Committee also recognized the 
value in successes and providing supporters with a sense that their actions had made a difference 
in the world. 
Most of the Committee’s work focussed on direct campaigning, but its international 
propaganda function took on increasing importance following the construction of the Berlin Wall 
on August 13, 1961. West Germans of all political stripes responded to the division of the city by 
attacking the SED in the language of human rights. Willy Brandt, the Social Democrat mayor of 
West Berlin and future Chancellor of West Germany, argued, “above all we must seize the 
initiative in order to denounce this flagrant violation of international human rights.”35 The 
Federal Ministry for All-German Questions produced pamphlets with titles like “Violations of 
Human Rights: Unjust Acts and Incidents at the Berlin Border” to document the abuses 
stemming from the border fortifications. The right-wing civil society organization, The Council 
for Central German Culture, used the building of the wall as a starting point for a broader 
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indictment of SED rule in publications such as “Human Rights and the Soviet Occupied Zone.”36 
Adding to this pressure was the creation of the West German chapter of Amnesty International in 
1961 and the stabilization of the Frankfurt-based German League for Human Rights following a 
decade of little activity due to internal divisions and mismanagement.37 
While most historical accounts of the United Nations have dismissed this era as largely 
irrelevant due to the human rights commission’s inability, and unwillingness, to act on petitions 
and reports of human rights abuses, the UN continued to serve as an important focal point for 
international propaganda.38 Just as West German anti-communist organizations had generated 
media publicity for their cause in the late 1950s by officially submitting their work to New York, 
so too did the Committee in the early 1960s. Most of the propaganda was aimed at both West 
German and international audiences and sought to demonstrate that it was actually the Federal 
Republic that violated human rights on a vast scale. The danger in West Germany stemmed from 
the continued prominence of former Nazis in the state apparatus indicated a stealth resurgence of 
fascism. East German actions were framed as defensive measures against western aggression.39 
As such, blame could be shifted to West Germany, which was accused of standing outside the 
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norms of the international community and threatening world peace through its continued 
intransigence on the matter of East German recognition.  
The Committee's focus on antifascism is evident in this period, but there are subtle 
variations on the main points in pamphlets and petitions submitted to the targeting specific 
audiences. For West Germans, the message of the propaganda was two-fold: Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer is the new Hitler and he poses a dire threat to both socialists and liberals alike. The 
Committee’s petitions and pamphlets on alleged political prisoners in West Germany presented 
this case immediately through inflammatory titles such as “Under Hitler in the Concentration 
Camps, under Adenauer in Prison.” Other words explicitly sought to link the persecution of non-
communists to the banning of KPD as a sign of things to come.40 Other pamphlets linked 
together the persecution of leftists and liberals, primary referencing the “Spiegel Affair” of 1962. 
When the magazine Spiegel ran an article on the lack of readiness of NATO forces in Europe 
based on leaked documents, Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss accused it of treason. The 
offices of the magazine were raided and the author of the article and the magazine’s editor 
Rudolf Augstein were arrested. Augstein would spend 103 days in prison before he was cleared 
of wrongdoing by the courts and the ensuing public uproar forced Strauss out of Adenauer’s 
cabinet.41 The Committee responded to these events with the pamphlet, “From Schabrod to 
Augstein: 22 months political justice in the German Federal Republic” used the “Spiegel Affair” 
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to promote their case.42 According to the Committee, the arrest of Rudolph Augstein was part of 
the same system of repression that had also jailed KPD chief Karl Schabrod. Many of the 
Committee’s works showed direct comparisons of the persecution of individual antifascists under 
the Nazis and their overall similar treatment by the West German state to demonstrate 
continuity.43 
 The other half of the message for international audiences had a different twist: Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer is the new Hitler and threatens both the international order and world peace. 
Rather than focus simply on political actors, the Committee at times also emphasized the idea 
that socialists were being persecuted in West Germany due to their opposition to rearmament. 
According to these petitions, the FRG sought “to create a graveyard atmosphere in internal 
politics permitting undisturbed nuclear rearmament, to prevent if possible the spreading of truth 
about its aggressive and revenge-seeking plans, and to cripple the rightful resistance of the 
people to these plans.”44 Just as the Nazis had first squelched domestic opposition before 
building the German war machine, so too did the new West German state seek to destroy 
proponents of peace in order to smooth the path to war. These works contrasted the extreme 
punishments of individual anti-rearmament activists in comparison to the coddling of former 
Nazis to demonstrate the West German commitment to reconstituting a militarized fascist state.45 
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 In each case, the UN Human Rights Commission rebuffed the submissions of both the 
Committee and western anti-communists on the grounds that they could not accept any 
petitions.46 Yet both the West and East German Ministries of Foreign Affairs continued to 
encourage their proxy civil society groups to submit more of these petitions, as they were useful 
in generating publicity. While West German news coverage of the Committee’s work at the 
United Nations was almost uniformly derisive, the SED’s antifascist message would nonetheless 
receive a broad hearing amongst West Germans.47 The Committee’s international propaganda did 
not succeed in delegitimizing the Federal Republic by creating a widespread notion that West 
Germany was a fascist threat to world peace. It did, however, provide a useful means to hit back 
against the human rights claims of the West German foreign office and anti-communist activists 
who would have otherwise dominated the inter-German discourse on human rights. 
 
Antifascist Narratives and Human Rights 
Instead of speaking from the perspective of ideological socialism, the Committee rooted 
their human rights activism in the discourse of antifascist narrative. The Committee could not 
work from a liberal democratic discursive framework without exposing the GDR to even 
stronger accusations of hypocrisy. As such, the Committee’s work centered more on narrative 
rather than ideology and story lines instead of linkages between defined legal norms and their 
transgressions.48 The discourse of human rights thus functioned as an extension of East German 
cultural norms, rather than legal or political theory. 
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As Catherine Epstein demonstrated in her study of the old Communists of East Germany, 
political legitimacy in the GDR was intimately connected to an individual’s biographical 
antifascist bona fides. The credibility of the SED leadership rested on their longstanding 
opposition to Nazism and their personal experiences of combating fascism during the Second 
World War. In the antifascist state, those who had the most compelling biography held the 
greatest privileges – until they crossed those of even greater authority. In the summer of 1989 as 
the GDR was faced with economic crisis and mass exodus, senior members of the SED who had 
been born in the postwar period did not believe they could act against the declining hard-line 
SED chief Erich Honecker because of his status as an anti-Nazi activist and survivor of the 
Mauthausen concentration camp.49 Thus antifascism in its many forms cannot be separated from 
the problem of political legitimacy and power in the GDR.50 
In practice, antifascism in the GDR functioned less as an ideology and more as a 
collection of legitimizing narratives founded on the traumas of recent German history. As literary 
theorist Julia Hell has argued, antifascist narratives in East German cultural production drew on 
the experiences of catastrophe and defeat that East Germans had suffered and portrayed the GDR 
as the “victors of history.” The primary message of the hegemonic antifascist narrative was that 
“the SED, its state, and, ultimately, the citizens of its state are heirs to those who fought for 
socialism and against fascism and won the battle of history.”51 As Jeffrey Herf has argued, in 
broader scope, antifascism “fostered a bi-polar discourse,” of good and evil with the world 	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cleanly divided between the “democratic world” and “fascist dictatorship.”52 The prototypical 
antifascist story in East German literature was that of the family novel, where the strong father 
figure represented the powerful and legitimate authority of the state and the figures of mothers 
and children representing the continuation of socialism through the generations. The basic arc of 
these novels is the active, gender-coded male, protagonist triumphing over the forces of fascism 
in the face of the, gender-coded female, efforts of some to give into surrender and submission.53 
Although the main administrative figures of the Committee – Chairwoman Friedel Malter 
and Secretary Siegfried Forberger – had no artistic background, several prominent cultural 
figures managed crucial issues such as the budget and planned for high-profile events involving 
foreign dignitaries. Many of the cultural notables who worked to define human rights in the 
1960s, were themselves developing popular antifascism as a narrative form through their mass-
produced work in the postwar period. The playwright Hedda Zinner, whose play The Ballad of 
Ravensbrück represents the classic antifascist homage to the solidarity of female concentration 
camp victims, served as a delegate to a meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in 1965.54 
Otto Gotsche, author of the novel and later film, The Flag of Kriwoj Rog about an antifascist 
family in a coal mining town surviving the Second World War also served as Secretary of the 
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State Council and represented the GDR at a UN conference on human rights in Budapest in 
1966.55  
The lines between human rights as political and cultural construct were blurred as the 
Committee’s propaganda functioned in terms of literary myth. The stories of those actually 
imprisoned in the West were portrayed through the same heroic narrative of resistance against 
fascist warmongers as the fictional characters in mass produced novels, and often by the very 
same writers. The Committee leadership was conscious of the importance of these narrative 
tropes and worked to ensure an aesthetic as well as political consistency to their work when 
involving victims or volunteers. When one East German wrote to the Committee offering an 
account of his arrest and imprisonment in West Germany, Secretary Forberger rejected the 
submission on the grounds that it lacked a clear “red thread” (Roter Faden) throughout. In his 
reply, Forberger outlined the key narrative points that their material needed to convey in terms 
that would be easy for a reader to comprehend: 
1. Bonn [West Germany] is against all-German understanding, against Peace and thus against 
communication between Germans, 
2. Bonn is instead for the reinforcement of the division [of Germany], for rearmament with 
nuclear weapons, for war, 
3. But this is not the will of the West German population. Bonn is therefore reacting with 
demagoguery (anti-Soviet agitation, anticommunism, now against the GDR, the People’s 
Republics, etc.) and terror (against fighters for peace, patriots, democrats, draft resisters). The 
effectiveness of this demagoguery is diminishing because of the growing strength and power 
of the peace-camp and so there is a reinforcement of terror. Terror as a sign of fear and 
weakness (here there are many possibilities for the discussion of the facts of your trial) 
4. Confidence that understanding and peace will prevail (Weakness and fear of imperialists). 
5. Necessity of the popular struggle against imperialism and militarism in West Germany, 
necessity of solidarity with all German patriots and fighters for peace. 
The above points must not be abstractly argued in the specific paragraphs and sections but must be 
clear from the facts that are presented.56 
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The personal story of one man’s incarceration was thus to be imbued with a complex geopolitical 
narrative which adhered to the broader Marxist conception of a violent and decaying capitalism 
lashing out at the forces of progress. The Committee acted as a lens through which the specific 
experiences of East German activists and officials could be focused in order to produce a 
cohesive narrative thread that indicted the west in specific and structural terms. 
 When raising awareness of the organization and soliciting donations, the Committee 
highlighted supporters who best represented the ideals of antifascism. In one newspaper article 
on the annual fundraising drive for the Committee at the coal processing plant Schwarze Pumpe, 
the vulcanizer Ernst Kays was chosen to speak on behalf of the cause. Kays was not only a 
veteran of the 11th International Brigade from the Spanish Civil War, but had also been 
imprisoned in the Esterwege Concentration Camp during World War II: “International solidarity 
by the working class springs open cell doors and opens dungeons,” said Kays speaking with the 
authority of one who “learned to practice solidarity sharing his last piece of bread with fellow 
antifascists” while imprisoned by the Nazis.57 Such supporters created a bridge between the 
mythic past of antifascism and the present-day lending legitimacy to both the cause and the 
Committee itself. 
 In addition to the broad narrative structures, the propaganda of the Committee – through 
its concentration on family and parental roles, particularly father figures – also reinforced the 
gendered components of the antifascist narrative. The focus on family roles was not only 
consistent with antifascist cultural norms, but it also universalized their suffering and allowed for 
an emotional appeal to those who were not wholly sympathetic to SED goals. When possible, 
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family as a whole. In a series of articles on the prisoner Georg Jacobi during Christmas 1964, his 
role as father took center stage: in the Märkische Volksstimme of Potsdam, the headline on his 
case read “The Third Christmas without Dad.” In Der Morgen, the national newspaper of the 
Liberal block party (LDPD), it ran as “Yet Another Celebration without Father.”58 The 
newspaper Freiheit in the city of Halle ran a large photo of his family sadly gathered together 
reading a letter from prison.59 The great sense of loss and sorrow that stemmed from the absence 
of the missing, usually male, parental figure was matched by a stoic reserve of faith in the efforts 
of the state to free the prisoner in question.60 The conclusion to every case was the reunion of the 
happy family, the restoration of the natural unit through the re-establishment of the antifascist 
authority figure, often with photos of Friedel Malter or another member of the Committee 
looking on at the scene smiling with satisfaction at another job well done.  
 In the absence of a cohesive ideological system or philosophy of human rights that could 
justify a critique of West Germany while ignoring similar abuses at home, the Committee 
integrated their message into the existing narrative structures of antifascist cultural production. 
Rather than beginning with a conception of specific human rights, the Committee and its 
supporters began with existing moral discourse and grafted on the language of human rights. In 
this discourse of human rights, international treaties and legal norms were peripheral to the more 
generalized fight for democracy (the socialist variety) against the forces of Nazism. Rather than 
seeking to motivate East Germans through an appeal to outrage against the violation of legal 
norms, they sought to tap into the widespread respect for those who had actively resisted fascism 	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and to leverage this legitimate feeling towards the specific political aims of the SED. In this way 
human rights became a short hand for the antifascist struggle of the present.    
The results of the Committee’s activities in its early years are a mixture of partial 
successes and failures. From the internal correspondence of the Committee, it is clear that their 
message strongly resonated with committed antifascists. The campaigns to free the prisoners 
appealed to those who wanted a chance to relive the glory days of the working class fight against 
the Nazis while for others it was a chance to emulate the actions of those who had heroically 
stood against fascism and now held positions of economic and political power in the GDR. The 
Committee provided a chance to participate, however vicariously, in the struggle against injustice 
and to be part of the great antifascist cause. Some took it upon themselves to organize protest 
letter writing circles or raise money at their workplace while others participated more passively 
by tracking the progress of campaigns by checking off freed activists from lists of political 
prisoners in the Federal Republic that the Committee issued to members and updated through its 
newsletter.61  
Although records of individual participation in Committee activities are limited, the 
reports of Paul Fabian, a veteran worker and Committee member, provide insight into how the 
enthusiasm for antifascist solidarity brought some supporters to the cause of human rights. Until 
1962, Fabian (b. 1885) had been a metal worker at IG Metall, at which point he was moved to an 
honorary position at the head office where he worked on issues of solidarity. At monthly 
meetings of veteran workers he would inform his colleagues of the activities of the Committee 
and each would be assigned a particular “victim of Bonn’s ideological arbitrariness 
[Gesinnungswillkür]” to whom they would write letters of solidarity – one of whom was actually 
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the case of Adolph Metzner mentioned above.62 The members of the group who were still 
actively working would then return to their workplace to spread news from the Committee and 
organize further writing of letters of solidarity or protest.63 Fabian saw his generation of workers 
as crucial to the endeavours of the Committee. In a letter to Malter, he wrote, “the continued use 
of veteran workers is fully justified: It cannot be otherwise, because the veterans have in their 
working life sufficiently come to know and have practiced solidarity, but frequently our younger 
colleagues do not pay enough attention when we speak about solidarity.”64 For Fabian, the 
Committee represented a means of maintaining a link between the revolutionary traditions of 
solidarity in the past and the new institutionalized forms of socialist action.65 
Although the Committee received some funding from the state, a significant part of its 
budget came from fundraising drives at factories, and from cultural events such as their radio 
concerts.66 The Committee was directed by a small group in Berlin but was sustained in its earlier 
years by the participation of workers who donated to their cause or signed mass petitions calling 
for the release of prisoners. The Committee for the Protection of Human Rights was another cog 
in the propaganda machine of the SED, but it did tap into a popular vein of support for working 
class solidarity and antifascism. Participation in workplace charity drives was undoubtedly 
influenced by pressure from party officials and peers but it was still widespread enough to 
indicate that the Committee did garner some popular support.  	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In addition to gaining some genuine support for SED approved human rights activities, 
the Committee had some successes in disseminating its particular brand of antifascist human 
rights. The internalization of the Committee’s message particularly appeared in one unlikely 
source: reports from the guards at the Berlin Wall. While for western observers, the Berlin Wall 
represented the clearest symbol of human rights violations in the GDR; those East Germans who 
manned the Wall saw it very differently. Internal police reports described efforts to get through 
the wall without official permission as attempted violations of human rights.67 Since the 
“Antifascist Defence Rampart” was a central element in official conceptions of antifascism, the 
fortifications and their violent protection were also folded into the discourse of human rights. 
From this perspective, the Wall ensured the continued existence of an antifascist state that was 
the epitome of human rights; to violate it was to violate the human rights of all East Germans.68 
This was likely instilled from above as the infamous “shooting order” to East German border 
guards, justified the use of lethal force against those attempting to depart in order to prevent “a 
crime against the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, against peace, humanity, and 
human rights.”69 Even in the most counterintuitive places, the SED was able to respond to human 
rights attacks by co-opting the critical language to legitimize its own actions. 
Although the Committee was successful at linking together the idea of human rights with 
conceptions of antifascism legitimizing the SED, it was less successful in educating East 
Germans on the international human rights system. Human rights remained a broad concept of 
justice and few were able to link this message to specific human rights abuses. When the 	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des Gegners an der Staatsgrenze der DDR zu Westberlin, Zeitraum 13. Aug. 1961-31. Aug. 1963. 
68 On desire for international respectability, see Patrick Major, Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the 
Frontiers of Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 145. 
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Committee issued questionnaires to returning prisoners they had supported in order to gain 
material for their propaganda, none could answer the question that asked which of their human 
rights had been specifically violated. While each recounted a story that fit the antifascist 
narrative where they, as peace-loving socialists, were arbitrarily detained or imprisoned by the 
militarist forces of the west, most left blank the question regarding specific human rights and 
legal violations. Of the very few who answered, all simply repeated the key elements of their 
story: Gerhard Looß, for example, made no mention of rights, constitutional, or human, and 
reiterated that he had entered West Germany officially and legally, thus making his 
imprisonment unjust.70  
 While individual prisoners stories were filtered through Committee officials who could 
compensate for a lack of specifics, other parts of the SED state apparatus were also beginning to 
engage with the United Nations human rights system without much knowledge of international 
human rights. In 1963, the GDR League for International Cooperation (Völkerfreundschaft) 
sought to follow in the footsteps of the Committee and send a petition to the UN Human Rights 
Commission to denounce the violations perpetrated by the West German government, yet they 
did not mention a single specific human right that the Federal Republic had transgressed. In 
making their case for the GDR, the League also simply repeated the message that socialism was 
the realization of human rights. The League’s supervisor, and the editor of the foreign affairs 
journal Deutsche Aussenpolitik, Hans Aust, informed them that they would have to justify their 
assertions with actual evidence: “In my opinion, the claim alone that the GDR has fulfilled all of 
the requirement of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not sufficient.”71 While 
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   99	  
East German officials could discuss the problem of human rights, most were not equipped to do 
so with the outside world in any convincing way. 
Beyond the internal reports at the Wall and some petitions to the United Nations, 
however, limited official usage of the idea of human rights persisted. Outside of the Committee’s 
publications and correspondence, the language of human rights remained marginal even within 
official propaganda. Most members of the East German intelligentsia preferred to use the more 
traditional terminology of socialist protest even while campaigning on the same issues as the 
Committee itself. When in October of 1963, the Committee coordinated a campaign for the 
release of West German socialist publisher Gunter Hofé with the Kulturbund, the limited appeal 
of the language of human rights was clear. The Committee and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
declared that Hofé’s arrest constitution a breach of internationally recognized human rights and 
warned, “The government of the Federal Republic will have to bear the consequences of such 
human rights violation.”72 Yet, of the 43 protest letters collected by local Kulturbund chapters, 
only four echoed this specific appeal.73 The vast majority attacked the imprisonment of Hofé as a 
violation of the rule of law, as a great injustice, or as an act of arbitrariness. 
 Educational and reference material prior to the late-1960s also tended to ignore the 
subject of human rights entirely. If human rights were mentioned, writers usually fell back onto 
the ideologically safe territory of Marx’s traditional denunciation of the Rights of Man. The 
Lexikon A-Z, published in Leipzig in 1962, still referred to human rights as serving to “protect 
the ruling classes of the West.”74 Outside of Karl Polak’s basic theoretical work from the 1940s, 	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Oder, Freiburg, Oranienburg and Halle. BArch-Lichterfelde DY 27 6331 Koordinierung von Protestaktionen gegen 
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there was no authoritative source on the meaning of human rights in the GDR and the SED 
leadership did nothing to set out a consistent party line on the meaning of human rights from an 
ideological perspective. Without clear directives from above, officials chose a conservative path 
of avoiding the new terminology altogether.  
Although the language of rights was almost wholly absent from the petitions of East 
Germans in the era, it seems that a few GDR citizens did choose to point out some of the blatant 
contradictions between the rhetoric and policies of the state. The Committee received some 
letters of complaint regarding domestic policy in their early years but those that chose to 
question the logic of the official human rights discourse touched a nerve. One letter from Frau M. 
to Paul Wiens, a playwright and member of the Committee’s Presidium, demanded to know how 
they could reconcile their promotion of human rights with the severe restrictions on her daughter 
being able to visit her in the GDR. At the end, she acidly demands, “Please tell me Herr Wiens 
where can I find the office for human rights (Menschenrechtsvertretung) for those who are here 
and cannot safely leave?”75 Instead of replying, Wiens forwarded the letter to the Ministry of the 
Interior as would become standard policy for all such “provocative” correspondence in later 
years. This letter was exceptional as an example of an East German citizen challenging the 
state’s policies in terms of human rights, but it provides an early signal of how the SED’s own 
propaganda would eventually be used to challenge their policies and later their monopoly on 
power.76 
 
The Limits of Antifascist Mobilization  
 This early usage of the discourse of human rights by the SED did not actually spark a 
domestic backlash of any significance. There was no “boomerang” effect in which the language 	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of the SED was then turned against the state outside of a few exceptional cases.77 Yet the SED 
did face a problematic response from how its loyal citizens chose to interpret its doctrine of 
human rights. Rather than a revolt against SED authority in the name of human rights, in 1966, 
the passage of The Law for the Protection of the Citizenship and Human Rights of the Citizens of 
the GDR confronted the regime with the far more indefinite problem of citizens’ subjective 
understanding of state policy clashing with the interpretations of the SED – a problem of Eigen-
Sinn. As Thomas Lindenberger has written, Eigen-Sinn (loosely translated as “self-will”) refers 
to a subject’s “sense of reality, which was different from, though not necessarily contrary to, the 
intentions and blueprints of the SED’s projects.”78 The adoption of the language of human rights 
by a significant number of East German citizens to promote their own rights, rather than against 
the human rights violations of other states, created the difficult situation of the SED ultimately 
having to disavow its own propaganda claims in order to avoid financial disaster at home. 
The weaknesses of relying primarily on cultural norms in a field that was becoming 
increasingly debated in terms of the law became clear in 1966 during an incident in the ongoing 
dispute over legal authority and state sovereignty between the FRG and the GDR. As part of the 
larger strategy of delegitimizing the GDR, the West German government had, since its inception, 
claimed an exclusive mandate (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) over all Germans regardless of 
geographic locations.79 In practice this meant that the FRG claimed that all Germans in the GDR 
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were actually citizens of West Germany and subject to its laws, including those banning 
communist organizations as threats to the democratic order. In July 1966, this stance was 
reinforced by the Federal Republic in anticipation of a planned SED-SPD meeting on the matter 
of international peace.80 While the West German government reiterated that under normal 
circumstances East German functionaries could be arrested as threats to the constitutional order 
of the FRG, a limited exception from prosecution was granted to state officials who would be 
meeting with their western counterparts.81  
 The SED responded to the West German law with its own legal countermeasure rather 
than mere propaganda. On 13 October 1966 they proclaimed The Law for the Protection of the 
Citizenship and Human Rights of Citizens of the GDR. The law stated that anyone who sought to 
prosecute East Germans for “the exercise of their constitutional rights” or attempted to enlarge 
the judicial jurisdiction of the West German state at the expense of an East German citizen could 
be punished with up to five years imprisonment. In addition to criminal prosecution, individual 
East Germans could launch civil action to gain compensation for the violation of their rights by 
filing a complaint to their local prosecutor’s office. It also guaranteed that in the case of a 
successful prosecution, the GDR would provide compensation if the convicted failed to do so.82   
 The connection of the law to human rights was tenuous from a legal perspective. The 
preamble of the law claimed that “these measures reflect the commitment of the German 
Democratic Republic to humaneness [Menschlichkeit], to the realization of international law and 	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the protection of legal certainty [Rechtssicherheit],” and that it stemmed from the international 
legal principles of the “Potsdam Declaration, the United Nations Charter, the London Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg.” The only international agreement on the list 
that mentioned human rights was the UN Charter, which was legally irrelevant given that neither 
East nor West Germany was a member of the United Nations. No specific human rights 
violations were cited, only a general reference to the “serious violations of citizens contrary to 
international law.”83 Yet, if the law is viewed from the perspective of the antifascist narrative 
constructed by the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, then the human rights 
component becomes clear. Since the realization of an antifascist republic in the form of the GDR 
aided the cause of human rights, West German attacks on this sovereignty through the 
prosecution of individual citizens were a clear violation of the principles of human rights.  
The language of human rights was added to the law quite carelessly and was not actually 
debated or discussed to any extent by SED officials and in some documents the term was omitted 
entirely.84 In passing the law, the Politburo also appears to have neglected to consult with any 
experts on the field of human rights and Siegfried Forberger makes clear in his memoirs that the 
Committee was surprised to hear of its promulgation as they had not been consulted or warned 
that it was being prepared.85 While the Committee was still responsible for publicizing the law 
and making the case against West Germany, it played no other role in the whole process.86 
Although the SED had institutionalized its human rights activism, the higher echelons of the 
party did not view human rights as a specialized area of knowledge requiring the advice of 	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84 BArch-Lichterfelde DY 30/ J IV 2/2/ 1079 Protokoll Nr. 40/66 Sitzung am 4. Oktober 1966. At the Politbüro 
meeting it was listed simply as “Gesetz zum Schutze der Bürger der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.” 
85 Forberger, Das DDR-Komitee für Menschenrechte, 22. 
86 BArch-Lichterfelde DZ 7/ 11 Presseveröffentlichung/Presseausschnitte 1966. 
	  	   104	  
experts. It was rather one more element of socialist ideology for which they, as the leading 
element of the working classes, were clearly qualified to handle without recourse to help from 
lower levels of the Party.  
 The propaganda that accompanied the law did, however, follow the same general 
narrative line as earlier GDR propaganda on human rights. In a speech to the State Council, 
Interior Minister Friedrich Dickel denounced the West German actions as a sinister campaign “to 
make GDR citizens into their subjects.”87 The claim to legal jurisdiction by the BRD sought to 
undermine the very concept of East German citizenship and with it, East German sovereignty. In 
order to demonstrate outrage of the East German people over this affront to their rights, the 
Politburo arranged for members of the GDR parliament, the Volkskammer, to question the 
Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice on how they would protect East German 
citizens from West German legal aggression and how they would ensure that peace would not be 
threatened by these acts of international aggression.88  
 While the propagandistic aspects of the law and its public presentation appeared to be 
successful with the broader public, the sections of the law promising restitution to victims proved 
to be problematic. According to an opinion reports collection by the Party Organs Department of 
the SED’s Central Committee, the public responded positively to the passage of the law. Local 
party sections reported that those they spoke with welcomed the measures to “reinforce our 
sovereignty” and to rebuke Bonn for its “persecution of our citizens”.89 Although the prospect of 
financial compensation aroused public support, there were some citizens and Party members who 
were concerned by this open-ended commitment. One person astutely asked, “Our state is paying 	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out compensation, but where is this money coming from? When will Bonn pay off these debts? 
What possibilities are there to make this happen?”90 If the law was meant to punish West 
German transgressions, why would East Berlin foot the bill? 
 The value of financial compensation was serious given the terms set out by the SED in 
documents accompanying the law. A report from the Ministry of the Interior claimed that 3,217 
East German citizens had been detained or imprisoned (robbed of their freedom in the colourful 
phrasing of some propaganda) between the years 1958 and 1966. Additionally, those East 
German citizens, who had been prosecuted as enemies of the West German democratic order, 
had been sentenced to 1,595 months (133 years) of prison time. According to the carefully 
tabulated list of necessary remuneration accompanying the law, these offences demanded 
compensation of slightly more than four million Marks.91 This substantial claim was widely 
publicized, but no actual legal case was filed against the government of the Federal Republic, or 
any specific officials. In the West German media, the claims were treated as a little more than a 
media stunt – the tabloid Berliner Kurier openly denounced the claim as a trick to distract from 
the fifth anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall. After the initial reaction from the media, 
the law was promptly ignored.92 
 It is likely that the SED would have been content to have made its claim publicly and 
leave matters at that. No bureaucratic preparations were made for any lawsuits or to deal with 
claims from citizens prior to the promulgation of the law.93 Yet East Germans followed the text 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Ibid.  
91 BArch-Lichterfelde DO 1/ 10296 Schadenersatz – ein rechtliches und menschliches Gebot. 
92 See coverage „Propaganda mit 13. August“ Berliner Kurier (3 Aug 1966); “Über vier Mill Mark fordert ein 
Zonen-Komitee von Bonn als Entschädigung für die Inhaftierung von ‘DDR Bürgern’ in der BRD” Die Welt (3 Aug 
1966).  
93 BArch-Lichterfelde DP 3/ 3157 Wendland to Funk (20 Oct 1966). 
	  	   106	  
of the law and began to file grievances at their local prosecutors offices. While a few cases from 
average citizens could have been ignored, one of the first complaints filed came from Johannes 
Dieckmann, President of the Volkskammer. The day after the law came into effect, he wrote to 
his local prosecutor in Potsdam in regards to an incident from 1961 when a crowd allegedly 
rushed a stage to attack him and some other GDR officials during a cultural event in West 
Germany: “What actually happened in Marburg is that I came within a hair of being lynched […] 
The attack on the stage caused me no physical harm. Nevertheless I believe I have a valid claim 
to compensation and herewith I register my complaint.”94 Nowhere in his story were there any 
efforts by West German officials to legally persecute him or to expand judicial jurisdictions. 
Like the victims of human rights abuse publicized by the Committee, however, Dieckmann’s 
complaint had more to do with a violation of the antifascist norms than with the law. His human 
rights had been violated because his efforts to convey a message of socialism and peace had been 
foiled by anti-communists. While his case was legally non-existent, his story was consistent with 
the narrative structures of human rights violations, as presented by the Committee for the 
Protection of Human Rights over the past seven years. 
 SED officials at the Ministry of Justice and the Chief Prosecutor’s office had not 
expected a spontaneous public response to the law (even though it included instructions on how 
regular citizens could file claims) and they now scrambled to head off bureaucratic chaos. One 
week after the passage of the law, the Prosecutor’s office sent out belated instructions to local 
offices on criteria for valid complaints under the law. In spite of the propaganda including 
incidents from 1958-1966 the Ministry of Justice sought to amend the law so that it would 
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explicitly only apply to incidents occurring after the date it was passed, 13 October 1966.95 On 
15 November, the Minister of Justice, Hilda Benjamin, officially notified the Chief Prosecutor, 
Josef Streit, that the law was not retroactively valid and that all claims regarding incidents prior 
to the passage of the law should be rejected.96 Although this entirely undermined the previously 
released propaganda claiming 4 million Marks in damages against the West German state, it 
would at least prevent a deluge of lawsuits and a huge liability for compensation that the Federal 
Republic would never pay. 
 It is possible that this decision would have stymied further demands for compensation 
from the public were it not for a seemingly minor clerical error two months earlier at a 
prosecutor’s office in West Germany that set off the next bizarre chapter. On 13 September 1966, 
the Office of the Chief Prosecutor of Cologne sent out a request for the arrest of Kurt Forster, the 
SED Party Secretary at a miner’s lamp manufactory in Zwickau, Saxony. Forster was sought in 
connection with an incident in 1961 when he stayed at the home of an active member of the 
banned KPD while visiting West Germany.97 The warrant, accusing Forster of representing a 
threat to the Federal Republic of Germany, was sent out by post from Cologne to the local police 
station in the small town of Lichtenstein. What no one in Cologne had noticed, was that the town 
of Lichtenstein was actually located in the GDR. While paperwork on Forster’s outstanding 
warrant was supposed to be copied simply for filing purposes, a photocopy machine error 
produced a third copy of his documents which a clerk assumed was produced on purpose so as to 
be distributed to the appropriate police authorities. Forster’s last known address, gleaned from 	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when he had crossed the border at the time of the incident, was added to the paperwork without 
anyone noticing that the police in question were East German. It was signed by the Chief 
Prosecutor, who did not read the details of the form that was in a pile with dozens of other 
documents requiring his signature.98 
 When the request arrived in the GDR, the police department passed it up the chain of 
command at the beginning of October: first to the local prosecutor’s office and then to the 
regional prosecutor’s office in Karl-Marx-Stadt, and then onto the State Crimes department of 
the Chief Public Prosecutor’s office in East Berlin by the end of the month. On 8 November, 
nearly two months after it had been originally sent from Cologne, it reached the desk of Chief 
Public Prosecutor Josef Streit. Although his office was not processing any complaints it had 
directly received from East German citizens, and the warrant had been sent before the passing of 
the law on 16 October making it retroactive, the incident was deemed to be such a clear example 
of West German judicial overreach that his office swung into action to respond anyway.99  
Launching a full investigation into the incident, the Streit’s office contacted Kurt Forster 
for a full account of his run-in with the West German authorities back in 1961. Forster, who was 
baffled by the whole situation, claimed that he had visited the home of an acquaintance from 
Cologne whom he met at a peace festival in the GDR. He received a phone call while in Cologne, 
at a different address, informing him that the police had raided the home of his friend who had 
been arrested and that the authorities had seized Forster’s suitcase as evidence. Rather than face 
possible arrest, he decided to immediately return to East Germany, which he did without 
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incident.100 In addition to the interview, the West German arrest warrant was sent to the Stasi for 
typewriting analysis to determine why two machines appeared to have been used by the West 
German authorities and to decipher some handwriting underneath a scribble.101  
The East German Chief Public Prosecutor’s office launched a propaganda campaign 
against this “provocation” by the West distributing information to media in both West and East 
Germany. A reprint of the letter was published in the GDR’s national newspaper Neues 
Deutschland. In West Germany stories on Forster and the arrest warrant ran in the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt, Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Berliner 
Morgenpost. In the version distributed by the SED, most of Forster’s story remained true to his 
telling, though there were some exaggerations, such as a claim that he had evaded capture while 
the raiding police officers were somehow distracted. In response, the Cologne prosecutor’s office 
denied all involvement and described the whole story as “absurd.”102 Finally on 14 November 
1966, the GDR’s Chief Prosecutor’s office filed charges against two officials from Cologne 
whose names were listed on the arrest warrant.103 
 While the incident as a whole was an embarrassment for the West German legal 
establishment, the lawsuit was of little lasting value for the SED. On the one hand, the Cologne 
office and the accused officials never responded to the charges and by February 1967, Streit’s 
office in East Berlin had given up all hope that they ever would.104 On the other hand, the 
increased publicity for the Law for the Protection of the Citizenship and Human Rights of the 	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Citizens of the GDR meant that Prosecutors offices were suddenly flooded with complaints from 
East Germans seeking redress for the violation of their human rights, preferably through 
monetary compensation according to the law. Although some local prosecutor’s offices did just 
enough to avoid offending the petitioners, other offices, following the guidelines sent out from 
the head office in Berlin, helped to coach claimants on how to phrase their demands and 
provided suggestions on how they could maximize their compensation.105 The local Prosecutor’s 
office in Leipzig even drew up standardized forms to make the process as easy as possible for 
claimants before forwarding their information to Berlin. 
In spite of this work, the Chief Public Prosecutor’s office rejected every application from 
East Germans. When the central prosecutor’s office actually bothered to respond to applicants, 
petitioners usually received a curt letter saying, “This illegal act of persecution has been noted 
with interest and officially registered. The initiation of special proceedings cannot occur as the 
law cannot be applied retroactively.”106 None of the reported incidents occurred after the law 
took effect in October 1966 and many had in fact occurred in the 1950s. Aside from this primary 
disqualification of timing, many claims had other severe problems. Several of the applications 
came from those who had still been West Germans residents and citizens when they were 
arrested prior to emigrating to the GDR, making the claim of western judicial overreach moot. 
One petitioner was actually imprisoned in Switzerland while working as a spy for the GDR at the 
time of his arrest.107 Not only did his activities not fall into the normal range of “exercising 
constitutional rights,” he never even came into contact with West German authorities.  
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 The seeming irrelevance of the applications to the actual text of the law stemmed from 
East Germans interpreting violations of human rights in narrative terms rather than legal 
principles. None of the claims mention any specific violations of human or actual constitutional 
rights, but they conformed to the antifascist narrative as disseminated by the Committee for the 
Protection of Human Rights. All of the applicants portrayed themselves, or the family member 
they were applying on behalf of, as innocent victims, seeking only to promote peace or work for 
socialism, oppressed by the West German (or in the one case, Swiss) police state. Most of the 
applications had few details on the actual activities that led to their arrest, but they provided 
extensively detailed itemized lists of their losses. Some asked for lost wages from their time 
away from work, others for medical bill reimbursements stemming from illnesses contracted in 
the West while others only wanted enough to replace personal items that were confiscated by the 
West German police, such as a pair of gloves or a jacket. In one case, an SED official who had 
been arrested while living in Kiel asked for more than 110,000M in compensation for his car, 
house, and furnishings, that he claimed were seized while he was imprisoned from 1960-1962.108 
Such claims were never accepted and none of the applicants even received compensation from 
the state in any form. 
 In spite of the blanket refusal to go forward with any lawsuits or to provide compensation, 
many petitioners refused to believe that their claim was not valid. As one functionary noted after 
meeting with an applicant, Herr W., “He could not be convinced that he was not entitled to 
compensation under the law or that the Act has no retroactive force. He wants a store and a 
senior position there as he [claims he] was promised.”109 Several wrote back every year or so, if 
they had received a formal notice of rejection or not, demanding to know when they would 	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receive their compensation. Often they would write to other organizations such as the Committee 
for the Protection of Human Rights to ask for assistance with what they thought was simply a 
bureaucratic error. In some cases, the Chief Prosecutor’s office had to arrange several meetings 
with the applicant to explain in person that the law did not apply to their case. One applicant, 
who first filed a complaint in 1975 regarding his imprisonment in 1950, was rejected 
immediately by the Dresden prosecutor’s office and only in 1986 did he finally accept that he 
would not be receiving any recompense.110 
In the end, the only successful legal action associated with the Law for the Protection of 
the Citizenship and Human Rights of the Citizens of the GDR came in 1988 when an applicant 
forged some documents to try and claim a larger pension based on his oppression by the West 
German state. While this particular applicant initially filed a complaint in November 1966, he 
wrote again to the prosecutor’s office shortly before his sixty-fifth birthday in 1987 hoping to 
receive the monthly pension he would have been eligible for had he paid into his pension over 
the fifteen months of his West German imprisonment. When his application was once again 
rejected, he altered the letter he received from the local prosecutor’s office to make it appear as 
though he had been successfully granted a larger pension as a form of recompense for the 
violation of his rights. The authorities quickly noticed this, since such a situation had never 
arisen before and no officials were familiar with such bonuses. Following the only court case 
stemming from the law, the applicant was imprisoned for fraud in 1988.111 
 The tenacity with which applicants continued to press their claims can also be explained 
by the increasingly favoured social status of the victims of the Nazi period received, beginning in 
the 1960s. In 1965, those who were officially designated as “fighters against fascism” or 	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“victims of fascism” were given honorary pensions and in 1966 this was amended so that the 
children of these groups would also receive special benefits. As Catherine Epstein has argued, 
“the benefits accorded family members of antifascist resisters thus created something of an East 
German hereditary caste – one based not on wealth or merit, but on biography.”112 As the rapid 
advancement available to loyal SED supporters in the early years of the GDR began to taper off 
as the system ossified, this new law must have appeared as a means of gaining otherwise 
unavailable special status and benefits. Some of the claimants writing to the Prosecutor’s office 
mentioned that in spite of their imprisonment in West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s had been 
previously, and unjustly, denied their rightful status as a victim of fascism. While the Committee 
for the Protection of Human Rights portrayed the prisoners they supported as moral equivalents 
to those who fought against the Nazis, the SED leadership drew a clear line of distinction 
between the status of those antifascists who were active before and after 1945. With political 
legitimacy, and to costly economic benefits, so closely tied to the correct kind of antifascist 
biography, the SED could not afford to create a new generation of heroes who could challenge 
their claim to power or drain the nation’s coffers. 
 The political nature of the East German legal system rendered the application of the law 
chaotic and put different elements of the SED bureaucracy at odds with one another in the 
absence of clear ideological directives. While such conflicts over the exact meaning of rights 
were resolved through the machinery of the legal system in West Germany, the East German 
judiciary could fulfill no such clarifying role, given its subordination to the whims of the 
Politburo. The Supreme Court of the GDR eventually dealt with the issue and produced a ruling 
on the exact meaning of the law in practice, but its opinion was made irrelevant by the directives 
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of the SED leadership that ensured no compensation would ever be paid.113 While they tried to 
claim the mantle of legality in the matter of human rights, the intersection of poorly written law 
and conflicting interpretations by East German citizens quickly exposed the law as a legally 
meaningless act of propaganda. 
Conclusion 
By 1966, with the end of the CDU-run government in West German politics and the 
easing of inter-German tensions through the creation of the CDU-SPD Grand Coalition, the 
Committee’s activities began to lose relevance. There were few politically driven prosecutions by 
the mid-1960s and the last custody battle originating from the Berlin Wall was finally settled 
after a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in 1967.114 The ban on the West German 
KPD was by this time largely ignored and a successor, the German Communist Party (DKP), 
was founded without state interference in 1968. As the GDR’s international priorities shifted 
towards gaining international diplomatic recognition and membership in the United Nations, the 
Committee’s work pivoted from domestic mobilization and inter-German affairs to reconciling 
SED rule with international human rights norms and gaining the support of the emerging bloc of 
non-aligned post-colonial states that were changing the character of the international community. 
Although the Committee did not succeed in fully integrating the language of human rights 
into the political culture and ideology of the GDR in these early years, their work did have an 
appreciable impact on the discourse of human rights in East Germany. Its activities normalized 
the usage of the language of human rights as a vocabulary of ideologically appropriate protest 
and mobilization. The absence of a significant backlash from the East German population against 
the state in the language of human rights meant that both the SED leadership and the rank and 	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file had time to become comfortable with this new discourse so as to allow for its further usage. 
The Committee demonstrated that the idea of human rights could be incorporated into communist 
propaganda both at home and abroad. While the campaign to delegitimize West Germany on the 
international stage did not achieve the hoped-for results, it did level the playing field and at times 
put the Federal Republic on the defensive. 
The problem remained that the East German usage of human rights was wholly negative. 
Human rights for the SED remained anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, antifascist, and anti-West 
German. The creation of a separate socialist discourse of human rights grounded in popular 
antifascist narrative provided some successes within the GDR, but it was limited on the 
international scene. Already in 1963, SED officials, the MfAA and the Central Committee were 
concerned that GDR human rights propaganda was too focused on Western flaws rather than 
providing a positive conception of human rights under socialism.115 As an official with the 
MfAA complained, “our individual arguments remain defensive because they are merely 
responses to West German attacks.”116 What the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights 
and the SED in general required was a more coherently developed conception of human rights 
from a socialist perspective that could function beyond mere propaganda within the terms of the 
rapidly developing international system of human rights norms.  
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CHAPTER 3:  
Socialist Human Rights, Self-Determination, and the Road to Helsinki, 1963-1975  
 
There is a price for everything. The East German leadership, expert 
practitioners of realpolitik, none the less did not seem to suspect that what 
they had signed went against almost every practice of their regime, and 
most spectacularly against the atrocity that was their fortified Wall through 
the middle of Berlin.1 
 
-Frederick Taylor on the Helsinki Accords. 
 
In 1975, thirty-five countries in Europe and North America from both sides of the Cold 
War, signed on to the Helsinki Accords, confirming the existing borders of Europe and providing 
guarantees for the free exchange of people and ideas across these boundaries. Included in these 
guarantees were pledges by the signatories to uphold the principle of international human rights. 
In recent years, the narrative of the “Helsinki Effect” – the idea that signing of the Helsinki 
Accords set off a cascade effect inevitably leading to the revolution of 1989 – has become 
popular in academic and popular works of history.2 From this assumption that the agreements 
sparked the popular movement that would ultimately undermine SED rule have come many 
corollary arguments. Many accounts of the “breakthrough” of human rights at Helsinki hinge on 
the assertion that the treaty represented a distinct break from past statements and commitments 
by the Eastern Bloc and particularly by East Germany.3  
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According to this narrative, the GDR and other Eastern Bloc countries were caught off 
guard and outmanoeuvred by canny western diplomats who managed to insert the language of 
human rights into the agreement against the will of the communist negotiators who were 
unprepared to engage with the idea of human rights.4  On the SED General Secretary Erich 
Honecker’s behaviour in regards to Helsinki, several lines of interpretation abound: some say the 
GDR was coerced into agreeing to human rights commitments due to economic desperation 
while others claim that Honecker simply signed on to the Accords as a cynical ploy to gain 
international prestige without any intention of living up to its human rights provisions.5 Others, 
such as Frederick Taylor – quoted above – are simply perplexed as to how senior members of the 
SED could not see the clear truth that their entire system violated the principles of human rights.  
Within the context of the longer history of the SED’s employment of the discourse of 
human rights, these assertions are largely untenable. The endorsement of human rights by the 
East German state in 1975 was in no way revolutionary, nor did it represent a break from past 
actions in terms of diplomacy, propaganda or ideology. Diplomatically, the GDR had endorsed 
international human rights norms upon joining the United Nations in 1973 and through the Basic 
Treaty with West Germany in 1972. It had already endorsed the United Nations Human Rights 	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Covenants in 1968 before the GDR was eligible to officially become a signatory. As shown in 
the previous two chapters, the SED had been touting its own conception of human rights since 
1946, before East Germany was even a state, and even had its own human rights organization, 
the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights since 1959. In short, well before the signing 
of the Accords in 1975 and even the beginning of negotiations in 1972, the SED had gone all in 
on human rights. 
In order to unpack this complicated history, one must examine what the SED understood 
human rights to mean before analyzing the role of human rights in the history of Cold War 
diplomacy and its importance in East German domestic politics between 1975 and 1989. As this 
chapter will show, the underlying ideology of this period was first outlined in Hermann 
Klenner’s 1964 work, A Study on Basic Rights (Studien über die Grundrechte).6 Klenner’s book 
pulled together the various strands of East German human rights thought and tied them together 
with the language of international legal human rights norms and the discourse of self-
determination and anti-imperialism emerging from the postcolonial world. This comprehensive 
human rights ideology, as concocted by Klenner, was quickly adopted as state doctrine and 
became the centerpiece of the SED’s extensive propaganda efforts to celebrate the United 
Nation’s proclaimed International Year for Human Rights in 1968.  
The timing of Klenner’s work and its adoption and mass dissemination by the SED 
within East Germany and internationally was crucial for the diplomacy of the 1970s. The SED 
formulated its ideological conception of rights in a specific era in which the history of human 
rights that was dominated by revolutionary, anti-colonial voices. While the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) was drafted and approved primarily by Western-oriented 
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supporters of colonialism and conservative Christian personalists, the emergence of the 
postcolonial Afro-Asian bloc revolutionized the system of international human rights.7 Gone was 
the focus on individual rights and the tacit commitment to the continuation of European 
hegemony and it its place was a program centered on the right to self-determination of peoples 
and an emphasis on the establishment of state sovereignty in the face of imperial oppression.8 
While this process began in the 1950s, the “post-colonial revisionist” tide in the field of human 
rights reached its peak in 1968 with the United Nation’s First International Conference on 
Human Rights in Teheran. The conference was dominated by voices advocating the sanctity of 
state power and sovereignty in the name of human rights and denouncing the evils of 
interference in internal affairs of others.9  
The negotiations on the Helsinki Accords from 1972-1975 took place during a time of 
radical discursive change in the international sphere. As post-colonial states claims to 
sovereignty increasingly became a cover for mass abuses by newly independent states, many 	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even in the developing world soured on their earlier rhetoric. The mass torture by military 
regimes in Greece and South America turned attention from problems of imperialism to those of 
unrestricted state power used to destroy individual human dignity.10 The massive humanitarian 
crisis created by the war for Biafran independence in Nigeria galvanized activists to intervene in 
the name of basic needs and human rights in spite of local demands that Europeans refrain from 
doing so in the name of self-determination.11 In the West in particular, many who had once 
hoped that an all-powerful state could realize a kind of utopia through socialism or communism 
were now becoming disappointed by both the Soviets and “development dictatorships” in the 
Third World.12 Part of this process of disillusionment was the explosion of human rights activism 
in the late 1970s, but this time human rights were grounded in the rights of the individual and the 
totalitarian state, not imperialism, served as the default enemy of justice.13  
For SED leaders and intellectuals in the 1960s and early 1970s, the actual idea of human 
rights – rather than its inferior bourgeois counterpart propagated by the imperialist West – 
defined non-interference in the internal affairs of self-determining people in sovereign states as 
an elemental component of the realization of human rights. As such, the commitment to 
international human rights treaties and agreements would, in theory, pose no threat to SED rule 
so long as they could gain recognition as an independent sovereign state. The greatest threat to 
the GDR in terms of human rights was its ambiguous status under international law and its 	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failure to gain diplomatic recognition as a sovereign state ruled by a people through the principle 
of self-determination. Contrary to Frederick Taylor’s claim that the SED was unaware that its 
system violated human rights on a mass scale, the SED actually believed that its system of rule, 
explicitly including the Berlin Wall itself, in fact represented the realization of human rights. 
Decolonization, Self-Determination and Human Rights 
In the 1960s, the GDR remained diplomatically isolated and formally recognized only by 
members of the Socialist Bloc while the Federal Republic of Germany was recognized by the 
NATO states, most of Latin America, and most of the recently decolonized states. West 
Germany also continued to claim the right to speak on behalf of all Germans, including those in 
the GDR and the rest of the Eastern Bloc. For the SED leadership, the affront of West German 
international stature alongside what it viewed as constant internal meddling in East German 
affairs by the western powers was intolerable. As mentioned in chapter 2, various efforts to 
combat FRG claims to represent the population of East Germany led to largely unsuccessful 
countermeasures such as the “Law for the Protection of the Human Rights and Citizenship 
Rights of the Citizens of the German Democratic Republic” (1966). In the late 1960s, SED 
Secretary General Walter Ulbricht thus sought once again to achieve a position of international 
respectability and to gain for the GDR status as a sovereign nation through international 
diplomatic recognition from the emerging Afro-Asian bloc of nations.  
The character of international diplomacy and the United Nations had changed radically 
since its inception. In 1948, only a small number of African and Asian countries were in a 
position to vote on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, yet the rapid pace of postwar 
decolonization, in particular the admission of twelve African nations to the UN in 1960, soon 
made these countries a majority at the General Assembly. This shift in power towards post-
colonial states revived the problem of self-determination and its place in the human rights system 
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of the United Nations. The idea of self-determination of peoples had been a cornerstone of anti-
imperialism since the early 20th century when both American President Woodrow Wilson and 
Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin employed the term as a rallying cry against the oppression of 
minorities and colonial subjugation.14 While the idea of self-determination had been central to 
the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the UN Charter in 1945, it was excluded from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Western representatives, including the drafters of the 
Universal Declaration John Humphrey of Canada and René Cassin of France, mounted a strong 
opposition against the inclusion of self-determination as a threat to the new international order 
and tool of anti-Western demagoguery.15 Once the composition of the United Nations had shifted, 
however, self-determination was reintroduced to the UN’s agenda with a vengeance. The 
ultimate sign of this shift came in 1960 when the General Assembly passed the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which essentially criminalized 
the colonial system itself.    
For the post-colonial states, human rights were never the centrepiece of the rhetoric 
against empire, but these states did employ the language of human rights to legitimize their 
claims against the European powers.16 As employed by these states at the United Nations or in 
newly written constitutions, human rights represented a call for national liberation and the 	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creation of sovereign states as opposed to claims for limitations on state power. In practice, this 
language of self-determination specifically referred to demands for an end to internal 
interference in the internal affairs of the developing world by the European powers.  
While this contrasts sharply with the international human rights system that developed 
from the 1970s onwards, in many ways, these claims echoed those made by the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789.17 The post-colonial discourse was, in the terminology of 
Samuel Moyn, a “Rights of Man” movement in the tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century declarations rather than a “human rights” movement in the modern sense insofar as it 
focused on the realization of sovereign state structures rather than universalist notions of rights 
existing outside of the state itself.18 Such ideas were not monolithic among nonaligned states in 
the Afro-Asian bloc with some, such as the influential Saudi representative Jamil Baroody 
placing an emphasis on total state sovereignty, from which individual rights would eventually 
flow, and others such as the Lebanese academic Karim Azkoul who saw individual rights and 
sovereignty as equal and interdependent results of self-determination.19  
As the United Nations sought to transform the non-binding Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights into a legally binding international covenant beginning in the 1950s, the problem 
of self-determination came to the fore. As conflicting views amongst the member states about the 
nature of rights and their implementation caused the new document to be split into two – one 
covenant for political and civil rights and another to cover economic, social and cultural rights – 
representatives from the Third World steadily pushed for the reintroduction of self-determination 	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as a founding human right.20 While representatives from Europe and North America argued that 
the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies were too “backward” to be granted “western” human 
rights, the changing membership of the UN along with anti-colonial pressure from the socialist 
bloc succeeded in overcoming this opposition.21 In 1966, the General Assembly passed the 
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, which contained as its first article “all 
peoples have the right to self-determination.” Although self-determination as a human right was 
not universally accepted at the time, and today the legitimacy of this argument is still hotly 
contested, in international law it was enshrined as one of the foundational human rights for all of 
mankind.22  
Self-Determination and Human Rights in the Postwar GDR  
 In the early postwar period, the SED also employed the idea of self-determination in 
political propaganda, but it was used in the assertion of German sovereignty. While human rights 
propaganda focused on the SED’s rivalry with the Social Democrats, self-determination was 
used to attack the “imperialist” tendencies of the west, which sought to colonize the German 
people. In a speech before the Deutsche Volksrat in 1948, SED co-founder and soon to be Prime 
Minister of East Germany Otto Grotewohl denounced the interference in German affairs by the 
imperialistic Americans as a violation of “the declared natural right of all peoples, the right to 
national self-determination,” and cited the Atlantic Charter of 1941 as the guiding document that 
supported his claims.23 Similarly, in July 1949, shortly before the formal creation of the GDR, 	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the SED Politburo declared that the decisive conflict of German politics was “the struggle for the 
preservation of the national existence of the German people, for its unity, independence and self-
determination,” while denouncing the transformation of the western part of Germany into a 
“colony of Anglo-American imperialism.”24 
 The increased use of self-determination in conjunction with human rights claims on the 
international level was highly influential in West Germany where those seeking to reclaim lost 
territory in the East sought to claim the legitimacy of this discourse. While the West German 
government held back from such rhetoric in public until 1959 in order to avoid offending the 
British and the French, West German activists began using the language of self-determination 
almost immediately following the war.25 The language of human rights and self-determination 
formed the basis for claims to a “Right to a Homeland” (Recht auf Heimat) for the German 
people that would legitimize irredentist claims in what was now Poland and Czechoslovakia. Just 
as the colonial peoples were oppressed by imperialism, many West Germans, particularly 
refugees expelled from the East, claimed that the German people were oppressed by Soviet 
imperialism and had been forced from their natural territory.26   
 The interconnection of the discourses of self-determination and human rights in East 
Germany developed slowly beginning in the 1950s. Following the creation of East and West 
Germany in 1949, legal theorist Karl Polak returned to the subject of human rights, this time 
seeking to legitimize the existence of the GDR as a separate sovereign state. At an international 
conference in 1953 he praised the Atlantic Charter, which included the idea of self-determination, 	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rather than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which did not, as the first "world 
declaration of human rights.”27 Similarly, writing in the SED’s legal journal Neue Justiz in 1954, 
Polak declared: “Throughout history, human rights have been identical with the freedom of 
peoples, the chief expression of which is state sovereignty and self-determination.”28 Not only 
was socialism identical to human rights, but now, the ideal of self-determination was added to 
the equation. Giving power to the people through self-determination would naturally result in the 
triumph of socialism and in turn the realization of human rights.  
This move towards the appropriation of post-colonial human rights discourse did not 
progress much further in the 1950s as the development of legal theory in general ground to a halt. 
Polak himself did not return to the subject and instead dedicated the final years of his career 
before his death in 1963 to enforcing a strict ideological orthodoxy within his profession. While 
two other scholars, Ernst Bloch and Bernhard Graefrath, did take up the subject of human rights 
in this decade, one would be in exile in West Germany by 1961 and the other forced into internal 
exile as part of a re-education program in 1958. Human rights proved to be dangerous territory 
for East German intellectuals. 
The efforts of Ernst Bloch (1885-1977), one of the GDR’s most prominent philosophers, 
to formulate a more complete conception of human rights in this era is indicative of how 
dangerous original ideas could be in the East German Academy. In a 1952 paper published in the 
cultural journal Aufbau, Bloch who had returned from war-time exile to settle in the GDR in 
1949, argued that socialist society needed to salvage what it could from the bourgeois and natural 
rights traditions: “In consideration of human rights, [the revolution] seeks bourgeois freedom 
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without the bourgeois citizen.” Paraphrasing both Lenin and the lyrics of Die Internationale, he 
went on to say, “Marxism is all-powerful because it is true just as it is all-powerful because [in 
the words of] the International, it wins the human right [erkämpft das Menschenrecht] in depth 
and breadth.”29 Although couched in the safety of official terminology, Bloch’s statement could 
also be read subversively – the truth and power of Marxism could also be judged on whether or 
not it fulfilled the ideal of human rights, not that it automatically did so.  
While Bloch made sure that his works were written in the idiom of Marxist-Leninist 
terminology, his career was doomed when his colleagues decided that he was ideologically 
unreliable and hopelessly utopian. He was stripped of his teaching position in Leipzig and 
isolated from the academic community while his works were removed from East German 
university curricula.30  Bloch’s further work on human rights and the socialist Utopia would not, 
however, be published until 1961, and then only in West Germany where he was living in exile 
in protest against the construction of the Berlin Wall.31 
On the 10th anniversary of the founding of the UN in 1955, a young law professor, 
Bernhard Graefrath (1928-2006), produced a slim volume entitled, The United Nations and 
Human Rights. While Graefrath cited speeches by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, his main 
authority in refuting the arguments of West German human rights academics came from the 
declarations of the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. In the calls from 
the Afro-Asian bloc for self-determination and an end to racial discrimination and imperialism in 	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the name of human rights, Graefrath saw a devastating critique of “the core element of fascism,” 
a system that represents imperialism “at its most refined and cruelly developed.”32 As activists in 
the Third World were appropriating the language of human rights against the imperial policies of 
Western Europe, Graefrath was in turn appropriating this new discourse to denounce the 
allegedly “imperialistic” policies of West Germany towards its Eastern counterpart.33 
While this argument also held the promise for a more coherent and complex ideological 
foundation for GDR human rights discourse, it received scant attention from Graefrath’s 
colleagues in the GDR until much later.34 Shortly after the publication, he was among those sent 
to work in the countryside as a form of re-education following his censure at the Polak-led 
Babelsberg Conference of 1958.35 As a result, his theoretical connection between third-world 
critiques of imperialism and East German anti-fascism would lie dormant in GDR thinking for 
several years. After serving his time working as an administrator in the countryside, he returned 
to academic work in 1961 but did not take up the topic of human rights again until the mid-1960s 
when he was invited to join the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights. 
While human rights theory in the GDR stagnated in the 1950s and early 1960s, SED 
officials lamented the weakness of East German arguments on the international stage. As a tool, 
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Karl Polak’s simplistic slogan “No Human Rights without Socialism” and the general theory that 
socialism itself was the realization of human rights had limited appeal beyond the Party faithful. 
The claim to “anti-fascist human rights” promoted by the Committee for the Protection of 
Human Rights, primarily in narrative terms, was not effective outside of the postwar German 
cultural context. As a report 1963 report from the MfAA noted, while the idea of human rights 
was of great importance because it was so “broadly popular [massenwirksam]” the GDR was not 
capable of fully competing with Federal Republic on an ideological level. Of greatest concern to 
foreign affairs officials was that “our individual arguments remain defensive because they are 
merely a response to West German attacks.”36 In short, the SED could explain why West 
Germany violated human rights on a massive scale but was incapable of making a compelling 
positive case for the successful realization of human rights in East Germany. To deal with this 
problem the MfAA called for greater attention to the problem by various groups within the 
National Front, including the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, but the problem 
was one of ideology rather than organization. Propagandists and diplomats had no convincing 
explanations for how they could simultaneously denounce West Germany’s record on human 
rights when in the GDR there were no free elections, no freedom of speech, and very limited 
freedom of religious practice. 
 Although the leading members of the SED normally settled ideological questions, in this 
case, no solution was forthcoming from the usual suspects. SED founders Wilhelm Pieck and 
Otto Grotewohl were either dead or dying in the early 1960s, and neither had employed the 
language of human rights in their public statements since the late 1940s. By this time, Walter 
Ulbricht had consolidated personal power as head of the State Council and General Secretary of 
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the SED, but his writings contained only a handful of mentions of the idea of human rights, 
almost entirely in terms of responding to its use in western propaganda against the GDR and 
other communist states. Polak, whose early writings on human rights in the 1940s had provided 
the ideological guidance for GDR officials to this time, died in 1963. The figures in the GDR 
who had the stature and authority to develop the ideology of human rights within the GDR were 
becoming fewer in number and the small group who now dominated political life atop the SED 
was unable or uninterested in developing a coherent response to the problem of what human 
rights meant in a socialist Germany.  
 Although the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and other propaganda 
organizations publicly responded to West German claims that the SED state and the Berlin Wall 
in particular represented gross violations of human rights, East German academics and 
intellectuals had little more than sophisticated slogans to offer. In a 1962 article in the legal 
journal Staat und Recht entitled “The Further Development of the Basic Rights of Citizens in the 
Fight for the Preservation of Peace by Strengthening the Economic Basis of the GDR,” Willi 
Büchner-Uhder and Eberhard Poppe sought to reiterate that socialism secured the basic rights 
and human rights of East Germans. 37 While even Karl Polak’s tendentious work had sought to 
engage with “bourgeois” conceptions, histories of human rights and the ideas of the nonaligned 
movement, Büchner-Uhder and Poppe restricted their sources and their ideas to the safe territory 
of SED generated doctrine and propaganda. The article quoted primarily from the works of Otto 
Grotewohl and Walter Ulbricht, in the case of the latter, citing nearly every one of his few 
mentions of the subject, whether relevant or not.  
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 Like Polak, the authors claimed that the anti-fascist and socialist order of the GDR 
brought about the rights of its citizens and that the further realization of socialism would in turn 
offer greater rights for the people. Most of the claims in the article were in broad terms and held 
little in the way of complex ideological justification. For example, on the subject of the Berlin 
Wall the authors claimed: 
In carrying out our measures to save peace and human rights, as Walter Ulbricht on the 18th 
August 1961 said, ‘much much less occurred [i.e. harm or damage] as compared to the average 
Rock-and-Roll event in the West Berlin Sports Palace.’ In contrast, within our state, the 
fundamental rights of the citizens have been further strengthened since the 13 August [erection of 
the Berlin Wall]. They can live and work in a manner that is more peaceful, more secure and 
more purposeful.38 
 
Although this was flattering to the members of the Central Committee, to whom the article was 
presented, it was hardly suitable as a means of convincing sceptical West Germans or others in 
the west of the SED’s commitment to human rights. Human rights remained a broad term 
symbolizing the highest aspirations of the socialist project and measures to ensure the success of 
socialism such as the Berlin Wall. By citing the leader of the SED as their primary authority, the 
authors were insulated from accusations of “deviationism,” but such work would be of little use 
outside the GDR. 
Hermann Klenner and the Invention of Socialist Human Rights 
 This ideological stagnation was finally broken in 1964, not from the efforts of the SED 
leadership but of a legal academic, Hermann Klenner, who was also a victim of the Babelsberg 
purges of 1958. Born in the town of Erbach im Odenwald in 1926, Klenner had joined the Nazi 
Party at the age of eighteen late in the Second World War but had become a dedicated socialist in 
the postwar period.39 In 1951 he gained his Doctorate at the University of Halle and began work 	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as a Dozent at the prestigious Humboldt University in Berlin. In 1956 at the age of thirty he was 
already a professor in the fields of legal theory and the history of law.40 His rapid rise would be 
cut short when he was personally called out for censure by Walter Ulbricht and denounced at the 
Babelsberg Conference held in 1958 to root out deviationism within the legal profession.41 After 
serving a short term of re-education as the mayor of Letschin, a tiny village on the new border 
with Poland, he began to teach again at the Hochschule für Ökonomie in Karlshorst and turned 
his attention to the problem of human rights. 
 Klenner first began work on the problem of the basic rights of citizens in a socialist 
society through his teaching and in 1964 wrote “A Study on Basic Rights” (Studien über die 
Grundrechte). On a discursive and intellectual level this work represented a break from Karl 
Polak’s earlier writings. Klenner’s conception of  “socialist human rights” moved beyond the 
cultural and narrative markers of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights’ propaganda 
and internationalized the SED’s human rights discourse while grounding it in the legal and 
intellectual norms of the United Nations. Klenner’s contribution was to take a Polak’s slogan and 
to make it into a full-fledged ideology. Rather than building a conception of human rights up 
from local problems as the Committee did through its prisoner activism and cultural vocabulary, 
Klenner blended SED ideology and the language of international human rights to create a hybrid 
discourse. In doing so, he pulled together the local and the international and placed the inner-
German conflict into the larger narrative of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism through the 
language of human rights and self-determination. Whereas Graefrath’s 1956 work had drawn 	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similar connections to third-world ideas, Klenner used the rhetoric of self-determination as the 
basis for a complete system of human rights thinking. 
In “A Study on Basic Rights,” Klenner prefaced his ideological claims with his own 
history of human rights. According to Klenner, while the dream of human rights was ages old, 
the Russian Revolution had now ushered in a new epoch in development, in which the forces of 
exploitation, oppression, and war could finally be eliminated. The abolition of capitalism and the 
transition to socialism meant that human kind was being “freed from all economic, ideological 
and political chains,” and as a result, a new form of human rights was to be realized as well.42 
For Klenner, this historical narrative stretched back to the Magna Charta and the demands of 
feudal lords for rights against the monarchy.43 This feudal era ended when the bourgeoisie 
overthrew the established order through the great revolutions of the eighteenth century in the 
United States and France. The American declaration of Independence and the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen realized a form of human rights -- but they were still only the 
rights of the bourgeois citizens disguised as universal human rights. In practice, the bourgeois era 
of human rights was defined by the great flaw of equal rights without consideration for the 
problem of economic exploitation. The exploited and the exploiter had equal rights under the law 
and man became alienated by a system of rights against the state that pushed citizens apart and 
atomized society. Such rights represented progress over the feudal rights of the Ancien Régime, 
but they remained rights within a society based on principles of egotism, exploitation and 
oppression. Through the claims that such a system of human rights was “self-evident,” such 
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notions were mystified and internalized as natural, inevitably leading to their further 
entrenchment in society as a whole. While the bourgeois notion of human rights actually 
furthered the exploitation of the working class, its proponents came to believe in its sanctity and 
inviolability. 
To this point in the story, Klenner was largely paraphrasing Marx’s critique of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Whereas Marx’s conclusion was to simply discard 
the language of rights from his conception of communism, Klenner here took a very different 
turn. He wrote, 
The rights of the victorious proletariat have their first formulation not in the bourgeois catalogues 
of basic rights but rather they have found them in the programs and statutes of the Party fighting 
for the power of the proletariat. Socialist fundamental rights are derived from the necessities of 
the economic development of society and the possibilities of the dictatorship of the proletariat – 
the executrix [Vollstreckerin] of historical necessity define their very contents.44 
 
In short, rights under socialism were not simply the rights that previously existed in the 
bourgeois epoch of history with better implementation, but instead they would be something new. 
They would not be created through law books, but rather expressed through the power of the 
leading party of the proletariat, which represented the force of historical necessity driving 
forward and liberating the masses. 
In explaining the connection between socialism and the realization of human rights, 
Klenner turned to the language of self-determination. According to his interpretation, the 
abolition of capitalism and the resulting end of exploitation allowed all to take part in the process 
of self-governance and thus produced a system truly rooted in the principle of self-determination. 
The triumph of the working class was actually the triumph of all humanity (unlike the triumph of 
the bourgeoisie, who claimed the same thing but was actually deluded) and as a result, the 
distinctions between state, society and the individual had broken down completely. In a socialist 	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system with real self-determination, the interests of the individual and society could no longer be 
in conflict since they were one and the same. Through such reasoning, the lines between 
socialism and self-determination became blurred as both came to mean the realization of a state 
ruled by the leading party of the working class on behalf of all.45 
How did socialist rights actually function in practice? Unlike in the earlier epoch of 
history, these rights “are not characterized by a sphere free of the state in which the individual 
can act with private arbitrariness [Willkür] (a petit-bourgeois conception and illusion), but rather 
through the ever more comprehensive state-organized mastery of lawful social relations of the 
masses of the people.”46 In the place of the freedom to act out of self-interest, basic rights under 
socialism functioned as a means for the state to mobilize, orient, and organize “the masses onto 
the path to their own liberation.”47 Human rights under socialism now represented a means of 
expressing social ideals, thus they did not exist to allow the individual to separate from society 
but rather to fulfil the interests of both the individual and society.  
Accordingly, all rights were now balanced by concurrent duties to employ one’s rights to 
the fullest so that the individual and society could realize the greatest benefit.48 In a society 
where the citizen has the right to work or the right to education, he also had the duty to work and 
the duty to educate himself for his own sake and that of the larger community. This concept was 
elucidated through Klenner’s descriptions of the three key rights under socialism according to his 
theory – the right to work, the right to education and the right to political participation. For 
Klenner, “to interpret the right to work as the right to be lazy or the right to education as the right 	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to be stupid, belongs to the typical bourgeois basic rights conception of subjective idealism,” and 
was thus wrong.49 The right to work was not the right to have the state provide you with a job but 
instead to cease being alienated from one’s work and to labour on behalf of society as a whole 
and not for the profit of a capitalist. The right to education was not the total freedom of 
expression as promoted by bourgeois theorists as this gave equal weight to truth and falsehood. 
Under socialism, all had the right to learn the truth. Concurrently, these rights came with duties – 
one had the duty to contribute to society through one’s labour and every citizen had the 
responsibility to assist in the “struggle against bourgeois ideology, against revisionism and 
against dogmatism.”50 From one perspective, as emphasized by Klenner, an individual had the 
duty to exercise his rights; from another perspective, however, this meant that he only had the 
right to fulfill his duties. 
 In terms of the right to political participation, rather than having the opportunity to vote 
for a variety of parties, all of whom were in the pocket of capital as in bourgeois society, citizens 
could now fully participate in the governance of their state through the vehicle of the leading 
party of the proletariat: 
In the past, workers and peasants have through their efforts won from “elites” the inalienable right 
to take part in governing.  It consists above all else of the right to free association in social 
organizations, the right to assembly and the freedom of demonstration, the right to participate in 
referenda, the right to actively take part in the work of the parliament and its institutions (including 
the election and removal of representatives by the citizenry), in the right to the armed defence of 
the workers’ and peasants’ state and in the right to legality in all actions by the state.51 
 
In Klenner’s idealized socialist state, one had the right and duty to active citizenship in society 
and in the institutions of state, both political and military. Since socialism fulfilled the true 
interests of the people, there could be no right to vote for alternatives to it as a political and 	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economic system as that would not only mean harming the interests of the individual but also of 
society as a whole. Political rights existed only within the context of the already established 
socialist system, the terms of which were ordained by “historical necessity” and not up for debate 
or contestation. 
 Klenner argued that these basic rights (Grundrechte) that a citizen experienced as 
member of socialist society in the GDR represented the manifestation of broader principles of 
universal human rights. In doing so, he linked together the domestic system of the GDR to the 
broader principles of the United Nations and the international discourse of human rights, 
primarily through his reinterpretation of the concept of self-determination as an underpinning 
principle of the state-socialist system. On an even broader level, Klenner sought to extend these 
ideas to the problem of international peace and the Cold War. According to Klenner:   
Wherever in the world the people are fighting against the exploitation, ignorance, and oppression 
brought about by the imperialists, they are fighting a just struggle for their self-determination. 
Wherever in the world there is the struggle against the threat of war, it is a struggle for the most 
important human right, the right to a peaceful life!52  
 
On a global scale, the root of conflict was exploitation, imperialism and the absence of self-
determination. The path to peace was thus the realization of self-determination through socialism 
that would in turn bring about universal human rights. In resisting the neo-fascist imperialism of 
West Germany and establishing socialism on German soil, the GDR was truly leading force in 
this quest for world peace. 
 In concluding his work, Klenner brought together the global struggle against imperialism 
with his philosophical vision of socialist human rights. He hailed the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples from 1960 not as the realization of the UN 
Charter but as a blow to the bourgeois human rights ideal and an important step towards the 	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liberation of all peoples through socialism. Klenner held out hope that when “all the peoples 
have heard the signal,” and the world has been united through socialism, man would overcome 
his contradictions, within himself and with nature, and human rights would be realized for all.53 
In a fascinating combination of high philosophy, popular socialism, and international affairs, 
Klenner had equated the idea of post-colonialism with Hegelian mysticism, all written in a play 
on the lyrics of the Internationale.54 In doing so, Klenner’s work translated the struggle for anti-
colonialism and human rights into the idiom of both high and low East German socialism.  
 Through all of the intellectual contortions on display in Klenner’s work, it is faith in the 
transformative power of “the revolution” that ultimately undergirds his thinking. The references 
to the Hegelian idea of man overcoming his contradictions and realizing true freedom were not 
just high intellectual gloss on propaganda but rather the essence of Klenner’s worldview. In a 
comparative study including some of Klenner’s later works, the philosopher Tore Lindholm 
argues that the red thread running through his arguments is a form of Marxist metaphysics that 
anticipated the total emancipation of humanity through the eventual triumph of Communism.55 
The double standard between the socialist world and the capitalist world was politically 
convenient, but it was rooted in a belief that the GDR had crossed a threshold into a stage of 
historical development that had fundamentally altered all human relations. Klenner was not alone 
in this conviction and this basic premise would prove to be a major hindrance to the emergence 
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on an independent human rights movement in the 1970s and 1980s as faith in the revolution led 
many dissident socialists to turn their backs on “bourgeois” human rights.56 
Klenner’s conception of socialist human rights provided a politically useful double-
standard that excused the abuses of the SED dictatorship while still allowing East Germany to 
criticise the shortcomings of other states in the west in the language of human rights. Since 
capitalist states were still in the bourgeois phase of history, denial of voting rights or censorship 
could be attacked as a violation of human rights while these same actions by a communist regime 
could be justified as necessary to protect the achievements of socialism and the realization of the 
true interests of the people. Within such states, it was conceptually impossible even to claim that 
the rights of the individual were being violated as the interests of society and the citizens were 
inherently the same. In a system where the state represented the pure expression of the will of all 
of humanity, how could the rights of the individual not be fulfilled? While one could argue that 
low-level functionaries imperfectly realized the will of the state, the moral legitimacy of the 
larger political superstructure was unimpeachable. Moreover, Klenner’s logic tied together the 
causes and vocabularies of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, socialism and human rights into a 
discourse in which all the terms came to be interchangeable and interconnected. 
It is also important to note here that while Klenner’s work was rooted in the classics of 
Soviet Marxism-Leninism, the ideas he published were not drawn from contemporary academic 
work elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc. While the Soviet Union did warm to the language of human 
rights in its propaganda, it was limited to claims that the USSR was governed by the principles of 
“socialist legality” rather than any kind of separate theory of distinctly “socialist human rights”.57 
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The rights rhetoric in the USSR in relation to constitutional rights differed significantly from 
human rights discourse as those rights were inherently connected to Soviet citizenship instead of 
a conception of universal humanity.58 Soviet legal scholarship on human rights did not begin in 
earnest until the mid-1970s in response to the domestic human rights activism and most likely 
the ongoing negotiations over the Helsinki Accords (1972-1975).  The earliest significant work 
on the subject, according to a study by Christopher Osakwe, was I. Farber’s Freedom and 
Human Rights in the Soviet State, which appeared in 1974. While the Soviets would later 
develop a rich body of theoretical work on the subject of human rights – the USSR began 
publishing a journal on human rights issues (Prava Cheloveka) in 1983 – in 1964, Klenner was 
not copying from the Soviets but rather creating something new. 
 Klenner’s work quickly gained acclaim among East German intellectuals – when Klenner 
submitted an earlier draft of the book as his Habilitationsschrift in 1964, Siegfried Forberger, the 
secretary of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights attended and found his work to be 
“fascinating.” As he would later write of the experience: “For the first time I was hearing a law 
professor speaking extemporaneously with logical clarity, convincing arguments and publishable 
formulations on the essential aspects and problems of Marxist human rights theory.”59 In 1965, 
Forberger invited Klenner to give a speech on his theories to a meeting of the Committee for the 
Protection of Human Rights and recruited him as a member. Klenner also found a patron in Hans 
Schaul, the chief editor of Einheit, the SED’s theoretical journal, in which Karl Polak’s 
influential papers had been published.60 While some more conservative members of the SED’s 
publishing bureaucracy expressed concerns over Klenner’s work, Schaul’s support ensured that 	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“A Study on Basic Rights” was published without extensive revision by the censors. His support 
was also likely the reason that Klenner was able to publish an article length version of the book’s 
argument in the SED’s international affairs journal Deutsche Außenpolitik in 1964.61 
Klenner not only gained influential supporters, but was skilled at presenting his material 
to wider audiences in the GDR. In contrast to the repetitious slogans and dogmas of existing 
human rights propaganda, Klenner’s 1965 address to the Committee for the Protection of Human 
Rights employed irony and humour in addition to ideological formulas, and openly advertised his 
cosmopolitan influences and international perspective. The presentation to the Committee 
brought together Klenner’s new intellectual conception of socialist human rights with the 
existing appeal to anti-fascism as the basis for the righteousness of the socialist project and the 
GDR that had been the mainstay of the Committee’s propaganda from the start. In his speech, 
Klenner declared, 
We not only have the duty to take stock of the implementation of human rights in Germany today, 
but we are also legitimized in this task by the fact that we are not on the side of those government 
functionaries and pensioners who so despise human rights [in West Germany]. On our side, with 
power in their hands, are those who fought for human rights during the dark night of fascism. The 
defendants are now the judges. The persecuted of yesterday are with us today as the rulers. And 
they have built a German Rechtsstaat in which human rights are the corner stone of our democracy.  
 
He continued ironically: 
 
To paraphrase Heinrich Heine: catalogues of basic rights do not make a man free just as cookbooks 
cannot make him full. Thus we find it necessary to appropriate the knowledge of the only force that 
is capable of realizing human rights. Because we know, that the course of history is unstoppable, 
because we know that the power of the people is immense, and so we believe and so we know that 
the age-old longing of man for freedom and peace, for equality and justice will soon be realized 
across the world.62 
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In his presentation, the local project of socialism in East Germany was part of the grand 
historical narrative of the progress of history towards the realization of human rights and the 
SED was shown to be the agent of this historical process due to its anti-fascist character. The 
earlier appeals to a sense of anti-fascist culture and identity remained but they were now part of a 
larger understanding of human rights that was centered on the norms and texts of the United 
Nations and international discourses of self-determination. 
In 1958, Klenner was a pariah; by 1965 his work rapidly became the orthodoxy of the 
East German state on the subject of human rights. Soon after joining the Committee for the 
Protection of Human Rights, Klenner displaced Chairwoman Friedel Malter and Secretary 
Siegfried Forberger as the intellectual force of its propaganda and publicity. Similarly, scholarly 
articles on rights under socialism now cited his work often and used it as the starting point for 
their arguments. Although fellow East German scholars did criticize many of his points for their 
apparent misinterpretations of nuances of Marxist theory (as communist academics are wont to 
do) Klenner’s work was the elephant in the room of human rights scholarship that had to be 
addressed and engaged. While Willi Büchner-Uhder and Eberhard Poppe had ignored Klenner’s 
earlier work, in a 1966 article in the legal journal Staat und Recht, they cited A Study on Basic 
Rights six times as compared to three citations of SED leader Walter Ulbricht and only one 
reference to Otto Grotewohl or Vladimir Lenin.63    
As imprisoned left-wing activists and KPD members in Federal Republic disappeared 
from GDR propaganda (and indeed from West German prisons) in the late 1960s, Klenner’s new 
voice paved the way for the transition of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights from 
activist organization dedicated to freeing communists into propaganda organization with a truly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Willi Büchner-Uhder, Eberhard Poppe and Rolf Schüssler, “Grundrechte und Grundpflichten der Bürger der 
DDR: Zur staatstheoretischen und -rechtlichen Grundrechtsforschung,” Staat und Recht 4(1966).  
	  	   143	  
international perspective. Klenner’s work also provided the substance and detail needed to 
engage with the problem of human rights at the United Nations as the GDR once more pressed to 
gain full entry into the community of nations and to normalize its diplomatic relations.   
The International Year for Human Rights and the Mainstreaming of Socialist Human 
Rights in the GDR 
 In January 1968, the Socialist Unity Party’s (SED) Secretary General Walter Ulbricht 
included the following passage in his New Year’s Address: 
The United Nations has declared the year 1968 to be the “International Year for Human Rights”. 
Our new socialist and humanistic constitution, which is based on respect for human rights and 
that highest of human rights, the right to peace, which will be the concern of our whole society, is 
also a fine contribution of the German Democratic Republic to the objective of this “International 
Year”. In West Germany, however, the year of human rights is marked by support by the ruling 
circles in Bonn for the barbaric US war against the Vietnamese people. It is dedicated to the 
disenfranchisement and the gagging of the people through the Emergency Decrees, the 
dismantling of social services and neo-Nazi propaganda.64 
 
While Ulbricht had almost never used the phrase human rights in the past, in 1968, it was the 
central theme of the GDR’s plans for domestic reform and international propaganda.  
For the SED, 1968 was to serve as a year of transformation - when the GDR would turn 
from the anti-fascist state of its founding into a true socialist country. The original 1949 
Constitution, with its tributes to German unity and bourgeois political structures was to be 
replaced by a “Socialist Constitution” that would confirm and legitimize SED rule. For Walter 
Ulbricht, 1968 would demonstrate that the GDR was continuing to advance through the stages of 
historical development towards pure communism – in 1952, the SED had begun the 
“construction of socialism” and now the GDR would become a “socialist people’s 
community”.65  The mass public consultations on the substance of the Constitution and vote on 
its adoption, the Volksaussprache, planned by SED would demonstrate the unity of the people 	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and make the document the bedrock for a distinctly East German political identity and 
citizenship.66 Internationally, the SED was going to use the International Year for Human Rights 
to declare its support for the recently passed United Nations Human Rights Covenants in order to 
gain diplomatic recognition so as to finally secure an equal place to the Federal Republic on the 
international stage.67  
While the decolonization meant that the Afro-Asian Bloc was rapidly growing at the 
United Nations and formed a majority of voting members by 1960, neither of the Germanies was 
recognized as a member of the UN and most international organizations refused to recognize that 
they represented separate sovereign nations.68 While West Germany had observer status and 
represented “Germany” at important UN bodies like UNESCO, the GDR was completely shut 
out. SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht personally hoped that the changing atmosphere 
would be enough for the GDR finally to gain entry in spite of western opposition. On February 
28th, 1966, East Germany put forward a formal application for membership in the United Nations 
but they were forcefully rebuffed. UN Secretary General U Thant objected that the application 
for full membership was inappropriate at the time, even though he was known to personally 
support the inclusion of the GDR as an observer on equal footing with West Germany. The 	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western members of the Security Council, whose responsibility it was to accept or deny the 
application, quickly circulated a note saying the GDR was not eligible to membership as it was 
not a sovereign independent state. With open opposition from the US, UK, and France, the 
Soviet Union did not even try to place the matter on the agenda for the Security Council since 
failure was assured by a western veto. In spite of a concurrent “goodwill” tour to nonaligned 
states, not one neutral country spoke out in favour of the East German application, due to 
continuing fears that Bonn would cut off foreign aid and trade deals in retaliation.69 
Following this defeat, Ulbricht sought to once again go on the offensive against West 
Germany with a strong ideological campaign, but this was prevented by the USSR on the 
grounds that it could interfere with the new Soviet efforts to negotiate with the FRG and other 
western European countries from a more conciliatory starting point.70 As a result, the SED had to 
find a means of asserting its claims through a positive case for its own sovereignty and 
legitimacy rather than simply attacking the FRG. What emerged in the late 1960s was a 
campaign to normalize the GDR in the language of human rights that did not shy away from 
attacking West Germany’s human rights record, but focused primarily on the accomplishments 
of East German socialism and the solidarity of the GDR with the Third World.  
The main vehicle for this campaign would be the International Year for Human Rights. 
On December 12, 1963 – two days after the 15th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights – the General Assembly passed Resolution 1961 (XVIII) “Designation of 1968 as 
International Year for Human Rights,” which invited all members to “intensify their domestic 
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efforts in the field of human rights with the assistance of their appropriate organizations, in order 
that a fuller and more effective realization of those rights and freedoms might be achieved.”71 In 
1966, the General Assembly added to this general request by asking that member nations use the 
year as an opportunity to sign-on to key UN human rights documents, to have state leaders issue 
statements as to the importance of human rights, to have other state agencies demonstrate their 
support for the year through symbolic measures (i.e. commemorative postage stamps) and that 
the Shah of Iran would host an international conference on human rights in Tehran.72 
For the SED Politburo, the Year for Human Rights represented a unique opportunity to 
demonstrate its credentials on human rights and to delegitimize West German claims to represent 
all German people. The SED would promote the foreign policies of the GDR and demonstrate its 
humanistic character by “unrestricted support for the Vietnamese people against the barbaric war 
of USA imperialism,” solidarity with the Arab people in order to “overcome the effects of Israeli 
imperialist aggression,” and support for new nations in “realizing the right to self-determination 
and the liquidation of all remaining traces of colonialism and neo-colonialism.”73 In contrast, the 
SED would highlight West German support for the American war in Vietnam, its aims to employ 
nuclear weapons – as “an acute danger to peace and thus a permanent attack on human rights” – 
and Bonn’s refusal to renounce its “imperialistic” claims to sovereignty over East German 
territory.74 Overall, it was crucial to show the world that “socialist humanism is the embodiment 
of human rights and to unmask the misuse of the idea of ‘human rights’ that drives the 	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implementation of West German imperialist class interests.”75 The Politburo believed that if the 
GDR could convince the developing world that its domestic politics were in line with 
international human rights norms, this would affirm the GDR’s claim to membership in the 
United Nations.76 Whereas the SED’s propaganda of the early 1960s portrayed the conflict 
between East and West Germany as struggle between the anti-fascist proponents of human rights 
in the GDR and the mass violators of human rights in the Federal Republic, this new line 
integrated this conflict into a Manichaean vision of international Cold War as a fight between 
capitalist imperialism and socialist anti-colonialism. 
 The effects of the SED’s embrace of the International Year for Human Rights would be 
manifold within the GDR. SED efforts to promote its credibility in terms of human rights led to 
the mass dissemination of the idea of “socialist human rights” throughout the Party and state 
bureaucracies. This campaign resulted in SED officials internalizing the ideological conception 
of a distinctly socialist human rights rooted in the post-colonial language of self-determination as 
developed by the legal scholar Hermann Klenner in his book A Study on Basic Rights in 1964.77 
The actions of the SED also linked together the domestic political and economic with the 
specific legal language of the UN Covenants on Human Rights. In contrast with the limited 
impact of the propaganda work of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights from 1959-
1966, the SED program of events, propaganda and domestic reform association with the 
International Year for Human Rights in 1968 mainstreamed Hermann Klenner’s ideas with the 
result that they became a natural part of the ideological landscape of the GDR.78 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid, 2. 
76 Ibid, 3. 
77 Klenner, Studien über die Grundrechte. See chapter 3, Part 1 for more explanation of Klenner’s theories. 
78 The actions of the Committee for the Protection of Human rights from 1959-66 are explained in chapter 2. 
	  	   148	  
The Socialist People’s Community and the Volksaussprache 
 The transformation of East Germany into a “socialist people’s community” was to be 
demonstrated through two key domestic reforms: the adoption of a new criminal code and the 
promulgation of a new “Socialist Constitution.” The text of the new criminal code claimed that 
the socialist order “ensures that every citizen can make his life in full compliance with his 
dignity, his freedom and human rights in accordance with the rights and interests of the socialist 
society, the state and its citizens.” (Chapter 1, Article 2) and that the “dignity of man, his 
freedom and his rights are protected under the criminal laws of the socialist state.” (Chapter 1, 
Article 4)79 Echoing the language of the secret “shooting order” issued to Berlin Wall guards that 
justified the use of lethal force against those attempting to escape in order to prevent “a crime 
against the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, against peace, humanity, and 
human rights,” the criminal code reserved the death penalty for those who committed “crimes 
against the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, peace, humanity and human rights 
or serious crimes against the German Democratic Republic"80 
 The introduction of a new constitution and the Volksaussprache – the massive 
countrywide series of meetings to discuss the matter with the people prior to a plebiscite in April 
1968 – formed the other plank of the domestic agenda. The crucial innovation of the new 
constitution was that it now clearly endorsed and legitimized the political reality of SED rule in 
East Germany. The first article stated: 
The German Democratic Republic is the socialist state of the German nation. It is the political 
organization of the working people of the cities and countryside, who under the leadership of the 
working class and its Marxist-Leninist Party [the SED], are realizing Socialism. 
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Article 2 continued from this premise and claimed that the end of capitalism in the GDR meant 
“the exploitation of man by man has been abolished forever,” employing a phrase that would 
become a standard quote in East German human rights propaganda from then onwards. The sixth 
article also explained that the GDR would abide by the principles of socialist internationalism 
and would follow the lead of the Soviet Union in these matters. While Walter Ulbricht promoted 
the “socialist and humanistic constitution” as a document “based on respect for human rights,” 
the new constitution actually decreased the number of explicit basic rights in comparison with 
the 1949 Constitution. 81 Although it did include numerous liberal-democratic sounding rights to 
expression and political participation, the right to strike had been removed to the consternation of 
many East Germans. Another point of contention was the reduction of religious freedoms: the 
1949 constitution had eight articles that explicitly guaranteed freedom of belief and the 
independence of the churches while the new document mentioned freedom of religion (but not of 
belief and conscience) only once.82   
 The call by the SED for suggestions as to how to improve the proposed constitution 
resulted in an outpouring of letters from East German citizens; most of the population attended 
consultative and educational meetings on the meaning of the new constitution in the lead-up to 
the plebiscite. While East German citizens sought to make changes to the constitution and restore 
guarantees for rights, particularly concerning religious freedom, almost no one used the 
opportunity to challenge the SED’s claims to political power. There were hardly any letters 
demanding changes to Article 1 that effectively legalized the SED monopoly on power. While 
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hundreds of citizens invoked international human rights treaties and declarations in the name of 
asking for change, the officials in charge of drafting the constitution saw this as constructive 
feedback rather than a cause for concern. Most comments deemed “provocative” by state 
officials referred to the events of the Prague Spring next door as a positive example for the GDR 
to follow rather than references to the United Nations.83 In the end, the massive propaganda 
campaign for the constitution proved to be a success as nearly 95 percent of the population 
turned out to vote in favour of its adoption. While many who voted yes undoubtedly held 
objection to aspects of “real existing socialism,” the SED was able to command enough authority 
to make the population take part in the vote without the need for extensive threats or outright 
coercion.84 
Although the constitution and the plebiscite were written off as a propaganda stunt in 
West Germany, gaining the “approval” of the people was a very serious affair for the SED.85 The 
new constitution and the consultations that leading up to the vote upon it, featured as one of the 
main rhetorical points of the SED in claiming that the GDR was in line with the norms of 
international human rights and was a democratically legitimate state. At all international events, 
the consultations and vote featured prominently. In her opening speech at an international 
colloquium held by the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Berlin at the end of 
March 1968, Chairwoman Friedel Malter emphasized the importance of the referendum that was 
soon to be held as a marker of East Germany’s commitment to human rights. She asked the 
delegates, primarily socialists and communists from Western Europe to not only “examine our 
conception of human rights [found in the constitution], in particular the relationship between 	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political and social rights or the system of material and judicial guarantees of human rights,” but 
to also experience the preparations for the referendum itself as a kind of triumph of human 
rights.86  
Not only did the Constitution demonstrate the vitality of human rights in the GDR, but the 
vote itself showed the sovereignty of the people and the fulfillment of the right to self-
determination. In a speech commemorating the 20th anniversary of the UDHR in December 1968, 
Foreign Minister Otto Winzer touted the role of the new constitution in ensuring peace, 
proclaiming:  
The plebiscite and the socialist constitution of the German Democratic Republic both document 
before the whole world that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that the principle of popular sovereignty is embodied in 
the German Democratic Republic.87 
 
Similarly, the GDR’s official declaration to the UN’s human rights conference in Tehran, 
claimed that  
The decision of the people of the GDR on a new constitution is convincing proof of the 
realization of the UN-Charter and of the right to self-determination as fixed by the human rights 
covenants, by virtue of which the people freely choose their political status.88 
 
The declaration then described the participation in numerical terms in order to demonstrate the 
full extent of popular involvement: 12,454 letters with suggestions for changes were sent to the 
constitutional commission, which then made 118 changes to the draft text. In the vote itself, 
11,536,803 citizens apparently voted in favour of the constitution with 409,733 voting against 
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and 24,353 spoiled ballots.89 Demonstrating mass participation was as important as showing 
mass approval in order to support the SED’s claims to self-determination for the East German 
people. 
Internalizing Human Rights as Law through the UN Human Rights Covenants 
The SED not only equated the creation of the new “socialist people’s community” with 
the realization of self-determination and human rights, but the terms of the GDR human rights 
discourse shifted from the cultural narratives of the Committee to a new legalistic vocabulary. 
Although this reconceptualization of human rights in legal terms was embedded in the larger 
anti-fascist narratives that were already established, the primacy now lay in fidelity to the 
language of the new UN human rights treaties that had been finalized in 1966: the International 
Covenant on Political and Civil Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. When the SED formally announced its commitment to the contents of the UN 
Covenants in October 1968 and affirmed its readiness to sign them once the GDR was a member 
of the UN, it represented the end of a nearly yearlong bureaucratic process that touched almost 
all sections of the East German state. The SED’s affirmation of the Covenants was a significant 
act from an ideological and propaganda perspective, but the more important process occurred 
behind the scenes as state and party officials of all stripes had to address UN human rights norms 
to determine if this act would constitute a threat to SED rule. Across the board, this encounter 
with the UN Covenants resulted in officials finding means of reconciling these ideas with East 
German socialism, both in its real and idealized form. Rather than provoking self-criticism or 
reform, the two decades of propaganda equating socialism with human rights intertwined with 
the new ideological work of Klenner and others to facilitate a mass rationalization of the East 
German political and economic system by state officials in the language of human rights.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ibid. 
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In November 1967, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs began internal deliberations as to 
whether the GDR could sign onto the United Nations human rights documents, which SED 
officials hoped could serve as a central symbolic contribution to the events of the year. Foreign 
Minister Otto Winzer sent a letter to more than a dozen state departments, party organs, and 
organizations asking for a review of the International Human Rights Covenants of 1966 and 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) with 
regards to whether any terms of the documents conflicted with GDR laws, norms or practices 
and what changes would be required domestically in order for the SED to sign on to them 
without contradiction.90 
 The response to this inquiry from the various departments was uniformly optimistic and 
recommended that the GDR sign on to the Covenants with only minor reservations as to the 
contents of the documents.91 As a report summing up the internal review to Walter Ulbricht 
described it, “the problems and questions raised, however, are not so grave that the affirmation 
by the GDR of the International Covenants would be called into question.”92 The response of 
General State Prosecutor Josef Streit is indicative of the tone of this departmental feedback. 
While there existed the possibility of problems arising from rarely used provisions of work as a 
form of criminal punishment and the absence of complex appeals process for those accused of 
criminal charges, Streit assured Winzer that in regards to the International Covenant on Political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The Departments, organizations and state organs contacted included the League for International Cooperation, the 
Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, 
the General State Prosecutor’s Office, the State Office for Work, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance, 
the State Central Administration for Statistics, the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, the State Office 
for Job Training, the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry for State Security. PA-AA, MfAA C 487/76 
Vorbereitung des Anschlusses und Beitrittserklärung der DDR an die Konventionen über wirt. 1967-1968 UN 
Konventionen. 
91 The full report on the feedback from the various departments was collected in the report “Einzelfragen, die aus der 
unterschiedlichen Regelung bestimmter Komplexe durch das nationale Recht der DDR und durch die 
Bestimmungen der beiden Menschenrechtskonventionen resultieren“ (undated) PA-AA MfAA C 487/76. 
92 BArch-Lichterfelde DA 5/660 Kohrt to Ulbricht (22.Mai 1968). 
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and Civil Rights, “the practice of law enforcement organs in the GDR has for a long time 
corresponded to the basic rights as determined by the UN General Assembly and in this 
Covenant.” Regarding the convention on racial discrimination he argued: “Due to the 
extermination of the social roots of fascism and the subsequent punishment of those in the 
territory of the GDR responsible for Nazi racial policy, these provisions are hardly an issue.”93 In 
contrast to Streit’s evaluation, a 1966 report from Amnesty International on the criminal justice 
system of the GDR concluded: “It is hard to see how a society which guarantees to its citizens 
any kind of elementary ‘human rights’ may be developed in East Germany without some radical 
changes not only in the penal code but also in the whole concept and organization of the judicial 
system.”94 The view from within the bubble of SED ideology was far rosier than it was to outside 
NGO observers. 
 In communicating the news of the GDR’s support for the Covenants, officials expressed 
some concerns that the announcement could be used against the SED, but only due to a failure to 
properly educate the public as to the real meaning of human rights. A report from the MfAA’s 
International Organizations Department mentions agreement between it and colleagues in the 
State and Law Department of the MfAA and the SED Central Committee’s Department of 
International Information, that propaganda efforts would have to address the articles of the 
Covenants that were “no longer relevant” as they had been “overtaken by our social 
development.” The rights that the officials specifically feared could “be exploited by 
oppositional forces against the GDR” included “the right to emigration, a right to absolute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 BArch-Lichterfelde DP 3/102 Streit to Winzer (4.12.1967). 
94 Amnesty International, Prison Conditions in East Germany: Conditions for Political Prisoners : A Factual 
Report (London: Amnesty International, 1966), 51. The three target countries for AI that year, following their policy 
of reviewing a western, socialist and third world nation, were Paraguay, the GDR and Rhodesia.  
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freedom of information, [and] the right to strike].” 95 Such language does not represent a coded 
admission that SED rule violated international human rights, but is rather completely in line with 
Klenner’s theoretical claims that human rights evolved in conjunction with the social progress of 
society as a whole. Such rights were necessary in a bourgeois society to fight against oppression 
but would only serve to undermine the needs of society following the development of socialism. 
Why would workers need to strike against themselves or emigrate from the socialist utopia?96    
The task of explaining these distinctions in regards to the UN human rights covenants fell 
to the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights. In two pamphlets published in 1967-68, 
the Committee sought to show that East Germany was not simply living up to the standards of 
the UN, but vastly over-fulfilling its specific requirements. Contrary to many claims by 
historians that socialist nations promoted only their social rights regime or argued that citizens 
were deprived of political rights in order to realize economic benefits for all, this propaganda 
material actively proclaimed the GDR to be a true political democracy in which all power was 
held by the people.97 In Political Civil Rights in the German Democratic Republic98 Hermann 
Klenner argued:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 PA-AA MfAA C 487/76 Abteilung International Organisation “Bemerkungen zur Vorlage über die Erklärung der 
Bereitschaft der DDR zum Beitritt zu den beiden UN-Menschenrechtskonventionen vom 16.12.1966” (19 Sept 
1968) 3. 
96 See chapter 4, part 1 on the Volksaussprache of 1968 and popular demands for the right to strike in the new East 
German Constitution. 
97 For an example of such claims, see Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Center for Human 
Values (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 19; Aryeh Neier, The International Human Rights Movement: 
A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 85. 
98 The booklet was published in German, English and French as Hermann Klenner, Die politischen Bürgerrechte in 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Berlin: Komitee zum Schutze der Menschenrechte, 1967); Hermann 
Klenner, Civil Rights in the German Democratic Republic. (Berlin: Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, 
1967). And Hermann Klenner, Les Droits politiques des citoyens en République démocratique allemande ... (Berlin: 
Comité pour la protection des droits de l’homme, 1967). The version cited here is the English edition that omits the 
mention of the political from the title likely due to the presumed connection between civil rights and political rights 
at the time of publication due to the American Civil Rights Movement. 
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In contrast to an authoritarian state doctrine which actually defines the people as those who do not 
govern, we maintain that he workers and farmers are not only there to vote but also to govern. 
Democracy is not that kind of rule in which the forming of the government and legislation depend 
on periodical elections. Democracy is rather a form of rule in which the people are entitled and in 
a position creatively to shape their own living conditions […] The basic rights of the collective 
self-government to which every citizen is entitled consists in the fact that every member of our 
state has the right as a member of a sovereign people to take a creative part in the exercise of 
power at any time and in every relevant sphere of social guidance.99 
 
Klenner’s argument in no way treated human rights as a foreign or dangerous concept and in 
particular, he did not hesitate to affirm the GDR’s success in fulfilling all aspects of the 
Covenants. 
 The pamphlets also show the transition to a new reliance of legal vocabulary over earlier 
Committee publications that focussed so strongly on an anti-fascist narrative. Political Civil 
Rights in the German Democratic Republic along with another booklet on the Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, written by Willi Büchner-Uhder, presented the full texts 
of the Covenants as an Appendix showing how various East German constitutional provisions 
and laws fulfilled every article of the UN treaties.100 Each article of the treaties was shown with 
corresponding laws promulgated in the GDR that often ran for paragraphs longer than the UN 
text. If readers were not impressed by the quality of human rights in the GDR, they would at 
least be impressed by the quantity. 
 In contrast to Ulbricht’s impulsive application for UN Membership, the process of 
reviewing the Covenants and approving the measure to notify the UN was slow and methodical. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Klenner and Komitee zum Schutze der Menschenrechte in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Civil rights 
in the German Democratic Republic, 5. 
100 This pamphlet was also published in German, English and French as Willi Büchner-Uhder and Komitee zum 
Schutze der Menschenrechte in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Socialist human rights in the German 
Democratic Republic, on the right to cooperate in the management of the state, economy and culture by all citizens 
of the GDR. (Berlin: [Committee for the Protection of Human Rights], 1968); Willi Büchner-Uhder, Les Droits de 
l’homme du système socialiste en République démocrate allemande. Le droit de participation à la gestion de l’état, 
de l’économie et de la culture en R.D.A. pour tous les citoyens ... (Berlin: [Comité pour la protection des droits de 
l’homme], 1968); Willi Büchner-Uhder, Sozialistische Menschenrechte in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: 
zum Recht auf Mitwirkung an der Leitung von Staat, Wirtschaft und Kultur durch alle Bürger der DDR (1968). 
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The MfAA began reviewing the documents in November 1967 and only at the end of May 1968 
did it confirm to Walter Ulbricht that the GDR was already in almost total compliance.101 
Following personal approval from Ulbricht, the vast and byzantine bureaucracy of the GDR 
swung into action at a very slow pace. On 19 July, the Council of Ministers produced a draft of a 
declaration and sent it to the Council of State, of which Ulbricht was Chair. On September 9th it 
was sent back to the Council of Ministers when it was determined that the first draft needed 
revisions to deal with some ambiguity of language.102 On 20 September, a new draft was 
approved by the State Council and signed by Ulbricht and Otto Gotsche.103 Finally, the 
declaration was sent to UN Secretary General U Thant by Foreign Minister Otto Winzer and on 9 
October 1968, the GDR formally committed to signing the UN Human Rights Covenants, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
Genocide Convention and numerous ILO and UNESCO conventions. 104 
 At the end of this very long and winding road, SED officials at all levels of the state 
bureaucracy had accepted the concept of human rights as an element of socialist ideology and 
propaganda. Those same official and functionaries had, almost without exception, approached 
the United Nations human rights system as natural ally of the socialist cause and considered the 
affirmation of the Covenants an inherent good in and of itself. While officials may have had a 
generally positive inclination towards the international human rights system and the discourse of 
human rights prior to 1967, the process of approving the UN Human Rights Covenants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 BArch-Lichterfelde DA 5/660 Kohrt to Ulbricht (22 May 1968) 
102 BArch-Lichterfelde DA 5/660 Gotsche to Stoph (9 Sept 1968).  
103 PA-AA MfAA C 487/76 Beschluß des Staatsrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die Bereitschaft 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zum Beitritt zu den UNO-Menschenrechtskonventionen vom 20. 
September 1968. File number 9-10. 
104 PA-AA MfAA C 487/76 Winzer to U Thant (9 Oct 1968) File number 1-4. 
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demanded that these functionaries made a positive connection between a collection of specific 
legal articles in the UN treaties and the norms of East German state socialism. While the SED’s 
motives for affirming the UN Human Rights Covenants were based on the desire to convince the 
rest of the world that it believed in human rights, the process of approving this action served to 
convince itself of its own righteousness in the field of human rights and their total fidelity to the 
norms of the United Nations. 
The GDR and International Conference on Human Rights at Tehran 
 By 1968, the use of human rights by many developing nations had evolved from a 
powerful rhetorical weapon against colonialism into a means of legitimizing dictatorship and 
domestic oppression following the end of formal colonialism. In many countries, revolutionary 
hopes that independence and self-determination would naturally bring about democracy and 
prosperity were dashed as local strongmen used the new state structures to suppress opposing 
political forces and individual rights in general. These states continued to employ the language of 
human rights as a means of deflecting criticism both from NGOs genuinely concerned for the 
well being of local populations and from western states seeking pretexts for intervention to 
reclaim their influence and control.  
The First International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran in 1968 reflected this 
state of affairs, so much so that the United Nations and human rights activists have largely erased 
its existence from the history books. Ironically it was hosted by the Shah of Iran, himself a rather 
brutal “development dictator” who had achieved power through a CIA engineered coup in 1953. 
M. More than two-thirds of the eighty-three countries that sent delegates to the conference were 
run by nondemocratic governments. Western NGOs in attendance viewed the event as useless or 
even counterproductive for the advancement of human rights as delegates, some of whom had 
come to power in bloody coups, celebrated such figures as the Haitian dictator François “Papa 
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Doc” Duvalier as a champion of human rights.105 As Daniel Whelan has written, the delegates 
“were not interested in the Covenants, monitoring or enforcement. They were interested in the 
problems of colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination […] as far as civil and political 
rights were concerned, Teheran was nearly silent.”106 The official enemies of human rights at the 
conference were western imperialism, Israel and South Africa, not state socialism. 
In such a context, the GDR’s human rights claims stood in the majority. In the company 
of so many dictatorships claiming to be fighting the forces of imperialism and working on behalf 
of the people, SED assertions such as, “since its inception, the GDR has worked towards the 
principles and goals of the United Nations Charter and is prepared to achieve them,” actually 
reflected a more eager commitment to the international human rights system than others at the 
conference.107 While opening the conference from the largely decorative parliament in Tehran, 
the Shah provided only the most tepid endorsement of the UN’s human rights documents, saying 
“while we still revere the principles laid down in the Universal Declaration, it is nevertheless 
necessary to adjust them to the requirements of our time.”108 As a “welfare dictatorship,” the 
GDR shared many characteristics of the revolutionary and post-colonial states in attendance at 
the conference and its rhetoric was actually far more fulsome in its praise of the United Nations 
human rights norms than even at that of the host. In such an environment, it is unsurprising that 
the SED saw itself at the vanguard of the international human rights movement.109 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 92–97. 
106 Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights, 151. 
107 BArch-Lichterfelde. DY 30/ J IV 2/2/ 116. Erklärung der Regierung der DDR an die Internationale Konferenz 
über Menschenrechte vom 22. April bis 13. Mai 1968 in Teheran. 1. 
108 Quote in Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 97. 
109 On the GDR as a welfare dictatorship, see Konrad Jarausch, “Care and Coercion: the GDR as a Welfare 
Dictatorship,” In Konrad Jarausch, Dictatorship As Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR (New 
York Berghahn Books, 1999). 
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Echoes of the International Year for Human Rights, 1969-1975 
In the interval between the International Year for Human Rights in 1968 and the signing 
of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the ideas of socialist human rights and rights talk in general 
became far more prevalent in the official discourse of the GDR. While the earlier efforts of the 
Committee for the Protection of Human Rights had limited impact on the language employed in 
state propaganda, official ideology, the law, and education, the vocabulary of human rights now 
entered the mainstream. This increasing usage of the language of human rights not only reflected 
a growing interest in the idea from intellectual and political elites, but the proliferation of works 
discussing human rights also shows how the idea was disseminated to an even larger populace 
within the GDR throughout the early 1970s. 
While the original purpose of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, namely 
the campaign for imprisoned communists in West Germany, ceased to be relevant when the ban 
on the KPD was lifted in 1968, the members of the Committee sought to reform the organization 
to remain relevant to the political needs of the SED.110 Therefore Secretary Siegfried Forberger 
proposed a new set of guidelines for the Committee: the newly renamed Committee for Human 
Rights in the GDR (Komitee für Menschenrechte in der DDR) would campaign for international 
human rights, self-determination and peace against the forces of imperialism and, at the same 
time, work domestically to ensure the realization of socialist human rights at home by 
monitoring state agencies and consulting on new laws.111 Such plans for domestic action, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 The successor party to the KPD, the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP) was legally founded in West 
Germany in July 1968. 
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evidence to confirm his claims that the Committee sought a domestic prerogative in 1969. While his claims can be 
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promoted particularly by Committee Secretary Siegfried Forberger and members Hermann 
Klenner and Bernhard Graefrath, did not entail a challenge to SED authority so much as a call 
for a system run on the principle of “socialist legality” in which citizens could hold 
administrative authorities to account should they fail to follow the rules. Citizens would thus 
have the right to contest the decisions of state officials in the language of human rights not in the 
bourgeois sense of separating themselves from the state as egotistic individuals but in the spirit 
of creating a better socialist society.112  
These suggestions for a new mandate were sent to the National Committee, the 
organization that technically supervised the Committee’s activities, and from there it was passed 
on to Politburo member and chief of the Western Division of the Central Committee, Albert 
Norden. After a closed meeting of the Western Division, Norden sent word that a new 
international mandate would be approved but that the Committee would have no domestic tasks 
outside of disseminating the philosophy of socialist human rights. In addition, he demanded that 
the new organization be named instead, the GDR Committee for Human Rights. Norden 
evidently feared that the alternative grammatical arrangement could encourage outsiders to see it 
as a vehicle for citizens in East Germany demanding their human rights against the SED and that 
it could become a magnet for complaints from GDR citizens and foreigners alike.113 Given that 
in the Soviet Union, in that very same month, a group of dissidents had formed the Initiative 
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Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR, Norden’s concerns were not 
unreasonable.114 
 The mandate for GDR Committee for Human Rights outlined three major goals: in 
compliance with the socialist constitution of 1968, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Covenants of 1966, the Committee would campaign to 
“secure peace - the highest of all human rights – against imperialist aggression and intervention,” 
to fight for the “total realization of the right to self-determination” in the face of “Nazism, racism 
and neo-colonial extortion,” and to work for “international cooperation for the furthering of 
human rights.”115 One of the explicit aims was the promotion of East German membership in the 
United Nations. The means by which the Committee would accomplish these goals was first, the 
dissemination of information to West Germany and other foreign countries on “the theory and 
practice of socialist human rights in the GDR,” and second, the expression of solidarity “through 
words and actions” with the victims of imperialism and all democrats who strive for the 
realization of human rights.116  
 Without imprisoned activists in West Germany to campaign for, the GDR Committee for 
Human Rights turned to a variety of foreign causes, many of which were also the subjects of 
western human rights campaigning. The U.S. war in Vietnam continued to be a subject of 
condemnation, but in terms of American politics the primary focus in the early 1970s was the 
plight of the persecuted African-American communist activist Angela Davis. The Committee 
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regularly covered her conflicts with authorities and in 1972 wrote a letter on her behalf to the 
presiding judge at her trial, proclaiming that “Angela Davis is a symbol for that section of the 
American population which is coming out against the racist policies of the U.S. Administration 
both at home and in Vietnam out of a sense of loyalty to the principles enunciated in the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”117  
The Committee weighed in on the conflict in South Asia, condemning Pakistani efforts to 
suppress the Bangladeshi’s right to self-determination and hosted events for Egyptians 
denouncing Israel in the wake of the 1972 war.118 The Committee published small articles, some 
no more than a few sentences, in the national newspaper Neues Deutschland as well as the 
smaller regional papers in, expressing their concern, shock and outrage at incidents in Latin 
America, Greece, South East Asia and South Africa.119 One interesting omission from their 
campaigning (aside from the absence of human rights abuses in the communist world of course) 
was the Biafran Civil War, which was both the great cause célèbre of the late 1960s and early 
1970s for interventionist human rights activists in the west and an excellent example of a people 
demanding the right to self-determination.120 Soviet support for the ruling Nigerian government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 BArch-Lichterfelde DZ 7/ 27 Friedel Malter to Judge Richard E. Arnason (2 June 1972). On the GDR and 
Angela Davis see, forthcoming dissertations: Natalia King Rasmussen, "Friends of Freedom, Allies of Peace: East 
Germany and the African-American Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1989" (Boston College) and Sophie Lorenz, 
“’Peace, Friendship, Solidarity’? East Germany and Angela Davis, 1965-89” (Universität Heidelberg).  
118 For full documentation on these events and campaigns, see BArch-Lichterfelde DZ 7/ 27 Tagungen des Komitees 
1970-1973. On human rights and the Bangladeshi War of Independence, see Dirk Moses, “The United Nations, 
Humanitarianism, and Human Rights: War Crimes/Genocide Trials for Pakistani Soldiers in Bangladesh, 1971–
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Recht auf Selbstbestimmung, der biafranische Sezessionskrieg und Menschenrechte,” in Jan Eckel and Samuel 
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and its military campaign against the Biafran rebels likely determined its exclusion from the 
Committee’s agenda. 
Outside of the work of the GDR Committee for Human Rights, the language of human 
rights appeared in numerous official sources including general educational material as well. This 
not only reflected the increased priority of the concept for policy makers and represented another 
vector through which the idea was propagated and normalized for the citizens of East Germany. 
Grammar exercises dealing with proper comma usage included such subjects as the assassination 
of Martin Luther King, “a fighter for the Human Rights of the Coloured People in the USA.” In 
one eighth-grade reading comprehension exercise, students were asked about the absence of 
human rights in the United States.121 While such entries had little depth in ideological terms, they 
reinforced the larger hegemonic discourse that depicted East Germany as a paragon of human 
rights and depicted the United States as a chronic violator through its endemic racism. 
Reference material in the early 1960s had largely omitted the idea of human rights, and 
other forms of rights, or denounced the idea as mere western propaganda, but state produced 
dictionaries began to include the new party line in the late 1960s and early 1970s.122 In the 
widely distributed “Small Political Dictionary” the space devoted to the idea of rights doubled 
between the editions in 1967 and 1974.123 Although the 1965 edition of the “Philosophical 
Dictionary” did not contain an entry on human rights, the 1974 edition had an extensive five-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Quoted in John Rodden. Textbook Reds: Schoolbooks, Ideology, and Eastern German Identity (2005) Pg. 21, 27. 
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123 The 1967 edition devoted two pages to the entry on the Basic Rights and Duties of the Citizen (Grundrechte und 
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page explanation of the subject.124 The Dictionary of the Socialist State, first published in 1974, 
described the recent history of human rights as follows: 
After the Second World War – as the result of the struggle against fascism which violated 
every human right and as part of the struggle for peace – in the UN Charter declared the 
promotion and protection of human rights as the universal task in the context of peaceful 
international cooperation on the basis of the equality of all states and the non-interference 
in the inner affairs of other states.125  
 
The reference book also contained separate and cross-referenced entries on self-determination, 
the right to work, and the right to political participation. 
 This increasing usage of the language of human rights by the Committee and in education 
and reference texts extended to other organs of state. The East German courts were taking a new 
interest in the language of rights following the text of the new constitution and its Basic Rights 
sections. While this did not create a system of subjective rights that could be employed against 
the state or even used to hold state officials accountable to their rhetoric, the legal system 
increasingly did begin to use the language of human rights in cases of civil and family law. For 
example, parents who exercised their right (and duty) to work were more likely to gain custody 
of children in the case of a divorce. In contrast to West Germany where working mothers were 
severely discriminated against by the state in regards to child custody, the courts often punished 
those nonworking parents, male or female alike, by denying or significantly reducing alimony 
payments and state benefits. The basic rights of a parent could also become a mitigating factor in 
certain circumstances. In a 1971 divorce case, the decision of a mother to move to another city 
away from her child in order to attend university was not allowed by the court to prejudice her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Georg Klaus and Manfred Buhr, Philosophisches Wörterbuch. (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1965); 
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claims to custody as she was seen to be exercising her right to education. The exercise of one’s 
rights and duties was rewarded while a failure to do so could result in serious consequences.126 
State security personnel not only saw their mission as that of protecting human rights in 
broad terms, it appears as though they also had a solid grasp of the ideological terms underlying 
this new vocabulary. One report from local security agents in the town of Gera on local church 
activities related to international human rights differentiated between those who sought to 
achieve real human rights and those who were simply pawns of the imperialists in employing 
human rights for anti-communist ends.127 Similarly, in 1969, the charter of the Stasi was revised 
and now included in the responsibilities of the feared state security organization was the duty to: 
Expose, investigate and take preventative measures against crimes, especially against the 
sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, peace, humanity and human rights and against the 
German Democratic Republic itself.128 
 
While to foreign human rights activists, the Stasi and the Berlin Wall demonstrated the East 
German state’s contempt for human rights; the perspective from the other side claimed the exact 
opposite. The guards at the Berlin Wall perceived themselves to be defending the nation against 
the threat of human rights violations and the Stasi saw the prevention of crimes against human 
rights as part of their basic mandate.129  
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 The events of 1968 and the proliferation of human rights propaganda and usage by state 
organs in the years following shows that the SED, loyal intellectuals, educational officials, the 
judiciary and the security services had become comfortable with the rhetoric of human rights as 
an aspect of socialist ideology and doctrine. In particular, three general ideas appear to have sunk 
in for a majority of state and party functionaries: first, that East Germany was a champion of 
human rights as defined by the United Nations, especially in comparison to the horrors 
perpetrated by western imperialism; second, the socialist world enjoyed a kind of human rights 
that was qualitatively different and inherently superior to the human rights of the bourgeois 
world; third, the principle of human rights was inevitably interconnected with the principles of 
self-determination and non-interference with sovereign nations. 
 This internalization and assimilation of the idea of human rights across the GDR occurred 
as the SED was engaged in intensive East-West negotiations to gain international diplomatic 
recognition. Throughout those negotiations, first with West Germany over mutual recognition 
and then later in the talks over the Helsinki Accords, East German negotiators and the SED 
leadership approached the problem of human rights through the framework of their own 
ideological conceptions: they were the victors of history and, in turn, the vanguard of the human 
rights movement. They did not view the concept of human rights as an inherently liberal 
democratic set of principles and ideals that favoured the West, but rather saw themselves as the 
protagonists in the long history of human rights, finally fulfilling a thousand year struggle for the 
cause. 
Human Rights Diplomacy and the Road to Helsinki  
 In spite of the extensive campaign by the SED to use the UN’s International Year for 
Human Rights to promote its position in the nonaligned world, these efforts yielded limited 
diplomatic results in the short-term. In 1969, Cambodia, Iraq, Sudan, Egypt and South Yemen all 
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officially recognized East Germany, but this came from East German promises of extensive loan 
guarantees rather than simply a sense of ideological solidarity. This small wave of diplomatic 
exchange did not result in the total normalization of East Germany in the international 
community as evidence by a vote at UN in the same year on whether to admit the GDR as a 
member of the World Health Organization (WHO). Only nineteen countries supported its entry 
with fifty-nine opposing and twenty-seven abstentions.130 The refusal of the Cambodian 
government, however, to back down from its decision to recognize the GDR in the face of West 
German warnings of diplomatic and economic consequences heralded the end of the Federal 
Republic’s Hallstein Doctrine that threatened retaliation against developing states for 
recognizing the GDR.  
 In the years following, the SED moved away from its efforts to gain recognition from 
nonaligned states as a means of bringing pressure on the west, to a strategy of engagement and 
negotiation with West Germany. The SED sought nothing less than full membership in the 
international community as a universally recognized and legitimate independent state, but 
without a resolution of German-German tensions, the UN Security Council would block the 
entry of both the GDR and the FRG into the United Nations. While in 1968, human rights was 
used as a means of normalizing the GDR in the eyes of the post-colonialist Afro-Asian Bloc, in 
the 1970s, the language of human rights became a standard element of treaties, covenants and 
accords, the signing of which would grant the SED the international respectability it demanded. 
Just as the SED had so thoroughly embraced the UN Human Rights Covenants, in the diplomatic 
lead up to the Helsinki Accords of 1975, such provisions, so long as they were connected to the 
UN human rights system, were treated as normal and non-threatening to SED interests. 
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 The shift in German-German relations did not stem primarily from East Berlin but from 
the 1969 elections in West Germany that brought an end of the Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU 
and the SPD, and ushered in the first Social Democratic-led coalition of the postwar led by 
Chancellor Willy Brandt. While Brandt had begun work on a more conciliatory policy towards 
the GDR (what would become the Neue Ostpolitik) as foreign minister during the Grand 
Coalition of 1966-1969, as Chancellor, he strengthened this move towards engagement with the 
East and “change through rapprochement” (Wandel durch Annäherung).131 This shift put 
Ulbricht in a difficult position as his plans for an aggressive Westpolitik hinged on convincing 
West Germans that the SED was the true ally of the working classes in comparison to FRG that 
was supposedly a hive of neo-Nazis, militarists and reactionaries. Willy Brandt’s background as 
a long time socialist and member of the anti-Nazi resistance during the Second World War 
provided unimpeachable anti-fascist credentials and his new assuaging stance made it near 
impossible to claim that he was a leader in line with Hitler or even hard-line CDU Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer. As Ulbricht complained to a Soviet representative, the conservatives in West 
Germany “have a long-term military concept, but the social democratic ministers believe that 
they can occupy the GDR even without war.”132  
 From 1969 until his dismissal in 1971, Ulbricht’s position within the SED gradually 
disintegrated due to internal and external forces. In 1970, Brandt’s new diplomatic posture paid 
dividends with the signing of treaties between West Germany and the Soviet Union and another 	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with Poland. While East Berlin sought to prevent the signing of the so-called Eastern Treaties 
(Ostverträge) unless they were preconditioned on West German recognition of the GDR, 
Moscow overruled their request.133 In 1971, Ulbricht’s key lieutenant Erich Honecker moved 
against his long time patron, and with the support of the Soviets, replaced him as General 
Secretary of the SED. With Honecker’s takeover, East German foreign policy shifted from 
Ulbricht’s offensive posture to a new position of “defensive pragmatism”.134  
Along with the general reorientation of foreign policy under Honecker, the international 
politics of human rights shifted from courting international opinion in the nonaligned world to a 
human rights politics of engagement with the Federal Republic of Germany and the west in 
general. Without the support of the Soviet Union for an offensive against the west or even the 
diplomatic leverage that dealings with the USSR would be contingent on recognition of the GDR, 
the SED had to fall back to more modest plans to defend against the insidious force of Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik. In 1971, the new leadership laid out three primary foreign policy goals: first, the 
normalization of relations with the west and primarily West Germany; second, the admission of 
the two German states into the United Nations; third, the active participation in the creation of a 
European peace and security treaty. 135 Each of these steps would require significant public 
commitments to the principles of human rights by the SED, and in every case, the senior 
leadership continued to tout its commitment to the idea of human rights as expounded by the 
United Nations and in key UN documents. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Hermann Wentker,“Pursuing Specific Interests Within the Warsaw Pact: The German Democratic Republic and 
the CSCE-Process,” in Carla Meneguzzi Rostagni, The Helsinki Process: A Historical Reappraisal (Padova: 
CEDAM, 2005), 47. 
134 Oliver Bange, “The GDR in the era of Détente: Conflicting Perceptions and Strategies, 1965-1975,” in Villaume 
and Westad, Perforating the Iron Curtain, 67–70. 
135 Federica Caciagli, “The GDR's Targets in the Early CSCE Process: Another Missed Opportunity to Freeze the 
Division of Germany, 1969-73,” in Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nünlist, and Andreas Wenger, Origins of the 
European Security System : The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75 (London: Routledge, 2008), 112. 
	  	   171	  
 After years of intransigence failing to produce results, the more flexible and conciliatory 
approach yielded positive results for both Bonn and East Berlin in the early 1970s. In early 1972, 
East and West Germany signed the Transit Treaty normalizing traffic between the two countries 
and allowing greater access to West Berlin in particular in exchange for increased loans and 
direct payments by the GDR. In December 1972, the greatest breakthrough came with the 
signing of the Basic Treaty – at a signing ceremony in East Berlin, West Germany officially 
recognized the GDR as a separate and sovereign state.136 This mutual recognition agreement 
cleared the final barriers on the path to membership at the United Nations, as both the USA and 
the Soviet Union had demanded such an agreement before moving forward. With the Basic 
Treaty in place, East and West Germany thus joined the UN as full members on September 18th, 
1973. This normalization of relations with the Federal Republic and entry into the international 
community resulted in a wave of diplomatic recognition across the world. Twenty new states 
chose to recognize East Germany immediately following the conclusion of the Basic Treaty with 
another 13, including NATO members Italy and the Netherlands, in early 1973. In 1974, even 
the United States recognized East German independence and sovereignty.137 
 This round of treaties and the entry into the United Nations was contingent on the GDR 
reaffirming its commitment to human rights. Although West German negotiators aimed to 
prominently include the problem of human rights in the Basic Treaty, the concept was only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 While this represented a formal recognition of East Germany for the purposes of diplomacy, the SPD and its 
coalition partner, the liberal FDP, made it clear at home that this in no way represented a moral or political 
recognition of the GDR. Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: 
Random House, 1994). 
137 Heinrich August Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West: Volume 2: 1933-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 286–87. 
	  	   172	  
mentioned once in the final text.138 Article 2 of the Treaty stated that both East and West 
Germany would,  
Be guided by the aims and principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, especially those of 
the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial 
integrity, the right of self-determination, the protection of human rights, and non-
discrimination.139 
 
The use of the language of human rights in the treaty suggested an interpretation of the term 
more in keeping with the SED’s conception of human rights as an elemental aspect of state 
sovereignty instead of any kind of super-national recognition of the individual. West German 
delegates placed top priority on the problem of family reunification, which many deemed a 
human rights issue, but this problem was dealt with primarily through private negotiations rather 
than public diplomacy.140 The mention of human rights served as a mutual signal of respect for 
the norms of the international community and symbolic recognition human rights as norms of 
international relations with neither side expecting or demanding practical consequences for the 
domestic political order of either state. 
 Upon becoming a member of the United Nations the SED held to their commitment in 
1968 that they would sign on to International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.141 The East German commitment to 
the Covenants did not, however, include signing either the optional "state grievance" article of 
the Covenants nor its Facultative Protocol that would allow the UN Human Rights Commission 
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to consider charges brought forward by other states.142 Having previously subjected the texts of 
the Covenants to such heavy scrutiny in 1967-1968, the decision to sign on to them in 1973 was 
uncontroversial within the SED bureaucracy. East Germany had moved from a symbolic 
affirmation of human rights to a legal commitment without significant internal controversy. 
Having finally joined the United Nations, the SED did not let up on its human rights 
propaganda, as one would expect if it had just been nothing more than a cynical ploy to gain 
recognition. In a speech to commemorate the 25th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1973, Gerald Götting, now President of the East German Parliament, the 
Volkskammer, declared, 
The German Democratic Republic is prepared to work together with the member states of the 
United Nation in [the area of human rights] on the basis of respect for the principles of self-
determination and non-interference. We hold it to be invalid, however, under the pretext of 
allegedly defending human rights, all attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of the GDR and 
other socialist countries.143 
According to Götting, it was up to individual states to determine how they would implement and 
enforce human rights and in a world with differing socio-economic orders and any other system 
would be unthinkable. In 1974, the charter of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights was 
revised once again, to change its duties from helping East Germany become a member of the UN, 
to representing the GDR at appropriate UN human rights bodies.144 In the press, numerous 
stories ran with SED officials proudly expounding on the strengthened position of the GDR in 
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the fight for, “peace, international security, the defense of human rights and the abolition of 
colonialism,” through its new membership in the United Nations.145 
The reaction of the population to the treaties and the GDR’s entry into the UN was more 
confrontational than the demands made during the constitutional Volksaussprache and 
applications to emigrate or to travel outside the GDR spiked after each event.146 These 
applications first jumped in 1972 following the conclusion of the Transit Treaty but the vast 
majority were rejected.147 When the GDR became a member of the United Nations the next year, 
and thus a signatory to the Human Rights Conventions of 1966, the number of applications for 
exit visas once again shot upwards, with a growing number citing the Accords’ human rights 
provisions or threatening to appeal to the UN’s Human Rights Commission. Applications that 
invoked international human rights norms came from citizens who had previously been rejected, 
sometimes repeatedly. The more worrying aspect of the applications for SED bureaucrats was 
not their appeal to human rights norms but the threats to take illegal action. Frustration with 
official intransigence ran so high that 15 percent of applicants in 1973 actually told state 
authorities that if they were not issued an exit-visa they would be forced to depart the GDR 
illegally.148 Although the sharp rise in applications concerned SED officials, no reports saw the 
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human rights claims as legitimate and there was no discussion of limiting diplomatic options in 
order to prevent further demands for emigration.149 
Human Rights and the Helsinki Negotiations 
 The main priority for the GDR delegation at the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) in negotiations over what would become the Helsinki Accords, was 
gaining the international recognition of East German sovereignty, particularly from the West 
German delegation. Such a recognition of sovereignty required an agreement that would 
guarantee the status quo in terms of the existing borders and include provisions that would allow 
the GDR to control the cross-border traffic of people, goods and information. In pursuing these 
goals, the GDR delegation was not always following the Soviet delegation, but the East German 
remained throughout the negotiations wholly dependent on the support of the Soviets. All 
directives for the East German delegations and their assessments of the negotiations “were the 
result of previous consultations between the Soviet and the East German chief delegate.”150 
While some of the western delegations were set on using the language of human rights to 
undermine the socialist bloc countries, the SED did not see the inclusion of human rights 
language, under the right circumstances, as a threat to its position or goals.151 In issuing 
directives to the East German delegates, the SED leadership was cautious to avoid an agreement 
that enshrined a “bourgeois” conception of human rights, but they did accept including 
references to United Nations human rights norms. The earliest Politburo directive to the 
negotiators that explicitly mentions the problem of human rights in 1973 sought to avoid the 
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inclusion of human rights in the Basket I152, Statement of Principles section, but told the 
delegates that “a reference to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the various 
states, separate from the Statement of Principles is possible.”153 While they opposed a Vatican 
proposal to include a section on human rights and “freedom of opinion, conscience and belief,” 
they did authorize the negotiators to include language “in accordance with the draft of the UN 
Declaration on Religious Tolerance and the ‘freedom of the believers.”154 
The directives from the next year followed a similar line of argument: mentioning human 
rights in accordance with UN documents already agreed to by the GDR was acceptable, but not 
human rights language proposed by the west. A Politburo directive from 15 January 1974 laid 
out the general strategy for the negotiating team: 
With respect to the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, continue to 
adhere to the narrow formulation of the Soviet draft General Declaration. If the western states 
make their agreement on the general declaration dependent on the inclusion in the Statement of 
Principles a section on individual rights and freedoms, we could agree to a general mention of the 
UN Conventions on the Civil and Political Rights and on the Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. 
The GDR already belongs to the two conventions.155 
 
Another directive from April of that same year reiterated concerns over human rights statements 
proposed by the west regarding religious freedom but specified that “a reference to the UN 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, to which 
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the GDR belongs, in connection with this principle is possible.”156 Human rights were a potential 
threat if misused by western negotiators, but if human rights provisions were limited to the 
inclusion of existing United Nations Covenants and principles, the SED would be safe from 
harm. 
The main concern of the SED delegation was not the reference to human rights, even if 
they did see certain human rights proposals as a possible trap, but rather the Basket III sections 
on the increased flow of information and people across borders. While the Basket III provisions 
are often referred to as “human rights provisions,” they are not referred to as such in the text of 
the Helsinki Accords and the SED viewed the matters as separate.157 Siegfried Bock, the chief 
East German negotiator, reported in 1973 that the western states were trying to undermine the 
SED’s authority. “According to the west's assumption, the socialist states have to pay the ‘price’ 
of so-called ‘human relief’ in return for a multilateral recognition of frontiers.”158 Human rights 
and the Basket III provisions for reuniting families and allowing greater ease of travel and 
communication were not viewed as the same point of contention by the negotiating team or the 
Politburo. 
 In the context of the SED’s previous commitments, the human rights references in the 
Helsinki Accords appeared to be a familiar re-tread of past statements and treaty obligations. The 
final version of the text included a very explicit guarantee of international human rights norms 
through “Principle VII Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the 	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freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief” which held that the signatories would “act in 
conformity with” the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration and the UN Human Rights 
Covenants. Reinforcing the seeming safety of the treaty was the location of the human rights 
provisions in the Declaration on Principles. The section on human rights was sandwiched 
between “Principle VI Non-intervention in internal affairs” and “Principle VIII Equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples” both of which contained prohibitions on interference in domestic 
affairs of the signatories. The text of Principle VIII guaranteed: “By virtue of the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, 
to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external 
interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural 
development.” When read in the context of the previous decade of human rights activity by the 
SED, the text of the Helsinki Accords appears to include distinct protections against outside 
interference in internal affairs, in keeping with the principles of self-determination, and these 
appear to be linked rather closely to the provisions on human rights.159 
 Outside of the textual evidence, the broader context of the negotiations reinforced the 
interpretation of the SED leadership. The Soviet delegation firmly believed that the western 
participants would respect the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Soviet leader 
Leonid Brezhnev was convinced by assurances from US President Richard Nixon and Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger that the agreement would not be used to foment domestic dissent and 
discord.160 Transcripts of conversations between Brezhnev and Honecker from this era show that 
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the human rights aspects of the Helsinki negotiations were not a major concern and that both 
thought the agreement would strengthen East German sovereignty.161 The belief of Erich 
Honecker and others within the SED leadership that human rights and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of sovereign states were compatible and that the GDR could plausibly assert a 
claim to international respectability in the field of human rights, cannot be reduced to mere self-
serving delusion. 
 While the SED was confident of its human rights message finding a sympathetic 
audience in this era, high-level West German politicians in this period also saw the field of 
human rights as one that was stacked against their efforts to delegitimize the GDR. In 1968, the 
West German Minister of Justice Gustav Heinemann cautioned against strong interventionist 
rhetoric by the Federal Republic during the International Year for Human Rights on the grounds 
that “politics today always stem from the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other 
states.”162 In the lead-up to Helsinki in the early 1970s, some West German political analysts 
actually saw the GDR as holding a superior position on the matter of human rights in the 
international arena. As one report from the Christian Socialist Union party lamented,  
With the change in majorities in the bodies of world organizations - particularly in the [UN] 
General Assembly - the socialist states have recognized the possibility of politicization of human 
rights, and the free world has almost cleared off the field without a fight: the US by its human 
rights abstinence, the Western European countries by their regionalism. Above all, the GDR has 
incorporated from the beginning and with great aggressiveness its concept of human rights in its 
foreign policy.163  	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Years later, one CDU politician recalled, “we saw things exactly as the Soviet Union did. Neither 
of us believed it [Basket III and human rights provisions] would lead anywhere.”164 If many in 
the SED leadership were fooled into thinking they were on safe ground in asserting the GDR’s 
right to non-interference from the west in the name of human rights, there were also many in 
West Germany who feared that they were correct. 
 Although the text explicitly referencing human rights could be reconciled with socialist 
ideology, the sections from Basket III of the treaty on the free flow of information and people 
across borders caused the real reservations from high-ranking SED members. Minister of 
Ideology Kurt Hager, Secretary for Security Paul Verner and Stasi chief Erich Mielke all voiced 
serious concerns that the Basket II provisions of the CSCE would open the door to further 
avenues for West German infiltration and propaganda. Not only would the SED face the constant 
stream of western television and radio in homes across the GDR, but citizens would now have 
increased individual contacts with West Germans and others from the west who could act as 
provocateurs or agents for foreign intelligence.165  
 In the end, Erich Honecker decided to endorse the Helsinki Accords, judging the risks to 
be acceptable given the stakes. Pressure from the USSR to accept the text was enormous and 
publicly rebuking the GDR’s Soviet allies would have been a drastic and dangerous move. 
Beyond this, however, Honecker thought that the propaganda effects of a major foreign policy 
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success and international recognition of him personally as a head of state equal to those in the 
west was worth the risk of western infiltration.166 As he told Brezhnev before the conclusions of 
the Final Act, should the West illegally overstep the bounds of the treaty, “there had always been 
the Staatssicherheit [Stasi], and it is still in existence.”167 Just as Honecker hoped, his signature 
cemented the GDR’s place in the international community and reaffirmed West German 
recognition of its sovereignty. By 1978, it was recognized formally by 123 countries.168 
In official post-mortem analysis of the negotiations by SED officials in 1975, the subject 
of human rights was described as an area of compromise in which the socialist bloc had carefully 
out-negotiated the west. A follow-up report to the SED’s Central Committee called the human 
rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords a concession, but declared that the negotiators had 
“foiled” efforts to prioritize “bourgeois” freedoms through the emphasis on self-determination 
and cooperation. Negotiators had formulated the section on human rights so that “the western 
states have no basis for the interference or defamation of the internal order of the socialist 
countries.”169 The SED believed that they had signed a document that would uphold their 
sovereignty and a socialist vision of human rights instead of any kind of concession to the 
principles of liberal democracy.170 
 When Eastern Bloc states were confronted with accusations from the west and their own 
populations that they were violating human rights commitments as described by Principle 7 of 	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the Helsinki Accords, communist leaders sought to defuse these attacks by pointing the 
commitment to non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign nations in Principle 6. While 
western signatories viewed Principle 6 as a Soviet commitment to renounce the interventionist 
Brezhnev Doctrine – the idea that the USSR would forcibly intervene to prevent a socialist 
nation from becoming capitalist – the Eastern Bloc leaders instead saw it as the ultimate trump 
card against all charges of human rights violations. As Sarah Snyder has noted, in the years 
following Helsinki, “their argument, however, was never given serious credence 
internationally.”171 While this is correct in the post-Helsinki period, prior to 1975, such an 
assertion of the inviolability of state sovereignty in the name of human rights was common 
currency in international diplomacy and was actually a crucial component of the dominant post-
colonial discourse of human rights. 
From the perspective of the SED, the human rights elements in the final text of Helsinki 
Accords were not a liability. Official East German doctrine on human rights, as first formulated 
by Hermann Klenner and disseminated through the International Year for Human Rights, held 
that the GDR was a sovereign state based on the principles of self-determination and, thus, all 
efforts to interfere in its internal affairs would be a violation of international law and the 
principles of human rights as promoted by the United Nations. This conception of human rights 
allowed them to see the Helsinki Final Act as a compromise between ideological systems, but 
one that included sufficient safeguards against a one-sided interpretation by the west to protect 
them from significant diplomatic consequences. Accepting human rights provisions was not the 
product of coercion, bullying or desperation on the part of the GDR but rather the continuation of 
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the intellectual and political trajectory that the SED had been on since the mid-1960s if not 
earlier. 
Conclusion  
Inspired by the dominant anti-colonialist discourses of human rights in the 1960s, the 
SED’s conception of human rights was inexorably interconnected to specific ideas about self-
determination, sovereignty and non-interference. Hermann Klenner’s innovative conception of a 
specifically socialist human rights was not simply cynically deployed for diplomatic purposes – 
even if it did baldy promote SED interests - but was also internalized by SED officials at all 
levels as the result of the International Year for Human Rights in 1968. The negotiations over the 
Helsinki Accords were conducted in this spirit as SED representatives and leaders believed that a 
balanced agreement that included “socialist” human rights concepts including the principles of 
self-determination would inoculate them against foreign meddling and would finally cement 
their claims to sovereignty. Such expectations of immunity from outside criticism would be 
dashed as the voices of the international human rights discourse shifted radically in the 1970s.172 
Where the anti-imperialism of the Afro-Asian bloc was once dominant a new emphasis 
developed on individual rights over the rights of peoples, participatory democracy over 
developmental dictatorships and anti-communism over anti-colonialism.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 On the global shift in human rights discourse in the 1970s, see Eckel and Moyn, The Breakthrough; Iriye, 
Goedde, and Hitchcock, The Human Rights Revolution; Moyn, Last Utopia. 
	  	   184	  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4:  
The Beginnings of Human Rights for Protest – Volksaussprache 1968 
 
Political ideas, even theoretically self-conscious ones, do not just have 
implications that flow from them with the frictionless ease of a mathematical 
deduction, assuming that to be the case. Their meaning, as ideas, has everything 
to do with the context of their provenance and reception, and the friction they 
encounter in their engagement with reality.1 
 
 
 The popular “Helsinki Effect” narrative from above - in which the SED naively agreed to 
human rights provisions thus ensuring its doom - is mirrored by the image of those living under 
socialism automatically responding to international human rights treaties with demands for 
liberalization and democratization. While the previous chapter showed that the subjective 
conceptions of human rights held by the SED complicate this narrative on the international level, 
the examination of how East Germans used language of human rights similarly adds nuance to 
the picture from the ground up. Human rights dissent, like the appropriation of the discourse by 
the SED, originated prior to the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and East Germans initially avoided 
connecting the problems of political power and dictatorship to the idea of human rights. Human 
rights dissent followed a similar path to that of the SED cooptation of the discourse, beginning 
with the appropriation of key words and slogans and attaching them to existing claims before 
developing a more complex and integrated conception of human rights.  
GDR citizens first began to employ the language of human rights to contest state policy 
in 1968 in response to the SED’s propaganda on International Human Rights Year and the mass 
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consultation process, the Volksaussprache, leading up to the plebiscite on the new socialist 
constitution. This public discussion was designed to educate the population on the meaning of 
the new constitution and ensure near universal turn out to approve it in order to demonstrate the 
unity of the socialist state. Thousands of East Germans, in particular Christians who saw their 
existing religious rights threatened by the new constitution, took the opportunity to provide 
genuine feedback rather than simply parroting back their support for the reforms. While 
dissidents in the Soviet Union in the late 1960s used the tactic of interpreting socialist law 
literally in ways that contradicted the intentions of the state, in 1968 East Germans sought to use 
human rights to influence the character and content of the basic law of the nation as a means of 
effecting change.2 Although the Volksaussprache was not a free and open exchange of ideas 
within a democratic public sphere, the process provided a crucial venue for East Germans to 
contest state policy using the language of human rights. It functioned as a guided process of 
affirmation, led by the SED, with the participation of the people to serve educational and 
unifying ends rather than to solicit actual criticism. In spite of these goals, East Germans acted 
within the formal parameters of the process while also advancing their own personal and 
communal interests in the language of human rights. 
Discourse, Social Construction and Performance in Dictatorship and Human Rights 
 Scholarship on dictatorships, communism and human rights shares a love of false 
binaries: victims against collaborators, a life of truth against a life of lies, fixed eternal concepts 
against cultural relativism. The nature of the Volksaussprache as an event and the responses of 
the East German citizenry complicate many of the simplistic narratives about human rights and 
the GDR as a dictatorship. The choice for East Germans was more than just loyalty or resistance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 On this strategy in the USSR see Benjamin Nathans, “The Dictatorship of Reason: Aleksandr Vol’Pin and the Idea 
of Rights Under ‘Developed Socialism’,” Slavic Review 66:4 (1 Dec 2007): 630–663. 
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and there existed many opportunities for partial acceptance and participation within the system in 
order to effect small changes and reforms at the margins. Similarly, GDR citizens could make 
human rights demands without contesting the logic of the SED discourse or immediately 
embracing liberal democracy in full.  
Scholarship on dissent in the GDR has moved away from totalitarian models of studying 
only the means of state rule, the niches of authenticity, which the people managed to eke out, and 
the sites of conflict between the authentic realm of resistance and the oppressive forces of the 
state.3 Recent work now includes the examination of the broad range of means and discourses 
used by East Germans to contest and oppose state policy from the perspective of everyday 
activities and not just extraordinary illegal behaviour.4 In terms of categorizing dissent as 
practiced by East Germans in the language of human rights, this chapter borrows from the 
historian and former dissident Ehrhart Neubert who delineates three separate types of 
oppositional behaviour in East Germany: protest, challenging specific policies and actions 
without broad attacks on the system as a whole; resistance, the conscious use of illegal activity to 
oppose SED rule; opposition, the organization of groups to provide alternatives to the existing 
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state socialist system.5 Although human rights activism is associated with resistance and 
opposition, in the case of the GDR, there was a gradual evolution and escalation in the use of 
human rights by East Germans. In 1968, human rights were used to protest changes to the 
constitution but those resisting did not use the language of human rights. Rather than challenge 
the legitimacy of the SED in its entirety, East Germans initially opted to work within the 
discursive framing of the state discourse of human rights when demanding greater rights and 
freedoms.  
The “failure” to resist did not imply however imply widespread loyalty to the state and 
the replication of SED discourses should not be interpreted as evidence that East Germans 
wholly supported such ideas. Such behaviour follows James Scott’s observation that “the appeal 
to would-be hegemonic values sacrifices very little in the way of flexibility given how malleable 
the terms are and has the added advantage of appearing to disavow the most threatening goals. 
For anything less than completely revolutionary ends the terrain of dominant discourse is the 
only plausible arena of struggle.”6 In the case of the GDR specifically, the sociologist Jeremy 
Straughn has described such a strategy as “consentful contestation” where, criticism of the SED 	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was connected with the heartfelt affirmation of the broad goals of the state and of socialism and 
critiques posed only for the benefit of the community as a whole. Not only were state goals 
endorsed by East Germans, but citizens also adopted and co-opted the discourse of the SED in 
order to promote their specific claims.7 As Alexei Yurchak has argued, however, such 
performances of loyalty are not reducible to cynical manipulations of the system by canny 
citizens hiding a pure “authentic” self behind a mask of compliance. The constative meaning of a 
statement and the act of its performance “are not in a binary either-or relationship; rather they are 
indivisible and mutually productive.”8 The social performance of citizenship and the invocation 
of state human rights discourse for change thus fall into a grey area between dissent and loyalty. 
Similarly, human rights protest and opposition is closely linked with the mass protests of 
1989, but it began much more modestly and packaged in the officially approved forms and 
formats of civic engagement as defined by the SED state. Public demands for human rights were 
almost always highly critical of state socialism, but private communication between citizens and 
the state through the Volksaussprache, and the official petition (Eingaben) system, shows a far 
less radical and much more accommodating picture of human rights discourse. In most cases, 
East Germans sought to use human rights to advance their claims but they did so cautiously and 
challenged the SED from a position of supposed loyalty. The language of human rights was not 
deemed self-evidently contrary to state socialism or to continued SED rule and human rights 
rhetoric did not automatically translate into revolutionary ideas or ideals. 
 Rather than treating human rights as fixed liberal democratic norms that could self-
evidently be used to demand an end to dictatorship, this chapter will examine the beginnings of 	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Republic,” American Journal of Sociology 110, no. 6 (May 2005): 1598–1650. 
8 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton: 
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human rights as a dynamic discourse in the GDR. This will be done through the theoretical and 
methodological framework of recent anthropological scholarship on the dissemination of human 
rights, which defines this discourse as “well beyond language to include the full range of social 
knowledge regimes through which human rights emerge in social practice.” Human rights norms 
are thus understood as “the means through which the idea of human rights becomes discursive, 
the process that renders human rights into social knowledge that shapes social action.”9  
 In charting this process, the idea of “vernacularization” of human rights as developed by 
Sally Engle Merry provides a useful set of conceptual tools. According to Merry, the adoption of 
global human rights language - as found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international treaties and documents - at the local level comes about through a process of 
translating these terms into a vernacular that is both linguistically and culturally resonant. Rather 
than examining international diplomacy alone to understand local effects, her work suggests a 
focus on the middle: those acting as transmitters and translators between the global and the local. 
Such translations place human rights in broader “frames” of interpretative meaning that can 
produce a social movement if the framing is resonant with a community. The reproduction of 
human rights language in the vernacular can range from a “replication” of terminology applied 
superficially to existing grievances and concerns or develop to a complex “hybridity” that deeply 
interconnects international human rights ideas with local cultural norms.  In examining the 
vernacularization process, Merry also distinguishes between the instrumental usage of human 
rights and a “shift in subjectivity” through which human rights ideas are internalized as values.10 
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 From this theoretical framework, the first forays into human rights politics by GDR 
citizens represent a form of replication and instrumentalization within a narrow field of issues. 
East Germans worked to simultaneously vernacularize both international human rights treaties 
and the discourse of the state in a way so as to triangulate demands for greater freedoms at a 
minimum of risk. The more resonant their message was with the existing state supported 
discourse of socialist human rights, the more legitimacy their claims would have from the 
perspective of the state, yet such resonance came at the cost of affirming SED rule in general. 
When East German citizens sought to use the language of human rights to make claims, they did 
not do so in the vocabulary of liberal democratic individualism and autonomy, but rather through 
the re-appropriation of the discourse of socialist human rights as developed and employed by the 
SED since 1946. They accepted the “framing” of human rights as presented by the SED and 
worked to challenge the state from within this logical structure rather than trying to bring down 
the entire system. 
The Volksaussprache, 1968 
 In the late 1960s, the SED sought to replace the original 1949 GDR Constitution, and its 
tributes to German unity and bourgeois political structures, with a “Socialist Constitution” that 
would properly confirm and legitimize its rule. For SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht, the 
reforms of 1968 would demonstrate that the GDR was continuing to advance through the stages 
of historical development towards pure communism as prescribed by Marxism-Leninism – in 
1949, East Germany was founded as anti-fascist state, in 1952, the SED had begun the 
“construction of socialism” and now the GDR would finally become a real “socialist people’s 
	  	   191	  
community.”11  Article 1 of the new constitution explicitly authorized the SED’s political 
monopoly on power stating: 
The German Democratic Republic is a socialist state of the German nation. It is the political 
organization of the working population in town and country, who are jointly realizing 
socialism under the leadership of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party.12 
 
As to how the SED would wield this power, Article 47 declared the Leninist concept of 
“Democratic Centralism” as a bedrock principle in the realization of the sovereignty of the 
people. In terms of foreign relations, the preamble denounced both “imperialism under the 
leadership of the United States” and “West German monopoly capitalism” for the division of 
Germany and Article 6 pledged the GDR to foster cooperation and friendship with the Soviet 
Union through “socialist internationalism.”13 
The rest of the document outlined the basic rights, and now correlating duties, of the East 
German citizen in line with socialist human rights theory. Several articles from the old 
constitution were now deemed superfluous due to the triumph of socialism and end of class 
conflict. These included popular sections such as the right to strike, which were excised entirely, 
and religious rights, which shrank from eight articles to only one in the new draft constitution. 
While the 1949 Constitution was written so as to plausibly form the basis for a united Germany, 
the 1968 version was specifically designed for the realities of the GDR. Whereas the old text 
referred to Berlin as the capital city of the “Republic”, according to the new version, “The capital 
of the German Democratic Republic is Berlin.” Similarly, generalized provisions on protections 
of minorities were replaced by an article on the protection of the Sorbian minority population 
that resided almost exclusively in the East. The new constitution would provide a legal and 	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symbolic foundation to complete the ideological metamorphosis from the early anti-fascist 
foundation that aspired to realize unification, to the socialist GDR that existed as an independent 
state separate and inherently different from the Federal Republic in the west. 
The SED ensured that participation by East Germans in the process, willing or no, was 
near universal. Between February 2 and the vote on 6 April 1968 nearly a million events and 
meetings were held throughout the GDR to discuss the contents of the proposed constitution.14 
Most of these were small discussion in factories, workplaces and homes and, if state statistics are 
to be believed, many people attended multiple events in different venues. SED officials from all 
branches of the government fanned out across the country to explain the constitution and counter 
any questions or critiques raised by citizens. Not only did the SED leadership go to the people, 
East Germans actively sought to influence the contents of the constitution independently of 
official functions. Over the course of the Volksaussprache, the constitutional commission 
received more than 12,000 letters and post cards from East Germans, expressing their support, 
concerns and criticisms. Not all of these events or letters contained criticism of the constitution 
but were rather perfomative demonstrations of loyalty and good citizenship. Many factories and 
working groups used the Volksaussprache as an opportunity to declare their total support of the 
SED and full agreement with the new constitution.  
Not everyone in the GDR, however, was willing to stick to the script provided by the 
SED. While the Volksaussprache was intended to educate the people about the contents of the 
Constitution and to secure their support through propaganda and, when necessary, coercion, 
many citizens pushed back against the SED’s conceptions of basic rights and the meaning of 
citizenship under socialism. These responses ranged from the very small minority who outright 	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refused to validate SED rule through participation in the process and encouraged others to do the 
same, to those citizens who genuinely sought to improve the GDR through their criticism. In 
between these two poles lay ambiguous groups of thousands who demanded change and 
rhetorically claimed to have the best interests of the state and all of society at heart. It is in this 
group of GDR citizens where we first see the mass employment of the language of human rights 
to challenge the SED. This was not a revolutionary movement of dissidents but instead a diverse 
group spread across the GDR that had reached the limits of working within the system to achieve 
its goals. For this group, the language of human rights provided a new means of making claims 
against the state when other options no longer appeared feasible or effective.  
While the Volksaussprache represented the beginnings of human rights activism in East 
Germany, it should not be seen as a parallel to the Prague Spring or an event that undermined the 
SED’s authority or power. Instead, the process represented both SED formalizing its political 
monopoly on power while at the same time engaging with the East German population and 
encouraging their participation in formal politics on a massive scale. The vast majority of East 
Germans used human rights as a means of protest rather than resistance in that they remained 
within the legal boundaries of participation as defined by the SED. From the perspective of the 
state, the complaints and demands of the people, expressed through the appropriate state-crafted 
channels, were integral to the SED’s project of legitimization. The letters submitted by citizens 
critiquing the constitution were even used by SED officials to show the international community 
that the Volksaussprache was a triumph of socialist democracy and that the adoption of the new 
constitution represented the purest form of self-determination.15 The outcomes of the 
Volksaussprache were distinctly ambiguous as the citizens were able to collectively demand 	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change with an unusual degree of freedom but the SED was able to use the results of this 
collective action as proof of its own legitimacy. 
Human Rights and the 1968 Constitution 
 The first person to connect the language of human rights to the new Constitution was not 
a protesting citizen but rather SED General Secretary and Chair of the State Council Walter 
Ulbricht. In his New Year’s Address, broadcast on the radio and television, and published on the 
front page of the national newspaper Neues Deutschland on January 1, 1968, he proclaimed: 
The United Nations has declared the year 1968 to be the “International Year for Human Rights.” 
Our new socialist and humanistic constitution, which is based on respect for human rights and 
that highest of human rights, the right to peace, which will be the concern of our whole society, is 
also a fine contribution of the German Democratic Republic to the objective of this “International 
Year.”16 
The language of human rights was closely linked to both the constitutional reform process and 
particularly the creation of a new criminal code in the state media. In addition to Ulbricht’s 
speech, in January 1968 alone, there were thirty-two articles mentioning human rights in Neues 
Deutschland: one more connecting human rights to the constitution sixteen explicitly linking 
international human rights to the new criminal code and twelve articles on human rights 
violations in the capitalist world including in West Germany, the United States, Greece and 
South Korea. According to SED media, in the socialist camp human rights was an essential 
aspect of society while in the capitalist world, empty rhetoric was matched by state brutality 
against democratic activists and peaceful protestors. 
 In the media blitz leading up to the Volksaussprache, the state press linked human rights 
both the rights of the citizen under socialism and also to the realization of East German 
sovereignty. One article on the Constitution argued that while human rights could not be 
achieved under the “dictatorship of the monopolies” in West Germany, in the GDR where 	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“human rights are the law,” a true harmony in society was possible. In such a system, East 
German citizens experienced the “fundamental rights of citizens, such as the right to work, the 
right to education, the equality of men and women, not just promises on paper.”17 The human 
rights achieved in East Germany were, however, only possible due to GDR sovereignty, the 
affirmation of which was central to the SED’s message. According to one article on the new 
criminal code, in contrast to West Germany where the state was implementing emergency laws 
to maintain order, “law and legality was rooted in socialist democracy,” where “our laws clearly 
define offences against sovereignty and human rights as among the most serious crimes.”18  
According to this propaganda, the constitution and the criminal code were solidifying and 
strengthening the existing human rights regime of East Germany and would further this cause on 
the international stage through the assertion of state sovereignty. 
  Such proclamations on international human rights were vague as to the exact contents of 
international human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
or the two UN Human Rights Covenants (1966). In 1968, West German media and activism was 
not yet a reliable source for detailed information on human rights in the GDR. Although anti-
communist groups and the West German Ministry for All-German Affairs denounced human 
rights violations in East Germany, the material produced by these organizations focussed almost 
exclusively on the total illegitimacy of the SED and the atrocity of the Berlin Wall. East 
Germans did have access to Western television and media, but human rights activism in the 
Federal Republic in the late 1960s moved away from its focus on East Germany. The 
humanitarian crisis in the Nigerian breakaway republic of Biafra was the human rights cause du 	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jour amongst international activists while political and civil rights at home had become a major 
concern due to the rise of the student movement and mass street protests.19 In propaganda on the 
Year for Human Rights, the West German government concentrated on appealing to the 
international community through endorsements of self-determination and condemnations of 
Apartheid, colonialism and racial oppression rather than fixating on anti-communism.20 Human 
rights discourse from the west likely played a part, but it was by no means a reliable source for 
those looking to criticize the system but not demand its downfall. 
 If East Germans were interested in human rights, however, with a bit of digging they 
could find all the information they needed in sources published in the GDR. The full text of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was reprinted in the widely available reference volume 
“The UN” by Peter Klein, published in 1966.21 The texts of the UN Covenants could be found in 
the GDR journal on the United Nations – “UNO-Bilanz” and the mass-produced pamphlets of 
the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights helpfully printed the entire text of the treaties 
with a side-by-side comparison showing how each article was achieved through specific East 
German laws.22 Other popular publications also published specific information about the rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 On the West German human rights discourse in the late 1960s including the creation of Aktion Biafra-Hilfe, see 
Lora Wildenthal, The Language of Human Rights in West Germany (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2012), 96–130. 
20 On FRG policy and activities regarding the Year for Human Rights, see BArch-Koblenz B 136/6441 
Internationales Jahr der Menschenrechte - Durchführung in der Bundesrepublik 1967-1968. 
21 Peter Klein, Die UNO (Berlin: Dietz, 1966), 166–172. Klein’s book was actually cited by one letter, BArch-
Lichterfelde DA 1/4076 Letter no. 1533. This same book would also be cited in the late 1980s by dissidents. See 
Robert Havemann Society (Robert Havemann Gesellschaft), RHG Samizdat PS 013/ 05 Aufbruch 
Informationsmaterial des Ökumenischen Friedenskreises 26. Juli 1988, 7. 
22 According to an article promoting the human rights properties of the constitution – Walter Trebs, “Mit 
Völkerrecht im Einklang,” Neue Zeit, (4 Feb 1968) the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights was printed in UNO-
Bilanz 1965/1966, 178. The two pamphlets that reprinted the UN Covenants were, Willi Büchner-Uhder, 
Sozialistische Menschenrechte in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik : zum Recht auf Mitwirkung an der 
Leitung von Staat, Wirtschaft und Kultur durch alle Bürger der DDR (Berlin: Komitee zum Schutze der 
Menschenrechte, 1968); Hermann Klenner, Die politischen Bürgerrechte in der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik (Berlin: Komitee zum Schutze der Menschenrechte, 1967). 
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contained in these international documents: one man from Cottbus noted in his letter to the 
constitutional commission that he learned about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 
the illustrated women’s magazine Für Dich.23 Even if one was cut off completely from western 
media or the campaigning of international human rights NGOs, it was possible, if one was 
determined to do so, to access a wealth of information on human rights from available sources. 
Contesting the Constitution 
 In 1968, hundreds of East Germans would decide to employ the language of human rights 
to challenge the SED’s constitution. They were amongst the thousands of GDR citizens who 
used the Volksaussprache as a means to criticize the SED and make demands for change to the 
proposed political and social order. The issue that raised the most public feedback and criticism, 
and was also the main source of human rights discourse, was the problem of religious freedom. 
An internal analysis of letters to the constitutional commission conducted shortly before the 
plebiscite in April 1968, found that more than 49 percent of letters to the commission dealt with 
the problem of religious rights. Specifically, these letters criticized Article 38 of the draft 
Constitution, which was to replace the eight constitutional articles (Articles 41 to 48) of the 1949 
Constitution that dealt with various aspects of religious freedom.24 This number actually 
underplays the extent of the public outcry as many of these letters were signed by multiple 
members of small church organizations or even entire parishes. One submission from a Catholic 
community in the town of Lenterode had 218 signatures spread over two letters.25 At public 
meetings and in SED reports, the issue of rights to practice religion, religious education and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23 BArch-Lichterfelde DA 1/ 4077 Letter # 1606. While the letters to the Constitutional Commission are not covered 
under German privacy laws, they were written by private citizens who did not expect their writing to be available 
publicly. As such, I have anonymized personal information as much as possible. 
24 BArch-Lichterfelde NY 4192 /111 Gliederung der Vorschläge nach Artikeln des Verfassungentwurfs. 
25 BArch-Lichterfelde DA 1/ 4157. Letters No. 9669 and 9670. The same letter was sent twice on the same date to 
accommodate the number of signatures.  
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possibility for citizens to be both good socialists while maintaining a Christian Weltanschauung, 
often dominated proceedings.  
While the Catholic and Protestant Churches had been decimated through concerted state 
efforts over the years, both institutions fought back hard against this symbolic erasure. Rather 
than relying simply on the existence of these rights in the old Constitution of 1949, Church 
leaders used Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and sections from the 
recently created UN Human Rights Covenants to denounce these constitutional changes. This 
turn to human rights by the church was not wholly unprecedented. The churches had used the 
language of human rights periodically when denouncing various state policies including land 
reform and the suppression of church privileges, this language was usually incidental and did not 
form the backbone of any kind of sustained or coherent attack on state power.26 In the 1960s, 
however, Christian churches internationally began to adopt the language of human rights and the 
claim to represent the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1963, Pope John 
the XIII officially endorsed the Universal Declaration in his encyclical Pacem In Terris.27 A new 
enthusiasm for the idea of human rights can also be seen in Protestant Churches worldwide: in 
1968 in Uppsala, Sweden, the Fourth Assembly of the ecumenical World Council of Churches 
moved human rights to the forefront of its agenda and created an active anti-racism program 
specifically targeting Apartheid.28  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Joachim Goertz, “Kirche und Menschenrechte in der DDR,” Horch und Guck, (14/1995) 68-70. For Catholic 
Church declarations mentioning human rights prior to 1968, Gerhard Lange, Katholische Kirche - sozialistischer 
Staat DDR: Dokumente und öffentliche Äußerungen 1945 - 1990 (Berlin: Bischöfliches Ordinariat, 1993), 
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27 Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris: Encyclical Letter of Pope John XXIII on Human Rights and Duties : A New 
Translation and Commentary (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1980). 
28 On ecumenical Christianity and human rights in the late 1960s see, World Council of Churches, The Uppsala 
Report 1968: Official Report of the Fourth Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Uppsala July 4-20, 1968 
(Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1968); Otto Nolde and Charles Malik, Free and Equal: Human Rights in 
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The Christian response to the Volksaussprache began with a letter from Archbishop of 
Berlin, Alfred Bengsch to the Constitutional Commission on February 5, 1968. After first noting 
in detail the human rights commitments of Walter Ulbricht’s New Year’s Address and the 
elimination of seven of eight Articles on religious rights from the original constitution, Bengsch 
argued that “the redesign of the Constitution is neither consistent with universal human rights nor 
an advance from the Constitution of 1949,” since it would directly attack the basic capacities of 
the church to function. Moreover, the emphasis on creating a socialist state would be 
discriminatory against those with a Christian world-view (Weltanschauung) and as such “calls 
into question whether all citizens are equal before the law.” He demanded the restoration of 
guarantees of religious freedom both practice and belief, since “only under these conditions can 
the Church carry out its activities in true freedom and serve the common good. And only under 
these conditions can the basic rights as expressed in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of the United Nations be realized in our new Constitution.”29 
On February 15, 1968, the Protestant Bishops of East Germany joined in condemning the 
elimination of the religious rights of the old constitution. In a similar argument to their Catholic 
counterpart, they asked that 
The new constitution will be created so that Christians and those citizens who do not share the 
worldview of the ruling party can share in the responsibility for our political system with a clear 
conscience. The draft itself emphasizes that man and human dignity should be the focus of the 
new constitution. For the "International Year for Human Rights," the draft includes the statement 
that that the rules of international law occupy an important place in the Constitution.30  
 
Protestant church leaders urged all parishioners and church officials to study the draft 
constitution carefully and to aid in their campaign, Bishop Hans-Joachim Fränkel of Görlitz 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Churches and Human Rights in the 1970s,” presentation at A New Global Morality: The Politics of Human Rights 
and Humanitarianism in the 1970s, Freiburg Germany (10-12 June, 2010). 
29 BArch-Lichterfelde DY 30/ IV A2/13/ 46 Bengsch to Ulbricht (5 Feb 1968) 1-4.  
30 Evangelical Central Archive (Evangelisches Zentralarchiv) EZA 104/687 Noth et al to Ulbricht (15 Feb 1968), 1.  
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distributed a detailed seven-page analysis of the new constitution in comparison with 
international human rights documents to assist in this process.31 
The SED sought to quell church concerns by issuing assurances that the new constitution 
did not threaten Christians. In a speech by Walter Ulbricht reprinted in Neues Deutschland, he 
said “I can only repeat that the religious freedom as it currently exists, will continue to exist and 
there is no intention to change that.”32 In a private response to Archbishop Bengsch, SED 
officials attacked the legitimacy of the church in participating in the Volksaussprache process at 
all. The fact that the church leadership was challenging the contents of the draft was denounced 
as an attack on the sovereignty of the GDR as it represented an inappropriate effort to influence 
the outcome of “democratic” processes that were underway to create the Constitution. Christians 
were already represented in the Constitutional Commission and in the Volkskammer so the 
actions of the church were both redundant and parochial. As to the contents of the critique, these 
were deemed wholly irrelevant. The absence of certain rights from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was meaningless for the Church since the new, slimmed down Article on 
religious freedom was already in full agreement with Article 18 of the Universal Declaration. 
Besides that, some articles from the Universal Declaration were not needed for an East German 
constitution since they were self-evidently not a problem – the letter ironically cited forced 
labour and torture as relevant examples of international human rights that were unthinkable in 
the context of the GDR.33 Bengsch was clearly not persuaded or intimidated by this response and 
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32 “Walter Ulbricht beantwortet Fragen,” Neues Deutschland (16 Feb 1968), 4. 
33 BArch-Lichterfelde DY 30/ IV A2/13/ 46 Stellungnahme zum Schreiben des Kardinal Bengsch vom 5. Feb 1968. 
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a rewritten version of his original letter was distributed across the country to be read out at Mass 
on March 3.34 
Other human rights-based contestations were not spurred on by any kind of organized 
effort like that of the Church, but two other major issues produced a response in the language of 
human rights: the right to travel (Article 28, 3 percent of the total letters received) and the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression (Article 23, almost 2 percent of letters received). East 
Germans invoked the right to free movement contained in the Universal Declaration but many 
omitted any mention of human rights to simply request that they have the right to be allowed to 
travel or leave the GDR. In terms of the right to free expression, arguments ranged from specific 
rights included in the Universal Declaration on free thought and speech as well as on religion to 
broader demands unconnected to any kind of human rights language.  
Those employing the language of human rights were not confined to a single region or 
class. Letters to the Constitutional Commission came from every part of the GDR, though 
officials did note higher concentrations of letters from Dresden and Cottbus on religious freedom. 
The efforts of the church in disseminating its human rights claims were successful not just in 
major population centers, but in small towns and villages where the church remained more 
influential. While individual letter writers using the language of human rights were often male, 
group letters from small communities and religious groups including large numbers of female 
signatories. In class terms, educated citizens were often those invoking human rights but here as 
well group letters contained a wide cross section of society: in one group letter from Erfurt 
invoking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in regards to religious freedom and the 
right to travel, of the fifteen signatures there were six high school students, three university 
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students, three office clerks, a pipe-fitter, an electrician and an apprentice.35 East Germans did 
not universally use the language of human rights, but it appears to have been accessible across 
religious, gender and class lines when packaged correctly. 
Outside of these three major areas, there were thousands of complaints and criticisms of 
the constitutional draft, many involving basic rights, but on these topics East Germans did not 
use the language of human rights or refer to international treaties of any kind. Although GDR 
citizens did contest the SED’s assertion of a monopoly on political power, issues of gender 
inequality, and economic rights such as the right to strike and choose one’s place of employment, 
they used other vocabularies with which to make their claims. From a contemporary perspective, 
issues that should clearly have fallen into the purview of human rights politics such as political 
freedom, the right to form a union and women’s rights, all took place within a very different 
discursive framework during the Volksaussprache as less risky and more established discourses 
of protest continued to be employed.  
While the SED’s dominance over political life in the GDR had been a fact since the late 
1940s, several dozen East Germans still sought to contest the legalization of the monopoly on 
power. Rather than invoking claims to political rights, they relied on either the rhetoric of the 
SED itself or exploited the contradictions between reality and theory inherent in East German 
political life. In criticizing Article 1, the relevant passage to enshrining SED power in the new 
constitution, one letter to the commission decried this as a violation of “socialist democracy,” 
and feared that it could lead to a dictatorship as had occurred in the USSR under Stalin.36 One 
letter pointedly asked if it made sense to proclaim the supremacy of the SED when it failed to 
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36 BArch-Lichterfelde DA 1/ 4126 Letter No. 6516. 
	  	   203	  
gain even 50 percent of the vote in the election in the author’s district of Halle in 1946.37 Others 
challenged the idea by pointing out the conflict in having one political party constitutionally 
guaranteed to rule when East Germans still went through the process of having periodic elections. 
Was it not possible that one of the docile Bloc Parties that formed the National Front with the 
SED, say the Christian Democrats (CDU der DDR) or the Liberals (LDPD), could win an 
election one day?38 Some were so bold as to question the provisions on friendship with the 
Soviet Union by asking, “Why shouldn’t other states of the socialist camp have a chance to take 
over this leadership role? Does it not already seem like [Czechoslovakia] is becoming the avante 
garde of socialist freedom and democracy?”39 Why appeal to abstract UN documents when the 
ongoing Prague Spring provided a much more concrete means of undermining the legitimacy of 
state socialism?  
Although women endorsed human rights claims in letters about religious freedom, travel 
and free expression, on the issues of access to abortion, social and economic benefits for women 
and gender equality, they continued to use other vocabularies and arguments rather than drawing 
on international human rights treaties.40 In terms of abortion access, a fiercely contested problem 
since the total ban imposed by the SED in the late 1940s, women argued that they had a personal 
right to decide whether or not to continue a pregnancy but they did not seek to legitimize this 
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38 BArch-Lichterfelde DA 1/ 4223 File Card on Letter no. 4891. 
39 BArch-Lichterfelde DA 1/ 4161 Letter no. 10089. 
40 The disconnect between women’s rights activism and the usage of international human rights language in the 
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claim in reference to more abstract human rights principles.41 As Donna Harsch has shown, the 
discourse surrounding abortion access shifted dramatically in the late 1960s from a vocabulary of 
social harm towards the language of personal rights, but this new discourse did not connect with 
the emerging human rights dissent of the Volksaussprache.42 On other rights and duties, women 
argued that the general principle of gender equality should mean the equal value of “women’s 
work” such as child rearing in comparison to that of industrial workers. Some wrote to the 
commission calling for a constitutional amendment that would give unmarried women the right 
to use the title Frau (Mrs.) rather than Fräulein (Miss), but this too did not include any mention 
of human rights.43 
 Aside from religious freedom, the absence of the right to strike – which was enshrined in 
the 1949 Constitution but already completely unthinkable in reality – caused the SED the 
greatest headache. The response of the population was so vociferous that one SED official 
described the tone of the criticism as “spiteful”.44 From across the country in letters and 
particularly at meetings involving workers, the absence of the right to strike was angrily noted by 
the populace with some proclaiming it as the “basic democratic right of the worker.”45 While 
these GDR citizens invoked “democratic rights” they did so from the tradition of working class 
struggle using the language of the state. If the GDR was the democratic country of the workers, 
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42 Donna Harsch, “Society, the State, and Abortion in East Germany, 1950-1972,” The American Historical Review 
102: 1 (1 Feb 1997). 
43 BArch-Lichterfelde DA 1/ 4223 File Card on Letter No. 3866 (Note mentions this request had been made several 
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45 Quotation from, BArch-Lichterfelde DA 1/ 4157 Letter No. 9650. 
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then the traditional rights of workers’ movements must be respected. Rather than look to new 
vocabularies of protest such as human rights, workers relied upon traditional discourses from the 
labour movement to make their claims. In response to concerns from local functionaries, Berlin 
issued talking points for officials that would explain how the right to strike was now superfluous 
under socialism. According to briefing notes, just as the reactionary West German press 
controlled by Axel Springer did not go on strike because he held so much economic and political 
power, the East German worker did not need to strike because he was now in charge of the 
country and its means of production, “and no one would strike against themselves, against their 
own interests or against their own power.”46 Such arguments failed to stem the massive number 
of complaints that continued to pour in up until the final plebiscite.  
It is also important to note that many of the harshest complaints and accusations against 
the SED, and some of the most troubling behaviour from the perspective of the state during the 
Volksaussprache, did not involve the language of rights at all. Some who spoke out strongly did 
so due to very specific grievances. For example, in Borna, a worker at a lignite plant threatened 
to vote no on the constitution because it did not guarantee that workers would have a holiday on 
Easter Friday.47 SED officials detected the influence of western television propaganda in one 
citizen in a village in the Pößneck district who declared: “The whole discussion about the 
constitution can’t change the contents of the constitution since it’s already finished and a done 
deal.”48 While most citizens offered their criticisms as though they could actually play a 	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constructive role in the creation of a new constitution, others simply refused to play along as 
“good citizens” in a consultation process they thought was a sham. Refusing the logic of the 
process often represented a greater attack on the legitimacy of the SED than harsh criticism 
offered in the correct form.49 
Those who sought to actively disrupt the Volksaussprache by distributing leaflets 
attacking the process or writing anti-SED graffiti on public buildings sometimes invoked specific 
freedoms they wanted to be instated but, here again, did not make claims in the language of 
human rights. The most common form of attacks on the process, as documented by the Stasi, 
were slogans such as “Have Courage, Vote No!” or leaflets with slogans like “We Berliners big 
and small say no to the constitution” (Wir Berliner Groß und klein sagen zur Verfassung Nein) 
that were definitely in the “provocative” category, but they focused on defiance rather than 
specific complaints against the state. While some leaflets dealt with political and civil freedoms - 
for example one sent out in Weimar called for “free and secret election and press and 
information freedom” - these did not use the vocabulary of rights, let alone human rights. 
Although those writing to the constitutional commission about travel invoked the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, dissenting leaflets more directly denounced the SED for creating 
the “Human Prison of the GDR.”50 When defying the SED outright, East Germans chose brevity 
over appeals to abstract ideals or international documents. 
Strategies of Contestation 
Although human rights claims, in particular in relation to the history of the GDR, are 
associated with radical opposition and striking individualism, the beginnings of human rights 
dissent in East Germany were remarkably non-radical and accommodating in their form. When 	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employing the language of human rights, East Germans couched their claims in what Jeremy 
Straughn has called “performances of consent” as a means of protecting themselves from 
punishment when contesting the state. As such, criticism of the SED was connected with the 
heartfelt affirmation of the broad goals of the state and of socialism and critiques were posed 
only for the benefit of the community as a whole. Not only were state goals endorsed by East 
Germans as part of this “consentful contention,” but citizens also adopted and co-opted the 
discourse of the SED in order to promote their specific claims.51 Most letters to the 
Constitutional Commission began with some variant of “as a citizen of the GDR, I am 
responding to your call to provide a response to the draft of the new constitution and to present 
my suggestions for changes.”52 The people of the GDR acted in the grey area between dissent 
and good socialist citizenship by leveraging their social identities, economic position and the 
international political problems of the GDR to push for concessions and changes. In all but a 
handful of cases, they did not invoke human rights as an eternal moral concept that held 
universal validity but instead politely requested that the SED formally create legal right in the 
constitution in recognition of the human rights declarations of the United Nations.  
In asking the SED to include human rights provisions from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights or the UN Human Rights Covenants, many East Germans phrased their letters as 
helpful reminders. They were not making demands upon the state but rather informing it of an 
unfortunate oversight. A church group from Rosenthal wrote to inform the commission that it 
had failed to include the right to leave the country as per the Universal Declaration and reminded 
it that the SED had informed the United Nations already in spring 1967 that this right was 
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already realized in the GDR.53 Another pointed out that “in Article 28 there is sadly a 
discrepancy with Article 13 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” and 
provided suggestions on how it could be reworded.54 Some offered a faux-naïve tone to their 
writing to insulate themselves from accusations of political opposition. One priest from Görlitz 
noted that he could not find a right to reunite families separated by the division of Germany. 
While he acknowledged that he was not an expert on the subject, such a right is “a part, as far as 
I know, of the Charter of Human Rights.”55 
 When writing to demand greater freedom of religious practice, most Christian East 
Germans phrased their letters as though the state had simply erred in the text of the Constitution. 
While they could support socialism as an economic system or as a “way of life” (Lebensform), 
without guarantees for religious freedoms, the Constitution essentially declared that all those 
with a Christian world-view (Weltanschauung) were not part of the socialist community. 
Christians were thus not trying to undermine socialism or the power of the SED, but asking for 
accommodation so that they could have the right to continue being Christians while participating 
in the progress of the socialist project in economic and social terms. Many also implied that if 
this situation were not remedied, they would be unable to support the constitution since it would 
contradict their core values. These letters were written as demands for inclusion and framed the 
problem as that of the SED seeking to arbitrarily and unnecessarily evict them from society. 
Such protests exploited the existing conflicts within the SED between those who saw the church 
as an anachronism that needed to be eliminated and pragmatists who favoured accommodation 
and inclusiveness to avoid alienating huge swaths of the population.  
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A letter from the city of Halle demonstrated many of the ideas and rhetoric found in these 
letters. The writer began by saying he was an “informed citizen of the socialist GDR,” and was 
greatly concerned by the discrepancies between Walter Ulbricht’s statements in his New Year’s 
message and his other speeches in which he assured East Germans that religious freedom would 
not be reduced.  
As a Christian, I must also state that the right to freedom of conscience (which, however, 
concerns not only Christians), as well as crucial basic rights of churches and religious 
communities have been eliminated. Freedom of conscience is granted in our present 
Constitution in Article 41 and in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in Article 
18. Since the conscience belongs to the heart of every person, I consider it essential to 
explicitly state this right to freedom of conscience again. 
Having established first his bona fides as a good citizen and helpfully pointed out the 
omissions of the draft, the writer then took a harder line in his criticism. 
It is not enough for me that these rights are still granted but not mentioned in discussions 
and presentations of the draft Constitution. It is clear to me that a socialist state also 
needs a socialist constitution. But I also think that nevertheless the attribute - socialist - 
should not in this sense be absolute and constant, so that nothing else counts. 
In concluding, he continued to walk the line between helpful and demanding, writing, “I consider 
that the removal of rights through the limitation of above Articles, cannot be deemed an advance 
from the basic rights of the current Constitution and I expect a response or changes.”56 
In advocating religious movement or expression rights, many East Germans also chose to 
link their demands to the foreign policy of the GDR. They framed the inclusion of human rights 
norms in the East German constitution as an international imperative. Rather than attack the 
Constitution themselves, they simply reminded the SED of the possible problems they could face 
from the international community. In one letter to the commission, a man from the village of 
Dobberkau said that while the living standard in the GDR was high and the right to work was 
clearly realized, the failure to include the right to travel could give the unfortunate impression, 
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both at home and in the west, that the GDR was “similar to a prison that one cannot leave”.57 
Another letter writer, expressed concern that without inclusion of a right to travel, the 
constitution and with it the GDR as a whole would be seen as falling behind in achieving the 
goals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.58 
In addition to the general problems the GDR could face in the international community, 
some argued that East German membership in the United Nations would be imperilled by a 
failure to heed their call for greater recognition of human rights. In a letter deemed by the 
commission “typical of working Christians and Catholics,” a man from Dresden asked, “since 
the GDR is striving for membership in the UN, shouldn’t the human rights that are binding for 
all UN members be included without restrictions in the new Constitution?” 59 In one example, a 
letter signed by two professional couples in Erfurt asking for the inclusion of greater religious 
freedoms cautioned that the good work the GDR could do as a member of the international 
community would be put at risk by the absence of human rights in the constitution. As an 
introduction to their suggestions on religious rights, the authors stated:  
The German Democratic Republic aspires towards membership in the United Nations. We 
support this effort wholeheartedly. Through this our Republic would have the opportunity on a 
global platform in the forum of all peoples to help show that the idea of humanism is universally 
possible. This means, however, that we need to make the positive aspects and conditions of UN 
[membership] our own.60  
 
Their solution to this problem was the inclusion of Article 18 (freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion) from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the constitution of the GDR. 
This line of argument was not limited to the highly educated but also came from working-class 
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East Germans. At a public meeting of workers in Frankfurt/Oder, some asked whether the failure 
to include the right to leave would create problems for the GDR when it eventually joined the 
United Nations with a constitution that did not include rights from the Universal Declaration.61  
 When writing to the Constitutional Commission, most citizens employed these subtle 
tactics to make their voice heard without endangering their position, yet there were also those 
who took a more direct approach. One succinct postcard to the commission said only: 
Suggestions 
1. Right to Strike 
2. Free Speech 
3. Free Press 
4. Free Assembly 
5. Free Party Vote.62 
 
In demanding these specific rights, the author provided no justification based on identity, social 
status, tradition or the language of human rights. While these rights were outlined in international 
documents, most East Germans chose to demand them without reference or recourse to the idea 
of human rights, humanity or universalism. It was simply a demand for a specific right that they 
believed they were due. In these cases, it is interesting that most East Germans believed that they 
had certain rights, but that they did not yet perceive these rights as universal and rooted in their 
humanity.  
While this direct approach was rare in the case of specifically human rights arguments, it 
did occasionally occur. One letter from a chemist in Rostock did not couch his letter in polite 
suggestions for constitutional changes but rather bluntly asserted that everyone had certain basic 
rights. On the matter of travel he said, “Freedom of movement is a generally recognized 
international law, a concept to which the draft constitutions refers several times?” Such a right 	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could not be restricted to a mere right to choose a place of residence within a country since “a 
partial right of free movement is none at all.” In a similar vein, he also argued that, “The right to 
free expression is an inalienable right and a hallmark of human dignity.”63 In a rare display, 
another letter demanded the inclusion of rights to religious practice and freedom of belief based 
on the principle that “these human rights cannot be changed through law.”64 Although this form 
of argumentation with its assumption of inherent moral legitimacy and implied belief in the 
universality of certain rights is closely associated with human rights activism, in 1968, these 
letters were distinct outliers that contrasted sharply with the supplications suggesting that 
adopting certain rights would be good sense for the maintenance of civil harmony and the 
achievement of international recognition. The vast majority of citizens used human rights 
provisions as a means to legitimize their demand for the implementation of civil rights at home 
rather than invoking them as universally valid rights held by all humans regardless of citizenship. 
 In examining these responses it is impossible to fully discern the boundaries between 
genuine concern for the state and the cynical employment of socialist idiom for the purposes of 
advancing a personal agenda. Anonymous letters to the constitutional commission were the most 
direct in their opposition to the SED, but some of those signed letters were clearly filled with a 
passive-aggressive concern that the rest of the world could possibly see East Germany as a 
prison or as out of touch with the norms of international law. While some citizens were clearly 
opposed to the state and could barely conceal their disdain for the SED in their letters, they did 
not dare to openly challenge the right of the party to rule. To assume that all involved were truly 
proto-dissidents at heart who only masked their hatred of the state to avoid persecution would be 
a mistake as the tone and content of many critical letters points to a belief in the ideals of the 	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socialist system. Some citizens attacked the contradictions of the system from the position that 
the state was not yet socialist enough and that the SED was too cautious in fully implementing 
the revolution. One letter writer went so far as to say that the constitutional claim “the 
exploitation of man by man has been abolished” was false since independent small businesses, 
and thus the last vestiges of capitalist oppression, still existed in the GDR.65 Years later, the 
dissident Freya Klier remembered taking the constitution discussion seriously rather than just 
dismissing it as an exercise in propaganda.66 
 On the other hand, a willingness to participate in the process often meant an aversion to 
persecution or just the hassle of enduring yet another speech from an earnest comrade or party 
hacks about the joys of socialism. Alexei Yurchak has perceptively argued that the stability of 
late socialism can be understood in performative terms as citizens dutifully acting out the rituals 
demanded by the state in order to live their lives with a minimum of hassle while not literally 
believing in the ideas their speech conveyed.67 Statements of loyalty and participation in the 
system served to demonstrate one’s good faith willingness to be part of the community, but it did 
not mean one was actually supporting the ideological program of the state. Similarly, as Andrew 
Port has argued, apathy was often the greatest driver of  “loyalty” amongst the citizens of the 
GDR.68 The minimal dissent in regards to the political power of the SED in comparison to 
demands made at the margins of power, points to the conclusion of Jan Palmowski that “the 
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party managed to sustain its power because most citizens came to accept the unavoidability of 
current power relations.”69  
Why Human Rights and Why 1968 
 Human rights emerged as a language of dissent in 1968 due to the intersection of state 
policies, international politics and the growing long-term grievances from the East German 
population. The Volksaussprache provided a uniquely low-risk environment for speaking out and 
the SED’s human rights politics created a convenient vocabulary of dissident with which to do so. 
Rather than appealing to a set of foreign values, the SED’s efforts to use the International Year 
for Human Rights for diplomatic propaganda meant that even though the GDR was not legally 
bound by international human rights norms, the need to appear to be in line with the Universal 
Declaration and the UN Covenants provided the East German people with some leverage. Walter 
Ulbricht’s New Year’s speech along with the myriad other pronouncements on human rights in 
the East German media disseminated the connection between human rights politics and SED 
foreign policy widely enough that citizens were able to draw their own conclusions. These 
circumstances allowed citizens to connect the language of human rights to their loyalty to the 
state and to socialism rather than its rejection. Criticism of the new constitution could be framed 
as a means of promoting foreign policy if demanding new rights or preserving the status quo by 
demanding the retention of old rights.  
The SED’s need for mass participation meant that standards of “hostile behaviour” were 
significantly loosened during the process.70 While the Stasi carefully tracked who refused to sign 
on to collective statements of support for the Constitution at factories or student groups, the 	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functionaries who were running public meetings, especially when far from the capital, sought to 
portray criticism and dissent as constructive, if only to ensure they were not themselves blamed. 
A National Front representative from the town of Cottbus reported that negative comments were 
“not always hostile opinions, but much more often the result of uncertainties and speculations 
about the contents of the new constitution.”71 By phrasing criticism as confusion, citizens 
provided officials with the excuse they needed to take statements that could be read as dissent 
and re-categorize them as ignorance. When a citizen did step over the line, SED functionaries 
sometimes sought to blame systemic problems rather than the individual so as to prevent the 
need for punishment. In Neubrandenburg, when a teacher asked why the new constitution was so 
“magic” that the citizens should have to hear and see nothing else all the time, this outburst was 
written off as the failure of the military to provide proper political education while the man was 
enlisted during his compulsory service.72 Through a combination of citizens seeking to “perform” 
the role of the good citizen and SED officials trying their hardest to overlook sedition whenever 
possible, the Volksaussprache provided a window of greater open discussion not seen in years. 
Another factor in the turn to human rights language was the role of the Church leadership 
as “translators” of human rights.73 Archbishop Bengsch and the Protestant Bishops took the 
abstract rights contained in the Universal Declaration and connected them to local concerns over 
the loss of freedom and provided the language with which to protest this absence. SED officials 
noted that many of the letters from citizens regarding religious freedom were copied from each 
other and based on the original letters from the Church, even down to identical typographical 
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errors in some cases.74 While hundreds of citizens made the connection between state 
propaganda on human rights and their own political demands, the church’s work in 
“vernacularizing” international treaties and declarations in terms East Germans were familiar 
with resulted in the massive outpouring of human rights rhetoric from below. 
 Human rights remained, however, a language of last resort for making demands. As 
Hannah Arendt argued, human rights are a tool for those who have lost all faith that the 
community to which they belong and the civic structures through which they a ruled, will 
provide them with basic justice. Abandoning claims to civil rights as a social actor and turning to 
the idea of human rights represented “a right of exception for those who had nothing better to fall 
back on.”75 A majority of the letters written to the Constitutional Commission and comments in 
public forums did not mention international human rights. While the Church was able to connect 
the idea of human rights to its institutional and pastoral prerogatives, there were no other civil 
society organizations that could serve as “translators” and those that did exist, like the Committee 
for the Protection of Human Rights, tried to defuse such dissent. Freedom of religion, travel and 
opinion were all problems that were long-standing and for which other forms and techniques of 
complaint had failed. Those seeking to see family on the other side of the wall had likely been 
trying since 1961 or even earlier. Censorship and the suppression of religion had been a constant 
since the late 1940s and with previous efforts to liberalize the system were unsuccessful, thus it 
made sense to turn to a new vocabulary with a new political calculus behind it. By asking for 
public feedback on a constitution, the SED essentially gave the populace permission to engage 
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and criticize the fundamental aspects of the GDR system after years of only being able to 
complain about everyday problems such as housing or consumer goods.  
 For those only seeking to alleviate more material concerns and to realize their social and 
economic rights under socialism it was far easier to appeal to one’s identity as a worker, as a 
mother or as a German in order to gain what one wanted. Instead of reaching for international 
treaties, it was more productive for such claims to work within the exiting core logic of SED 
ideology. Given the near complete irrelevance of the legal rights contained in the 1949 
Constitution, pouring so much energy into seeking the reform of the new version speaks more to 
desperation than confidence.  
Outcomes of Mass Protest 
Overall, the SED apparatus was highly positive about the feedback from the population 
and all the way up to the top levels of the party, officials and functionaries deemed the 
Volksauspprache a success. A report by the Constitutional Commission to the SED’s Central 
Committee shortly before the plebiscite spoke proudly of the massive response of Christians to 
the proposed changes. While SED officials saw the Bishops as a nuisance, the letters from 
regular citizens on religious freedom showed their engagement with the political process and 
desire to take part in East German political life. On balance, according to these officials, 
although some priests had said that the constitution must be rejected since it would impose an 
atheistic ideological world-view upon believers, thankfully no one had called for a return to a 
“bourgeois parliamentary” system as was happening in Czechoslovakia. The call for the 
inclusion of UN-human rights provisions was not flagged as “provocative,” but any talk of 
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blocking the adoption of the constitution, encouraging others to do the same, or joining in with 
the counterrevolution in Prague most certainly was.76  
In response to the hundreds of thousands of official events, 12,454 letters from the 
population, the Constitutional commission made118 changes to the draft text, most of them 
minor. In spite of the demands of the populace, a right to free movement, a right to travel and 
greater freedom of speech were not included in the changes. To do so would have damaged the 
ideological justifications of SED rule and created intolerable opportunities for dissent and 
opposition. The huge outpouring from East German Christians did have some effect: the SED 
chose to increase the number of Articles in the Constitution on freedom of religion and belief 
from one to two. While the Church had not succeeded in keeping the full text of all eight Articles 
from the 1949 Constitution, this was declared a great triumph and church leaders and 
parishioners turned out to vote like everyone else. Mark Allinson has speculated that the SED 
may have planned this conflict with the churches by initially reducing their rights so drastically 
and then giving in slightly to give the appearance of magnanimity.77 It is unclear from the 
archival record if this was anticipated in advance or simply good political manoeuvring in the 
face of mass protest.  
In the end, the SED leadership got what they wanted from the plebiscite. After a great 
deal of education, negotiation, threats and coercion, the vote on April 6 produced a result of 
nearly 95% in favour of the new constitution. 11,536,803 citizens, apparently, voted in favour of 
the constitution with 409,733 voting against and 24,353 spoiled ballots.78 In addition to the 	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voting itself, the Volksaussprache process produced 34,000 productivity pledges from factory 
and union groups across the country valued at 32 Million Marks.79 While the Prague Spring was 
quickly spiralling out of control in neighbouring Czechoslovakia, the GDR had managed to 
conduct a nationwide process of political reform in the direction of even greater power for the 
SED and outside of a few dozen youthful pamphleteers and a large quantity of very polite letters 
from the populace, the SED had avoided major disruption or unrest. Although some sympathetic 
protests would erupt later that year in solidarity with what was happening in Prague, the GDR 
was one of the few countries in the world not rocked by mass protest and dissent in 1968.80 
While the Volksaussprache could have provided a spark for another uprising like that of 1953, 
East German citizens instead conscientiously took part in the process en masse and only a 
handful of people sought to attack the SED’s monopoly on power. 
Conclusion 
The diverse response of GDR citizens and the SED to the Volksaussprache demonstrates 
three important points about the history of human rights in East Germany. First, East Germans 
were widely cognizant of the idea of human rights and international human rights documents in 
1968, well before the signing of the Helsinki Accords. If SED rhetoric in the 1940s and 1950s as 
well as the activities of the Committee for Human Rights had escaped their attention, the massive 
number of letters citing human rights from across the GDR and from all social classes shows that 
the concept was universally disseminated and accessible due to the actions of the SED and the 
church. Second, human rights rhetoric did not naturally and seamlessly inspire the people to 
reject the basic tenets of state socialism. For the most part, human rights served to legitimize 	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demands for greater inclusion and freedom within the structures of state socialism, not its 
destruction. Those who did challenge the SED monopoly on power did not connect their 
demands with the idea of human rights. Third, the SED did not see human rights rhetoric from 
below as inherently seditious or threatening so long as it was packaged in the correct forms 
through a proper performance of loyalty. While officials expressed concern about the activities 
of the Bishops in instigated an outpouring of complaints, it was this independent quasi-political 
behaviour rather than its character as a human rights campaign that was deemed provocative. 
The Volksaussprache has received almost no scholarly attention from historians as both 
the Constitution of 1968 and the vote itself are often dismissed as mere window dressing to a 
dictatorship.81 The exception to this is Mark Allinson’s regional study of popular opinion in 
Thüringen during the Ulbricht era. He argues that the event was more complex and ambiguous 
than a mere exercise of propaganda. 
The unspoken truth behind the Volksaussprache remained that the USSR still underwrote the 
SED’s hold on the GDR. However, within this framework the SED used the Volksaussprache to 
achieve a more acceptable modus vivendi with the population, and the various sectors of the 
population accepted this as an opportunity either to improve the aspects of socialism with which 
they agreed or (often successfully) to reassert their existing rights. In this sense, the SED’s 
‘dictatorship’ was qualified by recognition of the need to respond to at least some public 
demands.82 
 
In the 1968 Constitution and the process of its adoption, the many seemingly contradictory and 
paradoxical aspects of the East German dictatorship were thus on full display.  The political 
structures and ideology outlined by the proposed constitution were not simply those of party 
power over all other considerations, but rather those of a what Konrad Jarausch has described as 
a “Welfare Dictatorship” in that it showed the interconnections between universal claims to well-	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being of the citizenry along side the social and economic benefits of the system were inexorably 
tied to the continuation of SED rule and international Soviet hegemony.83 The contents of the 
Constitution were not literally demonstrative of reality in the GDR, but taken in the whole, the 
articles outlined the SED’s conception of the ideal society.  
The symbolic importance of the constitution and its adoption also illuminate other aspects 
of the GDR as a dictatorship. While the law itself as an institution was largely irrelevant to 
citizens except in cases of civil law, the symbolic meaning of the constitutional text was very 
important to the SED and deemed crucial to securing legitimacy in keeping with Martin 
Sabrow’s concept of “dictatorship of discourse” in which the state used ideology as a means of 
normalizing its rule rather than employing force to crush dissent.84 The process of approving the 
constitution through public meetings and programs to explain the meaning of its contents to the 
population are indicative of the “educational dictatorship” side of the GDR: the people needed to 
truly understand socialism in order to take part and the SED would explain it so as to further the 
progress of all society.85 The ultimate plebiscite on the adoption of the constitution reflected how 
the approval of the people was integral to the ideological self-conception of the SED and their 
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support, if only performative rather than genuine, and integration into state structures was vital.86  
The mass public consultations on the substance of the Constitution and vote on its adoption, the 
Volksaussprache, planned by SED would thus demonstrate the unity of the people and cement 
the document as bedrock for a distinctly East German political identity and citizenship through 
the affirmation of the populace.87  
This first engagement of the East German people with the idea of human rights en masse 
was only the beginning. In the 1970s, the polite and respectful requests of 1968 began to evolve 
into angry demands. While 1968 was relatively quiet, the events of the Prague Spring and the 
continuing hard-line stance of the SED against freedom of movement created widespread 
disillusionment in state socialism amongst the younger generation.88 Those seeking to leave the 
GDR went from trying to secure a constitutional right to travel or emigrate to seeking permission 
to personally leave. For many citizens, when these requests met with repeated failure, the idea of 
a human right to leave transformed from an instrumentalized vocabulary of negotiation into a 
means of expressing their sense that their basic human dignity was being violated. The activism 
of the churches at the top levels would likewise evolve into a more widespread engagement with 
the idea of human rights at home and abroad by Christians in the early 1970s as East German 
participation in the World Council of Churches and the Lutheran World Council created 	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networks of exchange that would open up the discourse of human rights. Although the Year for 
Human Rights was over, the SED’s ongoing diplomatic negotiations over international 
recognition were embedded in international human rights politics thus giving East Germans a 
continuous source of state rhetoric on the subject. The Volksaussprache had been a success for 
the SED but it presaged a much more tumultuous decade of human rights politics.
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CHAPTER 5:  
The Ambiguities of Human Rights: Dissent, Cooptation, and the Right to Leave, 1969-1982  
 
 
Illusion and hypocrisy may be able to delay recognition of truth in the 
question of human rights, but progress is inevitable both in theory and in 
practice. The people will see to this.1 
-Hermann Klenner, 1978 
 
In the 1970s, the international human rights movement exploded across the globe.2 Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs) proliferated in North America and Western Europe and the 
new prominence of these groups was cemented with Amnesty International winning the Nobel 
Peace Prize. Human rights campaigning reached new levels of international sophistication and 
intensity with the Chilean military coup of 1973 and its aftermath, which sparked international 
outrage.3 The intellectual and cultural elite of many socialist Bloc countries took up the banner of 
human rights and created civil society groups like Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77 and Poland’s 
Worker’s Defence League (KOR). On both sides of the Iron Curtain, NGOs devoted to 
monitoring compliance with the Helsinki Accords of 1975 sprouted up in the late 1970s. In 1977, 
President Jimmy Carter shifted the United States from its earlier defensive stance and declared 
that human rights would now form the centerpiece of US foreign policy.4  	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Yet this global “breakthrough” for human rights was neither uniformly present nor 
universally consistent. The competing human rights cultures of the 1960s did not simply 
disappear and in the case of the GDR, the dominant discourse of socialist human rights 
established by the SED was not washed away by the global tide. In 1968, East Germans had 
taken up the language of human rights to contest and criticize the SED with limited success. 
While some have claimed that once the “bulldozer force of the revolutionary logic of rights” had 
been unleashed, there was an inevitable march towards equality, emancipation and democracy, 
the “breakthrough” of human rights in 1968 did no such thing and the results of the “human 
rights revolution” were distinctly ambiguous.5 There was not just one “logic of rights” driving 
forward dissent but a multiplicity of conceptions of what human rights meant, including the 
version advanced by the SED to legitimize its rule. Human rights did not self-evidently lead the 
people to revolt or demand liberal democracy. 
In 1968, during the Volksaussprache, some East Germans had taken to the discourse of 
human rights as a means to claim a right to exit the GDR, the right to religious freedom and the 
right to greater freedom of speech and opinion. All three trends continued in the 1970s but these 
streams of thought and action never coalesced into a unified movement for change. As East 
Germans faced repeated rejection of application to travel or emigrate, they increasingly 
employed human rights terms and references to international treaties to support their claims. This 
amplified use of human rights language did not translate into the creation of a broader social 
movement, as this usage was almost exclusively instrumental in gaining the right to leave the 
GDR. Those seeking to leave East Germany by invoking human rights developed a discourse of 
dissent and opposition that revolved around the total rejection of state socialism in the GDR 	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rather than its reform. Although Protestants began to use the idea of human rights to construct a 
critique of East German society in the early 1970s, the signing of the Helsinki Accords actually 
resulted in a de-radicalization of the church as an institution. Instead of using the human rights 
provisions of the Helsinki Accords to attack the legitimacy of SED rule, Protestant Church 
leaders sought to use the church’s engagement with human rights and its response to the Accords 
to protect religious freedom to secure the place of Protestants within the GDR by endorsing the 
SED’s position on human rights on the international stage.  
While in theory, East German dissident intellectuals supported human rights, the politics 
of the human rights debate as part of the Cold War put them between the sclerotic bureaucracy of 
the SED, which was preventing the true realization of socialism, and the liberal capitalism of the 
west that would roll back socialism permanently. Having establishing a legitimizing discourse of 
socialist human rights and portraying western human rights activism as an outgrowth of capitalist 
imperialism, the SED put East German intellectuals into a bind.6 The Manichean ideological 
position of the SED meant that employing the language of human rights implied either the 
rejection of socialism or the acceptance of the SED. Furthermore, the one place for intellectuals 
to discuss and engage with the problem of human rights was the GDR-Committee for Human 
Rights, which was part of in the legitimizing project of the SED. 
The discourse of human rights was caught between global Cold War politics and local 
social conditions within the GDR. Although East Germans had access to the language of human 
rights through western television and SED propaganda, the absence of a domestic public sphere 
meant that there were no social milieus or institutions where GDR citizens could engage with 
this discourse on their own terms. Those that employ the language of human rights were either 	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disconnected from the community as they sought to emigrate or part of an isolated subculture 
within the Church. While many members of the intelligentsia embraced elements of the 
international human rights movement such as greater freedom of opinion, speech and travel, the 
seemingly binary politics of Cold War human rights were not apt for the reformed and humane 
socialism that they sought. The broader population of the GDR was exposed to an abstract 
competition of propaganda from both sides of the Cold War that appeared to have no connection 
to their daily lives and problems and, as such, did not adopt the discourse of human rights as a 
means to effect change.  
The Right to Emigrate – The Ausreisebewegung in the 1970s 
 The use of human rights as a discourse of protest and resistance in the 1970s, however, 
centred almost entirely on the problem of the right to exit and freedom of movement. Those 
seeking to leave the GDR increasingly sought to legitimize their claims by using international 
human rights treaties. The usage of the discourse of human rights began to shift from a 
superficial instrumentalization to a growing internalized sense amongst would-be emigrants that 
they had an inherent right to exit. This radicalization was in part driven forward by international 
diplomacy, but the more decisive factor was the cycle of rejection and punishment that emigrants 
faced in the GDR. While human rights language was initially used to support a polite request to 
the state, by the fifth or sixth request, East Germans progressively came to understand their 
grievances as human rights violations. Rather than inherently turning to the idea of human rights 
in the face of injustice, GDR citizens developed a sense of human rights through their active 
engagement with the discourse over the course of their many applications to depart. When in rare 
cases, these self-radicalized citizens were able to act publicly, their locally developed human 
rights vernacular proved to be highly effective in rousing other citizens across class lines to 
protest or resistance. This indigenous discourse of human rights for exit did not, however, 
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translate into a larger program of political reform and was rooted entirely in the problem of 
leaving the GDR, not changing it for the better.  
It is often claimed that the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords “inspired” a 
massive desire to exit the GDR, but as Bernd Eisenfeld has written, “like no other state in 
Europe, the GDR was confronted from its founding onwards with the exodus of its citizenry.”7 
The urge to leave the GDR stemmed from a variety of sources including separation from family, 
economic hardship and political persecution. It is estimated that every other family in the GDR 
had relatives in West Germany and the continued separation imposed by the Berlin Wall was a 
constant self-described motivation amongst those seeking to leave.8 GDR citizens were also 
attuned to economic booms and busts in the relatively stable socialist economy. Applications to 
travel and exit in the 1970s corresponded with greater material hardship and diminishing quality 
of consumer goods caused by a shortage of hard currency. The two major spikes in applications 
to exit coincide not only with international treaties in 1972/3 and 1976/7, but also with domestic 
austerity measures in response to global economic problems when, “a sharp rise in the price of 
coffee, together with its adulteration with chicory and rye, occasioned widespread anger that was 
communicated in the form of a flood of Eingaben [petitions]”9 The 1970s was also a time of 
significantly reduced social and economic mobility as the positions created by the SED through 
the revolutionization of the state and economy as well as the mass emigration of the late 1950s 
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petered out.10 As the party and economic structure ossified and the possibility of advancement 
died out, demand to leave rose. 
While international diplomacy and activism did not create this demand for travel, the 
expression of such demands from East Germans and the SED reactions to them were influenced 
by external factors. The Helsinki Accords represented one of many international agreements and 
state supported documents cited by citizens seeking to leave, rather than a universal touchstone 
of dissent. The concept of threat of war by the imperialist and proto-fascist west was the core of 
the official explanation for why East Germans could not travel to the west and the basis for the 
legitimization of the Berlin Wall. When treaties were signed with West Germany in the 1970s, 
East Germans assumed, or at least chose to believe, that peaceful relations would once again 
allow them to cross the border if only to see family and earn money as they had with far greater 
ease prior to 1961. The human rights commitments of the SED were used for leverage, but the 
more consistent correlation in the growth of applications was with the expectation of normalized 
relations with the west from international agreements or summits, whether those contained 
human rights commitments or not. 
Leveraging Human Rights for Exit 
After a decade of steadily declining requests to travel and to emigrate due to the building 
of the Berlin Wall, in 1972, the number of applications once again began to rise.11 This first sign 
of a change came in connection with international treaties, but not necessarily agreements with 
human rights provisions. When the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin was signed in 1971 
reaffirming the post-war rights and responsibilities of the occupying powers that had been put in 
question by the multiple Berlin Crises of the 1950s and 1960s, the main question citizens asked 	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at public meetings was how this would make their own personal travel to the west easier.12 
Although requests to travel were not outright belligerent, reports noted that there were “citizens 
who are little prepared to bring themselves to understand the politically necessary measures in 
regards to travel and the reasons for their rejection are not recognized.”13 The agreement 
represented the affirmation of the old status quo and did not mention human rights, but signs of 
reconciliation between East and West caused expectations for easier travel. When East and West 
Germany signed a Transit Treaty in May 1972, which again made no mention of human rights, 
applications to travel to West Germany jumped by 20 percent from the first to the second 
quarter. Similarly, in the third quarter of that year written applications rose again another 27 
percent while in-person applications jumped by 55 percent.14 This trend continued in the third 
and fourth quarter as applications shot up another 60% and applications to permanently 
immigrate to West Germany doubled.15 By the end of the year, the total number of travel 
applications rose to more than 2600.16 While the treaty was meant to normalize travel procedures 
between the countries, the number of East Germans who could leave and the conditions under 
which they could do so did not greatly increase leading to widespread frustration. GDR citizens 
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again assumed that the normalization of relations on travel even without mutual diplomatic 
recognition would make it possible for them to travel to the west.  
These requests were, for the most part, similar to the pleas during Volksaussprache: 
writers first affirmed their support for the SED and portrayed their requests as simply an 
extension of state policy. Reports described how, “Many letters from citizens expressed their 
approval and delight of the conduct of the party of the working class and support for the policy 
of the Government of the German Democratic Republic of detente and the establishment of 
normal, international legal relations with the FRG.”17 These same reports, however, noted that 
citizens were becoming angrier over the continued inability to travel. In early 1972, a report 
pointed out that there was widespread “frustration and misunderstanding” surrounding the treaty 
leading East Germans to believe their application’s success was guaranteed.18 Later in the same 
year the reports also noted that many applicants, “have illusions about the previously achieved 
level of normalization of relations between the GDR and the FRG, especially on the character of 
Brandt government.”19 While East Germans connected Détente with liberalization, the SED 
wanted to both normalize relations while maintaining the state of emergency that legitimized its 
control over movement and travel. 
The first spike in demands to exit explicitly based on human rights terms following the 
Volksaussprache came in 1973 in connection with the Basic Treaty and the entry of the GDR 
into the United Nations. The Basic Treaty cited both the UN Charter and respect for human 
rights and self-determination, since upon becoming members in the United Nations the GDR was 
now an official signatory to the UN Human Rights Covenants, as Walter Ulbricht had promised 	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would occur in 1968. These agreements provided momentum for the growing wave of 
applications with increasing references to human rights from GDR citizens. One report argued, 
The accession of the GDR to various UN conventions prompted an increasing number of citizens 
to justify their complaints regarding rejected requests for emigration and travel to West Germany 
and the rejection of GDR citizenship with the fact that the ratification of the Covenant on Political 
and Civil human rights conferred upon them the right of free choice of citizenship and deter-
mining their place of residence and the rejection of their applications was therefore unlawful.20 
 
Applications that invoked international human rights norms came from citizens who had 
previously been rejected, sometimes repeatedly.  
The Helsinki Accords and Human Rights 
The Helsinki Accords, and the human rights provisions therein, are often portrayed as 
having an explosive effect on the number of GDR citizens demanding to exit the country. 
Numerous accounts cite contemporary western media reports of more than 100,000 applicants in 
1976 alone. 21 Some claim that this continued to grow at a catastrophic rate reaching 200,000 in 
1977 and 300,000 in 1978.22 Out of a population of approximately 16 million, such a wave of 
would-be emigrants would have been dramatically destabilizing. Though many academic works 
have continued to cite this invalidated data, examinations of SED archival sources by Bernd 
Eisenfeld, Manfred Gehrmann and Patrick Major show a far less drastic increase.23 In 1975, the 
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year the Accords were signed there were approximately 13,000 exit applications, rising to around 
20,000 the following year. The number of exit applications would not reach 100,000 annually 
until 1987.24 
While the number of applications has been exaggerated, the turn to human rights in the 
language of those applying to exit was clear. According to an internal SED report, in the fall of 
1975, when the number of applications jumped by 40 percent, every fourth letter explicitly 
mentioned the Helsinki Accords.25 In the early 1970s, East Germans reacted to the rejection of 
their applications to travel by demanding better explanations as citizens or to say, “we feel 
through this decision our honour has been wounded.”26 By the late 1978, however, reports noted, 
“The centrepiece of their arguments is the slander of the politics of the GDR in regards to the 
guarantee of human rights. The approval of their emigration is evaluated as a criteria of 
democracy, of personal freedom and the humanity of the social order.” 27 Human rights were 
now a discourse for the masses, rather than for isolated individuals. 
The SED reacted to increased demands to travel and to permanently emigrate with 
alacrity and brutality. In 1976, Erich Honecker sent word to party officials across the GDR that 
“in the recent past, revanchist powers of the Federal Republic have been desperately trying to 
establish a so-called human rights movement in the GDR […] It is, therefore, necessary to reject 
these circles. It also requires all organs to reject any petitions calling for the denaturalization and 	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departure as well as those referring to the CSCE Final Act.”28 Punishments for those applying to 
emigrate were increased and could include unemployment and imprisonment. The Stasi 
interpreted the increase in demands to exit as the product of a widening “enemy human rights 
campaign,” to create a political underground against the SED. International human rights 
organizations were branded as fronts for western intelligence organizations and contact with 
them deemed an act of espionage.29 When a West German human rights organization publicized 
the names of GDR citizens seeking to exit on the grounds of the Helsinki Accords in 1977, 
almost everyone listed was subsequently prosecuted for treason.30 
These countermeasures were highly effective and after the steady climb since 1975, 
applications to exit the GDR in 1978 fell by almost half.31 The slump in momentum from within 
the GDR was masked to the outside world by the rapid proliferation of human rights activism 
from abroad. In 1975, the brother of a prisoner in East Germany, in collaboration with Amnesty 
International, organized a letter writing campaign demanding his release based on UN human 
rights provision, which resulted in 40,000 petitions being sent to the SED.32 The International 
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Society for Human Rights, founded in 1972 in Frankfurt, greatly increased its activism and 
publicity campaign in West Germany and abroad to expose human rights abuses in the GDR.33 
Although in 1978, East German applications to travel and exit dropped off, the rapidly 
proliferating human rights organizations of Western Europe and North America began to 
bombard the SED with letters supporting East German requests to emigrate: letters from abroad 
in support of petitions to exit the GDR jumped 176% from the year before.34 
The Helsinki Accords provided East Germans with a new tool to demand the right to 
travel and exit, but the use of human rights specifically in international diplomacy did not 
contribute directly to the spike in applications. The reaction to the signing of the Helsinki 
Accords produced an expectation of easier travel similar to that of the early 1970s, but it is 
important to note that this expectation existed before the text of the Final Act was even printed in 
the GDR and the human rights provisions widely disseminated. The text of the Helsinki Accords 
was published in full only on 2 August 1975, in the national newspaper Neues Deutschland and 
other daily newspapers such as the Berliner Zeitung and the Christian-targeted (and CDU-DDR 
run) Neue Zeit. While the SED was careful to survey public opinion on the Helsinki Accords 
following the publication of its terms, there are a small number of reports on reactions to the 
completion of the CSCE process from July 1975, before anyone had read the final terms of the 
agreement, including the provisions on human rights. In these reports, East Germans were 
already anticipating an easing of travel restrictions. Officials in Leipzig complained of 
“uncertainties” about travel policy amongst GDR citizens and mentioned that alongside the 
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positive impressions of Helsinki there were also problems of “illusions.”35 SED functionaries 
from the Potsdam office gathered reports of similar expectations in the towns of Oranienburg, 
Zossen, Rathenow and Brandenburg an der Havel.36 Such euphemisms about anticipated 
liberalization mirror the language used in reports from the early 1970s following other treaties. 
The signing of the Helsinki Accords in order to bring about peace in Europe already raised 
expectations for free travel before East Germans had a chance to know that the Final Act 
contained specific commitments on human rights.  
 As Anja Hanisch has argued, “the ongoing procedural character of the CSCE [the 
Helsinki Process] was for many applying to emigrate, a recurring source of encouragement for 
hopes of humanitarian relief which were then submitted to the regime.”37 Follow-up meetings in 
the 1980s would spur on flurries of applications not as the result of revived inspiration from the 
text of the agreement, but from the same pattern of expectation and anticipation that marked the 
1970s. The desire to exit the GDR was dependent neither on international treaties nor on state 
rhetoric, but the manner of expression and the timing of the demands were. The Helsinki 
Accords did spark both an increase in applications to leave and an intensification in the use of 
human rights language, but this must be seen in the context of the earlier patterns of human 
rights protest and mass demands for exit. The rhetoric and forms of human rights usage in 
regarding the right to exit similarly shifted before Helsinki but became much more visible, in 
particular to the west, in its aftermath in the late 1970s. By the late 1970s, the repeated 
disappointments and rejections that had piled up since 1961 produced widespread frustration and 
anger at the SED. The Helsinki Accords acted as a spark that set off an existing explosive force, 	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but this initial reaction died down when, once again, the SED refused to give in to demands. It 
provided one more international treaty to invoke against the state, joining the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Covenants and the UN Charter, not to 
mention the East German Constitution and the Basic Treaty. By the late 1970s, GDR citizens had 
a variety of international documents and treaties they could appeal to, but when doing so failed 
to put a dent in the resolve of the SED and resulted in increased punishments, demands to exit 
once again dropped. 
Radicalization of Rhetoric and the Human Right to Exit 
Those who did employ the language of human rights in the 1970s were overwhelmingly 
would-be emigrants. As John Torpey has written, “the freedom to emigrate was often the alpha 
and omega of the human rights question in the GDR,” amongst those who had ceased to believe 
that domestic reform was possible.38 During the long 1970s there was a shift from the 
instrumentalization of international human rights treaties to a developing sense among emigrants 
that they had an inherent right to do so. While in the first half of the decade most applicants 
maintained the polite forms of “consentful contestation” that defined the human rights activism 
of the Volksaussprache, there were small pockets of radicalization emerging among those who 
had repeatedly been denied the right to travel or exit. By the end of the decade, most letters to the 
SED on the freedom to travel no longer politely asked for a civil right to do so based on 
international treaties, but rather demanded authorization to leave based on their inherent human 
right to do so. 
After the initial burst of demands during the Volksaussprache of 1968, the discourse of 
human rights in relation to freedom of movement steadily radicalized over the course of the 	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1970s. In 1973 officials noted that those seeking to leave were now claiming that the SED’s 
support for international human rights meant, “the rejection of their applications was therefore 
unlawful,” rather than politely encouraging the state to accept their request to avoid criticism 
from others.39 In that same year, a growing number of petitions threatened to appeal to the UN’s 
Human Rights Commission even though there were no mechanisms for doing so. Frustrations 
with official intransigence ran so high that 15 percent of applicants in 1973 actually told state 
authorities that if they were not issued an exit-visa they would be forced to depart the GDR 
illegally.40 In the case of the right to exit, some East Germans had come to see this right as so 
inherent that they were willing to act as though it were allowed in defiance of the state’s refusal 
of their position. 
In 1975, in reaction to the Helsinki Accords, officials reported that applicants were now 
stating that “the signature of Comrade Honecker in the final declaration could not be a mere 
cipher and therefore their travel or emigration application had to be permitted.”41 Not only were 
these demands based in law, they also implied that the SED leadership was personally liable for 
these promises. By 1977, attitudes had taken an even sharper turn as one evaluation of petitions 
to exit reported that the majority claimed a “right to free movement” based on “one-sided 
interpretations” of international documents, treaties and East German law. Such claims bore the 
“unmistakably increased ideological influence of imperialist mass media.”42 Radical demands to 
exit the GDR had appeared to be both exceptional and manageable in the early 1970s, but in the 
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wake of Helsinki the SED bureaucracy realized that it was dealing with a problem that could not 
be ignored. 
 In the 1970s, East Germans continued to leverage SED international human rights 
propaganda but they now flatly pointed out the gulf between rhetoric and reality while 
reappropriating SED slogans. In a letter to the SED’s department on church affairs, Barbara and 
Lutz S. from Sömmerda cited the activism of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights on 
violations in foreign countries and after berating the official that “human rights begin at home,” 
they requested his assistance in procuring a permit to exit in order to “allow our family to realize 
the right to self-determination.”43 Others, like Siegmar Faust, did not just appropriate the 
language of the SED but the whole catalogue of human rights causes that the GDR touted in the 
media to press their case forward. Faust argued that SED propaganda on imperialist 
interventionism and right-wing dictatorships in Chile, Uruguay, Vietnam, Laos and Portugal was 
“laughable” because of the many political prisoners in the GDR.  He questioned why the SED 
became “suddenly allergic to any mention of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Helsinki Final Act,” when it was directed at themselves.44 
East Germans also became more willing to employ human rights discourse in public and 
to transgress the norms of official complaint over the decade. In 1973, forty-one people in Pirna 
signed a mass letter supporting the petition to exit of four local residents, including Siegmar 
Faust.45 While the letter itself remained within the style of an official approved complaint, the act 
of community organizing with multiple signatures was itself provocative. While during the 
Volksaussprache such behaviour was excused, likely because social organizations and factories 	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were encouraged to produce group declarations of support, petitioning the state was meant to be 
an individual act of communication by a citizen expressing personal concern. Collective letters 
implied the existence of structures outside the control and direction of the SED hierarchy and 
reeked of ambitions towards opposition.  
 Some took their protest into the streets representing a major escalation in the GDR where 
all public political action was tightly controlled and orchestrated from above. In April 1974, 
Karin and Werner Karl Nuthmann, a working class couple from Brandenburg, came to 
Alexanderplatz, the main public square of East Berlin, and set up a small protest with homemade 
signs about the right to free movement citing UN human rights conventions and the East German 
constitution.46 Both were arrested and Werner Karl was put in a psychiatric hospital for a short 
time before both were sent to West Germany. In January 1975, six months before the signing of 
the Helsinki Accords, a group of three protesters gathered at the Brandenburg Gate with signs 
accusing the SED of human rights violations in regards to the right to travel. They were arrested 
and sentenced to more than four years in prison for “subversive agitation” and “slander against 
the state”.47 That same year, Martin Böttger, later an influential activist in the 1980s, went to his 
local May Day parade with a poster demanding the realization of human rights.48 
 After the passage of the Helsinki Accords, human rights demands were made more 
publicly and with greater media savvy. In 1977, when one protester went to the East German 
parliament building, the Palace of the Republic with a sign saying “Freedom and Human Rights 
– Let me Leave!” he made sure to notify western journalists and the embassy of the Federal 	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Republic to get the maximum publicity.49 Petitioners not only circulated their letters within the 
community to gain multiple signatures but also distributed their complaints to the western media. 
The most famous and well-publicized case of post-Helsinki human rights activism is that of Dr. 
Karl-Heinz Nitschke of the town of Riesa. Dr. Nitschke had previously sought to emigrate in 
1973 on the grounds of being reunited with a sister who lived in West Germany. After this was 
denied, he opted for a more public approach by drafting a letter accusing the SED of systematic 
violations of human rights and invoked his right to leave the country along with his family based 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN’s International Human Rights Covenants 
and the Helsinki Accords.50  
While in some Eastern Bloc countries, human rights claims appealed primarily to the 
educated and the intelligentsia, a Stasi investigation showed that this petition had support from a 
broad cross-section of the East German citizenry.51 The doctor posted the letter in his office in 
Riesa so that others could sign in support which initially garnered thirty-three signatures as well 
as a later list of twenty more supporters from the same town, twelve more in Karl-Marx-Stadt 
and two more from the district of Meißen. Of the thirty-three initial signatures, twenty-two were 
workers (most from the local pipe-making manufactory VEB Rohrkombinat Riesa), seven office 
workers, one a doctor, one an engineer (both classified as members of the intelligentsia) as well 
as one person on a disability pension and a housewife. This letter was then sent to the United 
Nations, West German newspapers, the International League for Human Rights in Frankfurt and 
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a number of organizations in West Germany devoted to assisting emigrants from the GDR.52 The 
signatories were all arrested, but international pressure and the standard process of West 
Germany purchasing the freedom of imprisoned would-be emigrants resulted in most being 
released to the Federal Republic.53 
Rejection, Repetition and Internalization 
East Germans came to believe in a human right to exit not from external pressure but 
rather from the long and arduous process of trying to actually leave the GDR. In repeatedly 
asking for permission to leave East Germans sought new vocabularies of protest and engaged 
with these new discourse through letters and conversations with officials. After appeals based on 
civic identity and dignity as citizens failed, human rights provided a means of legitimizing 
demands based on an authority beyond the SED. When the SED responded to applications with 
coercion and intimidation including loss of jobs, benefits and even imprisonment this acted to 
break the social bonds of GDR citizens with their community and at the same time strengthening 
the appeal of the human rights discourse. As Hannah Arendt argued, the paradox of human rights 
is that their existence and their loss “coincides with the instant a person becomes a human being 
in general – without profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by 
which to identify and specify himself.”54 While initial inquiries to SED officials instrumentalized 
human rights language, the repeated engagement with human rights and the social sanctions 
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incurred from doing so, resulted in a “shift in subjectivity” wherein citizens came to internalize 
the language they were using in protest. 55. 
The personal escalation from demands rooted in civic identity to international human 
rights sometimes occurred rapidly, as with the case of Günter Knoblauch, a student from 
Dresden. Having been convicted of “Attempting to Flee the Republic,” in 1967 he was both 
kicked out of his university program and imprisoned for more than a year. Upon his release, he 
once again sought to leave the GDR. Having “returned” his personal identification papers 
directly to the head of the Ministry of the Interior with a request that this allow him to leave, he 
was fired from his factory job in 1970. He wrote to officials again requesting permission to leave 
since he could stand being a “second class” man within the GDR. At this point, Knoblauch 
turned to the language of human rights to justify his case. In his next letter to authorities in that 
same year he demanded to be allowed to emigrate based on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the text of the GDR’s Proclamation to the International Human Rights Conference in 
Tehran in May 1968.56 Human rights stood at the end of a process of trial and error rather than 
the beginning.     
The example of Siegmar Faust demonstrates the process of through which human rights 
became essential to some East German’s self-conceptions as they sought to emigrate. Faust was 
a writer who had been expelled from multiple universities in the 1960s due to his supposedly 
politically unreliable opinions. Placed under Stasi surveillance in 1968, he was subsequently 
jailed for contacts with West Germany where he sought to publish some of his writings that had 	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been banned in the GDR.57 In 1972, he was released from prison as part of a broader amnesty in 
honour of the 23rd Anniversary of the founding of the GDR and soon after he began the process 
of leaving the country altogether.58 In August 1973, he wrote letters to the GDR’s attorney 
general and local officials renouncing his citizenship and requesting to leave the country based 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Covenants, the 1968 GDR 
Constitution and East German citizenship law.59  
In Faust’s early letters to SED authorities, he used the idea of human rights in two ways: 
first, contrasting general statements by the SED in support of human rights claims with his own 
unjust treatment and desire to leave and second, references to specifically violated human rights 
norms as part of his own narrative of suffering. Human rights served as an external and objective 
authority that validated his grievances against the state in the case of his unfair dismissal from 
work to his imprisonment for speaking out. By 1976, when he was again jailed for criticism, 
Faust’s discourse had shifted. From his prison cell in Cottbus he produced a handwritten 
newsletter called Armes Deutschland (Poor Germany), a parody of the SED’s national 
newspaper Neues Deutschland (New Germany) that was to be an “organ of those fighting for 
civil and human rights.”60 Human rights had shifted from a series of legal norms that Faust used 
to shame the SED into a central component of his identity. He was not longer just using human 
rights as a discourse but also embodying them through his struggle. His everyday demands had 
been fused with the abstract norms of international treaties so that he was not only someone 
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seeking to leave the GDR but a “fighter for human rights,” and his personal interests were now 
integrated into a grand narrative of the struggle for global justice.  
While those seeking to emigrate certainly behaved as though they genuinely believed 
they had a right to exit, the language of rights was not the exclusive vocabulary used to express 
these demands. Although East Germans used international human rights documents and treaties 
to support their claims to exit, they were willing to use a wide variety of languages and tactics to 
protest the rejection of their applications and used any material provided by the SED to 
legitimize their demands.61 In the immediate wake of Helsinki, methods of protesting travel 
restrictions included suicide threats, hunger strikes and public protests where East Germans 
waved homemade signs, burned their official documents and chained themselves to objects and 
buildings.62 In 1981, a report mentions that in addition to international law and human rights, the 
GDR Constitution and laws on citizenship, 
new arguments include increased references to GDR publications such as the autobiography of 
Comrade Erich Honecker, "From My Life", the textbook "Constitutional Law," the brochure 
"Nationality - German citizenship GDR," as well as the interviews of Comrade Erich Honecker 
with the chief editor of the Saarbrücker Zeitung and the British publisher Robert Maxwell. 63 
 
East Germans were omnivorous when it came to repurposing SED rhetoric in their applications 
and human rights was one tool of many. 
 The unique situation in the GDR of the availability of a non-socialist alternative where 
East Germans could emigrate to created a rift amongst those who opposed the status quo. Those 
that did view political and civil rights as essential to human equality sought to go to West 
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Germany where they believed that these rights had already been realized instead of fighting for 
them within the GDR. The case of Rainer Bäurich, an engineer from Dresden who served five 
year in prison for sending a manifesto on human rights to Erich Honecker, is one example of 
those who simply embraced the idea of becoming West Germans rather than seeking to change 
the seemingly un-reformable GDR.64 In making his case for his emigration, Bäurich stated, “I 
unreservedly declare my allegiance to the FRG, which I regard as my fatherland, now that the 
territory of the GDR has obviously been lost to Germany […] I am tormented by this yearning 
for the FRG, because this free, pluralistic welfare state is my intellectual and political home.”65 
For those who believed in the idea of liberal democratic human rights, it made more sense to go 
to where they already were in force rather than try to challenge the entrenched position of the 
SED. 
Such statements by emigrants strained solidarity with other dissidents and distanced those 
still loyal to the ideals of socialism from those who employed the discourse of human rights the 
most. Wolfgang Templin, one of the later founders of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, 
attributes the delay in the emergence of a human rights movement in the GDR to the widespread 
use of human rights language for the purposes of emigration.66 He argues that such claims that 
changing the GDR was hopeless created a strong psychological disincentive towards dissent for 
others: 
It was hard enough to say, “I don’t just want to complain, I don’t want to just accept things as 
they are, I want to do something,” – then someone else’s decision, the decision of a friend, who 
had had just as many critical experiences, and then says, “There’s no point in staying, you can’t 
change anything here,” that was very difficult.67 	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While those seeking to exit the GDR took up the discourse of human rights as a means of 
resistance, the ideological and social implications of their demands to leave East Germany rather 
than change it from within acted to neutralize human rights as a discourse of opposition. As 
Albert Hirschman argued, the capacity to exit served as an “antagonist to voice,” in general and 
the same applied to the development of the discourse of human rights. As citizens engaged with 
the idea of human rights to legitimize their departure from East Germany, they discouraged 
others who sought to stay and reform the GDR from employing international human rights 
language.68  
The Church between Resistance and Cooptation 
Following the minor victory in 1968 in restoring official recognition of religious practice 
as a human right, the Protestant and Catholic churches took diverging paths. While the Catholic 
Church largely withdrew from engaging with the problem of human rights in East Germany, 
Protestants increasingly sought to reconcile their theological views with the emerging 
international human rights community. Some historians and former leaders of the Protestant 
Church in East Germany (Bund Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR or BEK) have portrayed the 
engagement of the church as an act of independence or opposition against the SED and official 
ideology.69 Since the early 1990s, however, scholars and those who occupied less senior 
positions within the church have demonstrated that the idea of human rights served a more 
ambiguous role and that there was a wide gulf between the opinions of the leadership and the 
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rank and file.70 While local pastors wanted to use human rights themes to push for greater 
freedom, the leaders of the church suppressed dissent and bought into the human rights discourse 
of the SED. The “neutralization” of human rights politics from within, as Ehrhart Neubert 
describes it, was achieved largely through internal pressure by church officials and not just 
through the actions of the state security apparatus.71 
The Protestant Church’s engagement with human rights was based on larger trends in the 
Christian world and the interests of the Church as an institution; contrary to the arguments of 
Gerhard Besier, in this case it was not just an extension of the SED’s own propaganda system.72 
On the other hand, Detlef Pollack’s conception of the church as an institution with limited 
autonomy that could provide “ideologically neutral” spaces, is undercut by the fact that 
protestant human rights language was thoroughly embedded in discourse of the SED.73 Church 
institutions accepted the broad conception of socialist human rights: rights came from social 
relations not from natural law or God and the world was divided between bourgeois and socialist 
versions thereof. Rather than choose sides, the church leadership claimed to beyond such 
political concerns and that it was only interested in basic rights that existed across all socio-
economic systems. While ostensibly neutral, this position trivialized the idea that problems of 
democracy were connected to problems of human rights and was used to prevent members from 
“politicizing” such a purely moral issue. The church voluntarily and enthusiastically entered into 	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the field of human rights and it was not just doing the bidding of the state, but in trying to walk 
the tightrope of endorsing human rights without antagonizing the SED, the neutrality of its 
private space was compromised. As Eli Rubin has argued, even when East Germans rejected 
“overt forms of ideology,” in their daily lives it did not mean that they could live in “ideology-
free zones,” of their own making.74  
 In the late 1960s and 1970s, Christians worldwide increasingly adopted the language of 
human rights as an aspect of theology. While earlier, human rights talk had been seen as the 
territory of “anti-clerical liberalism and atheistic socialism,” the endorsement of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by the Pope in 1963 and the use of human rights as by 
international and ecumenical organizations such as the World Council of Churches helped to 
propagate and legitimize the idea of human rights as compatible and in harmony with the tenets 
of Christianity. Of particular influence in East Germany was the Lutheran World Federation, 
which took up the problem of human rights at its global conference at Evian in 1970.  
 The Catholic Church in the GDR used the language of human rights to advance the cause 
of Christians, but the meaning of human rights remained limited to issues of religion. As Bernd 
Schäfer has written, “many leading Catholic officials had a limited view of freedom and human 
rights that included only the freedom to practice one’s religion in services and the freedom of 
conscience to live their lives in the Catholic faith.”75 The Catholic Church continued to advance 
church doctrine through appeals to human rights in the early 1970s. For example in 1972, 
Catholic bishops used the Universal Declaration and the 1968 Constitution to demand that 
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doctors had a right to refuse to perform abortions.76 In the same year, the SED reacted poorly to 
Archbishop of Berlin Alfred Bengsch using human rights language to advance the position of the 
Church when he connected his demands to the admission to the GDR into the United Nations.77 
In 1974, Catholic bishops argued that the Universal Declaration protected the parents’ right to 
choose how their child was educated.78 While SED officials were often frustrated by the 
insistence of the Church and Archbishop Bengsch in particular, that categories of “bourgeois 
human rights” remained relevant, the Catholic Church did not, however, step into explicitly 
political territory with its use of human rights language and stuck to using the vocabulary only to 
promote the interests of the Church and to lobby for explicitly Catholic social policies.79  
 Some Protestants went even farther in this era, particularly the East German branch of the 
Lutheran World Federation. In 1973, it produced a study Concerns for a Human World: The 
Normativity and Relativity of Human Rights. It declared, “The struggle for the dignity and rights 
of man is ongoing. Our churches cannot remain neutral in this struggle.”80 The authors saw 
human rights both as a matter of pressing moral importance and also as a political opportunity. 
They argued that, “advocacy for humanity and human rights will provide legitimacy for our 
activities…even if efforts to implement human rights are inherently illegal.”81 Such advocacy 
would not just include campaigning against injustice in the developing world such as the existing 
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Church programs against racism and Apartheid, but also pushed for the criticism of domestic 
policy. The report noted that while SED human rights theory legitimized state policy in areas 
such as criminal law in terms that would satisfy the United Nations, “this interpretation is, 
however, not in accord with reality.”82 Efforts to publish the study were stopped by the SED, but 
copies circulated within the Church.83  
 While such rhetoric existed in Christian circles, there were also Christians, particularly 
those in the leadership of the Protestant Church who avoided making any claims to human rights 
abuses within the GDR. Church leaders sought to describe human rights in ideologically neutral 
terms and refused to endorse either western liberalism or state-socialism while others followed 
the SED line outright with an added emphasis on the freedom of religion and belief. The 
Ecumenical Youth Service, an East German Christian group based in Berlin, devoted an 18-page 
issue of its newsletter to matters of human rights in 1974. Much of the content was inspired by 
the World Council of Churches consultation meeting in St. Pölten, Austria where human rights 
were the main theme. The content of the newsletter was hardly incendiary and encouraged 
readers to engage with the idea of human rights critically without advancing any specific claims 
or demands for domestic changes. “Appealing to ’human rights‘ is an easy way to show that 
everything needs to change in this world. But are ’human rights‘ themselves an unquestionable 
guidepost?” 84 It warned that many times those who invoke human rights do so for the purpose of 
propaganda and even churches are “not free from the prejudices, emotions and commitments that 
are visible in secular discussion.”85 	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 Such seemingly neutral commentary was accompanied by articles on human rights 
violations in South Africa and Chile as well as an article on the meaning of human rights 
produced by the “UN Study Group of the GDR Christian Peace Conference.” The article 
perfectly reproduced the ideological line of the GDR Committee for Human Rights with a few 
points of Christian theology added on. The history of human rights presented by the Study Group 
mirrored that Hermann Klenner’s works:  bourgeois revolutionary rights produced an unequal 
exploitative society but Lenin’s innovations in the “Declaration of the Rights of the Working and 
Exploited Peoples,” finally brought about a truly liberating vision of human rights. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is presented as the continuation of the socialist ideal – 
the abstention of the Soviet bloc at the United Nations in 1948 is naturally omitted – and the 
socialist world is shown to be valiantly fighting for real human rights in the face of capitalist 
obstruction at the United Nations.86 As to human rights under socialism, “the building of a 
socialist society can be understood as a comprehensive attempt to create social conditions for the 
realization of human rights.”87 While Christians were being exposed to human rights ideas 
through such publications, these ideas were carefully packaged and framed according to the 
ideological line of the SED. 
 Some senior members of the Church sought to acknowledge the SED’s position on 
human rights and avoid siding wholly with its western enemies while still advancing a critique of 
real existing socialism. In spring 1975, Bishop Hans-Joachim Fränkel, who had prepared 
theological interpretations of human rights for distribution in 1968, took to the pulpit to examine 
the problem of human rights in biblical terms. He argued that in all societies there existed a 
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tension between the ideal of individual rights and social rights and that no society could fully 
realize all human rights equally. Although even-handed in his criticism of both liberal capitalism 
and state socialism, he provocatively added, “Action in the struggle against racism cannot be an 
alibi to refrain from standing up for human rights at home.”88 Fränkel rooted his interpretation of 
human rights as integral to the cause of realizing the Christian mission to care for one another 
and did not adopt the liberal democratic language of western human rights activists but he was 
also willing to criticize the GDR. 
 By the mid-1970s, the Church was effectively split between those who sought to use 
human rights for protest by tacitly accepting the SED line and demanding more rights for 
Christians, and those who saw human rights as a means to legitimize more drastic, and possibly 
illegal, resistance to SED rule and state socialism in general. The state security apparatus was 
alarmed by the Church’s activities but it recognized that some factions in the Church were a 
threat while others could serve the purposes of the SED. One report distinguished those in the 
Church who “sought through human rights arguments to further the tolerance of the religion and 
the activities of the Church,” and “the reactionary representatives of the Church in the DDR who 
go farther and insinuate that the socialist state violates human rights and use this to go after the 
sovereignty and legitimacy of the state and the leading role of the party and to reject the 
education based on class consciousness.”89 While the one faction could be reasoned with, the 
other was acting as an agent of imperialism to destroy socialism itself and had to be stopped. 
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The Protestant Church Responds to Helsinki  
The Catholic Church in the GDR ceased to engage the problem of human rights 
altogether around the time of Helsinki. After the 1974 letter on education and human rights, the 
next official mention of human rights by the Catholic Church in East Germany would not come 
until the fall of 1989.90 The Protestant Church, on the other hand, welcomed the signing of the 
Helsinki Accords in 1975, but its members split on why. The radical faction sought to use human 
rights for political purposes but the leadership of the BEK would neutralize them in the ensuing 
years as part of the Church leadership’s larger project of normalizing church-state relations. 91 
The BEK saw human rights as an effective means for their community to promote peace and to 
combat racism abroad as well as to protect religious believers and military draft resisters at home. 
To fruitlessly challenge SED rule would simply undermine these more important goals. In order 
to gain the trust of the atheistic state, the BEK would negotiate a deal in 1978 in which they 
would be recognized as a “Church in Socialism,” able to carry out their tasks but the Church 
agreed that it would not become a “site of opposition” or a disguised opposition party.”92 Human 
rights would become a flashpoint in the conflict within the Church over its place in the GDR. 
In 1976, copies of the Helsinki Accords and other international human rights documents 
were distributed to churches across the GDR and the Church organized educational seminars to 
teach local pastors how to integrate human rights with protestant theology.93 Yet this new 
engagement with human rights took quite a conciliatory position towards the SED and its 
policies. In order to gain a position where the Church could be more active in East German 
society, senior officials sought to reassure the SED that they would not challenge their political 	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legitimacy. In a 1976 paper on Church policy towards human rights, Manfred Stolpe, Head of the 
Secretariat of the Federation of Evangelical Churches, argued that human rights were universal 
and “because they concern man and humanity we will advocate human rights.” At the same time, 
he also claimed that the GDR had actually already fulfilled all of its human rights obligations 
demanded by international law and that criticisms of the SED “usually come from a one-sided 
individualistic understanding of human rights.”94 The document showed the Church’s interest in 
a greater role in East German society but also signalled to the SED that as an institution it had no 
interest in challenging the power of the state or siding with outsiders in attacking the GDR.  
In subsequent writings as approved by the church leadership, this position was refined.95 
As depicted by the BEK, the world was divided by conflicting visions of human rights between 
the capitalist West and socialist East. The Church would not take sides in this conflict but rather 
saw both sides as two imperfect systemic efforts to realize human rights. Rather than engage in 
this political battle, it was the duty of the Church to fight for basic human rights that were 
universal and not dependent on broader ideological questions of political or economic structures. 
In practice, this support for universal human rights focussed on issues of freedom of conscience, 
anti-racism, oppression of the Third World and relieving the suffering of the poor. By claiming 
that essential human rights were wholly separable from problems of politics, the Protestant 
Church obliquely endorsed the SED position that dictatorship and human rights were compatible. 
In doing so, the Church sought to act on the margins and without fanfare to deal with problems 
such as helping conscientious objectors rather than demanding political or economic changes. 
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In advocating human rights in the 1970s, the Church leadership made sure that it could 
not be accused of supporting the enemies of socialism by avoiding contact with outside human 
rights organizations and suppressing dissent internally. While seeking to assist conscientious 
objectors at home, the Protestant Church actively rejected working with foreign NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International, that had similar goals. The BEK refused to share information let alone 
assist in campaigning.96 When a group of theology students from Naumburg produced and 
publically distributed what was known as the “Querfurt Paper,” rejecting the idea of class 
conflict and called for pluralism and human rights, the BEK was similarly unsupportive. 
Although they did not explicitly attack the SED or endorse liberal democracy, such talk was 
enough to bring about disciplinary action by the Church hierarchy as well as subject the students 
to scrutiny by the Stasi.97 
 Those who sought to discuss human rights within the walls of the church, but still outside 
the ideological and theological boundaries prescribed by the BEK found themselves stifled by 
the Church leaders. The best example of this was Ulrich Woronowicz, a pastor in Brandenburg 
who as a theology student fled to West Germany in the early 1950s but later returned to continue 
working for the Church.98 In the late 1970s, he created the “Working Group on Human Rights” 
in the town of Wittenberge. Woronowicz did not simply want to discuss human rights in the 
abstract but rather he consistently sought to transform human rights ideas into a concrete means 
of mobilizing Christians to fight injustice and to legitimize criticism of the abuses by the SED. 	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He wrote in the idiom of East German Christians combining the language of international human 
rights politics with the everyday vocabulary of prayer and worship. In theoretical terms, he was 
the ultimate “translator” who could take abstract human rights ideas and place them in the 
vernacular of the GDR. 
Woronowicz and his group produced and distributed sermons and prayers that used 
human rights language and incorporated international human rights documents for churches 
across the Brandenburg region. In 1978, he wrote a version of the Lord’s Prayer to incorporate 
human rights: 
Lord, Thou God of justice and peace, 
You call on us to be the voice of the voiceless. 
That is why we lament to you the disregard of human dignity in many countries. 
We'll lament the violation of guaranteed human rights in our own country. 
We think about… (Individuals, groups and issues can be called here.) 
We ask you: 
Forgive the guilty, 
Heal the suffering, 
Free the prisoners, 
But encourage us to resist violence and injustice.99 
 
For the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that same year, his group 
prepared prayers to commemorate the occasion, openly challenging the Church line. Instead of 
using a conciliatory tone, one said “we lament to you [God] the violation and contempt for 
human rights in many countries around the world and in our own,” asking for divine help in 
having the courage to “defend against injustice within the church and in the world.”100   
 Such initiative from below was not appreciated at the top levels of the Church. When 
Woronowicz sent material on human rights directly to the BEK that was not already approved by 
his local superiors, it was simply returned.101 Not only did he challenge the official line of the 	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Church on human rights, but he was accusing it of participating in such violations and when he 
spoke out, he did so in a way that challenged the legitimacy of the hierarchy. In 1979, the 
“Working Group on Human Rights” was disbanded under intense pressure from the Church and 
interference from the Stasi.102 While Woronowicz and others continued to play an active role as 
dissidents, their organizational basis for doing so from within the Church was broken up. 
 The SED reacted positively to the BEK’s ideological perspective and its actions in 
relation to human rights politics in the late 1970s. Within the SED bureaucracy it was noted 
almost immediately after the signing of the Helsinki Accords that Church activities on the CSCE 
process were notably free of imperialist propaganda. A report on a meeting on the Helsinki 
Accords held by the church in Buckow in October 1975 described the discussion as having “no 
anti-communist tendencies,” and happily observed that the “consciousness of the CSCE process 
in socialist countries was praised.”103 This appreciation continued through into the early 1980s. 
When the BEK produced the short book “Human Rights and Christian Responsibility” in 1981, a 
reviewer for the ministry responsible for Church oversight declared that the text was “an explicit 
rejection of the imperialist forces and enemies of Détente that seek to incorporate the Churches 
of the GDR into the anti-communist and interventionist conception of human rights.”104 The 
engagement of the Church with human rights was viewed positively by the state so long as it 
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followed the SED line on international affairs, criticized human rights abuses in the capitalist 
world and downplayed human rights violations in the GDR and under socialism in general.105 
The Protestant Church had adopted the language of human rights to promote its values, 
but in turn, its public work was coopted by the SED as a means of reinforcing the socialist 
position. SED propagandists seized upon positive statements by the Church on the compatibility 
of state socialism with human rights to buttress their own claims of legitimacy. Guidelines 
produced by the Ministry of Justice on combating pacifism actually cited Church publications to 
claim religious backing for state defence policy.106 Socialist human rights theorists quoted 
Church documents, which themselves sometimes quoting SED propaganda, to claim that even 
the Church agreed that human rights were not inherent moral principles or discoveries of 
Christianity but the product of contemporary social and economic relations.107 Although the 
Church was able to carve out a space for a conception of human rights grounded in Christian 
ethics, it did so at the price of reinforcing and legitimizing the hegemonic state discourse of 
human rights. 
Rights without Human Rights Politics 
 While East German citizens turned to emigration and the Church was co-opted by the 
SED, the GDR elite remained reluctant to adopt the idea of human rights as a basis for resistance 
and opposition in the 1970s. In December 1975, fifty-nine intellectuals in Poland sent an open 
letter to the government demanding the safeguarding of human rights based on the Polish 
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constitution and the recently signed Helsinki Accords.108 In 1977, in Czechoslovakia, the 
formation of the human rights organization Charter 77 was led by cultural luminaries such as 
Vaclav Havel and Pavel Kohout, intellectuals like Jan Patočka and disillusioned Communist 
Party elites such as Zdeněk Mlynář and Jiří Hájek.109 In the USSR, human rights dissidents 
active since the 1960s formed Helsinki Monitoring groups in Moscow, Georgia, Ukraine and 
Armenia.110 In the GDR, by contrast, the elite figures in the fields of culture, academia and the 
SED bureaucracy did not form any kind of significant oppositional organizations nor did they 
take part in the international human rights movement.  
The most prominent examples of the intellectual elite dissenting in the 1970s showed 
little sign that human rights as a discourse would come to be so important in the following 
decade. When the popular singer Wolf Biermann was stripped of his East German citizenship 
and expelled for criticism of the SED in 1976, GDR intellectuals petitioned the state to 
reconsider citing his loyalty to East Germany instead of posing any abstract right of free 
expression.111 The internationally famous dissident chemist Robert Havemann only occasionally 
brought up the subject of human rights and rejected the efforts of western human rights activism. 
Before his expulsion from the GDR, the SED functionary turned eco-utopian prophet Rudolf 
Bahro rejected the human rights movement in Eastern Europe entirely and ridiculed those who 
would follow the agenda of an American President. East German dissidents sought to reform the 
GDR from within while remaining convinced of the need for a system based on true anti-fascist 	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socialism, divorced from the “bourgeois” liberal democracy of the west. Although western media 
portrayed dissent as action on behalf of human rights, those engaged in dissent in the GDR 
studiously avoided such language and connections with international activism. 
 Two main factors separating East Germany from the rest of the Socialist Bloc explain 
why the GDR was an exception in this decade: the continuing residual legitimacy of socialism 
due to the role of communists in opposing the Nazi State and the pre-existing hegemonic 
discourse of human rights as propagated by the GDR-Committee for Human Rights.112 While 
activists in the rest of Eastern Europe and even the USSR compared oppression to that inflicted 
by the Nazis, in the GDR, the official culture of anti-fascism made such ideas untenable. 
Communism embodied the opposition to fascism and while the reality of SED rule did not 
inspire much loyalty, most East Germans who had experienced the Third Reich had embraced 
the idea that they were now absolved of guilt for those events due to the triumph of the primary 
political opponents of Nazism. Especially amongst élites, the ideal of anti-fascism still held sway 
and prevented the wholesale rejection of socialism as a viable route to reform.  
Unlike the rest of the Socialist Bloc, the earlier conflicts of the SED with West Germany 
had prepared them ideologically for the wave of international human rights criticism that 
exploded in the late 1970s. Elites in East Germany were not necessarily convinced by the 
propaganda produced by the GDR-Committee for Human Rights, but its ideological 
indoctrination fostered a Manichean perspective that demanded siding with either socialism or 
capitalism in the global fight for human rights. The Committee’s propaganda through the 1970s, 
featuring the intensification of western nuclear weapons deployment, the horrors of South 
African Apartheid and the brutality of the military Junta’ of South America, put these socialist 
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elites into a difficult position should they seek to criticize the SED in similar terms. The 
dominant human rights discourse allowed for the total endorsement of socialism or the total 
rejection, with no gray area in between.  
The GDR-Committee for Human Rights remained the only such body organized in the 
communist world and it continued to adapt human rights propaganda to the shifting needs of the 
SED and to disseminate these ideas to the cultural, intellectual and party elites. The Committee 
maintained the integrity of the SED’s hegemonic discourse of human rights by preparing 
responses to criticism and ensuring that officials would be ready to engage with questions from 
citizens. Beginning in 1975, it created a bilingual quarterly journal – “Schriften und 
Informationen” in German and more prosaically “Bulletin” in English – that would provide 
information on socialist human rights theory concerning contemporary problems, commemorate 
important events in human rights history and document human rights victories in the socialist 
Bloc and atrocities in the west and the developing world. Articles provided up-to-date 
ideological interpretations of international law and gave readers the official line on what events 
around the world constituted human rights abuses and how. Rather than retreat from the topic of 
human rights, in the late 1970s, news coverage vastly expanded. Committee protests regarding 
human rights abuses in West Germany and the rest of the capitalist world filled the pages of the 
East German national newspaper Neues Deutschland. While the number of articles mentioning 
human rights in the paper hovered around 250 per year in 1975 and 1976. In 1977 this shot up to 
793 of which there were 173 articles just on human rights abuses in Chile under the Junta and 
another 55 on human rights violations under Apartheid in South Africa.113 
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Diplomatically, the SED also maintained its earlier position on human rights and refused 
to give an inch, ideologically at least, to foreign pressure. Publicly, SED leader Erich Honecker 
maintained that the GDR had fully realized human rights and denied that there could be such a 
thing as genuine civil rights activism in the East Germany as the supposed dissidents were really 
just western provocateurs.114 In private discussions between diplomats, East German 
representatives refused to accept the possibility that the SED had violated human rights or the 
validity of any such criticism from another country. While the American government, following 
President Jimmy Carter’s new emphasis on human rights in foreign policy sought to apply moral 
pressure on SED officials, they did not budge. In 1978, when American Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights Patricia Derian visited East Berlin to meet with the Deputy Foreign Minister Kurt 
Nier, she was unable to gain even the acknowledgement that the United States had a legitimate 
right to discuss human rights problems within East German borders. While Nier argued that 
massive violations of human rights, such as those taking place in South Africa, Chile and Central 
America, made internal affairs an international issue, to criticize state socialism would cross a 
line and violate the spirit of Détente. Derian then sought to convey her point by way of analogy: 
in a neighbourhood where everyone kept neat gardens it would become a matter for community 
discussion if someone began to keep goats in their front yard. Nier coldly responded that if they 
were to have problems with goats going where they should not, one could always build a wall to 
maintain order.115 With that, the topic of conversation was quickly changed. In a report from the 
following year, Derian concluded that while the United States might support dissidents such as 
Robert Havemann (1910-1982), we should  “be modest in our assessment of what we can do in 
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the short run.”116 With the SED holding its ground and refusing to accept the idea that it violated 
any human rights, it was not possible to express support for change based on human rights 
without appearing to be taking the side of the west against the cause of socialism. 
 The cultural elite of East Germany was particularly influenced by this discursive 
hegemony. Artists produced works of art protesting human rights abuses in Chile – in 1973 
Henryk Berg produced a collage entitled “Pinochet: Human Rights, Parties, Unions, Culture, 
Free Elections – all over.” But they were unwilling to apply such language to similar problems in 
the GDR.117 While writers such as Christa Wolf, Stefan Heym, Jurek Becker and Volker Braun 
were willing to speak out against SED repression of artists, such as the expulsion of singer Wolf 
Biermann in 1976, they did not adopt human rights ideas as a means of challenging the state and 
they did not expand their protest to the level of opposition. As Mark Thompson has argued, in 
contrast to Czechoslovakia where artists such as playwright Vaclav Havel were crucial to the 
early formation of a human rights opposition, the cultural dissidents of the GDR were more “a 
counter-cultural movement than a counter-elite.”118 Just as the GDR-Committee on Human 
Rights worked to maintain the hegemonic discourse of human rights, the Writers’ Union 
functioned here more directly as a disciplinary institution to keep people in line. As Thomas 
Goldstein’s dissertation demonstrates, in the late 1970s, cultural elites in the GDR were no 
longer given room for dissent within official structures. By 1979 when nine members of the 
Writers’ Union were expelled in part for their protests against the expulsion of Wolf Biermann 
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“authors who harboured divergent views on cultural and political questions in East Germany had 
one choice: expulsion or marginalization.”119 
The SED line on human rights also put other intellectuals outside of the field of cultural 
affairs into a difficult position. The one-time Stalinist turned dissident, Robert Havemann was 
one of the most influential and best known East German activists of the 1970s and his 
intellectual engagement with the problem of human rights was ambiguous and conflicted. A 
chemist by training, Havemann had been imprisoned during the Third Reich for his membership 
in the Communist Party and his activism with the resistance organization European Union of 
which he had been a founding member. In the post-war period, he was initially an enthusiastic 
supporter of the SED, attained a position at the Humboldt University in Berlin and became a 
representative at the East German parliament, the Volkskammer in 1950. When, in 1963, he 
turned against the dogmatism of the state, he was expelled from the SED and fired from his 
position at the university. Owing to his continued dissent, regularly leaked to the western media, 
he was placed under house arrest in 1976 where he would remain until his death in 1982.120   
Although Havemann promoted greater freedom of expression – he supported the creation 
of an opposition party in the GDR and sympathized publicly with those seeking to leave East 
Germany – he rejected the human rights politics of western activists. In many ways he held to the 
orthodoxies of Karl Polak that human rights could only be fulfilled as part of the full realization 
of socialism. As a dissident, he saw himself promoting true socialism in the face of the SED 
dictatorship, but he also rejected the idea that East Germany needed to go backwards to a system 
of bourgeois democracy or a market economy. The quasi-mystical conception of the Soviet 	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Revolution as a transcendent world event that had forever ended capitalism and ushered in a new 
era of history as found in SED human rights philosophy, pervaded Havemann’s thinking. The 
difference between him and intellectuals like Hermann Klenner was that for Havemann, the real 
communist revolution envisioned by Marx in which the state would wither away and all would 
exist harmoniously together in freedom, had yet to fully occur even if it was underway. As such, 
Havemann agreed in theory with western human rights activists, that state socialism violated 
human rights, but he rejected their solutions: the return to bourgeois democracy and capitalism – 
as a treatment more deadly than the disease. 
In spite of his aversion to Cold War human rights politics, Havemann did at times clearly 
denounce certain actions of the SED as violations of human rights. In 1970, in Fragen, 
Antworten, Fragen, he supported the right of East Germans to travel freely and even to leave the 
country as one of the “most elementary human rights.”121 In a public declaration sent to Amnesty 
International London while under house arrest in 1979, he also said that the punishment of his 
wife and son through the legal system “represents a blatant violation of human rights, that cannot 
be legitimized through the appearance of legality.” 122 In a clear contrast with the official line of 
the GDR-Committee for Human Rights, Havemann rejected the notion of human rights through 
dictatorship and his work regularly attacked the unrestricted power of the state.  
While it is clear that arbitrary restrictions of freedom of movement and punishment 
without cause constituted a violation of basic human rights for Havemann, his conception of 
political human rights was more complex. In an essay published in the collection, “Why I Was a 
Stalinist and Became an Anti-Stalinist,” he argued that a socialist democracy would include “the 	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rights and freedoms that were won in bourgeois democracy.”123 The crucial difference was that 
“the privilege that defines capitalism would by enjoyed by all through the true equality of all 
citizens.124 Havemann did not endorse the return to a system of bourgeois rights and freedoms, 
but rather the re-introduction of the rights and freedoms that had existed in the bourgeois era 
back into the political system now that socialism had been achieved in its economic form. For 
Havemann, the socialist revolution represented a transcendent event that eliminated class conflict 
and capitalist exploitation. This project needed to progress farther in order to achieve human 
rights, rather than to be dismantled. 
While Havemann believed that the socialist world needed greater rights in terms of 
speech and political participation, he remained wary of what he saw as the destructive Cold War 
politics of human rights in the 1970s. In an exchange of letters with Joachim Steffen, a member 
of the radical left-wing of the West German SPD, Havemann agreed, “generally protection of 
human rights, both social and political, represents the essential foundation of a free and 
democratic society.” But he in turn asked, “where is a there today a free and democratic society, 
in which individual human rights have been realized?”125 Havemann argued that neither East nor 
West could claim to have totally realized these rights and that the use of the “human rights club” 
(Menschenrechtsknüppel) as a tool of conflict in international affairs did nothing to actually 
advance the cause. The spectacle of different nations, listing out the failings of each other at 
international summits, such as the recent Belgrade Helsinki follow-up meeting in 1977/8, was 
simply counterproductive. 
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As an alternative, Havemann argued that in order to achieve human rights, the East 
needed to make moves towards democracy while the west needed to advance towards socialism. 
Only through these mutually reinforcing processes at home would progress be made throughout 
the world. Rather than attacking other countries for their failings, politicians should go out and 
draw the world’s attention to the failings of their own countries and show how these would be 
addressed. This agenda would not result in a convergence of bourgeois and socialist systems but 
instead would represent the final success of the communist project:  
While the implementation of political human rights in the lands of real existing socialism would be a 
revolutionary act with enormous and far-reaching effects, not just in our country, it would not be the 
beginning but rather the completion of a revolution, precisely the world-shaking October Revolution 
[of 1917].126 
 
Human rights were not universal values devoid of political ideology, nor were they the 
basis of liberal democracy, but rather the essential final act that would bring about 
Havemann’s longed for socialist utopia. 
 Robert Havemann’s dissident activities and writings were a source of inspiration 
for the human rights movement in 1980s, but he himself was unable to fully trace a “third 
way” between the western and socialist human rights discourses. While he accepted the 
idea that all citizens should have the right to freedom of speech, opinion and participation 
in a democratic society, western human rights activism was too closely linked to anti-
communism. The socialist human rights discourse of the GDR-Committee, on the other 
hand captured the problems of imperialism, racism and the neglect of social rights in the 
west but its discourse served to legitimize dictatorship and downplay human rights abuses 
under the SED. In the end he had difficulty formulating a conception of human rights that 
would advance the cause of true socialism, reject the oppressive realities of “real existing 	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socialism”, and at the same time not play into the anti-communist human rights 
campaigning from the west. Havemann’s contradictory embrace of human rights alongside 
the distancing from human rights politics was a product of the transnational political 
conflicts of the 1970s. 
While Havemann sought to square the circle of imagining a human rights for a 
democratic socialism, other dissidents openly denounced the international human rights 
movement of the 1970s as a step backwards. Rudolf Bahro (1935-1997), a SED functionary, 
imprisoned and then deported from the GDR following the publication in West Germany of his 
1977 eco-utopian treatise Die Alternative, was openly contemptuous of the growing international 
human rights movement: 
It is indicative of the rapid ideological process of collapse that has afflicted Eastern Europeans 
countries since the militaristic police action of August 1968 [the Prague Spring], that the bulk of 
the oppositional elements have seen themselves pushed back to a program of purely liberal 
democratic demands, a human rights campaign, a position that is the most general, platitudinous 
and inane possible.127 
 
For Bahro, the turn away from the realization of socialism towards a movement based on the 
principles of liberal democracy was as bad a failure as the status quo. 
Not only were the human rights campaigns of the Eastern Bloc failures from an 
ideological perspective, but they also spoke to an overall failure of political organization:  
It remains, of course, a disgrace, that the system of our entire society has prepared the most 
ostentatious part of our inner opposition to search out the President of the USA for advice and 
assistance. Human rights and political democracy – of course! But what the Eastern European 
countries are missing, not least the Soviet Union itself, is an organized, long-term struggle for 
another total system of politics [Gesamtpolitik].128 
 
While human rights and democratization were theoretically good things worth fighting for, 
Bahro saw the human rights movement with its connections to western liberalism and American 	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foreign policy as a distraction from the real cause of the revolutionizing of society. Human rights 
were small change in comparison to the total liberation of humanity. Ironically enough, while 
imprisoned in 1979, the International League for Human Rights awarded Bahro the Carl von 
Ossietzky Medal for his contributions to the cause. 
 Others who objected to the status quo but remained committed to the ideal of socialism 
looked to Marxist tradition rather than utopianism, but here too, human rights did not serve as a 
means of reform or opposition. The emphasis on realizing “true revolution” and the rejection of 
the contemporary international human rights activism can be seen even more clearly in the work 
of the humanist Marxist intellectual Jürgen Kuczynski (1904-1997). Kuczynski had joined the 
Communist Party in 1930 and came from a distinguished family of Jewish intellectuals, 
including his father Robert René Kuczynski who was a prominent member of the Weimar Era 
League for Human Rights. A self-described as a “party line dissident,” Kuczynski thought the 
regime had drifted from the true ideals of the cause, but he refused to openly oppose the SED 
and was even a member of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights.129 In his book “Human 
Rights and Class Rights”, published in the GDR in 1977, Kuczynski sought to push back against 
both western human rights attacks on the GDR as well as against SED human rights propaganda 
that he saw as a deviation from the tenets of classical Marxism.130 There was no need for special 
measures to realize specific lists of rights under socialism according to Kuczynski and to believe 
this was to buy into a bourgeois fallacy. The socialism, once the revolution was fully 
implemented, would objectively provide far superior benefits through the eradication of class 
conflict and the liberation of mankind.  
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Kuczynski’s main concern was not engaging with the lived realities of socialism but 
rather the abstract philosophical concepts of classical Marxism and humanism. Human rights 
were a problem of dialectics, ancient Greeks and the literature of Goethe, not the United Nations 
and NGOs. He supported human rights as a broad ideal but did not want to reconcile 
international human rights systems with socialism so much as fight for socialism which would 
solve everything else. While he had been sympathetic to Robert Havemann’s critiques of the 
SED, as soon as he publicly broke with the party, Kuczynski cut ties.131 Like many other 
intellectuals of his generation in the GDR, Kuczynski’s political worldview was shaped by the 
collapse of parliamentary democracy and the rise of Hitler. At the same time, as the academic 
eminence grise, he had a privileged position that afforded him freedoms and material benefits not 
seen by most East Germans. Kuczynski was too tied to the anti-fascist view of history, Marxist 
theory and the personal benefits of real existing socialism to turn to human rights as a solution. 
Despite one very public declaration of support for human rights from the East German 
intelligentsia, it was not indicative of a broad trend. In 1978, over two issues, the West German 
magazine Der Spiegel published the manifesto of the “Union of Democratic Communists of 
Germany,” that purported to represent a widespread movement from within the SED for human 
rights and liberalization.132 Although the Manifesto was portrayed as the East German equivalent 
to Charter 77, it appears that it represented the views of no one other than the author, Manfred 
von Berg, an SED functionary who emigrated to West Germany in 1986.133 The SED was 
furious at the publication and shuttered the East German offices of Der Spiegel as well as 	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launched an internal investigation to identify the “mass movement” for democratization in their 
midst, which could never be found.134  
Since the human rights abuses in the west all stemmed from the evils of capitalism 
according to the SED human rights discourse, translating criticism of arbitrary state action 
abroad into a similar standard at home required one to attack the very legitimacy of socialism 
and possibly endanger the accomplishments of the whole project. The performance of human 
rights as a discourse had social meaning beyond the actual content. Touting the human rights 
accomplishments of the GDR and denouncing the abuses of the west was part of the discourse of 
affirming membership in the socialist community, while to use human rights against the SED 
indicated opposition and a rejection of social norms.135 While signalling the rejection of society      
was actually helpful for those seeking to emigrate, for self-described socialist intellectuals, it 
represented a self-imposed alienation from one’s community. To employ the discourse of human 
rights against the status quo was not simply to level criticism but to claim that the SED was 
morally comparable to the Chilean Junta, the Greek Colonels, or even Jimmy Carter. In West 
Germany, conservatives spoke of promoting “human rights in enslaved Europe,” leaving little 
doubt that they saw the entirety of the communist system as an evil unto itself.136 In a memoir 
written after the collapse of the GDR, the expatriate American Communist Victor Grossman who 
had defected to East Germany, recalled his frustration with those who advocated human rights 
under socialism while “turning a blind eye to human rights violations in the west,” and ignoring 
the positive support provided by the GDR for freedom fighters in South Africa, Central America 	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and Chile.137 Complaining about the implementation of socialism at home when there was 
fascism abroad would demonstrate a problematic set of priorities. 
As Peter Schneider observed, most of the dissidents of the 1970s, especially those from 
the cultural elite, “almost always remained committed to one assumption in their critique: they 
never questioned the legitimacy of the socialist one-party state. Nor the party’s right to rule. 
They criticized the Socialist Unity Party’s abuse of power, not its monopoly of it; their demands 
for more democracy were meant not to secure free elections and a (‘bourgeois-reactionary’) 
multiparty system, but to eliminate censorship and build a plurality of opinion within the 
socialist power structure.”138 From such a perspective, the hegemonic discourse of socialist 
human rights was too supportive of the status quo but the alternative provided by western states 
and NGOs went too far in seeking to wholly dismantle the socialist project. As with other groups 
in the GDR, the intelligentsia chose the path of least resistance and rather than trying to 
formulate a middle path between the two conceptions of human rights, they simply chose to 
engage the SED on different and more favourable discursive ground. 
Amongst younger East Germans, however, there were signs that this was changing and 
human rights held appeal as a means to articulate a critique of the SED. The problem, however 
was that these individuals were small enough in number and isolated enough that the Stasi could 
ensured that they did not organize beyond obscure conspiratorial groups. The Stasi believed that 
outside groups sought member of the cultural elite to act as a “pacemaker” to jumpstart a local 
“human rights movement,” within the GDR.139  When anyone appeared as though they might fit 	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this role they were quickly dealt with. One such example is Bernd Eisenfeld, an economist who 
had served as a “construction soldier,” in the labour corps’ alternative to mandatory armed-
military service. At a reunion of fellow “veterans,” a Stasi informant reported,  
He accused the Democratic Republic of constant and deliberate violations of human rights [...] He 
explained that the Constitution of the GDR was a farce that was undermined by the laws and 
instructions of various ministries that override or suspend it. He criticized the church for not 
acting against state power enough and he advocated for the establishment of a democratic 
socialism. He approved the opportunity to express his opinion freely within the Church, but 
would look for other ways to get publicity as well.140  
  
Soon after, Eisenfeld was banned from employment, subject to harsh harassment and by the end 
of the year he had emigrated to West Berlin. Eisenfeld’s sentiments echo those of the dissidents 
who rose up a decade later, but his dislocation to the the Federal Republic meant that he could 
play only a limited role in disseminating such views within the GDR. 
Those seeking to emigrate who showed signs of creating social bonds based on human 
rights activism were quickly imprisoned or expelled as in the case with Dr. Nitschke in Riesa or 
Siegmar Faust. Those who were interested in human rights as a basis for dissent were quickly 
found through the Stasi’s network of informants. Those who sought to connect with western 
human rights groups were tried for espionage and treason while those seeking to contact human 
rights activists in the rest of the Eastern Bloc were usually just jailed. When a young seminary 
student from East Berlin travelled to Czechoslovakia as part of a larger plan to create a 
“Committee for the Observation of Human Rights” in conjunction with Charter 77 he was 
arrested by the Stasi for “provocative conduct”.141 As one activist recalled, in contrast to 
Czechoslovakia, in the GDR “whenever someone dared to come out and voice her/his complaints, 	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they were expelled. In one way or another, our network was destroyed time and again; we never 
had the chance to build a stable oppositional structure.”142 
Conclusion 
Human rights were not a timeless concept or doctrine that could act independently of 
human actors. As Quentin Skinner argued, the “reification of doctrines,” such as occurs in the 
history of human rights results in a story in which the “ideas get up and do battle on their own 
behalf.”143 Human rights, as a concept, had no inherent force to topple dictatorship and without 
actual people willing to take up such a cause, it did not become a revolutionary doctrine. The 
social and political circumstances of the era shaped and defined how human rights discourse as 
practiced by East German citizens evolved and human rights represented a contested discursive 
space rather than a bulldozer pushing forward towards a clear teleological endpoint. 
 Although human rights emerged as a language of protest and resistance in the 1970s, it 
was limited in its appeal beyond those seeking to exit the country and those trying to carve out a 
parallel space for Christianity within the larger socialist system and a very small number of 
dissidents who were soon imprisoned or expelled. Most of the intelligentsia seeking change 
avoided international human rights politics as a distraction from bringing about a true revolution. 
Without translators from the intelligentsia or the Church, the process of “vernacularization” for 
the purpose of challenging the power of the SED remained largely one of individual innovation 
based on specific personal grievances. The problem for the development of human rights in East 
Germany was not the absence of privacy but the lack of an unfettered public sphere in which 
citizens could link together their problems with the more abstract moral and legal principles of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Interview with Cornelia Matzke in Dirk Philipsen, We Were the People: Voices from East Germany’s 
Revolutionary Autumn of 1989 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 249. 
143 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8:1 (Jan 1969), 11. 
	  	   276	  
individualistic human rights.144 While East Germans may have increasingly engaged with the 
idea of rights in general, the SED’s hold over the public sphere allowed the state to continue to 
instrumentalize the concept of human rights to legitimize and reinforce its own rule. From the 
vantage point of 1989, the growing demands to exit, the growing interest of members of the 
church in human rights and the rise of a very small number of dissident intellectuals were all 
important steps towards the eventual emergence of a human rights opposition, but in the 1970s 
these groups were fractured and divided both in terms of ideologies, goals and actions.  
 The decision by most East Germans not to engage with the discourse of human rights 
must also be placed in the context of the alternatives available to citizens in challenging state 
policy. In addition to the long-established system that allowed GDR citizens to petition the state 
and party officials so long as such requests were properly couched in affirmations of loyalty and 
good faith, citizens also had access to state-run Conflict Commissions and locally administered 
Dispute Commissions.145 For disgruntled citizens seeking redress on everyday matters ranging 
from consumer goods to housing problems to public disturbances, the SED provided both a 
discursive and institutional framework to which citizens could appeal. As with the 
Volksaussprache process, the legal system encouraged citizens to understand their rights within 
the context of the greater system of SED rule in conjunction with their duties to the community 
as had been formalized by the 1968 Constitution.146 Rights did not exist outside of SED rule 	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either legally or ideologically. These institutions did not represent the triumph of the rule of law 
under socialism, and the administrative and civil system of the GDR acted as organs of the party 
rather than an independent judiciary. The existence of these structures, and their ability to 
facilitate at least somewhat acceptable redress for grievances in the everyday, acted as a deterrent 
to the adoption of human rights in general.147 So long as there existed state-approved low-risk 
means of contesting specific SED policies, there was no incentive or benefit to invoking abstract 
international law when operating within the guidelines of state ideology held a better prospect for 
success. Only when demands went outside the tenets of good socialist citizenship, by say 
applying to leave the GDR, did human rights become a useful discourse of dissent.  
 By the early 1980s, the SED still maintained its hegemonic socialist human rights 
discourse within the GDR but this would soon change. The ebb in applications to leave of the 
late 1970s would turn into a massive wave in 1984, the seemingly docile church organizations 
would become political and the intelligentsia would become disillusioned with the SED to the 
point where they could no longer defend the status quo. In the late 1970s, however, it appeared to 
the SED as though they had survived the explosion of international human rights activism. In the 
face of rising international pressure on human rights, Hermann Klenner confidently declared in 
the GDR-Committee for Human Rights journal, 
Illusion and hypocrisy may be able to delay recognition of truth in the question of human rights, 
but progress is inevitable both in theory and in practice. The people will see to this.148 
 
And that they did. Unfortunately for the SED, hypocrisy and illusion could only carry the day for 
so long. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
Human Rights for Democracy, 1982-1989  
 
Whereas the abolition of the exploitation of man by man is the basic 
prerequisite for ensuring equal human rights without discrimination…1 
 
-Preamble, Socialist Declaration of Human Rights, 1981 
 
 
 The idea of human rights had helped to sustain the legitimacy of SED since before the 
GDR had even been founded and the hegemonic discourse of socialist human rights had 
weathered the storm of the late 1970s. At the beginning of the 1980s, there were only a few 
hundred citizens using human rights to demand exit visas, small pockets of the church where 
human rights were spoken of as a means of reform and some individual intellectuals who clung 
to the idea. This was a scattered group without any organization or shared vision of how to 
change the GDR. By the end of the decade, however, there were dozens of human rights groups 
across East Germany and mass protests in the streets demanding the right to speak and assemble 
freely as well as the democratization of the GDR. The SED’s claims to champion human rights 
had collapsed within the party and in the socialist bloc as a whole.  
 How did human rights evolve from being a mainstay of state ideology challenged from 
within only by a scattered minority to the lingua franca of the revolution against the SED 
dictatorship and for the democratization of the GDR? In the 1980s, two parallel developments in 
the field of human rights, one from below and one from above, worked together to create such 
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explosive results.2 After years of suppression by state security, the independent peace movement 
of the GDR turned to the problem of human rights and political reform as a means of realizing 
their moral goals. New organizations such as the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights (IFM) 
acted as translators, connecting human rights ideas to a variety of local problems ranging from 
draft resistance to environmental destruction to state enforced military instruction for children. 
This new generation of activists looked to pluralism, participatory democracy, and legally 
guaranteed rights of civil society as a means to realize the widespread goals of the growing social 
movements in the GDR. Human rights served to both legitimize the creation of an independent 
civil society and as a subject for the work of these newly created groups and organizations free 
from state control. This small minority of activists turned to human rights as a solution to 
numerous problems and created networks where East Germans could increasingly engage with 
this new discourse as a means of trying to create a new society.3  
 From the other side of the equation, the SED human rights doctrine that had held against 
international pressure through the turbulent past decades rapidly crumbled as the conflicts 
between theory and reality became too great to deny. The decade began promisingly with East 
German officials seeking to foster greater cooperation amongst communist states on the problem 
by creating a Socialist Declaration of Human Rights. Whereas the process of socialization and 
organization based on human rights increasingly brought East Germans together, for the 
international socialist community this attempt was a fiasco. The efforts to create a joint 
declaration exposed the fiction of a self-evident united bloc of socialists fighting for human 	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rights according to scientific Marxist-Leninist principles. From this realization came disillusion 
and the collapse of the hegemonic human rights grounded in the certainties of the black and 
white world of anti-fascism. 
 The realization of human rights in East Germany was not a linear movement from a self-
evident set of moral values to a clear program of revolution: within the claims and demands for 
rights on all sides there existed a multiplicity of logics, ideals and utopias. For some it was about 
rescuing the old utopia, for others about creating an altogether new utopia and for others there 
was nothing utopian about the project.4 Human rights could contain communist reformers, 
Christian socialists, utopian Marxists, environmental activists and others whose main priority 
was either basic material need or the desire to see distant family members. The pluralism of the 
dissident movement, not just as a political system, but also the embrace of pluralism in terms of 
conceptions of human rights was crucial in the lead-up to the revolution of 1989.  
From Peace and Ecology to Human Rights, 1982-1985 
 At the beginning of the 1980s, human rights remained a language of protest and 
resistance for those trying to leave the GDR rather than for those trying to change it. While the 
population was by no means pleased with SED rule, the years of propaganda did have an 
appreciable effect in limiting the direct emotional appeal of human rights as a language of 
dissent. While to western NGOs it was clear that a system lacking the rule of law, judicial 
independence and pluralistic democracy was deficient in all basic human rights, East Germans 
did not all subjectively believe that they were totally denied all human rights and victims of a 
dictatorship even if they did chafe under the arbitrary rule of the SED and the observation of the 
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Stasi.5 As activist Carlo Jordan later explained, the SED’s conception of human rights was not 
fully internalized by the population, but it still had some persuasive power: “In our socialist 
education, demands for equality always collided with demands for freedom and this made the 
problem of human rights so sensitive […] Equality and freedom were always perceived to be 
separate alternatives with the main negative example of the USA where freedom had been 
realized, but at the cost of equality.”6 In contrast to human rights, the two causes that did arouse 
great enthusiasm were peace and environmentalism. 
While next-door neighbour Poland was in turmoil following the organization of the 
independent trade union Solidarity, East Germans were forming small groups, working under the 
protection of the Protestant church, calling for disarmament, the end of nuclear proliferation and 
the general demilitarization of society. Rather than challenging SED rule, GDR peace activists 
were more concerned with the nuclear arms race and the impending deployment of intermediate 
range missiles in West Germany.7 While a small core of pacifists and draft resisters had begun 
the peace movement, it gained widespread traction in 1978 from a popular backlash against 
mandatory military classes for students in the 9th and 10th grades.8 In 1982, the famous dissident 
Robert Havemann and Protestant pastor Rainer Eppelmann launched an independent peace 
movement with the publication of the Berlin Appeal, a one-page declaration calling for dialogue 
with the SED and for the cessation of military parades as well as mandatory military courses in 
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public schools as well as compulsory armed service.9 While the Berlin Appeal demanded greater 
participation for East Germans in the political life of the GDR, the actual language of human 
rights was noticeably absent. Similar peace groups founded at this time such as Women for 
Peace, Swords to Ploughshares, and the Concrete Peace network also avoided the language of 
human rights so as to focus on the problem of peace unencumbered by politics and ideology.10 
As with Havemann’s writings from the 1970s, many of the core ideals of other human rights 
movements – dignity of the individual, free exchange of ideas, etc. -- were present, but there 
remained a wariness of employing such a discourse and becoming tainted by association with 
Cold War propaganda. For other activists, there was also the hope that they would be protected 
from reprisal by focussing on ostensibly apolitical moral causes that the state officially 
supported. 
 The environmentalism movement also began to spread across East Germany in the early 
1980s in response to mass pollution and unrestricted industrial practices.11 At first, like the peace 
movement, the greens had little interest in human rights. As activist Carlo Jordan later said, 
“ecology as the thematization of the destruction of the cultural and natural foundations of life is 
much more concrete than the abstract question of human rights.”12 The movement did not begin 
from theory, but rather built upon the clear connection between everyday problems and the 
environmental destruction that East Germans experienced. The solutions it offered such as taking 
part in tree planting and writing letters to officials about specific problems were also concrete, 
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helping to attract members who actively wanted to better their community but who no longer 
trusted the SED apparatus to do so.13 
 The apolitical intentions of the activists did not placate the Stasi, which only recognized 
that they were organizing outside of official structures and threatening the unity of the socialist 
community. The Stasi saw human rights and emigration as the primary vector for stirring up 
dissent and opposition by western imperialists in the late 1970s, but by the early 1980s, the peace 
movement became enemy number one. An evaluation of domestic threats made by the Stasi in 
1982 made no mention of human rights activism and focused entirely on increasing organization 
by the peace movement and “reactionary clericalism,” within the church.14 The SED was 
officially committed to peace, but its interpretation of this cause was filtered through an anti-
fascist lens that portrayed the task of the socialist states as one of armed resistance to the forces 
of war, rather than outright pacifism. The “class indifferent,” nature of the peace movement 
threatened the readiness of the GDR and could undermine the morale of the armed forces, which 
were vital to maintaining socialism and thus peace.15 
 Propaganda from the SED turned from the problem of human rights to the problem of 
peace. In the pages of Neues Deutschland, human rights coverage peaked in 1977-78 and then 
articles mentioning the terms dropped by more than half in the following years and continued to 
decline into the next decade.16 Peace had always been a key term in SED propaganda, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Wolfgang Rüddenklau (ed.), Störenfried: DDR-Opposition 1986-1989 (Berlin: BasisDruck, 1992), 45. 
14 BStU SED-KL 1088 Bericht des Leiters der HA XX über die "Bekämpfung des politischen Untergrundes, 
insbesondere der Versuche, unter dem Schutz der Kirche eine oppositionelle Bewegung mit konterrevolutionärer 
Zielstellung zu schaffen" auf der Sekretariatssitzung am 31.08.1982. 
15 BStU SED-KL 4862 Zu aktuellen feindlichen Bestrebungen, den politischen Pazifismus als Hauptform für die 
Schaffung einer politischen Opposition in der DDR zu missbrauchen (Apr 1982), 8. 
 
16 In 1977, 793 articles mentioned human rights and in 1978 there were 645. In 1979, this dropped to 316 and by 
1981 it was down to 193. See http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/. 
	  	   284	  
mentions of it in the press began to steadily rise in 1979 hitting a peak in 1983.17 The GDR-
Committee for Human Rights was pulled into the new effort by further connecting the SED’s 
commitment to peace with its pledges to realize human rights. The Committee still concerned 
itself with human rights abuses by imperialists, at this time with a particular focus on the 
oppression of Palestinians and socialists in Paraguay, but it now also took up the cause of 
disarmament in Europe and campaigned against the neutron bomb. Just as Hermann Klenner had 
written in his early work in the 1960s, the Committee reminded the East German people “the 
right to life and peace is the first and most important human right.”18  
 
Beginnings of a Dissident Shift to Human Rights 
While the ecology movement in East German was closely connected to localism and 
rooted in specific daily problems, some activists began to see the origins of the East German 
environmental catastrophe in the lack free information exchange and democratic freedoms. Of 
particular concern was the decision by the state Ministry of the Environment to stop collecting 
and publishing data on environmental damage in 1982. As one activist wrote, “the struggle to 
improve the environment is only possible through the implementation of political rights and 
freedom and on the side it is only possible to guarantee more political rights and freedoms 
through the implementation of better environmental conditions.”19 Similarly, in 1983, Horst 
Dienelt of Berlin-Lichtenberg released the “95 Theses of the Green Manifesto,” which included a 
call for violence-free demonstrations for “general human rights and freedom of movement,” and 
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the “rejection of all dictatorships, including those of the Communist Party.”20 Faced with a 
government more intent on appearing to care about the environment yet suppressing criticism 
from the citizenry, some local activists were beginning to connect parochial problems with 
systemic causes and they looked to increased political freedom to solve both. 
 A handful of dissident intellectuals who represented a younger generation who had grown 
up in the GDR also began to directly challenge SED human rights doctrine. One example is the 
philosopher Guntholf Herzberg (1940-) whose work represents an intellectual bridge between 
that of Robert Havemann and the later human rights dissidents. Herzberg was a formerly loyal 
party member who had been inspired by Robert Havemann’s academic lectures in 1963-4. Like 
Havemann, he became a critic of the SED and was kicked out of the party in 1972 and lost his 
position at the Institute for Philosophy at the prestigious Academy of Sciences the following year. 
Herzberg was also involved in the protests against the expulsion of singer Wolf Biermann in 
1976 and became a good friend of the ecological activist Rudolf Bahro prior to his imprisonment 
in 1978 for the publication of Die Alternative.21 In 1980, in talks with students (given in an 
informal capacity) he took up the problem of human rights.22 Herzberg did not advocate 
emigration, Christian theology or western liberal democracy but rather the study of SED human 
rights philosophy. In a later copy of his presentation, he specifically singled out Hermann 
Klenner’s 1982 opus magnum “Marxism and Human Rights,” as an important source for ideas 
on how to engage with the state.  
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 After outlining the theoretical aspect of socialist human rights, namely that they were a 
product of socioeconomic relations stemming from a historical dialectic, Herzberg observed that, 
in the discussion of basic rights in the GDR, “the greatest interest is focussed on political rights, 
the realization of which as subjective rights is hardly credible for the citizen because so many 
experiences speak against it. From this emerges, unfortunately, a certain pessimism in regard to 
the value of those rights.”23 Contrary to that pessimism, he argued “every individual that sees 
himself as a responsible citizen should exploit every opportunity to realize his basic rights.”24 In 
doing so, however, he advised that one should always keep in mind that, according to the SED, 
the “purpose of all rights is the development and protection of socialism,” and be wary that the 
state was “allergic” to demands that appeared to be coordinated with “Western media, Amnesty 
International or similar organizations.”25 Instead of adopting the rhetoric of the SED’s Cold War 
opponents, Herzberg encouraged his audiences to adopt and then reinterpret the language of the 
state.26 In doing so, citizens were to demand their rights but they were to do so by exploiting the 
logic of the SED’s human rights discourse, not simply its words. Herzberg advocated the re-
appropriation of the SED’s ideals rather than just echoing its rhetoric.   
 Other dissidents took a more direct approach by attacking the ideological roots of 
socialist human rights doctrine based on the postwar experience of real existing socialism. In 
1983, Peter Eisenfeld, a long-time intellectual dissident who would soon file an application to 
exit the GDR, wrote a forty-page treatise on human rights as a response to Jürgen Kuczynski’s 	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1977 work, “Human Rights and Class Rights.”27 Using Kuczynski’s classical Marxist 
interpretations of rights as a basis for his criticisms, Eisenfeld contested the claim that the 
interests of the people and the state were unified following the socialist revolution. While the 
official human rights doctrine of the SED claimed that all contradictions had been resolved due 
to changes in “relations of production,” so that it was objectively impossible for the state to 
violate the human rights of its citizens, Eisenfeld detailed at length how recent history had 
proved otherwise, 
Historical experiences (the Stalin Era, the events of Czechoslovakia 1968, the social crisis in PR 
Poland and the associated violations of democracy in general and civil rights in particular, the 
crisis of trust between the people and the party, bureaucratism, careerism, conformism, passivity 
etc. the Cultural Revolution in PR China, the events in Kampuchea 1975-1978, the border 
conflicts between the PR Vietnam and Kampuchea, like that between PR Vietnam and China), 
but also the obvious phenomena here in the GDR, (border fortifications, political prisoners, 
handling of dissidents, privileges like travel and information freedom for special citizens, the 
Intershops etc), these areas of experience show that the theoretical claim of the Marxist-Leninist 
Party does not, however, exist in reality.28  
 
East German intellectuals like Kucyznski were adept at arguing on the level of theory, but in one 
devastating sentence, Eisenfeld demonstrated just how much that theory had failed in practice 
over the past forty years. For some, the cognitive dissonance was too much and in the contest 
between theory and reality, the theory was beginning to give way. Eisenfeld sent his critique to 
Kuczynski himself and unsuccessfully attempted to have his critique printed by the same 
publisher that had produced “Human Rights and Class Rights.”29 The younger intellectuals of the 
GDR were indoctrinated in Marxist-Leninist thought, but they were not blind to the events of the 
world around them and some were able to add up the mounting contradictions. 
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 While individual East German intellectuals were moving towards the language of human 
rights as a unifying idea, within this small minority there were no institutions where such ideas 
could be shared, debated and disseminated. The audiences for Guntholf Herzberg’s talks were 
small and Peter Eisenfeld’s text was only seen by a handful of readers prior to the fall of the wall. 
In isolation such ideas show that younger generations of East Germans were not as conflicted in 
employing human rights language like those who had been born in the 1920s (such as Robert 
Havemann) or the 1930s (such as Rudolf Bahro). The lived experiences of East Germany and the 
events of the postwar era, not the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, defined 
the world-view of this younger generation. Parliamentary democracy was the flawed system of 
the west but it was not by definition the gateway to fascism and terror as it was for older East 
Germans who had survived the war. As memory of the war and the power of anti-fascist rhetoric 
and ideology faded in time, so too did the legitimacy of a dictatorship for human rights.30 
Competing Visions of Human Rights for Dissent 
 The idea of fighting for moral issues of peace and the environment rather than democracy 
could not be successful so long as the SED and the Stasi considered all such activities as 
dangerous and oppositional. Peace activism could take place within the official peace movement 
and environmentalists could help out with state-run clean-up operations. The Stasi saw all other 
action as a threat to the SED’s power and control. Human rights had been the territory of 
emigrationists, the church and a small handful of dissidents on the margins, but activists started 
to reconsider when their refusal to demand political change bought them no credit or 
understanding from the state. While the church sought to protect many of the fledging groups 
devoted to peace, the Stasi could not abide those that were demonstrating publicly and 	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questioning state policy. In 1983-1984 a campaign against the movement destroyed half of the 
peace organizations in the country. The SED successfully pressured churches to evict activists, 
key figures such as Bärbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe were jailed and others such as Roland Jahn 
were involuntarily deported to West Germany. Lower level activists faced dismissal from work 
and/or educational institutions.31 
As with earlier turns to human rights in East Germany, the shift in the discourse of the 
peace movement came from a position of desperation when all other traditional forms of protest 
and moral appeal had failed. While many in the peace movement feared that such a turn would 
be “political suicide” and sure to bring more Stasi repression, for a growing group, it appeared as 
though they would always face repression without human rights reforms.32 Frank Eigenfeld, a 
peace activist from Halle later recalled: “We realized that we were not at all accepted by the 
powers that be, and that we had little opportunity to articulate ourselves in public…the focus 
changed from the arms race towards human rights…[but] only after we had begun to run into 
enormous organizing difficulties did our focus begin to change.”33 Such sentiments were not 
universal and in shifting the conversation towards human rights, there were great complications 
within the peace movement itself. As Ulrike Poppe later explained, “democratic freedoms were 
always seen in a capitalist context. This made the debate about them problematic […] I don’t 
want to say that we used the theme of peace in order to actually work through human rights and 
bourgeois freedoms. At the least, however, the people were more open to the problem of human 
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rights compared to just working on the problem of our own democratic deficits.”34 The cause of 
peace was so important that it legitimized, at least for some, the venture into the world of human 
rights and political reform. 
 The first major joint action of peace activists for human rights came in July 1985 when a 
group of thirty-four dissidents primarily from groups based in East Berlin wrote an open letter to 
the participants of the 12th World Games for Youth and Students held in Moscow. The activists 
argued that a “comprehensive development and realization of the person,” was only possible,  
[when] the fundamental rights laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been 
fully realized […] For us in the GDR, the implementation of the following right is an important 
task: the right to freedom of expression, freedom of information, freedom of movement, right to 
unrestricted freedom to travel, the right to assembly and association, equal opportunities in 
education, regardless of religion and ideology.35 
 
Such rhetoric represented an important break from past dissident activity. While Robert 
Havemann had called for the introduction of greater freedoms and rights to participate within a 
socialist society, the letter’s enumeration of such a list of political and civil rights took his line of 
thinking to a new level. The letter did not call for the perfection of socialism or claim that such 
rights would occur through such a process but assumed that these rights could be separable from 
socialism itself. In short, they were harkening back to the initial conflict between the SED and 
the SPD in 1946 and attacking the claim of Karl Polak that there could be “No Human Rights 
without Socialism.” 
In January 1986, Ralf Hirsch, Wolfgang Templin and Peter Grimm, all long time peace 
activists and signatories to the World Youth Games letter, issued a statement announcing the 
creation of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights (IFM), the first dissident group to work 
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outside of the protection of the church and to focus on human rights within the GDR.36 In 
addition to the three signatories, the fledgling organization was composed primarily of 
intellectuals and activists from Berlin including Robert Havemann’s widow Katja, Lotte Templin 
(wife of Wolfgang Templin), Ulrike and Gerd Poppe, Bärbel Bohley and Werner Fischer. All 
were deeply involved in the peace movement and many were part of the counterculture scene in 
the Prenzlauer Berg district of Berlin. Having determined that the “goals of peace initiatives 
depend upon the implementation of basic democratic rights and freedoms,” they called for 
assistance from the various dissident communities as well as cooperation from the peace 
movement in developing the idea of human rights in relation to social justice, the right to work, 
the protection of the environment and the rejection of obligatory military service.37 The human 
rights advocated by the Initiative for Human Rights represented an important synthesis of 
political aims and ideologies. In their founding document they sought to bring together activists 
to discuss such wide-ranging problems as international peace, education, religious freedom, the 
environment, the draft, and worker’s rights. Instead of focussing on a single issue or grievance in 
the name of human rights, the IFM pulled together the concerns of the many disgruntled 
elements of East German society including the peace movement, religious believers, the growing 
environmental movement, draft resisters and workers, all under the umbrella of the concept of 
human rights.  
Members of the IFM stressed the importance of legally guaranteed political and civil 
rights as a means of achieving these broader goals in the name of social well-being and harmony 
rather than to promote the autonomy of the individual. In particular, they argued that the human 
right to peace, which had so long been the centerpiece of state propaganda, actually contradicted 	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the SED’s monopoly on power as peace required democratic participation by the people as a 
whole. In a petition to the 11th SED Party Congress in 1986, the IFM wrote, “Peace and security 
policy cannot only be a matter of party and government. For peace is a human right, and 
therefore every member of society must be able to discuss and take part in the decisions 
regarding anything relevant to this right.”38 Whereas the SED argued that human rights and 
peace were the natural products of socialism, the IFM made human rights the starting point for a 
just society and the precondition for peace. 
In contrast to the SED discourse of human rights, and that of earlier dissident 
intellectuals, however, they also stressed the importance of a broad pluralism. The cause of 
human rights was not about finding the one true path or theory, but rather about being open to all 
conceptions of human rights and working together in open dialogue. Also in the letter to the 11th 
Party Congress, the IFM declared, “pluralism is an overarching value for the enforcement of 
fundamental human rights […] The essential tension between different approaches to human 
rights issues is productive and should not be destroyed by policy debates with the goal of 
unity.”39 For the IFM, human rights and pluralism were open concepts that were not curtailed or 
limited by a narrow political program. 
The IFM also sought to form a movement that could fight for human rights outside of the 
confines of church-based activism. The Protestant Church was home to numerous peace groups 
but the problem of human rights for domestic reform was still an area the leadership feared to 
tread. In 1985, BEK leader Manfred Stolpe gave a speech on “human rights deficits in the GDR,” 
which represented a bold step given his statements in the 1970s on the total realization of 
international treaties by the SED. Stolpe’s message was a plea for greater dialogue and freedom 	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of expression, but this was couched in extensive praise for the GDR’s extensive social rights.40 
This message was undercut by the deepening integration of church and SED human rights 
activities. In 1984, the BEK held a conference on human rights in Eisenach with “Universal 
Human Rights and National Sovereignty: the Interdependence of Helsinki Principles VI and 
VII,”41 in reference to the SED claims that the principle of sovereignty (VI) precluded 
intervention on the grounds of human rights (VII). Hermann Klenner served as the keynote 
speaker and the Stasi reported that they were most pleased with the conference as the “socialist 
side was well represented,” and there were no “hostile-negative,” statements made over the 
course of the proceedings.42 
Finally, the IFM members refused to side with the west in the human rights debate and 
presented themselves as part of a “third way” between state socialism and capitalism. In 
announcing the creation of the group they were careful to ascribe guilt to both sides of the Cold 
War when it came to the problem of peace,  
Over the heads of those affected, there is a tense continuation of the arms build-up in both 
political blocs, negotiations are being held behind closed doors, and peace movement activists are 
being prosecuted and sometimes criminalized. As far as these practices are concerned, the 
“Western democracies” are right up there with our governing leaders.43 
 
The members did not connect human rights with the adoption of a western system even if they 
saw elements of western parliamentary democracy that they thought were admirable. As Gerd 
Poppe put it, “when we use ideas like democracy and human rights, they are connected to quite a 
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different conception than in the west.”44 They rejected the theoretical dichotomy of capitalist 
versus socialist human rights and popular fears that freedom could only come at the cost of 
equality. 
The birth of the IFM and the East German human rights movement was complicated by 
the simultaneous emergence of a competing group called the Counter-Voices (Gegenstimmen).45 
While this group was also made up of peace movement veterans, members such as Thomas Klein 
were from the left-wing Christian side of the cause whereas others such as Rheinhard Schult 
were radical Marxists. In contrast to the IFM’s calls for individual civil rights and the 
introduction of bourgeois political liberties, the Counter-Voices sought to advance human rights 
through the perfection of the revolution, either moral or economic.46 The focus on individual 
liberties reinforced the problem of egotism and selfishness that were problematic for both the 
Christian and Marxist elements of the movement. At a joint human rights seminar organized in 
early 1986 that was marred by Stasi interference and infighting, representatives of the Counter-
Voices attacked the concept of political reform as pointless and counterproductive. Echoing 
Rudolf Bahro’s complaints about the human rights movement in the 1970s, they opposed any 
human rights activism not based on the radical restructuring of economic and social systems. The 
Counter-Voices rejected the demand for pluralism as a dead end, preferring to fight for the moral 
and economic revolution they thought was needed. Schult, a draft-resister and founder of the 
group, dismissed the IFM’s claim that political pluralism was necessary for the implementation 
of basic human rights: “That is for me is no more than ideology or religion. It is on the same 
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level as Lenin’s line: Marxism is all-powerful because it is true.”47 Essentially, these activists 
bought into the overarching theory of socialist human rights with the crucial difference that they 
did not believe that the socialist utopia had yet been achieved in practice by the SED. 
 The opposition of the Counter-Voices to the nascent IFM has been written off by some 
historians as product of Stasi interference in an effort to disrupt the creation of a human rights 
movement.48 While it is accurate that half of members of the Counter-Voices were informants to 
the Stasi, the same was true of the IFM.49 The Counter-Voices may have been repeating a similar 
line to that of the SED when it came to human rights, but for some it was a genuinely held 
position based on an ideological commitment to socialism and a rejection of western capitalism. 
Even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Rheinhard Schult maintained his opposition to 
individualistic human rights: 
[Human rights] were a type of ideological weapon against us. If we were also against the state, 
we didn’t want unification with the West and also the western system. Pure individual human 
rights stand in conflict with social human rights. The human right to property was to us a 
capitalist human right. We rejected the bourgeois ideology of the human rights declarations. 
Naturally we were against the secret police. Nevertheless, we did not want to adopt the western 
electoral system. “Free Elections,” was not our cause.50 
 
In this quote it is clear that Schult actively identified with the GDR to the extent that he viewed 
western human rights criticism as an attack on “us,” rather than the SED alone. Schult hated the 
Stasi, but he agreed with the SED that there existed a split between socialist and capitalist human 
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rights and he saw the western system as inherently inferior to the human rights that could be 
offered under a system of true socialism.  
 
The Proliferation of Human Rights Activism 
The creation of the IFM represented a breakthrough both in terms of ideas and 
organization. As co-founder Ralf Hirsch later said, “the IFM was a mixture of workers, 
intellectuals and church members. It was also a melting pot for different groups – earlier 
the ’practitioners‘ and the ’theorists‘ were strictly separated. This mixing was something new.”51 
Such an arrangement created a dynamic for the “vernacularization” of human rights discourse in 
the GDR.52 Although the organization was still on the margins of society, the diversity of its 
membership and the combination of intellectuals interested in international human rights issues 
and local activists immersed in daily problems, allowed for the development of a dissident 
human rights discourse as never before. The radical pluralism of the movement brought in all 
issues and in turn “translated” these problems into the language of human rights.  
 The creation of the IFM and other human rights groups played a crucial role in social 
function by creating a discourse of human rights that would resonate with East Germans but it 
also produced a forum in which people could engage with one another outside the structures of 
the SED on broad social issues. Ulrike Poppe later described the value of these organizations: 
The members of the groups learned to take themselves and their problems seriously. They learned 
a different kind of communication, that is, they learned to speak authentically and relate to each 
other. They were encouraged to try and become involved in social issues and to resist. The groups 
were therefore a training field for social behaviour.53 	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Parochial concerns and single-issue activists could be introduced to others and find common 
ground through a shared commitment to human rights, even if their individual grievances were 
not concretely connected. At first the “abstract” nature of human rights made the discourse 
problematic in organizing dissent, but once the process of vernacularization began, this very 
quality allowed for the creation of a broad coalition based on shared values and not simply on 
identical interests. Thus at the end of 1985, there was not a single human rights organization in 
the GDR, whereas by 1988, around ten organizations explicitly devoted to human rights activism 
and numerous other peace and environment groups that now dealt with human rights problems 
had sprung up.54 
 Following the creation of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the number of 
independent dissident organizations outside the church increased and the nature of work on 
human rights within the church became politicized. Independent human rights groups following 
the model of the IFM and advocating democratization brought in dissidents who did not have 
contact with the church and thus expanded the base of activists. On the other hand, those who 
remained in church-protected organizations and were exposed to this new discourse began to 
politicize and expand their focus outside of state approved topics such as anti-racism and anti-
imperialism. In Berlin, the creation of the IFM was followed by the formation of the church-
based Working Circle for a Church in Solidarity (Arbeitskreis Solidarische Kirche) in October 
1986. This group of theologians moved away from the church-leadership-approved focus on 
morality and now took on the problem of “participation and democratization.” In their founding 
declaration, they announced their position that “human rights are indivisible. We strive for a 
public dialog with all social forces on how to implement human rights both at home and 	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abroad.”55 Like the IFM, they appropriated the slogans of the SED to advance a subversive 
domestic agenda. While the idea of “indivisible human rights,” was advanced by the SED to 
diffuse demands for political rights from the west on the grounds that this overemphasized one 
class of right, the Arbeitskreis Solidarische Kirche used such rhetoric to legitimize their 
transition to the political from a focus on purely moral issues.56  
 Similar pairings of independent human rights groups and church-based organizations 
emerged elsewhere across the GDR. In Leipzig, the young activist Uwe Schwab organized the 
Initiative Group for Life (IG Leben) bringing together democratic socialists and others from the 
alternative scene.57 At the same time, the arrival of the dissident pastor Christoph Wonneburger 
at the city’s Nikolai Church led to a politicization of the previously sedate internal groups. 
Wonneberger had been in Prague in 1968 and active in the peace movement in Dresden until he 
had been forced to leave and move to Leipzig.58 When he arrived there in 1987, he began to 
organize peace prayers, which by 1989 would be attended by thousands of people, and to speak 
out on the problem of human rights. Both the church’s internal peace groups and the independent 
IG Leben argued for the interconnection between human rights, democratization and peace, but 
they served very different social functions. The church could introduce new ideas and political 
concepts to the congregation and bring in more cautious East Germans who did not want to take 
on the risk of belonging to an explicitly dissident organization. For the already oppositional and 
radicalized, groups such as IG Leben focused such energies towards a more unified cause. 
Dialogue between the two groups allowed for ideas to spread between different social classes 	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56 Daniel Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights: A History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 
57 RHG RG/S 01/03 Initiativgruppe Leben Leipzig 
58 Pfaff, “The Politics Of Peace in the GDR,” 292–3. 
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and demographics that were often isolated from each other by either their absence from official 
organizations or their membership in different state-run institutions. 
 The split between those seeking to emigrate and dissidents hoping to reform the GDR 
from within was an important factor in dividing opposition in the GDR, but in the late 1980s, the 
problem of human rights served to mend some of these divisions rather than drive these groups 
further apart. Many dissidents were hostile to those seeking to leave as their departure 
undermined collective action against the state and many emigrationists resented the scorn of 
dissidents who would have them remain in the GDR when reform appeared hopeless.59 Yet this 
division had been far greater in the 1970s when the widespread use of human rights discourse by 
emigrationists had resulted in East German reform dissidents avoiding the language almost 
completely. As one dissident from Leipzig later recalled, working with emigrationists: “We 
didn’t care about that. There were also those trying to emigrate with us. We didn’t make the 
effort to think about it. That was a human right, so what is this shit.”60 Divisions remained in the 
late 1980s, but in this period, the discourse of human rights helped to bring these forces closer 
together and allowed for some coordination between the two.61  
Cooperation between the two sides also led to a broadening of human rights concerns 
amongst those seeking to exit. In September 1987, Günter Jesschonek, an artist who had been 
blacklisted from working following his application to leave the GDR formed the Working Group 
for State Citizenship Rights (Arbeitsgruppe Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht). This organization would 
be the first formal effort to coordinate human rights demands by those trying to emigrate. 	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Das war für uns ein Menschenrecht, also was soll die Scheiße.” HIA Joppke Collection, Box 1, Interview mit Frank 
Sellentin  (26. Juli 1991), 2. 
61 Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR, 672. 
	  	   300	  
Although it was controversial, Wolfgang and Lotte Templin of the IFM assisted in the creation 
of the group and supported its activities. In turn, the public statements of Jeschonnek and the 
Working Group branched out from a single-minded focus on the right to leave to explicitly 
attack other human rights abuses in the GDR. In a manifesto delivered to the GDR-Committee 
for Human Rights on 10 December – Human Rights Day – the group declared: “The realization 
of human rights can not be solely a matter of the state. In our view, this includes equal 
participation of all citizens, the unvarnished examination of existing problems, open dialogue 
with dissenters and free space in society for the unrestricted work of independent peace and 
human rights groups.” 62 While trying to leave the GDR, those who chose exit were also using 
their voice on the way out.63 
 Across the GDR, individual human rights ceased to be a theoretical concept and became 
a way of life. Dissidents were not just demanding the right to speak, organize and participate in 
public life, but they were acting as though they had these rights already. Human rights activists 
arranged for interviews with foreign journalists and used western television as a means to 
transmit their message throughout the GDR. As part of the creation of a “second public sphere,” 
dissident groups began to create newsletters and mass-produce mimeographed copies for 
distribution. Although these samizdat publications were intended for the general public, most 
were still stamped with the phrase “Only for Internal Church Distribution,” as a fig leaf so that 
groups could try and claim that they were not trying to break into the SED controlled public 
sphere. The most important of these publications for the human rights movement was the IFM’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Arbeitsgruppe Staatsbürgerschaftsrechte der DDR, Erklärung (10 Dec 1987), www.bstu.bund.de/DE/ 
Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Vorabend-der-Revolution/1988_Liebknecht-Luxemburg-Demo/Dokumente/1987-12-
10_Menschenrechte/. 
63 Pfaff dubs these activists “noisy exiters,” Steven Pfaff, Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: 
The Crisis of Leninism and the Revolution of 1989 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 80. 
	  	   301	  
Grenzfall, which was published irregularly beginning in 1986. While many of these publications 
only had a few hundred copies and their impact on the public was limited, the process of writing 
and distributing them by the dissidents themselves provided a means of socially practicing rights 
instead of just talking about them.64 
 Not only did the human rights activists seek to create their own public sphere, they also 
wanted to take part in the public life of the GDR. The demand of the IFM and others to 
participate more fully in the affairs of society was not just empty rhetoric. In 1987, the dissidents 
infiltrated and participated on their own terms in the official Olaf Palme Peace March. In January 
1987, a group from the IFM took part in the annual march to commemorate KPD co-founders 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht with banners emblazoned with Luxemburg’s saying, 
“Freedom is always freedom for those who think differently.” Some groups started to hold their 
own public rallies with or without the permission of the SED. In Leipzig, IG Leben held a march 
in June 1988 to raise awareness about ecological problems in the city and when denied a permit 
to do so, “claimed for itself the right to have a demonstration.”65 Such actions resulted in mass 
arrests, expulsions and other sanctions, but the police and the Stasi were not able to expel 
everyone and arrests did not stem the movement. When the majority of the leaders of the IFM in 
Berlin were arrested and several deported to West Germany in the wake of the Luxemburg-
Liebknecht rally in 1987, the centre of the gravity in the movement shifted to Leipzig and 
Dresden and diffused into the smaller groups in small towns in the countryside.66 
On a mass scale, those seeking to emigrate were also moving from the 
instrumentalization of human rights to an internalized sense that they had the right to leave and 	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the SED just had to respect that. According to a Ministry of the Interior report on applications to 
exit from 1988, applications almost all included 
the slander against the politics of the GDR, especially accusation of massive human rights 
violation. The assertion that conflicts exist between international agreements and the domestic 
policies of the GDR plays a dominant role.67 
 
Günter Jeschonnek of the Working Group for State Citizenship Rights recalled that he wanted to 
make clear that this was a “legitimate human right,” and that “we are not supplicants but we have 
a right.”68 Gone was the polite language of begging permission to leave and the reminders that 
doing so could help with international opinion and in its place a militant sense of entitlement 
based on the idea of human rights. 
 In December 1988, dissidents sought to appropriate the commemoration of Human 
Rights Day to their side after decades of SED using the UN event to proclaim its continuing 
commitment and fidelity to human rights. For the 40th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the human rights movement organized numerous church events to discuss 
human rights problems and deficits in the GDR. The Stasi estimated that 800 people took part in 
a Human Rights Day service at a church in Berlin-Treptow including representatives from more 
than 200 groups and organizations. At another Berlin church 120 people were discussing Article 
19 of the UDHR on freedom of speech. At a third Berlin church, there were 50 attendees 
discussing the role of the church in overcoming human rights abuses within the GDR. 
Demonstrations by those seeking to leave also took place in Berlin, Halle and Erfurt.69 In 
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response to the SED’s proclamation, several human rights groups issued their own declaration, 
pointing out the glaring contradictions between the regime’s rhetoric and reality.70   
 
Inspirations and Influences for an East German Human Rights Movement 
 As East German intellectuals turned to human rights, they did so from a diverse range of 
sources. Western media and the activism of NGOs certainly raised the issue of human rights but 
the transmission of human rights ideas should not be seen as a direct transfer from West to East. 
Networks connecting East and West emerged from the Helsinki process in the late 1970s and 
1980s; but in contrast to many other Eastern Bloc states, East Germany did not have any 
Helsinki Monitoring groups.71 Western media was crucial in disseminating many of the abuses of 
SED rule such as border shootings but as mentioned in previous chapters, the emphasis in these 
reports on anti-communism was off-putting to peace activists and reforms socialism. West 
German human rights activism was incorporated into SED propaganda as “imperialist hypocrisy” 
that was to stir up dissent and cover for the crimes of capitalism. The competing claims of total 
righteousness against the horrific crimes of the other must cancelled each other out for many 
East Germans whose lives were not dominated daily by Stasi agents intent on their oppression. 
Daily life for most was not perceived by all as the totalitarian nightmare it appeared in the 
reports of those who had indeed suffered the worst the system had to offer in terms of arbitrary 
arrest and psychological torture.  
Organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Society for the 
Protection of Human Rights assisted in keeping activists out of prison and in helping them to 
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emigrate to the West, but ideologically, they were not as influential.72 Amongst dissidents in East 
Germany, it is not clear that even those most directly assisted by Western human rights activism 
were significantly influenced intellectually by their foreign counterparts. A survey of those 
assisted by Amnesty International in the 1980s by Anja Mihr is instructive for this complex 
relationship. While most of those assisted had heard of Amnesty before their own imprisonment, 
they thought of it primarily as a support group for political prisoners rather than a human rights 
organization. Some had only heard of Amnesty as an “enemy organization,” via state media. 
While they praised its work in helping gain their personal release, it was not seen as a source of 
inspiration for human rights activism at home.73 
 While Western Europe was louder on matters of human rights, Eastern Europe proved to 
be a greater source of possible examples to follow.74 Two leading dissidents in the human rights 
movement, Ludwig Mehlhorn and Wolfgang Templin, had both studied in Poland and worked 
with the human rights group KOR. They took from the Polish experience the main lesson that 
dissidence needed to take place in the open if it was to effect real change and that pluralism 
rather than ideological purity was the basis for movement.75 The early issues of the samizdat 
newsletter of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, Grenzfall (Border Case) included 
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several articles on events in Poland and protest letters to Polish officials.76 Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia was also a clear influence on the human rights movement and the Initiative for 
Peace and Human Rights in particular. In a letter from the IFM to Charter 77 printed in Grenzfall, 
the group declared, “For us, the existence of the Charter and other human rights movements in 
Eastern Europe was and is an encouragement and a source of inspiration. At the beginning of our 
independent human rights work in the GDR we were often accused of trying to copy Charter 
77.”77 In addition to the importance of the group itself, the samizdat publication “Human Rights 
and the Political Revolution,” by Peter Uhl, a far left member of Charter 77 was also an 
important text on reconciling revolutionary socialism with human rights.78  
 The Third World was also an important site of inspiration for human rights activism. 
Many dissidents who later worked on domestic human rights concerns were first concerned with 
those abroad. The dissident Thomas Rudolph would later note that the Working Group on 
Human Rights in Leipzig only came to local problems later and that its membership was initially 
more concerned with Nicaragua and South Africa.79 The human rights problems highlighted by 
the SED drew sympathy and interest and there was overlap between those fighting for rights in 
the developing world and those who eventually took to the streets in the GDR.80 
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 Finally, a main source of human rights dissent was the political and cultural life of the 
GDR itself. As Konrad Jarausch has argued, “an authentic product of the GDR, the opposition 
developed from within socialism.”81 This applies as well to the IFM and others as they re-
appropriated the discourse of human rights from the SED. As with the earlier examples of 
Guntholf Herzberg and Peter Eisenfeld who sought to challenge socialist human rights doctrine 
from within its own logic, the IFM worked with the abstract claims of the SED on human rights. 
They took the purported ideals of socialist human rights rhetoric such as the total control by the 
people and world peace and deduced from these principles a program of reform and 
democratization. In doing so, GDR human rights activists adopted historical figures of German 
communism, especially KPD co-founder Rosa Luxemburg, as their symbolic forbearers. 
Luxemburg’s slogan “Freedom is always freedom for those who think differently,” because a 
mainstay of human rights activism and her criticisms of Lenin and the Soviet Revolution were 
employed to legitimize calls for a new path for the GDR.82 In a speech on the interconnection of 
human rights and peace in 1986, Bärbel Bohley cited Luxemburg saying, “socialist democracy 
means much more and in no way less than bourgeois democracy. It definitely does not mean the 
abolition of civil rights.”83 Additionally, like Herzberg and Eisenfeld, East German human rights 
activists drew from SED human rights scholarship and propaganda. The pastor and activist 
Heiko Lietz cited Bernhard Graefrath in his public writings and his personal papers include notes 
on Hermann Klenner’s discussion of the Virginia Bill of Rights.84 The personal papers of IFM 	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founder Ulrike Poppe contain articles and news clippings on human rights from East German 
academics Hermann Klenner and the journal of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights and she 
also corresponded with Professor Eberhard Poppe (no relation) who taught at the University of 
Halle and wrote extensively on human rights law.85 
 Although influenced by outside activists and movements, the human rights ideals of the 
IFM and others were indigenous to the GDR and a product of its unique history. The GDR-
Committee for Human Rights had acted as the primary “translator” of international human rights 
into local East German idiom since the late 1950s but soon the dissident movement would 
displace them in this role. The human rights vernacular of the IFM was built on tangible local 
issues such as suppression of free speech, environmental destruction and draft resistance but it 
connected all of these issues together with the vocabulary of socialism, solidarity and popular 
anti-fascism. They took the anti-fascist narratives of the SED in which a heroic few fought for 
human rights, peace and democracy against the forces of war and oppression and simply dropped 
the SED from the equation.86 The party and the whole bureaucratized apparatus of the East 
German state were now lumped together with the imperialist capitalists in threatening peace and 
suppressing the human rights of the people. The IFM had not just co-opted the rhetoric of the 
SED, it had hijacked its basis for moral legitimacy.87 
The Collapse of Socialist Human Rights, 1981-1988 
 The SED began the 1980s supremely confident in its human rights politics. By 1988, it 
was internationally isolated with other socialist nations treating it as a pariah and its own 	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intellectuals admitting ideological defeat. The long project of creating a discursive world in 
which SED rule, dictatorship and state socialism were unquestionably the highest order of human 
rights had inoculated the GDR against change, but when the ideological winds shifted, the SED 
was unable to adapt and evolve. All human rights activism from abroad and below was 
categorized as enemy activity and all action by the SED categorized as the realization of human 
rights. This had disrupted the basis for dissent in the 1970s when socialist intellectuals shied 
away from human rights, but in the 1980s, the hermetically sealed bubble in which the SED 
operated intellectually prevented party officials from understanding how rapidly the international 
situation was shifting and how quickly their legitimacy was ebbing away.  
 The continuing hubris of the SED in the face of growing human rights dissent at home is 
best seen in the project to create a “Socialist Declaration of Human Rights.”88 While Western 
Europe had the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) the Americas had a hemispheric 
Declaration (1948) and Convention (1969) of human rights and the Organization of African 
Unity had created the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981), the communist 
world did not have an equivalent. In 1981, the East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided 
that a Socialist Declaration of Human Rights would bring together the communist bloc and foster 
unity against western propaganda. This initiative would go terribly awry. Although met with 
initial enthusiasm, the process of trying to create a declaration on human rights that every 
socialist country in the world could agree to only exposed longstanding fissures. Rather than 
bring together the socialist bloc, the project became a site of conflict as part of the rapidly 
growing ideological divide between hardliners and reformers following Soviet Secretary General 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s programs of Glasnost and Perestroika in the USSR. The anti-fascist 	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worldview pitting a unified bloc of socialists fighting for human rights against the arrayed forces 
of capitalism, racism and imperialism, collided with the messy realities of real existing socialism 
on a global scale. While the disaffected citizens of the GDR were coming together and creating a 
new discourse of human rights from below that created a unity of purpose in spite of great 
differences in terms of political ideology and religious faith, the process of engaging with the 
problem of human rights on an international scale was one more problem driving a wedge 
between the socialist nations. Failed dialogue at the state level combined with pressure from 
below chipped away at the faith of the élite as the status quo on human rights became 
increasingly untenable. 
 In the early 1980s, loyal East German intellectuals remained confident in their vision of 
socialist human rights. The GDR-Committee for Human Rights continued to publish its quarterly 
journal “Schriften und Informationen,” in German and English and had subscribers from dozens 
of countries included numerous academic libraries in North America.89 East German presses 
were producing annual contributions to the socialist human rights cannon such as “Human 
Rights: Unmasking Demagoguery,” (1980), “Human Rights: A Utopia?” (1981) – short answer: 
under capitalism yes, under socialism no – and in 1982 Hermann Klenner’s magnum opus, 
“Marxism and Human Rights: a Study of Legal Philosophy.”90 While the flurry of human rights 
media coverage in the late 1970s to counteract western propaganda inspiring increased 
applications to exit the GDR had died down, the intellectuals who had been pushed to respond to 
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Tarnopolsky, a Canadian judge and human rights academic who had sparred with Committee member Bernhard 
Graefrath at the United Nations in the 1970s. BA DZ 7/ 52 Tarnopolsky subscription card. 
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the imperialist provocation continued to produce even more complex and detailed explanations 
of socialist human rights politics.  
 In this regard, the GDR was moving in the opposite direction to many socialists and 
communists worldwide where liberal human rights as a means of reform were becoming a major 
theme. In addition to dissident groups in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Praxis group 
in Yugoslavia was developing arguments for liberal democratic human rights as part of the 
revival of real socialism.91 Euro-communist parties in France and Italy were embracing the idea 
of rights under communism as a more gradual path to utopia.92 More mainstream Marxist 
thinkers in the west such as Claude Lefort were engaging the idea of human rights as something 
more than just the hypocritical claims of the bourgeoisie.93 In Latin America, communists who 
had been brutally suppressed and tortured by military regimes had turned to the language of 
human rights as used by international campaigners to denounce their own oppression by 
dictatorships.94 
The unusual optimism of the East Germans on the matter of human rights stemmed from 
the equally exceptional absence of an organized human rights movement within its borders. As 
Poland descended into martial law to suppress the threat of Solidarity and human rights activists 
were perceived by the leaders of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia as serious threats to their 
power, the GDR appeared to have the situation under control. At the United Nations, the SED 
was facing increased pressure from abroad, but this was still considered manageable. East 	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93 “Politics and Human Rights,” in Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, 
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Germans had contacted the UN Human Rights Commission directly with their demands to leave 
the GDR but this failed to produce a significant impact. While the SED had been careful to avoid 
signing additional protocols to international human rights treaties that would permit automatic 
investigations of reported abuses, there was a loophole they had not anticipated. The “1503 
procedure” of the Human Rights Commission allowed members to launch an investigation into a 
country so long as the Commission had received 50 complaints demonstrating a “consistent 
pattern of gross violations.”95 In 1981, the UN had received enough complaints and the 
accidental absence of the Soviet representative allowed for the other members to begin 
proceedings against the GDR.96 Rather than change its travel policy, the SED released just 
enough of complainants to bring the number below the fifty-person threshold.97 The affair was 
an embarrassment, but since the proceedings were confidential up until the conclusion of the 
investigation, there was almost no publicity. At the same time, the letters from East German 
citizens sent to the UN were returned to the SED so that those who were not already imprisoned 
would likely have faced retribution for going outside official channels and causing international 
scrutiny.98 
Behind the scenes, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs launched an ambitious project, 
without guidance or directives from the Soviet Union, to create a Socialist Declaration of Human 
Rights. An initial draft was created in 1981 by a team including GDR-Committee for Human 
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Rights veterans Hermann Klenner, Bernhard Graefrath as well as three legal academics, 
Eberhard Poppe, Rudolf Hieblinger and Angelika Zschiedrich.99 The preamble of the draft 
opened with the line: “Whereas the abolition of the exploitation of man by man is the basic 
prerequisite for ensuring equal human rights without discrimination […]”100 The text that 
followed represented human rights under socialism in its most idealized form rather than the 
actually human rights under "real existing socialism. The draft proclaimed that all citizens were 
equal and working together through self-determination to realize a world of peace. Under 
socialism there was total gender equality, all citizens were able to take part fully in the running 
of workplaces, in the cultural life of the nation and the political rule of the state. All citizens 
enjoyed the benefits of education, leisure and a healthy environment. Citizens were free to 
exchange views, to hold religious beliefs of their choosing and even to travel on the condition it 
did not threaten the “interests of national security or of public order and security of the protection 
of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”101 Officials 
within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee were pleased with the draft, 
but they immediately removed all reference to a right to travel.102  
The project of the Socialist Declaration of Human Rights appears to have stalled for a 
time after 1981, but the return of human rights as a major component of the Cold War brought it 
back into action.103 At a follow-up meeting as part of the ongoing Helsinki Process (CSCE) in 
Madrid in 1983, the Soviet Union allowed concessions on travel and emigration against the 	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101 Ibid., Article 16. 
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advice of GDR experts much to the horror of the SED leadership.104 The following year, a 
massive wave of applications to emigrate set off fears of increased  “political-ideological 
diversion,” from the west. Rather than face the consequences of deteriorating domestic 
conditions and a growing dissident movement, Stasi officials blamed a “campaign based on 
alleged violations of human rights,” launched by West Germany since the conclusion of the 
Madrid talks.105 As more and more East Germans demanded to leave using human rights 
language, the Stasi and the SED leadership saw only the work of imperialist interference in the 
internal affairs of the GDR. When a massive wave of exit applications occurred in 1984, such 
fears of an escalating campaign of western aggression appeared to be realized. 
 While western human rights propaganda had been on the agenda of international summits 
of Communist Bloc officials in the late 1970s, the topic of concern had shifted in the early 1980s 
to matters of peace activism, Solidarity in Poland and American sabre-rattling.106 In 1985, 
however, the problem of human rights reappeared in a speech to the “Meeting of Secretaries for 
Ideology and Propaganda of the Central Committees of the Fraternal Parties of Socialist 
Countries,” in Moscow. In the midst of a discussion of economic issues, a young member of the 
Soviet Politburo, Mikhail Gorbachev warned the attendees that the apologists for imperialism, 
“make pretty speeches about ’bridging the gap‘ [between East and West], about freedom and 
human rights. They lie and dissemble with a single goal; to make us waver in our unity, to 
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weaken us, and to eliminate us, the main obstacle to the realization of their imperialist plans.”107 
Five days after giving this speech, Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko was dead and 
a few hours later Gorbachev was sworn in as his replacement.  
 Interest in human rights at Eastern Bloc conferences increased and both the East German 
and Soviet delegates continued to raise the issue. Only two months after the conference in 
Moscow, in May 1985, the SED representatives to a meeting of junior ideology and international 
affairs officials in Budapest brought the problem of human rights to the forefront.  
It is important for us to counteract the strengthened campaign of the West on the issue of human 
rights, which is not new but in recent time is again being militantly conducted. We meet it head-
on by demonstrating the humanistic values and achievements of real existing socialism in the 
everyday life of people above all in confronting the propaganda of the FRG and opposing the 
phenomenon of chronic crises in the capitalist world, its inhumanity and lack of perspective. We 
particularly emphasize as the most important human rights: the right to peace and the right to 
work.108  
 
In October 1985, Gorbachev once again raised the issue at a meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign 
ministers in Sofia and suggested that the next meeting of ideology officials be devoted entirely to 
this topic.109  
 While the Soviet Union was the instigator of the discussion on human rights, the GDR set 
the agenda for the future when it came to the meeting of Secretaries for International and 
Ideological Issues, held in Bucharest in December 1985. The Soviet representative M.V. 
Simyanin opened the meeting with a long-winded speech about the accomplishments of 
socialism, the many crimes of capitalism, and spoke in favour, in vague terms, of a greater 	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exchange of ideas on the problem of human rights. His main plan was that the socialist bloc 
needed to do more to tout its human rights achievements, from the support of peace to the right 
to work, to gender equality, while at the same time increasing attacks on American imperialism, 
such as support for death squads in Central America or against the Apartheid regime of South 
Africa. While he acknowledged that many publications mentioned the idea of human rights in 
recent years, he also admonished academics for “devoting insufficient attention,” to the topic and 
cadres for “underestimating the possibilities for propaganda inherent in these matters.”110  
When SED Ideology Minister Kurt Hager addressed the meeting, he proposed a more 
ambitious plan: the delegates would form a joint commission to create a Declaration or Covenant 
of Human Rights for the socialist states to match the other regional human rights systems.111 This 
would include the creation of an international committee to handle the coordination of human 
rights propaganda and an academic council that would work through the ideological and 
theoretical problems.112 While Simyanin spoke as though the problem of human rights was new, 
Hager specifically praised the work of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights - and made sure to 
mention it was founded in 1959 - for providing invaluable support for such work over the 
decades in East Germany.113 Citing long experience in dealing with human rights propaganda 
from the west, Hager declared that the only option was to “take up the banner of human rights 
even more firmly in our hands,” and to launch a counterattack.114 As a first step towards this goal, 
his office had prepared a briefing booklet on the realization of human rights in East Germany and 	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one on western human rights propaganda, which were distributed to all the delegates. Hager’s 
confidence on the matter of human rights was rewarded and the SED was placed in charge of 
coordinating increased information exchange on the problem of human rights and organizing a 
meeting through which further measures on the strengthening of international propaganda could 
be determined.115 As the front line of the fight against western human rights “demagoguery” and 
the country with the greatest experience in organizing for human rights politics, the SED would 
lead the way. 
 The SED set to work on increasing their institutional capacity for international human 
rights scholarship and propaganda in June 1986 by creating the “Interdisciplinary Academic 
Working Group for Questions on Human Rights.”116 Based in the Academy for Social Sciences 
of the Central Committee, the so-called “Red Think-tank” of the SED, the project was put into 
the hands of the reform Communist Rolf Reißig (1940-).117 Although Hermann Klenner and 
other veterans of human rights activism had been involved in the project from the beginning, the 
Academy was more closer integrated into the upper echelons of power in comparison to the 
relatively free floating GDR-Committee for Human Rights. While Klenner was at that time the 
GDR’s representative at UN on human rights matters and Vice-Chair of the Human Rights 
Commission, he was forced to withdraw his candidacy for Chair of that body when the Israeli 
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delegation revealed that Klenner had been a member of the Nazi Party as a teenager in 1945.118 
The ensuing scandal undoubtedly damaged Klenner’s position at home and helped to explain 
why the much younger Reißig was given the position, to his own surprise and chagrin.119 
Few would have welcomed this progress as much as the members of the GDR-Committee 
for Human Rights. While the organization had previously received the occasional request for 
assistance with applications to leave the GDR, beginning with the massive wave of exit requests 
in 1984, the Committee became a lightening rod for dissent. In that year, the Committee received 
150 letters from citizens trying to leave the GDR.120 As per Committee policy these were all 
turned over to the Ministry of the Interior without reply. Ignoring the letter writers did little to 
stem the tide and another 190 emigrationists wrote to the Committee in 1985 with 170 more in 
1986.121 Citizens writing to the Committee justified their demands based on problems with their 
work, both practical and ideological, the absence of consumer goods from cars to tropical fruits, 
distaste for ideological indoctrination and military education for youth as well as restrictions on 
basic freedoms such as the right to speak freely and travel.122 
 The letters from citizens begging for assistance from an office they believed was meant to 
assist them in human rights issues was damaging to the morale of the organization, but 
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engagements with sceptical foreign socialist officials appears to have severely shaken the resolve 
of the Committee members even more. On October 2, 1986, a joint delegation of foreign affairs 
functionaries from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria visited the headquarters of the 
GDR-Committee for Human Rights in Berlin as part of preparations for the creation of their own 
human rights offices at home.123 Since Kurt Hager had boasted of East Germany’s longstanding 
expertise in human rights activism, it was only natural that functionaries from other socialist 
countries would come to see the experts in action. Once the visiting officials delved into the 
details of the operation, however, it was clear that they would not be replicating the East German 
model. The delegation expressed concern that the small staff of the Committee, with only 
Secretary Forberger and a handful of clerical staff working full time, would not be sufficient to 
deal with all of the inquiries from citizens. Forberger tried to explain that they were able to 
handle all of their duties without serious problems, but that all letters from dissidents or those 
seeking to leave the country were left unanswered and simply transferred to the security services. 
The visiting officials “were not satisfied” with this answer and argued that they should at least 
have to officially respond and explain that the Committee was not authorized to assist in these 
requests.124 For the visiting officials, a human rights office was meant to engage with dissidents 
and work through these problems, whereas the GDR-Committee existed to campaign for human 
rights abroad while maintaining the hegemonic discourse at home and sweeping such challenges 
under the carpet.  
 While the visit of lower-level officials was going poorly, at a follow-up meeting of 
Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Berlin in the same month, the process ground to a near total 
halt. Though the GDR delegation had circulated a draft of a possible declaration entitled 	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“Freedom and Human Rights under Socialism,” the representatives shied away from any kind of 
formal agreement on the contents with the Romanian delegate flatly stating that he had no 
mandate to agree to any specifics.125 All of the delegations involved demanded that the project be 
limited to a declaration on human rights rather than any kind of binding covenant or 
convention.126 From a working copy of the draft declaration used by the GDR delegate, the only 
concrete decision of the meeting was to strip the term “self-governance” from the document 
entirely.127 With delegates requesting more revisions and time for further review, the meeting 
settled on the Spring of 1987 as the new deadline to circulate a new version of the declaration so 
that the “fraternal parties can decide on the concrete questions of adopting the document.”128 
 At yet another meeting of Ideology Ministers in January 1987, Kurt Hager touted the 
creation of a draft of the socialist declaration of human rights, but participating countries could 
not agree on the contents.129 When experts met in Berlin in March to hammer out the final details 
before a new draft was sent to the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers for further review, the focus 
began to drift from refuting capitalist propaganda towards ideas for reform. The effects of 
Perestroika and Glasnost are evident in the records as delegations from neighbouring socialist 
countries sought to include previously taboo “bourgeois” rights and institutions. The Polish 
delegate suggested that legal mechanisms for citizens to questions state laws would be beneficial 
for human rights. The representative from Czechoslovakia wanted to include rights to personal 	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property and other types of property in the draft. Since the declaration was meant to represent the 
whole of the socialist world and not just the Warsaw Pact, the meeting in Berlin included non-
European communists from Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, and Mongolia. While these representatives 
were enthusiastic about the project in general, they also wanted to shift focus from just 
presenting a united ideological front to include more work with neutral and non-aligned states.130 
While everyone agreed that the creation of the Declaration was important, no one wanted to 
commit to a concrete path forward. 
 Finally in June 1987, the GDR experts had prepared a revised version of the Declaration 
that could be circulated to all the participants. The first article outlined the broad principles that 
were to define socialist human rights on the world stage:  
The peoples of the socialist states realize their right to self-determination through which they 
determine, free from exploitation and oppression, their economic, social and cultural 
development. They perfect the socialist system, the socialist state and socialist democracy with 
the goal of building communism. 
 
The development, realization and guarantee of human rights are inextricably linked to the self-
determination of peoples and therefore belong to the internal affairs of the state.  
 
The socialist state ensures that the exercise of this right will not be hindered either through 
external intervention or through attempts to introduce a system of exploitation of man by man.131 
 
The declaration ran to 20 pages of text outlining 32 Articles representing the best of the 
constitutions of the socialist states and the human rights documents of the United Nations. When 
the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact approved the text, the socialist world would finally 
have a unified vision of human rights that would serve to counteract the slander and propaganda 
of the west. 
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 After six years of work, however, the draft was once again rejected and the project stalled. 
While the delegates from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria were positive, a bloc consisting 
of the USSR, Hungary and Romania demanded they go back to the drawing board. The Soviet 
representatives pointed out all the areas they disagreed with but did not have any constructive 
criticism on how to fix the problems and left the East Germans to conclude, “there was no 
coordinated or coherent conception within the USSR on the further composition of the 
Declaration.”132 The Hungarian ministry wrote ahead to inform the GDR officials that they 
would not commit to moving forward on the draft.133 At the meeting itself, the delegate reassured 
the others that he had nothing against a general project on human rights, but it was simply not the 
time for a formal declaration. The Romanians agreed that the timing was poor and reiterated, as 
their delegation did at every meeting, that they lacked the mandate to agree on any concrete 
plans. 134  Although all involved agreed they should move forward with more coordinated action 
on human rights, the Declaration was effectively dead. While all involved could agree in theory 
that they championed human rights, reconciling this heroic self-image with the actual norms of 
human rights created too many contradictions and too much internal conflict. 
Losing Faith in the Socialist Human Rights Message  
 Within the GDR-Committee for Human Rights, pressure from East German citizens was 
mounting and the emerging split in the socialist bloc once again reverberated at home. In 1987, 
the number of citizens writing to the Committee demanding help to leave the country more than 
doubled to 330. For the first time, citizens responded directly to the Committee’s proclamations 
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on Human Rights Day (December 10) including protests and a joint letter from the emigration 
organization the Working Group for Citizenship Rights (Arbeitsgruppe Staatsbürgerschafts-
recht).135 Morale continued to decline as the Committee had to increasingly engage with the 
population outside of the shrinking bubble of committed SED élites. Secretary Siegfried 
Forberger reported to the group’s Presidium: 
We have taken notice that, unlike in previous years, a greater number of letter writers articulated 
an aggressive stand against the state. Almost all letters contained misconceptions of UN 
documents and agreed upon international legal human rights standards in addition to the status 
and duties of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights.136 
 
Failing to receive responses to their letters, East Germans now telephoned and appeared at the 
Committee’s office in person to demand answers. “Our brief but factual information and 
arguments did not receive a sympathetic hearing from these citizens because of their defiant 
attitude.”137 Not only were East Germans challenging their human rights work, in 1987, another 
visit from a Soviet official from the Ministry of Justice went just as poorly as the international 
conferences on the Socialist Declaration of Human Rights. Forberger reported, “A lengthy 
dispute followed on the question of why the Committee as an NGO had no domestic function. In 
his view, a Soviet human rights committee that dealt only with foreign policy would not be 
sufficient to be approved by the party.”138 From within and without, the certainties of SED 
human rights doctrine were besieged by dissent and doubt.  
 In 1988, the socialist bloc rapidly moved from gridlock to an open split between 
hardliners and reformers and then to the complete isolation of the GDR specifically on the 
problem of human rights. In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev had shifted from conservative 	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modernization to a program of radical reform and the rest of the socialist world was going to be 
part of his experiment whether they wanted to or not.139 SED leaders did not accept that the 
meaning of human rights was changing beneath their feet and sought in vain to keep the socialist 
bloc together on their terms. In May, a Politburo report noted with horror that every other 
socialist state aside from the GDR was accepting the idea of legally binding agreements 
regarding the implementation of human rights and basic rights in the final document of a 
Helsinki follow-up meeting in Vienna. It noted, “Multiple attempts to induce the USSR and other 
fraternal states to take up the same position have had no effect.”140 That same month a meeting 
of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers confirmed that the Socialist Declaration for Human Rights 
project had been abandoned by all involved. In November, at a UN sponsored conference in 
Moscow, the GDR delegates frantically reported that the East Germans were the only 
representatives to say that they did not have serious human rights deficits in their own country 
and, along with the Polish and Czechoslovakian delegations, the only ones to connect the 
realization of human rights with socialism.141  
 It is no coincidence that at the moment the GDR was suddenly ideologically isolated that 
the Stasi began to heavily indoctrinate its own workforce on the subject of human rights. In the 
summer of 1988, two separate manuals on human rights were issued internally. One text written 
by the legal affairs department, “Human Rights in the Struggles of Our Time,” focused on 
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technical ideological issues regarding the application of socialist law.142 The other booklet issued 
by the Central Operative Staff (ZOS), was meant to educate Stasi officers as to the meaning of 
human rights, explain the international ideological struggle over their meaning and to inoculate 
them against the arguments of dissidents and reform communists. “Human Rights: Fundamental 
Statements and Political-Ideological Questions About Human Rights Issues and Human Rights 
Demagoguery in Our Time,” represents the paradoxical position of the SED on human rights 
near its ultimate demise. The text reassures the reader that state-socialism is completely correct 
and that the people still support the system wholeheartedly, but the tone and subtext betray an 
ever-present fear that the “demagoguery” of the West is actually working in the East, and that the 
system is crumbling around them. While in the late 1970s, the SED thought it necessary to flood 
the public media with stories on human rights achievements in the socialist world and abuses 
under capitalist imperialism, only in 1988 was it deemed necessary to reinforce the ideological 
backbone of the secret police when it came to human rights. 
 While the background on the nature and history of human rights in the manual was 
boilerplate propaganda repeating the same slogans on historical development and the 
emancipatory nature of revolution, the discussion of contemporary problems in human rights was 
practically apocalyptic. The calls for freedom and civil rights represent a demand to abandon 
socialist human rights principles as a precursor to the ultimate goal of “destroying the leading 
role of the party, the end of the socialist planned economy and means of production and a turn 
back to capitalist economic relationships.”143 International human rights campaigns aimed to 
“torpedo the political goals of peace, understanding and disarmament,” and to cover up the 
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crimes of the west. International outcry about the suppression of dissent, specifically that which 
followed the imprisonment and expulsion of leading protestors at the Luxemburg-Liebknecht 
parade on 17 January 1988, were designed to “slander” the GDR, “form an anti-socialist 
opposition,” and to “bring into question the traditional celebrations of the working class.”144 
 From this nightmare-vision of human rights for counterrevolution, the text also sought to 
reassure Stasi officers of the superiority and successes of the GDR. Socialist human rights 
continued to be “of a higher quality than those brought about by capitalism,” and “political and 
personal rights did not simply remain declarations,” but were rather ensured by basic social 
conditioned and institutions. Essentially, human rights were achieved through the status quo and 
all efforts to change the system threatened these accomplishments. The manual concluded with 
the declaration:   
On the theme of human rights we have nothing to dread, it is rather […] the human rights 
demagogues. We have to call a spade a spade and on the other hand, we must continue to work 
steadfastly to ensure that the human rights situation in the GDR is a highly visible part of the 
growing appeal of socialism.145 
 
The message was contradictory in its vacillations between the confident first half and the second 
half dripping with false hope. If socialism had nothing to fear, why did it have to work so hard to 
ensure that human rights were maintained, particularly since they were supposedly emanating 
from all officials, institutions and the basic conditions of society? Did the “growing appeal of 
socialism,” imply that the cause was ever strengthening or that support had collapsed and was 
once again recovering? Here too, overcoming the friction between rhetoric and reality was 
causing problems even among the most loyal members of the regime. 
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 In December 1988, the SED put on a brave face for the 40th Anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and rolled out even more propaganda than usual to mark the 
occasion. Official statements boasted of the achievements of the GDR in the field of human 
rights and touted the fidelity of the SED to the universal norms of civilization as outlined by the 
United Nations.146 In private, however, the GDR-Committee for Human Rights finally lost faith 
in their message and the system they served. In a letter to Günter Sieber, head of the SED’s 
International Relations Section, the leading members of the Committee’s Presidium, 
Chairwoman Friedel Malter as well as deputies Bernhard Graefrath and Ferdinand Thun, 
admitted that they could no longer go forward propagating socialist human rights doctrine when 
it appeared as though no such thing existed any longer. “Recent events in the socialist bloc itself 
have shown that in the international conflict over human rights, there is no longer a unified 
conception of socialist human rights.”147 Of particular concern was the move by Hungary and 
Poland to adopt bourgeois attitudes towards human rights and to begin talks over the creation of 
a pan-European human rights declaration rather than one only for the Socialist Bloc. The writers 
of the letter were not young reform communists but rather the old party stalwarts from the 
generation born in the 1920s and 1930s. The failure of socialist unity was breaking the morale of 
those who had been part of the SED from the very beginning. 
 The Committee leaders suggested that in order to avoid total isolation and a loss of all 
international credibility, the Committee would have to start dealing with internal human rights 
problems. They could assist in domestic governance not only by dealing with citizen complaints 
but also by advising the government on reforms and legal problems so as to ensure that the GDR 
was in line with international agreements. “In this way, the credibility and effectiveness of the 	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work of the committee internally and externally could be substantially increased. The committee 
could help citizens see that their rights and obligations are realized through the human rights 
policy of the GDR.”148 While the note spoke reassuringly that such moves would help stabilize 
the situation at home and abroad, the very idea that the party would require a group of academic 
experts to instruct them on changes or that citizens could legally claim that the state was 
violating their human rights completely undermined the SED’s claims to power and the existing 
doctrine of socialist human rights. Such a decision would officially admit that human rights 
could exist outside of socialism and that there could actually be, as the SPD claimed in the 1940s, 
“Socialism without Human Rights!” The system could not be reformed, because such reforms 
would undermine the privileges of the party and destroy its legitimacy. Facing such an 
intractable crisis, the SED’s Central Committee simply did not reply to the letter and chose to 
ignore the problem.149 
Conclusion 
The creation of the IFM represented a watershed moment in East German history when 
the language of human rights, was finally turned against the very basis of SED rule by a dissident 
movement within the GDR. The activists who took up the cause of human rights did not have the 
luxury of a moral epiphany on the part of the East German people or of a population that already 
agreed with their message. Before a human rights movement could be created, the founders of 
the IFM and other dissidents needed to overcome three major hurdles: first, the disruptive 
activities of the Stasi and the rest of the security apparatus of the SED; second, the concerns of 
activists who feared that the politicization of their cause could dilute the pure moral message of 
peace; second, the continued influence of the hegemonic discourse of socialist human rights that 	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led many dissidents to reject liberal democratic rights as a tool of imperialist capitalism as well 
as a distraction from the real aim of realizing true socialism. These obstacles were overcome 
both through the creation of a vernacular discourse of human rights that connected abstract 
concepts to local problems but also through the spreading realization that the SED and the Stasi 
would not even tolerate apolitical activism outside of approved state structures. The growing 
sense that the political system of the GDR needed to be changed before moral goals could be 
fought for, let alone achieved, altered the calculus of dissent and helped bring about a shift in the 
human rights discourse. 
The collapse of socialist solidarity on the problem of human rights, on the other hand, 
was far greater than the failure of just one diplomatic initiative and it struck at the heart of East 
Germany ideology and the legitimization of SED rule. While East Germany was bombarded with 
human rights criticism beginning in the 1950s and increasingly so in the 1970s, western attacks 
in some ways worked to reinforce the socialist discourse of human rights by providing the SED 
with an enemy and a foil. The SED human rights discourse was built upon a binary anti-fascist 
narrative in which the world was cleanly divided between the democratic forces of peace against 
the imperialist capitalist exploiters. Without the support of the rest of the bloc and the Soviet 
Union in particular, however, the Manichaean view of human rights as divided between East and 
west collapsed. When the official slogan in the GDR held that “to learn from the Soviet Union is 
to learn how to win,” it was difficult for regular citizens, state functionaries and SED leaders 
alike to rationalize how the USSR could now agree with the imperialist west on the problem of 
human rights. The ideological bubble created by the Committee was getting smaller and smaller 
to the point where even other apparatchiks from the Eastern Bloc found their behaviour overly 
rigid and eventually just incomprehensible. 
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The simultaneous rise of an indigenous human rights movement and the collapse of the 
socialist discourse of human rights from above would have explosive consequences in 1989. East 
German apparatchiks still believed that human rights was an essential aspect of socialism but 
they no longer believed in the inherent connection between the SED’s monopoly on power and 
realization of human rights. This doubt in the system would connect with the democratic 
alternative demanded from below by groups such as the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights. 
As East Germany careened into perpetual crisis in 1989, this interconnection would have 
powerful results. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
Human Rights Revolution(s)? 1989-1990 
 
 
Human rights. How they had been distorted! Now all felt the 
same. To go into the streets was a human right. 1 
 
-Hartmut Zwahr  
 
 
In 1989, the dissident movement was growing, discontent was rising and the SED’s 
power structure was crumbling. In the 1970s, the movement to exit in the language of human 
rights had helped to suppress the emergence of voice on those same principles, but the mass 
exodus of East German citizens in 1989 alongside a crumbling economy that created a seemingly 
intractable crisis that worked to support the dissidents demanding democratization. The idea of 
human rights fuelled emigration, but it was also driving reform. As Konrad Jarausch has argued, 
the civic revolution that caused the end of SED rule stemmed from “the disparate developments 
of the mass exodus, the protest demonstrations for human rights, and the reform debates within 
the communist elite,” which created an “unstoppable dynamic.”2 As dissident Jens Reich later 
said, “We had not wanted, had not expected,” events to radicalize as they did: “Evolution, reform 
and reason slipped out of our hands and towards revolution.”3 There was not a single “bulldozer 
revolutionary logic of rights,”4 driving events forward but rather this dynamic that emerged from 	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the dialogue amongst those who seeking to leave, the dissidents and the SED taking place 
through the discourse of human rights. 
When the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989, this dynamic shifted and the tenuous 
coalition between these groups began to fall apart. With the freedom to travel achieved and the 
SED voluntarily relinquishing its monopoly on power by the end of the year, the political 
calculus of the East German people was radically changed. As elections approached in spring 
1989, the project of restoring socialism through the realization of human rights faltered as the 
majority of the population sought reunification rather than new utopias. As the old East German 
elite joined together with the dissidents to work out a basis for their idealized democratic state, 
East Germans soured on the prospect of reform as new revelations of SED corruption and Stasi 
abuses poured out in the newly liberalized media. While human rights groups such as the 
Initiative for Peace and Human Rights were unable to make the transition from protest group to 
mass political party, the idea of human rights was central to the first democratic elections of the 
German Democratic Republic. 
Prelude to Revolution – January to September 1989 
 In the 1970s, those seeking to emigrate had turned to human rights following arbitrary 
rejection of their application; and in the early 1980s, the peace movement had been drawn to the 
language of human rights when faced with violent repression of their cause. In the final years of 
the GDR, this process was now occurring to the vast majority of East German citizens as the 
SED increasingly violated its own system of norms and defining more and more actions as 
“oppositional.” In September 1988, a group of students at the Carl Ossietzky high school were 
expelled for criticizing martial law in Poland and questioning the militarization of the GDR.5 	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Such a punishment for students advocating peace at an elite high school in the Pankow district of 
Berlin that was home to many of the leading members of the SED, including the son of Deputy 
Secretary Egon Krenz, was unnerving for those who thought that they could continue to work 
within the system. In November, the SED banned an issue of the increasingly popular Soviet 
press digest Sputnik because it contained an article on the Stalin era that criticized the German 
KPD’s failure to work with the SPD to prevent Hitler’s rise to power in 1933. While Gorbachev 
was comfortable in taking a hard look at the past, in East Germany such ideas were deemed 
intolerable attacks on the legitimacy of socialism itself. With this decision, the SED 
demonstrated to many that open discussion of contemporary problems, let alone those of decades 
past, was simply impossible under the present conditions.6 Party members complained of feeling 
“gagged,” with one reporting, “I have been in the party a long time and cannot remember a time 
when I was so helpless and clueless.”7 The absence of the rule of law and freedom of expression 
was becoming increasingly present in the daily lives of East Germans. 
 In May 1989, the SED made a critical error in clumsily fixing elections. The electoral 
process in the GDR was always rigged to the extent that the candidates were all part of the 
National Front that was constitutionally required to be led by the SED, as the “political 
organization of the working population in town and country, who are jointly realizing 
socialism.”8 The Politburo wanted to go ahead with a clean vote in which they still expected to 
get more than 90% approval, and instructed local officials not the alter the results. When some 
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districts registered less than 50% approval, local officials took it upon themselves to rig the 
outcome. Rather than acknowledging that a small minority would refuse to acclaim the 
preselected candidates, local officials sought to erase dissent and present a picture of unanimity 
by showing a remarkable, even by GDR standards, 98.5% vote in favour of the official slate.9 
Even symbolic votes against a panel of candidates guaranteed to still take power were now 
outlawed in the “socialist democracy” of the SED. 
Human rights organizations had tried to organize a boycott of the elections to make a 
statement on the importance of secret ballots but the obvious fraud was far more useful. They 
demanded recounts in the presence of non-party observers. Protests in the streets prompted 
violent police reactions creating new grounds for protest. Human rights groups justified their 
protests in reference to the GDR constitution’s right to free expression (Article 27) and accused 
the SED of “violating the inner peace” of the country and declared that the police “must ask 
themselves whether the GDR is truly under the rule of law and if their actions are appropriate.”10 
Documentation of the fraud produced by human rights groups was instrumental in convincing 
several church pastors to move protests out to the streets and every month afterwards on the 7th 
there would be demonstrations commemorating the event.11 Other citizens actually tried to use 
the legal system to punish SED officials involved in the fraudulent counting, alleging that they 
had violated their right to take part in the political system of the GDR.12 
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The Proliferation of Human Rights Activism  
The elections were a major flashpoint in human rights activity in public, but the real progress for 
the movement was its continued proliferation across the country. By this point, almost every type 
of activist organizations was concerned with the problem of human rights in some way. As 
Heiko Lietz, an energetic pastor who was officially stationed in Güstrow but organized dissident 
groups across the rural areas of the north explained the appeal of human rights, “Without free 
access to data (freedom of information) any environmental work was to waste, without the right 
to belief and freedom of conscience, alternative peace services were impracticable, without the 
freedom to travel, it was impossible to establish contacts with the 2/3 world [see fn. 13] and 
conduct projects internationally.”13 In addition to these logistical problems, “because the 
curtailing of basic human rights was becoming stronger, the question of a fundamental change in 
the political system turned increasingly urgent.”14 Human rights provided a discourse that could 
be used either to demand these basic rights within the system or to call for the end of the system 
itself. 
On 23 May 1989, Stasi Chief Erich Mielke produced an overview of every known 
underground and dissident group in the GDR. According to the report, "human rights groups" are 
among the youngest and as association, the most complex in structure and differentiated in terms 
of membership.”15 The Church had failed to sufficiently crack down on human rights groups 
within its walls and numerous “provocations” could be attributed to the movement, such as the 
infiltration of the Luxemburg-Liebknecht march in January 1988. The “main subjects that these 
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‘human rights groups’ are focused on attacking include problems of alleged failures to grant 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the GDR, the principle of democratic centralism and 
the organization of socialist democracy. In conjunction with these issues are demands for the 
“democratization of society,” “change of authorities,” reforms to socialist law, the elimination of  
“exclusion and the absence of legal protection,” for citizens in addition to the “full” realization of 
human rights for everyone.”16 
The IFM was the top of the list of human rights groups along with a number of groups in 
Leipzig almost all of which had some connection to Pastor Christoph Wonneberger of the 
Nikolai Church. In smaller communities across the GDR, however, the report also found diverse 
organizations and groups that were engaging with the problem of human rights. The “Eisenach 
Women’s Peace Circle” was writing protest letters to the GDR-Committee for Human Rights.17 
The “Church from Below” community in Halle was discussing “socialist democracy, freedom of 
speech, freedom of belief, constitutional legality, travel practices and environmentalism,” and 
had organized a public rally to support the human rights activists imprisoned in January 1988 for 
their participation in the Luxemburg-Liebknecht rally in Berlin.18 In the Karl Marx City district, 
the “Discussion Group Auerbach,” dealt with problems of current events, ecology, peace, human 
rights and medical ethics. Its membership included, “artists, doctors, church representatives and 
workers. Amongst these there are married couples, retirees and applicants for exit.”19 In Rostock, 
the Schalom Society, one of many groups organized by Heiko Lietz, met to talk about peace, 
civil alternatives to the draft and “the implementation of human rights in the GDR.” The eight-	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person group was composed of Catholics, Protestants, those seeking to emigrate and included an 
offset printer, a chemist from the regional Academy of Science, and an electronics specialist at a 
local fisheries plant.20 The number of active dissidents across the country numbered only around 
2,500 according to Stasi estimates, but these groups showed the appeal of the human rights 
message to a broad audience across the GDR.21 Human rights, as a discourse of dissent and civic 
engagement, appealed to the disaffected intellectuals and artists in Prenzlauer Berg, Berlin’s 
counter-culture enclave, but also to factory workers on the Baltic coast and retirees in small 
towns in the Thuringian hinterland. Although the hard core of dissent was small, by setting up 
multiple small groups across a region, determined activists like Heiko Lietz were able influence 
citizens well beyond their immediate circles. 
The number of East Germans who demanded the right to exit the GDR in the name of 
human rights and the number who simply decided to act out this right without permission of the 
state continued to grow in early 1989. By the summer time the outflow of citizens had turned 
into a mass exodus. Efforts to stem the tide by increasing the number of those allowed to around 
a third of applicants to leave legally the previous year only stirred up more desire in those who 
remained to leave or at least to travel. East Germans began using West German embassies in 
Berlin and the rest of the Eastern Bloc as places of sanctuary, much to the chagrin of the 
diplomats within. In the summer, the dam finally broke and when news spread that people were 
crossing to Austria from Hungary en masse, thousands of East Germans on holiday in Eastern 
Europe made their way to the newly opened border.22 Aside from those leaving illegally, by 
September of that year, the SED had received 160,785 applications to leave the GDR. 59,725 	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were first time applicants, with the remainder those who had been applying for several years 
without success.23  
The discourse of those seeking to leave demonstrates a widespread internalized 
conception of a right to free movement. Leaving the GDR was both a legal and moral right 
according to the citizens writing to the SED. The Ministry for the Interior reported that most 
letters included the claim, "our application is legal and cannot be punishable. Since the 
application is supported by a variety of applicable laws, we rule out the possibility that it will be 
rejected from the outset. Whosoever rejects this application, will be rejecting human rights.”24 
East German citizens were no longer just claiming their own personal right to exit but also 
accusing the state of rejecting human rights in their totality by not permitting free movement. 
Not meeting legally valid claims was now a matter of universal morality. 
 The worsening economic situation in the GDR was also creating leverage for West 
Germany on the human rights front. Since the signing of the Helsinki Accords, the FRG had 
always sought to keep a low profile with human rights politics and to use behind the scenes 
leverage to pressure the GDR into allowing for greater emigration.25 As the SED required more 
and more hard currency to compensate for declining aid from the Soviet Union, it was able to get 
it from West Germany only at the cost of travel concessions. In 1988, the GDR was able to 
nearly double the fees it received from West Germany for keeping open transit lines in exchange 
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for more freedom of movement.26 In 1989, emigration was hampering production and the 
economic crisis affecting the Eastern Bloc as a whole was driving down revenue giving West 
Germany even more leverage to demand human rights reforms.27 
 Although there continued to be friction between those seeking to leave and those who 
wanted to reform the GDR from within, these two streams of protest were coming together in the 
streets and reinforcing each other within the dissident movement. Dissidents sought to convince 
those seeking to leave not just to fight for their own right to leave, but for the human rights of 
everyone. In the discussion following presentations by dissidents at the Lukas Church in Leipzig 
in July, one member of the audience said:  
Those who are most vocal about human rights, are often those who want to make claims only for 
their own individual rights, and often the only right in particular: emigration. There are many 
other rights that are also violated to you but do not care about those... I'm thinking of the right to 
organize, to the rights to assemble, to inform ourselves and to produce our own publications. 
There are ways in which we can also fight for our rights. You do not fight for the right exit by 
making an application to leave. It does nothing to improve the overall situation, but one does 
something when making a claim to collective rights for all and to act as if they were already legal 
by simply gathering together.28 
 
From May and September 1989, 20% of those arrested at demonstrations had outstanding 
applications to exit the GDR.29 Some were perhaps persuaded by human rights solidarity, for 
some it was an expedient means to possible be expelled from the country like other prominent 
dissidents and for others it was simply that they no longer had anything to lose. From the 
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summer onwards, the positive reinforcement between human rights for voice and human rights 
for exit would only increase. 
Collapse of SED Legitimacy From Within 
 The state apparatus controlled by the SED was increasingly incapable of dealing with 
such arguments as the demolition of the SED’s carefully constructed human rights politics by its 
socialist allies and domestic translators continued apace into 1989. In January, the Vienna 
follow-up meeting for the Helsinki process concluded with a fresh round of compromises on 
human rights by the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet representatives.30 The agreement collapsed 
the distinction between the socialist and western blocs on the problem of human rights and the 
Soviet concessions were so dramatic that Sarah Snyder has suggested that the document marks 
the end of the Cold War.31 When Stasi Chief Erich Mielke met with his KGB counterpart 
following the meeting he blamed the debacle on the lack of unity in the socialist camp. He laid 
this at the feet of the USSR and railed at the Soviet rhetoric that “accused and defamed 
individual socialist states (the GDR and Czechoslovakia) as hostile to the Helsinki Process, 
hostile to reform and violators of human rights.”32 The Soviet Union itself was now in the enemy 
camp when it came to human rights according to the dwindling number of hardliners in the 
leadership of the GDR. 
 Further down the ladder of power, the SED had lost the conviction of intellectuals and the 
civil servants who had to deal with conflict between theory and policy first hand. In April 1989, 	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a group of intellectuals from across the socialist bloc originally organized to develop the 
Socialist Declaration of Human Rights and led by the East German Rolf Reißig released a report 
to their governments with a series of recommendations for reform that explicitly rejected the 
main tenets of socialist human rights doctrine. The leading mistakes they identified in the 
socialist bloc included the idea that “social property and production methods and the political 
power of the working class meant that the problem of human rights had ‘automatically’ been 
solved in a qualitatively superior way.” Such a misconception led to the “undervaluation of 
personal and political rights versus economic, social and cultural rights and the undervaluation of 
the legal guarantees of personal rights of the citizen against state and society.”33 Karl Polak’s 
dogma that the socialist revolution, by definition, realized human rights was no longer tenable 
when the intellectuals now implicitly took up the rallying cry of the SPD in the 1940s that there 
should be “no socialism without human rights.” 
 After decades of resolving human rights criticism with more ideological manoeuvres and 
clever answers, the SED leadership was finally out of ideas on how to reconcile the realities of 
GDR life with the idea of human rights. Functionaries who were supposed to be defending the 
system and propagating it to the next generation could not defend the charges of mass violations 
of human rights and they were getting no help from above. In August 1989, one teacher wrote to 
her local SED district office to ask,  
The recognition of human rights for all citizens has been proclaimed by the state leadership of the 
GDR for years and years. In dealing with those who think differently politically [sic]) it appears 
as though, in my humble opinion, this principle has been repealed or how else would you explain 
and justify the many actions of the police in front of the Nikolai Church in Leipzig? Students 
have been eyewitnesses and they have questions!”34  	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The actions of human rights activists were not just rhetorically challenging the human rights 
doctrine of the SED but the response of the state to their demonstrations was undermining belief 
in the possibility that human rights could exist under the status quo. Once this negative cycle had 
begun it was self-reinforcing as more joined to protest resulting in increased arbitrary brutality. 
Midlevel officials were not just confused by the contradictions between the human rights claims 
of the SED leadership and reality around them, but many began to defect ideologically to the 
side of the dissidents. An internal party report from Leipzig, one of the epicenters of dissent, 
found that amongst the middle-tier of SED officials and state functionaries, “the policies of the 
party are said to be dogmatic and conservative and incapable of change […] more democracy is 
supported, and in this context the protection of human rights in the GDR is placed under 
criticism.”35  
The greatest threat within the party was the total loss of faith in the system among young 
party members. By spring 1989, the Leipzig Institute for Young Research found that the 
proportion of SED members under 25 that had confidence in the SED leadership was less than 
50%.36 In Leipzig, one such example was Katrin Walter who quit her work as a secretary of her 
local Free German Youth chapter to become a human rights activist in 1989. She was from a 
loyal socialist family, raised with the stories of the “horrors of the evil imperialists,” and she had 
joined the state-run youth group to make her family proud: “But that quickly disillusioned me. 
My desire for justice and democracy could not be achieved there.”37 In order to live up to ideals 
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they had been raised with, East Germans were now abandoning the SED and fighting for human 
rights with the opposition. 
 In August 1989, the Security Bureau of the SED Central Committee produced a report on 
why so many East Germans sought to leave and the results were bleak. Letters from citizens 
contained the standard complaints about declining economic benefits and the shortages of 
consumer goods alongside increased demands that the GDR “catch up” to the level of human 
rights achieved in the West with a particular focus on “the discrediting of the recent elections.”38 
One leaflet being passed around in the summer of 1989 summed up the increasingly glaring 
contradictions of “real existing socialism,” with The Seven Great Wonders of the GDR: 
1. There is no unemployment but half of us have nothing to do. 
2. Even though half of us have nothing to do, there is a shortage of manpower. 
3. Even though there is a shortage of manpower, we fulfill the plan. 
4. Even though we fulfill the plan, there is nothing to buy. 
5. Even though there is nothing to buy, the people have almost everything. 
6. Even though the people have almost everything, more than half always complain. 
7. Even though half of us complain, we still vote 99.9% in favour of the candidates for the National 
Front.39 
 
The objective realities of life in the GDR were worsening and the population was becoming less 
forgiving of the SED’s failings. In such an environment, the human rights movement had a 
receptive audience. 
The Peaceful Revolution, September-November 1989 
 On 11 September 1989, Hungary announced that it would be opening its border to 
Austria starting the exit crisis that would culminate in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse 
of SED power. Within three days more than 15,000 East Germans had crossed with the intention 
never to return. 6,000 more intent of leaving who could not make it to Hungary took refuge in 	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the West German embassy in Prague as thousands more took to the streets in Leipzig joining the 
weekly Monday Peace March organized by Christoph Wonneburger at the Nikolai Church. In 
September, new organizations devoted to mass protest and dialogue with the state such as New 
Forum were created and an organized opposition formed from the diffuse protest groups across 
the country. While those in the Prague Embassy were given permission to leave by the end of 
September, the SED was intent on preventing further embarrassments and closed down the 
border to Czechoslovakia on 3 October. With the border to Poland largely sealed off since the 
introduction of martial law in the early 1980s, travel outside of the GDR was now nearly 
impossible. On 9 October, crowds in Leipzig swelled to the tens of thousands and the police 
ceased efforts to contain or stop the demonstrations. Although there had been conflicts between 
those seeking to exit and those who wanted to stay, in 1989, “emigration was a precondition for 
mass movement,” as the mass exodus of East Germans to the West sparked mass demon-
strations.40 In less than a month, the civic movement had taken over the streets of the GDR. 
 Political pluralism returned to the GDR in September 1989 as new organizations formed 
seeking mass membership. Some, like New Forum were concerned with opening dialogue and 
creating a participatory society while others such as the revived Social Democratic Party (SDP), 
were clearly   organizations with definite policy objectives. Human rights appeared across the 
spectrum of these groups as both an end goal of their work and as a process for how to get there. 
The SDP itself included, the duty for all members to work towards the “protection of human 
rights and civil rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two 
human rights covenants (1966).”41 At the same time, a splinter group of disillusioned officials 
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from the SED and the state trade union organization, the FDGB formed the United Left. It’s 
platform in early September 1989 demanded “political democracy, the rule of law, consistent 
implementation of the indivisible human rights and free expression of the individuality of each 
member of society”42 Although the group, which included Counter-Voices members such as 
Thomas Klein as founding members, could not agree on what type of socialist democracy to 
endorse be it parliamentary, council or communal, the minimal consensus they reached had 
“securing individual and collective freedom rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, (including the unrestricted freedom of movement and the right to strike),” as the 
first in its list of basic principles.43 
While left-wing political parties called for human rights, new opposition groups 
originating from the Church did the same. Founded on September 14, Demokratischer Aufbruch 
(Democratic Awakening, DA), a group of protestant clergymen including Rainer Eppelmann, co-
author of the Berlin Appeal with Robert Havemann in 1982 and Bishop Gottfried Forck from 
Eastern Brandenburg, focused on the creation of a “socialist society on a democratic basis.” 
While the Stasi saw the group as reactionary, its politics were actually quite cautious and 
conservative.44  In announcing its creation, they called for the rule of law and argued that they 
did not expect “the state to grant human rights, but rather to respect them.”45 This meant both 
reforms from below and reforms from above with the goal of splitting apart party and state, 
developing a free and open public sphere and the introduction of market mechanisms into the 	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economy while maintaining a “society of solidarity.”46 In fighting for these causes, the DA 
sought to portray its cause as the outcome of “the realization of guaranteed human rights as 
found in the constitution and international agreements.”47 
While the Catholic Church had avoided political engagement in the GDR since the late 
1970s, in the fall of 1989 it once again took up the problem of human rights. In 1968, the Church 
had sought to narrowly protect its own institutional interests but now it branched out into broader 
problems of freedom and political representation. In September, the Church made an official 
statement endorsing a right to travel and to emigrate. In October, this expanded to the right to 
free elections, the right to free speech, peaceful assembly and free association. In a notice to all 
priests and deacons, the bishops implored them to remember these rights “as contained in the 
UN-Human Rights Declaration.”48  
As the Catholic leadership was cautiously re-entering the world of politics via human 
rights, Catholics in general were outpacing them. For many, a sense of Christian duty compelled 
them to speak out on the problem of human rights and democratization, whether the Church 
hierarchy agreed or not. On 12 October, seventy-one employees of the Berlin offices of the 
Catholic charity Caritas signed on to a letter to Prime Minister Willi Stoph calling for the 
“acknowledgement and maintenance of all human rights,” by means of “an open and general 
societal dialogue about the foundational democratization of the state.”49 The writers did not seek 
permission to speak out on the subject and did not notify their superiors until after the letter was 	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sent. They noted that while they were “accustomed to remaining silent about the current situation 
in our country [, as] Catholic Christians and church employees, we want to speak up and no 
longer wait for what church authorities negotiate non-publicly with the state.”50 
 Human rights as a broad concept and the institutional of individual political and civil 
liberties along liberal democratic lines represented a baseline consensus amongst these groups 
even though they had very different ideological and religious beliefs. At the beginning of 
October 1989, most of the new opposition organizations alongside many of the smaller dissident 
groups came together in a show of unity to issue a joint declaration demanding free elections and 
democratization. Signatories included New Forum, Democracy Now, Democratic Awakening, 
the group of Democratic Socialists, the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, the Initiative 
Group for a Social Democratic Party in the GDR as well as several church-based peace groups.  
In spite of differences amongst these dissidents, they could agree that their overall “goal is to end 
the situation in which citizens of this society lack the opportunity to enjoy political rights, as 
guaranteed in the human rights conventions of the United Nations and the CSCE documents.”51 
Human rights symbolically represented the ideals of the opposition even if their programs for the 
realization of specific human rights were not always aligned. 
Human Rights in the Streets 
 Out in the streets, as protests grew from hundreds to thousands to hundreds of thousands 
from September to November, the language of human rights provided a unifying positive theme 
for the demonstrators. Those seeking to reform communism, democratize the GDR, or simply to 
leave it, could now at least all agree that they all sought the realization of human rights. Hartmut 
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Zwahr described the atmosphere of the protests in Leipzig, the epicenter of the mass 
demonstrations: 
Singing, the demonstrators encouraged each other. They began with the Internationale – learned 
in 7th and 8th grade music class at the polytechnic high schools of the GDR. Memorized, sullenly 
performed, never to be sung again, until this moment, when a chunk of the refrain suddenly fit, to 
sing out the protest with all the power of their voices: “people hear the signal/ on to the last fight/ 
the Internationale / wrests the human right!” Human rights. How they had been distorted! Now 
all felt the same. To go into the streets was a human right. In the call “Democracy Now!” and in 
the singing of “On to the last fight!” came together everything that this moment held. To dare. 
Now. Some only understood in this instant, in the pincer of state power, the loss of human rights, 
and that he was absolutely prepared to win them back.52 
 
Zwahr’s description illuminates how the discourse of human rights had become so essential to 
the dissident movement. First, hijacking of the Internationale as a song of protest rather than 
affirmation of SED rule shows the re-appropriation of the state language of human rights. 
Second, the subjective shift in East Germans where they came to define their problems as human 
rights violations rather than as either material deprivations or political deficits. Third, the mass 
sense of empowerment that came with the internalization of the idea of human rights that led to 
citizens acting as though the right to speak, assemble or leave was already a reality. 
 The language of the human rights message from the Internationale was just one of the 
means employed by protestors to undermine the SED’s human rights propaganda from within. 
As with the Luxemburg-Liebknecht march in 1988, human rights activists promoted freedom of 
speech with Rosa Luxemburg’s saying, “Freedom is only the freedom of those who think 
differently.” Protesters also picked up on the phrase “practice solidarity,” which had been the old 
slogan of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights in its campaigns in the 1960s and that of the 
communist group Red Aid during Weimar.53 While the SED demanded that outsiders refrain 
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from criticizing human rights abuses in the GDR because this violated the principle of self-
determination by “intervening in the internal affairs,” of a sovereign nation, the protesters turned 
the phrase around declaring that they had a “right to intervene in our own affairs.”54 If the East 
German people were to have the right to self-determination, they would now exercise it 
themselves rather than through the proxy of the SED. Protest movements ratcheted up the 
pressure on the political system by demanding dialogue between these new organizations and the 
SED. In agreeing to talk with these groups as representatives of the people, the SED effectively 
admitted to failing in its task to represent the people and it was now reduced to negotiating with 
the representatives of the population whose interests it claimed to have fully realized for more 
than forty years.  
Such actions were effective in bringing SED officials to the table in dialogue and in 
defusing violent responses from security services. In Karl Marx City, dissidents organized a 
discussion session between citizens and local officials at a church in mid-October and the final 
declaration stated, “we will not be silenced again and we will practice solidarity with those who 
are threatened and we must protect our human rights.”55 Such language made the engagement 
with SED functionaries easier as they could compromise on meaning while continuing to speak 
in the familiar texts they had employed throughout their career. Against the police and troops in 
the streets, such actions undermined the claims of the Stasi that the protestors were nothing more 
than imperialist provocateurs.56 Having heard the crowds singing the Internationale and 
demanding reform, General Major Raimund Kokott, a National People’s Army officer sent to 
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help restore order in Dresden claimed to have reported that the demonstration “was no 
counterrevolution. The people wanted a better GDR.”57 When confronted with such crowds in 
their own country, many police and militia units were unwilling to do “the dirty work” of the 
party by stopping them.58 While many in the lower-tiers of the security apparatus could justify 
defending socialism from counter-revolutionaries to themselves, they could not accept shooting 
peaceful demonstrators, many of whom were neighbours and colleagues to prop up the SED. On 
one level, the dissidents had shifted the narrative lines and symbolically placed the East German 
state in the role of the fascistic state pointlessly brutalizing democracy-loving socialists seeking 
nothing more than human rights, and fewer and fewer police were willing to play that particular 
role. 
 The process of demonstrating and exercising the freedoms they were denied had the 
effect of making people rethink their place within the GDR. As Sebastian Pflugbeil said, only 
after change began did it become clear “the dimensions of what they had done to us, how many 
rights we had given up, even though most had been guaranteed constitutionally. It’s very 
strange…”59 In taking to the streets, previously well behaved East Germans were now faced with 
the worst of the violent repression and arbitrary rule that the SED had to offer. East Germans 
became increasingly outraged when their friends or they themselves were rounded up in police 
wagons, subject to physical abuse and detained for demonstrating.60  
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According to one Ministry of the Interior study of all documented protests on 4 October, 
the most common sentiment expressed on large banners at demonstrations was anti-SED and 
anti-Stasi, but the most common positive agenda was that of realizing human rights.61 In his 
voluminous study of protests across Saxony, the main hotbed of demonstrations including the 
cities of Leipzig and Dresden, Michael Richter documented human rights language as a 
ubiquitous demand at almost every demonstration. In the town of Schmölln signs demanded the 
resignation of Erich Honecker alongside posters for “Comply with Human Rights,” and “CSCE-
Human Rights.”62 In Leipzig, banners had slogans demanding, “Freedom of Assembly – 
Freedom of Association,” and “Freedom to Travel Instead of Mass Flight,”63  
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to visit the GDR in early October, slogans and banner 
had the same mix of anti-SED and pro human rights messages. In Pirna, protestors carried 
posters saying “Out with the Reds,” “Gorbi,” alongside those demanding “Human Rights” and 
“Freedom to Travel Instead of Mass Flight.”64 In Berlin on 7 October, handouts at a 
demonstration called for, “Democracy – Establish a Dictatorship of the People, Down with the 
Dictatorship of the SED,” along with demands for human rights, reform and “real socialism.”65 
In Bad Lausick on 10 October, the Stasi documented a stonemason hung a sign saying “More 
democracy and human rights” in his storefront window on the main street.66 In Dresden, a protest 
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of several thousand were singing the Internationale and marching with the slogans “We Want 
New Forum,” “We Want Out,” and “Human Rights and Freedom,” as the local playhouse staged 
their own protest and declared, “we have a right to dialogue.”67 At the end of October in 
Olberhau, 800 people protested in front of the town’s church and town hall chanting “Human 
Rights, Reforms, We Want Freedom.”68  
The Wende and the Fall of the Berlin Wall 
The leadership of the SED reacted to this crisis as it had in previous years through a 
combination of repression and ideological resolution. Erich Honecker continued to speak only of 
human rights violations in west and refused to acknowledge any deficits within the borders of the 
GDR. On September 5, the party journal Einheit, published him saying that East Germany is a 
“state with a functioning, effective, socialist society system which will, with its fully realized 
human rights, manage the challenges of the 90s.”69 By the 40th Anniversary of the GDR on 9 
October, as more East Germans were marching in streets for change rather than to honour the 
achievements of socialism, Honecker turned his ire to the failings of the west. In promoting the 
“scientific, technological revolution” taking place in the GDR he noted, “mass unemployment, 
homelessness, lack of social protection – all of which accompany modern technology in the FRG 
– do not exist here now and won’t in the future. It is a perversion of human rights when one-third, 
one-fourth, or whatever proportion of the population is shunned and excluded.”70  
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By 11 October, with hundreds of thousands now protesting freely in the streets of Leipzig, 
Dresden and Berlin, the human rights rhetoric from the top became more belligerent. The 
Politburo issued a statement saying “many of those who have turned their backs on our republic 
in recent months were victims of large-scale provocation. Once again, the imperialists of the 
FRG have confirmed that they will never come to terms with a socialist state on German soil; 
agreements have been broken and human rights have been violated.”71 Even at this point 
Honecker refused to accept that there could be legitimate human rights criticisms of the GDR. 
Otto Rheinhold, rector of the Central Committee’s Academy of Social Sciences later said, 
“Honecker always remained the Saarland Communist Youth Functionary of 1932. [For him] the 
highest that could be achieved was that everyone had enough to eat at cheap prices, that 
everyone had work, and that everyone had a good and cheap apartment…He thought that 
everyone was happy. Everyone had cheap bread, a cheap apartment and work.”72 The demands 
of human rights activists in the GDR were so incomprehensible to such a mindset that the only 
possible explanation was western subversion. 
 While the younger generation within the Politburo had hoped a “biological solution” 
would remove Honecker from office, by mid-October the crisis has reached a level that they 
decided to act.73 On 18 October, Egon Krenz, Honecker’s long-time right-hand man, deposed 
him as he was recovering from surgery and announced that the GDR would begin a program of 
reform and a turnaround – Wende – was at hand. The Wende would include political changes 
including free elections, the release of those imprisoned for “fleeing the republic,” and 	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immediate measures to stabilize the faltering economy, but such promises only increased the 
mass protests. Krenz had overseen the fraudulent elections in May 1989 and had publicly 
expressed support for the Chinese government following the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 
giving him zero credibility with the dissidents and with much of the populace.74 His definition of 
free elections did not include “bourgeois pluralism,” they were not to be held until 1991, and his 
public comments, trying to demonstrate his open-mindedness, that he could actually imagine a 
vote where the SED “were to win with only eighty per cent of the popular vote,” were hardly 
reassuring.75 Krenz’s decision to declare an amnesty for border violations and open the border to 
Czechoslovakia only inflamed protesters who demanded total freedom of movement and found 
the half-measures intolerable.76 While he claimed to implement reforms, like Honecker before 
him, Krenz tried to paper over human rights violations with positive rhetoric. On 8 November, 
the Central Committee announced that its program was rooted in “the socialist rule of law 
(sozialistischer Rechtsstaat) emanating from the fundamental and human rights,” but the street 
protests continued to grow.77 
 While the top levels of the SED were fumbling the Wende, reformers within the party 
promoting human rights were still incredibly timid. On the same day as the Central Committee 
announcement, the GDR-Committee for Human Rights prepared its first public demand for 
domestic change in order to realize the rights it has been ostensibly been campaigning for since 
1959. The declaration by the Committee called for equality before the law, the principle that all is 	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allowed which is not forbidden, an independent judiciary, the presumption of innocence, 
improved access to lawyers, an overhaul of the criminal code and modifications to domestic laws 
that concerned the right to free speech, assembly and association. Such reforms were “urgently 
necessary, so that in the future any arbitrariness in dealing with citizens is precluded to the best 
of human ability.”78 The declaration, notably absent of any mention of the freedom to travel, was 
made public on 9 November, the day the Berlin Wall fell.  
 The fall of the Berlin Wall came not with a bang but with a whimper. In announcing that 
East Germans could begin travelling to the Federal Republic with the appropriate visa, Politburo 
member Günter Schabowski accidently reported that the liberalization of travel would take effect 
“immediately” rather than the following day. Word spread that the border was now open, the 
subtleties of Schabowski’s announcement being ignored entirely, and crowds gathered at 
checkpoints and border crossings. After a few tense hours, the guards stood aside and simply let 
the people pass first by stamping their identity cards to render them unusable, and after a while 
even giving up on that. Only a few years earlier, the SED and its security services were confident 
that the dictatorship they had built was the pinnacle of human rights achievement at the end point 
of a thousand year history of struggle that had begun with the Magna Carta. The Berlin Wall was 
a tool in the realization of these human rights by preventing a counter-revolutionary invasion and 
maintaining the sovereignty of the socialist state. For nearly three decades, the border guards of 
the GDR had been willing to use deadly force against their fellow citizens and yet on 9 
November, they walked away when confronted by expectant crowds demanding to pass. 
Hans-Herman Hertle has compared the final events leading up to the opening of the 
Berlin Wall to the social dynamics of a bank run: once people subjectively decide that a bank is 	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unreliable they withdraw their money and thus objectively destabilize it. False information can 
lead to real outcomes if enough people react as though the information is true.79 In this case, 
when Schabowski muddled the announcement of liberalized travel to West Germany, the 
misunderstanding of his message by East Germans who interpreted his remarks to mean that the 
wall had already been opened, created the conditions whereby it was. Spurred on by mistaken 
media reports, East Germans did not dismiss the announcement as an error but as the SED finally 
accepting what most of the population now saw as a self-evident right. As Gareth Dale has 
argued, ““It was only a wilfully optimistic interpretation of the press conference by citizens,” 
that could have led to such an unlikely event.80 This wilful optimism was in many ways an 
extension of the mental revolution that had occurred within the GDR and the culmination of the 
evolution in human rights activism. For decades East Germans had been claiming a human right 
to free movement and travel. Thousands had been subjected to the loss of their job and even 
imprisoned for demanding this right. By 1989, hundreds of thousands had taken to the street 
demonstrating against the SED and in favour of human rights in spite of police brutality and 
intimidation. Amongst those seeking to emigrate, the presumption of a moral right to travel only 
increased. As one poster read a few days before the fall of the wall, “We don’t need a law – the 
wall must go!”81 Mass emigration in September created mass activism in the streets, which in 
turn created the psychological condition in which the wall could fall. Without a universal sense 
of an unlimited human right to travel, Schabowski’s announcement could very well have been 
dismissed as one more incremental reform rather than the end of the border between East and 
West Germany. 	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The Falling Apart and Coming Together, November 1989-March 1990 
 Once the Berlin Wall had fallen, the human rights discourse of the SED transformed over 
night. While the national newspaper Neues Deutschland had been filled with articles on human 
rights abuses across the capitalist world, ranging from homelessness in America to hunger-
striking Roma in Hamburg and oppression in South Africa, after 9 November, human rights 
ceased to be a problem only for imperialists and was now a domestic issue that the government 
was diligently seeking to solve. Human rights thus became the overarching slogan in the SED’s 
dismantling if its own monopoly on power over the course of the next month. The “Proposed 
Program for a Fundamental Transformation,” presented by the leader of the SED in the 
Volkskammer announced that the reform of the GDR would focus on “the development of the 
socialist rule of law and the guarantee of human rights,” including free and secret elections, 
freedom of expression and a total overhaul of the criminal code.82 Egon Krenz, his credibility as 
an effective reformer now completely gone, had resigned on 18 November and been replaced by 
Hans Modrow, a popular reformer from Dresden who promised to abolish the SED’s monopoly 
on power, restore political and civil rights and to hold free elections in the spring. The 
dictatorship of human rights had fallen apart both physically and ideologically.  
 The SED’s decision to embrace individual human rights was not the end of the revolution 
but a new phase in its evolution. As the SED’s monopoly on power evaporated at the close of the 
year and free elections were called for the spring, the seemingly unified masses on the streets 
broke apart based along political lines earlier obscured by a shared desire to realize basic human 
rights. Many of the elite of the dissident movement saw the toppling of the SED gerontocracy as 
the first step towards a new socialist utopia based on human rights that would bring about 
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emancipation and equality to all. Most East Germans, however, saw the collapse of the SED and 
the institution of freedom of speech, assembly, association and plans for free elections as a 
triumph for human rights that would allow them to elect leaders who would fix the massive 
economic problems facing the GDR and finish the job of removing the SED and Stasi from 
power. Although dissident groups had avoided discussion of reunification both as an ideological 
problem and as a means of avoiding Stasi persecution on grounds of treason, West German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl aggressively campaigned for reunification as the logical end point of 
the restoration of human rights and self-determination. In winter 1990, as dissidents and the 
aging East German intelligentsia banded together to save the dream of a renewed socialist utopia, 
the masses that had so recently taken to the streets with them chose an end to experimentation. 
Self-Determination for Independence or Reunification  
In the early phases of the revolution in fall 1989, there were some vociferous advocates 
of reunification, but such talk was largely subdued on both sides of the Wall. In the East, New 
Forum meetings, the most attended of any civil society group in the GDR, tied their 
endorsements of rights and democratization clearly to the reform of the GDR, not the adoption of 
capitalism or reunification. In Hoyerswerda, the group agreed on reforming the electoral system, 
defending all basic rights, freedom of movement, press freedom and the right to assemble and 
demonstration but they clarified that reunification was “not a theme we are pursuing since we are 
starting from the position that there are two Germanies and we are not striving for a capitalist 
social order.”83 Ludwig Mehlhorn of Democracy Now echoed these statements lamenting “in the 
West it is unfortunately the case that self-determination for the Germans of the GDR is 
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automatically identified with reunification.” 84 Yet this assumption in the west was tempered by 
fears that such rhetoric could disrupt the revolution in the GDR and that it could reopen old 
conflicts regarding the German-Polish border. Dorothee Wilms, the CDU Minister for All-
German Questions, on Sept 29 said that the realization of human rights and self-determination in 
East Germany “should result in a process, at the end of which lies German unity.”85 CSU 
Minister-President Max Streibl of Bavaria disagreed arguing “For East German citizens, the first 
priority are freedoms and human rights, and after that comes the question of the nation.”86 The 
Liberals and the SPD saw the possibility of two Germanies continuing into the future if East 
Germans so chose that path based on self-determination. Theo Sommer, editor of the newspaper 
Die Zeit, captured the concerns of many saying “Nobody nowadays has the right to thump on a 
powder keg with the burning torch of human rights."87 In such a precarious situation, loud 
pronouncement connecting human rights to reunification could backfire badly. 
 With the Wall gone and the SED in retreat, the problem of reunification reappeared and 
redefined the political landscape. Hoping to head off calls for such action, representatives from 
the GDR cultural elite, including famed authors Christa Wolf and Stefan Heym, reform 
communists and dissident groups, and some Church leaders joined together on 26 November to 
draft a joint appeal titled “For Our Land,” calling on the East German people to resist the siren 
call of the west. For this group, the establishment of human rights and self-determination in the 
GDR was only the first step in a greater process. The choice was clear, “either we can insist on 
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GDR independent [and] develop a society of solidarity, offering peace, social justice, individual 
liberty, free movement, and ecological conservation,” or there would be “a sell-out of our 
material and moral values and [we will] have the GDR eventually taken over by the Federal 
Republic.”88 In the next two weeks, over two hundred thousand East Germans signed on to show 
their support for the program to continue the “antifascist and humanistic” ideals of the post-SED 
German Democratic Republic. This movement represented the dream of realizing a “Third Way,” 
between socialism and capitalism, echoing many of the general sentiments from the early 
pronouncements of the IFM and other dissident groups.89 
On 28 November, the same day as Stefan Heym held a press conference to present “For 
Our Land,” to the public, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl released his own Ten-Point 
Plan for German Unity. Kohl sought a democratic process to bring about a united Germany 
within the context of an integrating Europe.  Point 6 of his plan included “unqualified respect for 
the principles and rules of international law, especially respect for the people’s right of self-
determination,” and “the realization of human rights.”90 Once again at the end of 1989, the East 
German political landscape was divided between two competing visions of a political future tied 
to the discourse of human rights.   
 Those seeking to maintain the independence of the GDR presented their plan as the 
realization of a democratic and socialist vision of human rights that was in keeping with the 
goals of the mass demonstrations. In late December 1989, the transitional government of Hans 
Modrow assured the declining readership of the Free German Youth newspaper Junge Welt that 
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reforms would demonstrate “strict respect for human rights without exception, which demands - 
in contrast to the time before November 1989 – a new attitude of the state towards the 
individual.”91 As the SED transformed into the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of 
Democratic Socialism, PDS), which would take part in democratic elections on equal terms in 
the spring of 1990, this rhetoric continued. In a publication written at the very end of 1989 by 
Frank Berg, one of the leading academics who had worked on the Socialist Declaration of 
Human Rights project, argued that while the SED had used human rights as a tool of propaganda, 
it was now the watchword of its successor party. When asked, based on the past, “does the SED-
PDS have the moral right to speak about human rights,” Berg replied, “The SED – no. The PDS 
– yes.”92 The end of the SED was not supposed to become the end of socialism but the beginning 
of a real democratic socialism, based on the principles of human rights for all. 
 The civic movement was also trying to steer the GDR towards a “third way” solution via 
the Central Round Table – a power-sharing arrangement that included representatives from the 
SED, the newly democratized bloc parties of the national front and various opposition groups 
including New Forum and the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights.93 The Round Table 
planned to draft a new East German Constitution that would formalize and secure the 
achievements of the revolution and chart a path for the new GDR. While the dissidents did not 
want to seize power directly, they did want to increase the speed of SED-PDS reforms and 
ensure that when elections came, there was a credible democratic alternative to reunification.94 
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 As the leaders of the dissident movement were working together with the SED-PDS to 
change the country, East Germans continued to emigrate in droves and protests continued in the 
streets. In November 1989 the demonstrations were against the SED and for human rights, but 
the demands were shifting to widespread calls for reunification rather than just reform. The 
slogans “We are the people,” were transforming into “We are one people,” and patience with the 
slow pace of change was wearing thin.  
One key point of conflict was the enduring presence of the Stasi. The SED had abolished 
its monopoly on power, but the secret police had been largely untouched by the revolution aside 
from a change in name from the Ministry for State Security to the unfortunately acronymed 
Office for National Security (Amt für Nationalsicherheit, or NaSi). Popular anger towards the 
agency exploded as revelations of abuses streamed across the newly free media of the GDR. On 
10 December 1989, a Pastor in Suhl dedicated his Human Rights-day address entirely to the 
problem of eliminating the Stasi as an agency, but also imploring the audience not to take 
revenge upon Stasi agents and collaborators through vigilante violence.95 On 15 January 1990, 
when it became clear that agents were destroying incriminating files, citizens stormed the Stasi 
headquarters in East Berlin. Having established freedom of speech and assembly in the GDR, the 
dissidents had empowered the people to speak their minds and the general sentiment from the 
crowds was “no more experiments – reunification now!”96 
 After lengthy deliberations, the Round Table finally released its Constitution for a “Third 
Way” in March 1990. As Inga Markovits has argued, it was not a rebuke to the West German 
Basic Law but rather an attempt to surpass it by “moving towards a more participatory, more 	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culturally diverse, more inclusive and more tolerant democracy.”97 The document contained 
extensive guarantees for political and civil liberties, both as freedoms from the state as well as 
positive mechanisms to allow for greater participation through direct forms of democracy. Social 
rights for the elderly, disabled and unemployed alongside measures to ensure substantial gender 
equality through bodily self-determination, state sponsored child-care and equal pay also 
featured prominently. Many of these provisions echoed the promises of earlier socialist 
constitutions including restrictions on free speech in the case of “war propaganda” and 
limitations on the amount of farmland that could be held privately.98 In general, the constitution 
promised the social and economic rights of an idealized socialism guaranteed through a new 
commitment to the liberal democratic rights and freedoms. 
While the actual content of the Round Table Constitution reflected the demands of the 
demonstrators from the fall of 1989, its appeal was limited by problematic associations with its 
proponents and the political baggage of forty years of dictatorship. The human rights section of 
the Constitution, in particular, was shaped by the SED-stalwarts-turned-reform-communists of 
the now defunct GDR-Committee for Human Rights. The East German legal academic Karl-
Heinz Schöneberg took the lead in drafting the language of rights and Hermann Klenner and 
Bernhard Graefrath were also involved in the process.99 Internal discussions still revolved around 
SED terms such as “abolishing the exploitation of man by man,” and the document’s emphasis 
on “revolutionary renewal,” connected it closely to the project of reforming the old GDR rather 
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than creating an entirely new one.100 Many of the intellectual dissidents associated with the 
project were also alienating possible supporters by acknowledging that their path would involve 
extreme financial hardship without the financial support of the Federal Republic. Christa Wolf 
told audiences that there would be “no quick prosperity but participation in a great 
transformation,” and Bärbel Bohley promised “we will be poor for a long time, but we don’t 
want to have a society in which profiteers elbow their way to the front.”101 Those emerging 
political leaders who were dealing with collapsing infrastructure, a faltering economy and 
shortages of basic material goods had little time for such utopianism. For much of the East 
German population, the appeal of socialism had not been anti-capitalism but rather the 
guaranteed economic benefits and the possibilities for consumerism unseen by previous 
generations in the working class.102 For these GDR citizens, an essential aspect of the revolution 
in 1989 was securing the right to economic prosperity and equal access to consumer goods.103  
Democracy in the German Democratic Republic 
 When elections were held on 18 March 1990, the results were a ringing victory for 
reunification and a stunning defeat for the “third way.” The Alliance for Germany (Allianz für 
Deutschland, AfD), conservative coalition of the eastern CDU along with Democratic 
Awakening and the German Social Union, campaigned on a platform of rapid reunification and 
won nearly 50% of the vote. The gradualist Social Democrats took slightly less than 22%, the 	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PDS slight more than 16% and the Bündnis 90, the coalition of dissident groups and human 
rights organizations a paltry 2.9%. The results have been interpreted as a clear sign that East 
Germans preferred the political and economic system of the Federal Republic to the abstract 
human rights rhetoric of the intellectual dissidents. A closer look at the party platforms reveals, 
however, that every political party had adopted much of the dissident agenda and the Alliance for 
Germany in particular was promising much of the same content. The language of human rights 
had become ubiquitous in East German political discourse and the parties were largely 
distinguished by how they planned to go about achieving these lofty goals.   
 The Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, as part of Bündnis 90, was promising to 
realize “Human rights and humanity in all sectors of society,” but this hardly set it apart from the 
crowded field.104 The liberal German Forum Party promised to fully implement the tenets of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Covenants of 1966.105 The 
Greens portrayed their agenda of improving the health and well being of the GDR as 
contribution to “fundamental human rights.”106 The Social Democrats promised,  
The creation of social and democratic relations in our country to provide a legal foundation for 
fundamental human rights in order to participate in a pluralistic society in which everyone has 
the right to take part in decision-making processes.”107 The PDS program, “Democratic 
Freedoms and Social Security for All,” pledged “an unrestricted guarantee of human rights,” 
through constitutional measures to protect democratic freedoms and workers’ rights.108 	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 The Alliance for Germany did not promote constitutional measures to secure the social 
and economic rights proposed by the dissidents and the PDS in its call for a rapid reunification 
with West Germany, but its platform contained much of the same human rights promises as its 
left-wing opponents. Under the heading “Never Again Socialism,” point one of the joint platform 
emphasized German unity and the restoration of basic and human rights. In spite of the blistering 
rhetoric against the SED dictatorship and socialism in general, it promised that privatization 
would spread wealth to the “employees” of the community, protect people from massive rent 
increases, co-responsibility at workplaces through unions, increased pensions for the elderly and 
the retention of the state system of daycares and child benefits.109 The AfD platform essentially 
offered the benefits contained in the platforms of the dissidents and the PDS but stripped of 
Marxist jargon, the taint of state socialism and the Stasi, and offered the prospect of having it all 
funded by West Germany. Promises of human rights on paper, promoted by former SED 
members and dissident intellectuals were not as appealing as a concrete plan for the realization 
of those same rights in practice. The PDS, successor to the Party of Workers and Farmers had the 
votes of the intelligentsia, but the AfD had the support of the actual workers of the GDR who 
were finished with experiments and were uninterested in exploring new forms of democracy if 
that meant continued poverty.110  
On 19 April, non Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière of the CDU presented his 
government’s program to the first democratically elected session of the Volkskammer. For 
reform he proposed, “as much market as possible and as much state as necessary,” by converting 
the “previous state-controlled command economy into an ecologically-oriented social market 	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economy. On the subject of German unity he declared that citizens of the GDR had much to 
contribute including, 
Our identity and our dignity. Our identity: that is our history and culture, our failures and our 
achievements, our ideals and our suffering. Our dignity: that is our freedom and our human right 
to self-determination.111  
 
As de Maizière presented it, East Germans were not entering into the reunification process as 
supplicants but as equal partners. They were not joining together with the Federal Republic 
because of inertia or a “sell-out,” but through a conscious choice exercised through self-
determination. Reunification would not subsume the citizens of the GDR and it was not turning 
their backs on their own past but rather a means of bringing their historical experience together 
with that of their western counterparts. East Germans had not turned away from human rights by 
rejecting the program of the human rights dissidents but rather chosen a different vision of how 
to achieve those rights for all East Germans.  
 In the Unification Treaty between the two Germanies from 31 August 1990, one passage 
read, “Aware of the continuity of German history and bearing in mind the special responsibility 
arising from our past for a democratic development in Germany committed to respect for human 
rights and peace.”112 In November of the previous year, reform communists had seen human 
rights activism and the fall of the Berlin Wall as the salvation of the socialist experiment and 
now under the banner of human rights it was being buried. Everyone in East and West could 
agree that history showed the importance of democracy and human rights. But what would that 
mean in practice once the GDR was no more?  
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Conclusion 
 One of the crucial elements in the revolution of 1989 was an ideological crisis centered 
on the problem of human rights. The simultaneous coming together of diverse groups to demand 
reform and exit in the name of human rights alongside the crisis of confidence in the underlying 
legitimacy of SED rule from above created a reinforcing dynamic that resulted in decisive shift 
in how people perceived and understood human rights in practice. East German citizens 
developed a new sense of what rights they possessed, both morally and legally, and chose to act 
out those rights in spite of the refusal of the state to recognize them. Large swaths of the SED, 
the state bureaucracy and the security services, on the other hand, lost faith in the idea that the 
system they worked for and protected was actually in line with the ideals of human rights. 
Within the discourse of human rights generated from below, defecting from the state to the side 
of the protests became a way to stay true to one’s highest ideals rather than to reject them. 
Fighting to maintain the status quo was transformed from championing antifascism to protecting 
a corrupt gerontocracy that had strayed from its own principles and goals.  
Much of the debate over the meaning of 1989 focuses on its character as either an 
implosion or a revolution.113 Some historians would argue that such problems of ideology and 
ideas are simply distractions from the real problem of economic decline and collapse. As 
Stephen Kotkin has claimed, “the GDR was a Ponzi scheme that fell in a bank run.”114 Others 
such as Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle have argued that East Germany was simply an artificial 
creation propped up only by the support of “Soviet bayonets,” and its collapse was inevitable as 
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soon as the guarantee of violent suppression disappeared.115 These mechanistic explanations of 
the end of the GDR presume much on the side of both the state and the people. The SED did not 
look at their financial accounts with the eyes of a neo-liberal economist and simply decided that 
the great emancipation of the socialist revolution was a lie.  
Similarly, the human rights movement of 1989 was a social creation decades in the 
making rather than a constantly existing, but latent, expression of the collective popular will. A 
revolution for human rights was not self-evident to the population until right before it actually 
took place. Those who ran the SED and those who made the state function believed in socialism 
as universal system of politics, economics and society, and the population of the GDR bought 
into this system in the day-to-day for most of the country’s existence.116 The paradox of stability 
and sudden collapse was more than just a problem of violence and money but one of perception 
and belief. The legitimacy of state socialism and SED was grounded in Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and an antifascist interpretation of history.117 The SED tied the concept of human rights 
to both of these pillars over the course of its first decades of rule and in 1989, their collapse 
helped to bring down the whole edifice of power. 
 Economic decline and the damage from mass exodus were crucial to the collapse of state-
socialism, but there was a critical subjective component to the decision by so many in the SED to 
simply give up. The constant pressure of dissidents and ordinary citizens in criticizing and 	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challenging the hegemonic ideology of the state in the 1980s steadily wore down the defenders 
of the status quo. Both the ideas and the actions of the dissident human rights activists chipped 
away at the worldview of the SED elite until they could no longer justify their own position to 
themselves. In place of this shattering belief system, the dissidents put forward the possibility of 
a humane socialism grounded in direct democracy and human rights for all. The alternative they 
presented drew adherents from the ranks of the so-called “service class” of the state socialist 
system – the teachers, intellectuals, functionaries and officials who were to translate state policy 
in to practice.118 The human rights movement provided them with an opportunity to embrace a 
movement founded on their true principles if not their daily practice and offered a means to 
reform a system they knew too well was broken. The cause of human rights appealed to both 
their ideals and their practicality and was both utopian and pragmatic. 
The long-term embrace of the discourse of human rights by the SED is crucial then to 
understanding the revolution of 1989. Since the 1940s, the SED had erected a grand edifice of 
human rights ideology to defend the status quo, but like the rest of its political institutions, this 
“at first sight contributed to stabilizing its rule, but in the long run made it fragile.”119 Human 
rights as a general concept was normalized and internalized by the apparatus of the state but only 
so long as the SED could control this language within the discursive bubble of the GDR. Once 
the SED lost control of the discourse in the 1980s, however, this precipitated a radical shift in the 
meaning of these ideas.120 For East German dissidents and regular citizens hoping to leave or just 
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make a better future, human rights ceased to be one more phrase in state propaganda or western 
television documentaries but a vital and pressing cause that would bring about revolutionary 
change for the better. At that point, SED officials did not need to be convinced that they should 
love human rights, they just needed to change their mind about what they meant in practice. The 
dissident movement within the GDR changed the meaning of human rights from within and once 
this subjective shift had occurred, the state apparatus abolished itself in order to realize its own 
ideals. The possibility of saving socialism by realizing human rights proved to be an illusion as 
the reforms implemented to save the system facilitated the continued mass protests against the 
state and then in March 1990, the popular vote to abandon independence and unify with West 
Germany. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
We wanted justice but we got the rule of law. 
- Bärbel Bohley1 
 
 Since German reunification in 1990, the German Democratic Republic has become a 
symbol of human rights violations. The SED dictatorship was without the rule of law or free 
elections, the Berlin Wall prevented free movement with deadly force, and the Stasi suppressed 
the civil liberties of the people through a noxious system of nationwide surveillance and 
infiltration. The Constitutional Court in the new Federal Republic found that the human rights 
abuses by border guards were so great that it legitimized a degree of retroactive punishment for 
those responsible even if they were acting legally according to the laws of the GDR.2 For some, 
this did not go nearly far enough one former regional high court justice argued that the 
similarities between the crimes of the SED equalled those of the Third Reich. “The one group 
disregarded human rights from the standpoint of race while the other did it from the class 
standpoint.”3 This concept extended from the law into academia, with one historian going so far 
as to label historians as apologists for the SED regime when they failed to explicitly refer to the 
GDR “as a state in which human rights abuses were institutionalized and were a defining feature 
of the regime.”4  	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 The widespread sense that that the GDR was clearly home to massive human rights 
violations has even functioned retroactively on the memories of East Germans who had propped 
up the human rights discourse of the SED. Some former academics now claimed that the human 
rights scholarship of Hermann Klenner and others represented a form of dissent against the 
regime. To write about human rights under such a system could be nothing else.5 Others found 
their own memories confusing. Siegfried Forberger, secretary of the GDR-Committee for Human 
Rights for forty years, was puzzled by his inability to see the contradictions in the system over 
the years when they seemed so clear a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. “Yes, the free 
development of the person [through socialist human rights] – that sounded full of promise and 
was also what socialists had held up to us as the ideal. But did we not notice that we were light-
years away from this in the GDR?”6 Some simply erased the SED’s efforts from their past, 
including Ideology Minister Kurt Hager whose memoirs omit the Declaration of Socialist Human 
Rights from his recollections of key meetings in the 1980s, which in his retelling focused only on 
problems of international peace.7 There were exceptions: from his cell in the Moabit Prison in 
Berlin, Erich Honecker remained resolute that the real problem with human rights was that the 
SED had simply been too passive in pointing out the violations of the west, though it was 
possible that he could have, perhaps, liberalized travel rights.8  
If human right are self-evident moral and legal values, why had taken East Germans so 
long to rise up to demand them? In West Germany, some explained this discrepancy by blaming 	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East Germans themselves, arguing that years of dictatorship had warped their perceptions of 
freedom and left them without a true understanding of human rights, in clear contrast to the 
virtuous West German system that had embraced these ideas decades earlier. When East 
Germans challenged the terms of reunification in terms of human rights or showed differences in 
opinions on the matter from that of the west, they were deemed aberrant. Citing survey data 
showing somewhat greater enthusiasm for social and economic rights in the former East, pollster 
Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann declared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Among the East 
Germans resounds the conception of freedom held by totalitarian states: the state secures the 
freedom of the citizen from want. The conception of freedom held by western democracies is 
completely antithetical to this.”9 While the article in the cited 17 per cent support for the right to 
housing amongst former East Germans, it left out that respondents included the inviolability of 
the home within this right – likely due to the extensive violations of privacy rights during the 
GDR. Similarly, more East Germans than West Germans associated the idea of human rights 
with the “freedom of the individual – absence of arbitrary detention” and the right to free 
movement – both essentially negative human rights against state action.10 In spite of scant 
evidence, the article painted a picture of freedom-loving West German citizens seeking to live 
without interference from the state, confronted by decadent, dependent Ossis, willing to sell out 
liberal democracy in exchange for government handouts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The author selected only two points of comparison and two other singular data points from the East German 
responses alone. The right to free expression was deemed an important human right by 30% in the West versus 19% 
in the East and the right to life and prohibition on torture by 15% in the West and by 9% in the East. In addition to 
these variations, she pulled out the statistic that 35 per cent of East Germans highly valued the right to work and 
another 17% emphasized a right to housing. See Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, „Kein Schutz, keine Gleichheit, keine 
Gerechtigkeit,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (8 Mar 1995).  
10 Oddly, only 1 per cent of all Germans cited the freedom to assemble as a crucial human right. Elizabeth Noelle-
Neumann, “Rechtsbewußtsein im wiedervereinigten Deutschland,” Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie, 16 (1995), 127.  
	  	   374	  
While this narrative legitimized and naturalized the marginalization of East Germans in 
the new Federal Republic, it was hardly a fair reflection of reality. Some West German 
conservatives saw reunification as a chance to roll back the liberalization of abortion, and 
increase the authority of the state in matters of reproduction. While in the GDR, there was free 
access to abortion; the Federal Republic still had strict regulations and controls requiring 
authorization by medical authorities based on reasons of physical or psychological health. As one 
CDU member said in the Bundestag, “The Unification Treaty provides us with a unique 
opportunity to realize human rights across Germany that cannot be missed. The Treaty must be 
used to give a clear signal in favour of life and to bring about the end of the present abortion 
practices.”11 As Susan Gal and Gail Kligman have written, for East German feminists “self-
determination with respect to abortion paralleled self-determination with respect to democracy; it 
was considered an individual’s fundamental political right.”12 Demands of East German 
women’s groups to preserve their right to bodily autonomy were portrayed as the last remnant of 
a “failed system” that was both economically and morally “bankrupt.”13 While West Germans on 
the whole held themselves to be the paragons of individualistic liberal democratic human rights 
thinking, when it came to control over women’s bodies, the state was deemed the final and 
definitive authority.  
Over the course of the history of the German Democratic Republic, human rights proved 
to be a malleable concept. First the SED and then dissidents adopted the idea of human rights 
instrumentally to deal with specific problems, and then proceeded to expand upon this initial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Bundestag and Volkskammer, Auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit: Deutschlandpolitische Debatten im Deutschen 
Bundestag vom 5. bis zum 20. September 1990 mit Beratungen der Volkskammer der DDR zu dem Vertrag über die 
Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands (Bonn: Bundestag, 1990), 597. 
12 Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 99. 
13 Ibid. 
	  	   375	  
foray with new theories and philosophies of human rights and finally they progressed to a point 
where the connection between human rights and their cause was self-evident. In 1946, it was 
clear to the SED that there could be no “human rights without socialism.” In the decades that 
followed, it was equally apparent to the party that the GDR was a great international champion 
of human rights and that signing international human rights agreements would serve to support 
its sovereignty. In the early 1980s, it was controversial for dissident activists to broach the idea 
of human rights yet in 1989 tens of thousands in the streets were demanding their realization. In 
the elections of 1990, human rights were the major component of the winning party’s platform 
running on the slogan, “Never Again Socialism.” At each of these points, such ideas were 
ostensibly obvious to those who held them and the transitions from one set of ideas to another 
came about through conflict rather than the seamless unfolding of a unitary idea. As Samuel 
Moyn has argued, “what is self-evident about human rights turns out not to be very much.”14 
What were the factors that allowed the SED to claim to be a champion of human rights 
for so many years without serious challenge at home and then, suddenly in 1989, such a 
discourse became central to dissent, mass opposition and the end of state socialism in general? 
On the global level, the changing conceptions of human rights within the international 
community were interconnected with the evolution of human rights in East Germany. The SED 
appropriated the discourse of human rights at a time when it was broadly defined as the values of 
the antifascist coalition of the Second World War. In the 1960s, when anti-imperialism 
dominated the international human rights agenda, the SED was able to claim solidarity with the 
post-colonial nations and maintain its legitimizing discourse of socialist human rights without 
significant backlash. Within the GDR itself, with the support of the SED leadership, intellectuals 
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effectively translated the concept of human rights into East German vernacular and connecting it 
to other legitimizing discourses with popular appeal such as antifascism. The GDR-Committee 
for Human Rights worked to continually update and modify the hegemonic discourse to 
correspond with new developments and adapt to new threats. The SED not only created an 
elaborate discursive support system for its claims but it also jealously guarded this hegemony by 
deporting, marginalizing and generally suppressing those who could act as translators for a 
dissident or even an alternative socialist conception of human rights grounded in local values and 
cultural norms. Amongst the general population, the claims to leadership grounded in popular 
antifascism combined with the security of social welfare benefits for all was enough to gain the 
grudging loyalty if not affection of the people. Those who sought to contest SED policies did so 
within the official channels provided by the state rather than reject its right to rule entirely and 
face severe consequences. 
The decisive shift towards a democratizing vision of human rights within the GDR came 
when all three of these levels aligned against the SED in the 1980s. The GDR was steadily 
isolated from the international community on the problem of human rights. While the post-
colonial world was never as close to the socialist position as the SED portrayed in its propaganda, 
the abundance of “development dictatorships,” and other ideologically grounded authoritarian 
regimes prevented the East Germans from becoming a pariah. In the 1970s, the turn towards 
individual rights, liberal democracy and the rule of law as basic prerequisites for human rights 
throughout the world steadily reduced the number of East German allies and sympathizers. As 
Afro-Asian countries turned to discourses of cultural difference and relativism to deflect from 
human rights criticism, the SED and the rest of the Eastern Bloc continued to invoke an 
ideological conception of historical development that had little intellectual purchase in the rest of 
the world. Once socialist solidarity on the matter of human rights fell apart with the acceptance 
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of the rule of law and the introduction of some limited “bourgeois” political and civil rights by 
other socialist countries, the basis for the SED’s claims collapsed with it. 
 The capacity of the GDR-Committee for Human Rights and other elites to reconcile 
reality with theory also began to falter in the 1980s. Growing economic problems were 
undercutting claims to modest egalitarian prosperity as the great benefit of socialism and the 
explosion of demand to exit the GDR shook the faith of loyal intellectuals who could now see 
that reform was necessary if the cause of socialist was to survive. As a human rights movement 
emerged from the independent peace movement, groups like the Initiative for Peace and Human 
Rights translated the hegemonic discourse of the SED into a new vernacular of democratic 
socialism further undermining the resolve of wavering elites. From the perspective of the East 
German people, there was a steady collapse in legitimacy for the regime as the population with 
strong connections to the ideals of antifascism declined and the economic benefits of accepting 
the “welfare dictatorship” system of the SED became more and more paltry. Once joining the 
human rights movement and the demonstrations in the street seemed more likely to help 
individuals realize their interests, the population shifted in huge numbers from apathy to revolt. 
The dissident movement created a discourse of opposition that was broad and inclusive enough 
to allow for the integration of a broad coalition with diverse interests and goals as East Germans 
abandoned the system and took to the streets in protest. 
 The collapse of socialist human rights in the GDR and the rapid transformation of human 
rights discourse towards democracy were the product of complex changes in the international 
community, the social dynamics of the GDR and the capacity of the SED to project an image of 
legitimacy rooted in history and economic achievement. While Louis Henkin may be correct in 
the claim that “human rights is the idea of our time, the only political moral idea that has 
received universal acceptance,” but this does not mean that all who have adopted this language 
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agree on what it will mean in practice.15 The initial spread of the vocabulary of human rights 
alone did little to spur on democratization in the GDR and actually helped to reinforce the SED 
dictatorship for many years. There was no innate revolutionary and democratic reaction to 
hearing such rhetoric from a dictatorship. Human rights have been codified through international 
treaties and turned into law through numerous constitutions around the world, yet it remains a 
highly malleable discourse capable of integration into a diverse array of social, economic and 
political arrangements rather than just serving as the ideological root of western liberal 
democracy. 
The example of the GDR does not show how human rights were “invented,” but rather it 
shows the extremes to which they can be reinvented and re-imagined and shows that there is not 
a straight line from awareness of human rights to western liberal democracy. The discourse and 
politics of human rights in the GDR are not an isolated case of a state cynically and illegitimately 
co-opting such rhetoric in the face of blatant violations. Just as the stark contrast between the 
contents of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the continued oppression of 
women and non-whites in France (and the colonies) did not fatally undermine the authority of 
these documents, so the leaders of GDR could be both hypocritical and sincere.16 Similarly, the 
American Declaration of Independence with its claims of “self-evident” human equality 
comfortably coexisted with slavery and institutionalized white male supremacy, and is still held 
up as a major human achievement for the cause of human rights.17  
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In the modern period, this ‘sincere hypocrisy’ was equally commonplace and not just a 
feature of specifically East German statecraft. While South Africa did eventually abstain in the 
vote on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Prime Minister Jan Smuts demanded the 
inclusion of human rights in the UN Charter in spite of his country’s system of racial 
subjugation.18 Although today it is incomprehensible that a socialist dictatorship could be 
imagined as a champion of human rights, it is somehow unproblematic that Jim Crow America 
would endorse human rights treaties or that the British and French delegates at the UN could 
have supported such notions while their empires denied these rights to millions. In the post-
colonial world, anti-imperialist leaders who dismantled direct European control under the banner 
of human rights often created their own systems of oppression in its place.19 Tanzania’s Julius 
Nyerere championed human rights as part of his plans for African Socialism, but in power he 
also relied on autocratic measures including “signing a few death warrants, detaining people in 
custody without trial and deporting citizens of Tanzania from one part of the country to 
another.”20 In spite of this, Nyerere eventually guided the country through the transition to a 
multi-party democracy.   
Such complicated and seemingly contradictory scenarios have not concluded with the 
Cold War. While preaching human rights to the world, the United States has engaged in 
unrestricted mass surveillance and torture as part of the war on terror – supposedly two of the 
greats sins of communist dictatorships that had distinguished the tyranny of the East from the 
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freedom of the west. One American politician even favourably compared border fortifications at 
the US-Mexican border with those of the Berlin Wall, adding to the horrible irony.21 
Dictatorships have continued to adopt the language of human rights to legitimize rule and deflect 
criticism. Since the 1990s, North Korea has developed a robust conception of human rights as an 
element of its Juche ideology that stands in opposition to the “imperialist” human rights of the 
west.22 In a familiar parallel to the East German example, the Iranian state has created the 
Islamic Human Rights Commission to investigate and campaign against human rights abuses 
abroad while it is restricted from, and uninterested in, commenting on domestic issues.23  
The German Democratic Republic was not the only country to embrace human rights 
while violating them and this contradiction is intrinsic to the very problem of human rights in all 
places. As Upendra Baxi has argued, “all nations and peoples come to human rights as equal 
strangers.”24 In applying an abstract set of universalistic principles to a diverse population, 
instances of hypocrisy, exclusion, and double standards, will inevitably develop. The narrative 
history of human rights is not a matter of whether a system deviates from human rights norms 
but how it seeks to resolve the tensions between ideals and complex social institutions that are 
meant to carry them out. In the GDR, state institutions were designed to maintain those very 
contradictions and to suppress those who would seek to resolve them. The revolution of 1989 did 
not bring about the total realization of human rights, but given the diversity of conceptions of 
human rights amongst the protestors, that was never a possibility. Reunification did not realize a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 John McCain (Senator from Arizona, Republican), quoted in Todd Miller, “War on the Border,” New York Times 
(17 Aug 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/opinion/ sunday /war-on-the-border.html. 
22 Jiyoung Song, Human Rights Discourse in North Korea: Post-Colonial, Marxist and Confucian Perspectives 
(New York: Taylor & Francis, 2010). 
23 Reza Afshari, Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2011), 279–81. 
24 Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (New Delhi: Oxford University Press India, 2012), 46. 
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utopia of human rights, but it did create the basic structures necessary for citizens to call 
attention to these sites of conflict and fight to overcome them.  
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